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CONTENTS

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Page 228. line 17. *for* "1780" *read* "1680."

LIVES

OF

EMINENT BRITISH MILITARY COMMANDERS.

JOHN DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH

(CONTINUED).

While he was thus reaping the reward of his eminent public services, and, amid the approbation of his countrymen, paving the way for still greater successes, an event befell which plunged the duke of Marlborough into the deepest distress, and of which the recollection served in a great measure to cast a shade over all his future fortunes. Of the six children who had been born to him, one son, a promising youth of seventeen years of age, with four daughters *, survived: the former, who bore the title of marquess of Blandford, was seized with the small-pox, and, in spite of every care on the part of his physicians, died. It was a severe blow both upon the duke and the duchess; so severe, indeed, as seriously to affect their happiness: nor could the advantageous matches contracted by the sisters of the young nobleman in any degree compensate for his loss. The truth indeed is, that Marlborough, like other great men, was ambitious of perpetuating his name and honours in

* Of the marriages of the two eldest of these an account has been given elsewhere. The third, lady Elizabeth, was united, in her seventeenth year, to Scroope Egerton, earl of Bridgewater; and the youngest of all, Lady Mary, gave her hand to viscount Monthermer, the eldest son of Ralph, earl, and afterwards duke, of Montagu.

the male line. The death of the amiable and accomplished heir of his title naturally interfered with this wish, and brought with it more than the common pang of a bereaved parent: for though he clung long and fondly to the hope that another son might yet be born to him, it was mixed up throughout, as it might well be, with apprehensions of the contrary. Nor were these fears groundless. With himself the family name became extinct; nor was it revived till the noble house of Spencer chose voluntarily to adopt it as an appendage to their own

While England was thus mustering her strength for a renewal of the contest, events befell elsewhere, all of them tending, in a greater or less degree, to determine the probability of success. Among the favourable occurrences may be enumerated the adhesion of Portugal to the league, and her proposal, in case the allies would support her with troops and money, to march 28,000 men across the Spanish border. In like manner the revolt of the protestants in the Cevennes, whom the intolerance of the French government had goaded into rebellion, promised materially to affect the issues of the approaching campaign. Yet, important as these advantages might be, they were fully overbalanced by the turn which affairs had assumed in other quarters. In the first place, the elector of Bavaria, after amusing the confederates with professions, took possession of Ulm by surprise; and finding himself in communication with the armies on the Upper Rhine, declared openly in favour of France. To assist his endeavours, marshal Villars, on the 14th of October, had advanced as far as Friedlingen, where he defeated the margrave of Baden in a great battle, and opened out the passes to the Black Forest. Almost at the same moment Tallard, sweeping the Rhine and the Moselle, reduced the strongholds of Treves and Traerbach; till the Germans, instead of profiting by their successes at Landau, were pressed back into an exposed position behind the lines of Stolhoffen. In Italy, too, the campaign of 1702 was far from terminating advantageously to the cause of the league.

Prince Eugene not only failed in an attempt to carry Cremona, but was foiled in his still more important design of establishing himself beyond the Po; and eventually compelled, after losing Luzzara and Guastalla, to confine himself to the narrow and exhausted tract of country between the Po and the Secchia. With the solitary exception of the operations in Flanders, therefore, no movements on the part of the allies had been attended with success; and the preparations which the Bourbons made during the season of repose, threatened to rob them, in the approaching campaign, even of the acquisitions which the skill of their great leader had secured.

On the 17th of March, 1703, Marlborough reached the Hague, at a moment when the movements of the enemy's columns announced the developement of a design pregnant with gigantic issues. On one hand, marshal Villeroi, drawing his detachments to a point, threatened the forts on the Meuse, and menaced the Dutch frontiers. In another quarter, marshal Villars, who, during the winter months had beaten up the quarters of the imperialists, and reduced Kehl, divided his army into two corps; one of which, under Tallard, watched the prince of Baden at Stolhoffen, while the other, led on by himself, penetrated through the Black Forest into Bavaria. At the same time the elector, after driving the Austrians from the Inn and the Danube, and making himself master of Neuburg and Ratisbon, defiled towards the mountains which border his own country on the west, and effected a junction with Villars on the 12th of May at Dutlingen. Meanwhile, the greatest alarm, accompanied by the most unaccountable supineness, prevailed in Holland: Saarbruck and the earl of Athlone were both dead, and their places inadequately supplied by generals Overkirk, Opdam, and Slangenberg; of whom the first was chilled by age, the second naturally incompetent, and the third a man of talent certainly, but untractable and overbearing. Nevertheless, Marlborough was far from regarding matters as desperate. After in-

specting the condition of the troops in Dutch Brabant, he hurried back to his own proper province; and, in spite of the numerous obstacles opposed by Dutch timidity and German sloth, took the field so as to anticipate the favourite project of the enemy.

Had the plan proposed by the English general been adopted, French Flanders and Brabant would have become at once the seat of war; but to a measure so bold the states would by no means consent. They had set their hearts upon the reduction of Bonn; and to gratify them, Marlborough gave up with a good grace his own well-matured opinions. By the middle of April, after leaving an adequate force to cover Liege, he was in full march towards the point of attack; on the 3d of May the trenches were opened, and on the 15th the place was surrendered by capitulation. All this occurred ere Villeroi could well believe that the allies were in a condition to act even upon the defensive. But no sooner was he made fully aware of his error, than he hastened to retrieve it, by pressing vigorously upon Overkirk and the corps which protected Liege. Marlborough, however, was not slow in coming to the assistance of his colleague. Without so much as waiting to receive the submission of the governor of Bonn, he contented himself with signing the convention, and hurried back to Maestricht, at a convent in the vicinity of which he fixed, on the 17th, his head-quarters.

Having thus thwarted Villeroi in his designs upon the fortresses, Marlborough returned to his original plan of campaign, of which he now pressed the adoption with all earnestness possible. He was not opposed on the present occasion, as he had previously been, by arguments founded on false policy; but its execution was cruelly perplexed by the avarice or stupidity of those to whom it was necessarily in part committed. How this came about, will best be understood by taking a glance at the positions which were respectively occupied by the opposing armies, as well as by considering the purposes which the occupation of those positions was expected to serve.

The French, with the view of securing the provinces of East and West Flanders and South Brabant, had constructed two extensive chains of field-works, which stretched in one direction from Antwerp to the Mehaigne, in another from Antwerp to Ostend. While Villeroi availed himself of the former of these, both as a base of active operations and a place of retreat, the latter was maintained by two corps, one of which, under the marquis de Bedmar, occupied a camp close to Antwerp, while the other was stationed chiefly, under the count de la Motte, near Bruges. It was the great object of Marlborough to render both lines untenable, by the reduction first of Antwerp, and afterwards of Ostend. With this view, he instructed general Spaar, who was advanced as far as Hulst, to hold La Motte in check, by frequent demonstrations. Cohorn, again, who had established himself on the east of the Scheld, was to communicate between Spaar and Bergen-op-Zoom; whilst Opdam, advancing from the latter place, should endeavour to surprise Antwerp, or, at all events, penetrate the lines, and maintain himself till supported. Meanwhile Marlborough undertook to keep Villeroi in play, by feigning an assault upon his position; till, having gained a march or two, he might find an opportunity of piercing the lines somewhere between Antwerp and Lierre. Thus would a junction be formed with the Dutch army at the very moment when that of the enemy became separated, and Antwerp falling, as fall it must, Ostend would become the next point of attack.

Had these instructions been rigidly obeyed, there cannot be a doubt that, widely extended as the line of operations was, a series of brilliant victories would have followed; but they were not rigidly obeyed. While Marlborough by a variety of skilful manœuvres passed the Yaar unperceived, and pushed his immediate opponents first upon Landen, and finally back as far as Diest, the generals at the head of the other corps not only failed to act up to the orders issued, but positively and glaringly infringed upon them. Cohorn, in particular, impelled

either by jealousy, or, as has with equal plausibility been conjectured, by the hope of plunder, left Opdam to shift for himself; and joining Spaar, led the combined corps directly against La Motte. Some little success he doubtless obtained; that is to say, he drove in the enemy's outposts, and penetrated to their more advanced works; but these were far from compensating for the hazards to which Opdam became in the mean time exposed. That officer advanced as he had been instructed; but he did so without support, and having lost all touch to the right, became absolutely isolated in his position at Ekeren.

Marlborough received intelligence of these unhappy blunders, not indeed in sufficient time to restore things to their former order, but early enough to permit his sending instructions to Opdam, that he should provide as he best could for his own safety. And high time it was that some such step should be taken; for the enemy, whose intelligence was excellent, were soon aware of the breach in the allied lines, and made haste to turn it to account. While Bedmar remained immovable, leaving De la Motte to his fate, Boufflers, at the head of 20,000 men, was detached from Diest; and hastened with rapid strides to co-operate in an attack upon the corps thus exposed to hazard. It was to no purpose that Marlborough strained every nerve to pass Villeroi and to support Opdam. Ere the former measure could be effected, Opdam had permitted himself to be surprised, and, escaping almost unattended from the field, left his corps to fight or flee, according to the humour of the men themselves. It was fortunate, in such a juncture, that general Slangenberg, the next in command, possessed a greater share both of courage and conduct than his chief. He put himself hastily at the head of the columns; attacked and recovered several passes in the rear, of which the enemy had possessed themselves; and, retiring in good order, disputed every inch of ground with his pursuers. The result was, that, in the numbers of killed and wounded, neither party could boast of much superiority over its rival; and that the single fruit of victory

gathered by the French was the temporary derangement of a plan concerted with singular skill, and laid down with extraordinary clearness.

Chagrined, but not disheartened, at this untoward event, Marlborough so far yielded to his fate as to determine now upon trusting all to a direct attack on the enemy's position. With this view he moved his army to Thielen, and establishing it there, repaired himself to Breda, for the purpose of concerting arrangements with the deputies of the states. He proceeded next to Bergen-op-Zoom, where he saw and held a conference with Cohorn, and communicated his own sentiments to Slangenberg; but he soon became convinced that with such men no business could be done, because no reliance could be placed either on their temper or their promises. On the one hand, Slangenberg, elated by his recent good fortune, affected to treat every proposition which emanated from other sources, with disdain. He disputed the justice of Marlborough's representations, and ventured to accuse the duke himself of having wilfully, and through the basest motives, exposed the Dutch troops to certain defeat; while of Cohorn he never spoke except in language the most contemptuous. Cohorn, on the other hand, entertained so rooted a dislike for Slangenberg, that he positively refused to serve, unless the latter were removed; and as such a proposition could not under any circumstances be admitted, he gave up his command and quitted the army.

To this point affairs had come, when the reported junction of Boufflers with Villeroi, and the advance of both, strengthened by a portion of Bedmar's corps, upon Sandhofen, recalled Marlborough to his own camp. He broke up from Thielen, and, apprehensive for his communications, which were threatened on the right, moved briskly to Vorstelar. A corresponding movement on the part of the enemy followed: they established themselves at St. Loo; and, beginning to entrench, Marlborough was again elated with the prospect of bringing them to action. But just as he arrived on the great heath of Antwerp,

making signals for Slangenberg to join him from Lillo, a dense smoke rising in the direction of the enemy's camp attracted his notice; and it was found, on sending forward a reconnoitring party, that they had retreated, and were behind their lines. Upon these no arguments which Marlborough could employ would induce the Dutch generals to hazard an assault. After a short delay, therefore, and a reconnoisance pushed as far as the outer entrenchments, he abandoned his mighty project, and with a heavy heart began to retrace his steps to his old position on the banks of the Meuse.

On the 15th of August the allied army pitched its camp at Val Notre-Dame, Villeroi moving in a parallel direction behind his lines, and establishing himself at Wasseige. On the 16th, a corps was detached for the attack of Huy, which surrendered soon after the batteries began to play. Hoping that his colleagues might be emboldened by this success, Marlborough once more urged upon them the propriety of storming the enemy's lines; but his arguments were again met by expressions of despondency and mistrust. It was now that, with undisguised reluctance, he applied himself to the reduction of Limburg and Guelder, both of which opened their gates ere the close of September; thus leaving the Dutch secure from all hostile visits, except on the side of Brabant alone. No doubt these were very valuable acquisitions. They completed the conquest of the provinces of Cologne and Liege, and relieved the states from the dread which had so long held them in suspense: while they paved the way in future campaigns for enterprises still more extensive and important. Nevertheless the result of the struggle fell so far short of what the general had anticipated, that he seems to have regarded the summer of 1703 as, in a military point of view, sadly misused. He accordingly disposed his troops in winter quarters, under the command of his brother, general Churchill, and set out on the 30th of October for the Hague.

Marlborough was accompanied in his present journey

by the archduke Charles of Austria, who had recently been proclaimed king of Spain in his brother's capital of Vienna. This prince, captivated by the reputation which our great commander had acquired, visited him while distributing his army in their cantonments; and besides addressing to him compliments in the highest degree gratifying, presented him with a diamond-hilted sword of great value. He entered with him, likewise, much at length, into the actual state of affairs and their probable results. He consulted him as to the measures which it behoved himself to adopt, both as to the establishment of his claim on the Spanish crown and the conciliation of the people; and he freely submitted to his judgment every arrangement relating both to his own conduct and the selection of the officers whom it would be judicious to entrust with command. Marlborough delivered his opinions on these points with the freedom which became his high talents, and the modesty which was natural to him; whilst Charles received, or affected to receive, his admonitions as a son receives the advices of a parent They accordingly journeyed together in the best humour possible, and when Charles soon afterwards visited England, Marlborough was the individual selected to introduce him at the court of St. James's.

It is not to be imagined that the cares of conducting his army, mighty as in Marlborough's case these unquestionably were, constituted the only or perhaps the chief sources of uneasiness to which that great man was subject. There was not a political movement at home, nor an intrigue or a cabal among the powers abroad, in which he was not, by some means or other, made a party. Thus, during the progress of the campaign which has just been described, the duke of Savoy exhibited symptoms of a desire to break with the king of France, and give in his adherence to the terms of the grand alliance. To Marlborough was committed the delicate task of reconciling the pretensions of that prince as well with the pride of the emperor as with the selfish policy of the

maritime powers; and even Marlborough might have failed in bringing the negotiation to a happy issue, but for the precipitancy of Louis in disarming the Piedmontese contingent. In like manner, the important struggle which was carried on between the tories and whigs gave to Marlborough incessant uneasiness. Disposed from personal feeling to support the former, and aware that the inclinations of the queen corresponded with his own, he found himself thwarted in all his endeavours, not only by the strength of a numerous and well-organised opposition, but by the irresolution and inconsistency of the very men who professed to hold opinions congenial with his own. Lord Godolphin, though advanced principally by Marlborough's influence to the office which he held, yielded at last so completely to popular clamour, as to write seriously of resigning; whilst the duchess, a strenuous supporter of the whigs, urged her husband with the most pressing arguments to cast himself loose from the tories altogether, and coalesce with the opposite faction. Now, had the proceedings of these different parties gone no farther than their correspondence, it would have been irksome enough for a man circumstanced as Marlborough was to have his leisure moments occupied by the perusal of angry or expostulatory letters; but when it is further considered that the wheels of government were completely clogged, that supplies were either totally withheld, or furnished in a very inadequate degree, and that distrust and suspicion were thus engendered in the minds of the allies, some notion may be formed of the real comforts of that situation which Marlborough was called upon to fill. The truth, indeed, is, that even his patience, exhaustless as it appeared to be, ceased at length to hold out; and he returned to England with the avowed determination of resigning his command, and retiring into private life.

It is not our province to describe in detail the many political feuds to which, in the present stage of his career, the duke of Marlborough was made a party.

Enough is done when we state, that after spending the winter in the very whirlpool of faction and debate, he saw abundant cause, as spring approached, for relinquishing the determination which he had formed, and prepared to return, with zeal unabated, to the scene of his past glories on the Continent. Nor was there, at any stage of the war, greater need of the commanding genius of this extraordinary man. In spite of the accession of Portugal and the defection of Savoy from the Bourbons, the latter, so far from relaxing in their endeavours, seemed to increase them fourfold. To this they were encouraged, as well by the command which they themselves held of the passages of the Rhine and the defiles of the Black Forest, as by the successful insurrection of prince Ragotski in Hungary; who, after compelling the imperial general Schlick to retreat upon Presburg, levied contributions in Moravia and Silesia, and spread alarm to the very gates of Vienna. The elector of Bavaria, too, had not been wanting in exertions, to which fortune, on almost all occasions, proved kind. Master of Ratisbon, Kempten, Kaufleuren, and Gravenbach, which commanded the country between the Iller and the Inn, in possession of Augsburg, which afforded a passage over the Lech, and occupying Ulm with a strong garrison, he besieged and carried Passau and Lintz, the keys of Upper Austria, and was prevented from reducing Nordlingen and Nuremberg only by the approach of winter. He thus held the course of the Danube from its fountain-head to the frontier of Austria; established a communication with the French armies on the Rhine and the rebels in Hungary; and by these advantages, joined to his central position, was enabled to overawe the provinces of the empire, and to penetrate, almost without obstruction, to Vienna itself. His field force, again, consisted of 45,000 men, with which he occupied cantonments in the vicinity of Ulm, waiting till he should be strengthened, in early spring, by a French corps, which was ready to proceed, so soon as the state of the roads would

permit, through the rugged country bordering the sources of the Danube.

While such was the state of affairs in this quarter, and Villeroi continued strong in the Netherlands, Tallard, with 45,000 veteran troops, invaded Suabia and Franconia, from his position on the Upper Rhine. The Tyrol was threatened from Italy; the duke of Savoy was sorely pressed; and the whole country between the frontier of Dauphiné and the Trentine Alps seemed on the eve of subjugation. Meanwhile, the best exertions of the court of Vienna had failed to infuse either vigour or daring into the sluggish confederacy of which the empire was made up. Twenty thousand regular troops, encamped behind the lines of Stolhoffen, and commanded by the margrave of Baden, were all that the emperor could oppose to the elector of Bavaria. To bands of militia and armed peasantry, feebly supported by a few battalions under general Stirum, the important passes of the Black Forest were entrusted; while a body of Dutch troops, amounting to less than 7000 men, covered Wirtemberg from their quarters at Rothweil; and a few Hessians and Prussians watched the Rhine below Philipsburg. Such was the exposed condition of the empire in the beginning of 1704; and as Marlborough well knew that the downfall of that power would leave France without a rival on the Continent, he determined to sacrifice his own feelings to the public good, and make a great and decisive effort to save the liberties of Europe.

For some time previous, Marlborough had meditated a scheme, of which he communicated the perfect outlines to prince Eugene alone.* Even Godolphin, though usually in his confidence, was, on the present occasion, consulted only so far as appeared necessary for the due supply of resources; while the sanction neither of the queen nor of the cabinet was solicited, that being left to follow should the result prove fortunate. The scheme

* With this officer, whose name stood deservedly high, he had entered into a close and intimate correspondence during the last campaign, and he renewed it with daily increasing confidence, as he saw the crisis approaching.

in question embraced nothing less than a complete change of the theatre of war, by a separation from the allied and the Dutch contingents, and the march of his own army into Germany. Now, there were many and serious obstacles opposed to this measure, from the bare contemplation of which most men would have shrunk. In the first place, it would be necessary to obtain the consent of the states, a matter only to be accomplished by the exercise of consummate address; in the next place, the protection of Holland and Flanders must be committed to the Dutch troops alone; and last, though not least, a strong hostile army, supported by numerous fortresses, must be left to act upon the communications and block up the rear of the corps engaged in this distant expedition. On calculating all the chances, however, it appeared to Marlborough that, provided he should succeed in masking his design at the commencement, success was at least more probable than failure. He was satisfied, moreover, that nothing short of success could prevent the ruin of Austria and the subsequent dissolution of the league; and he regarded that object as an end towards the attainment of which every imaginable hazard ought to be run. Having therefore availed himself of the circumstances of Portugal and Savoy to obtain both subsidies from the parliament, and an augmentation of 10,000 men to the army in the Netherlands, he set sail on the 15th of January for the Hague, where, on the 19th, he arrived, and proceeded instantly to concert measures with the pensionary and the states-general.

Maintaining the same cautious silence here which he had preserved at home, he succeeded, after a good deal of opposition, in wringing from the states a reluctant consent to what was represented and believed to be a partial change of system. It was agreed, for example, that Marlborough, with the British troops and part of the foreign auxiliaries, should open a campaign upon the Moselle; while Overkirk, with the Dutch and the rest of the auxiliaries, should act defensively in the Nether-

lands. At the same time the states were prevailed upon to advance subsidies for the maintenance of the corps acting under the princes Louis of Baden and Eugene, as well as to take into their pay 4000 Wirtemberg troops, in the room of certain detachments sent off to Portugal. The duke of Savoy, likewise, was encouraged to hold out, both by pecuniary remittances and assurances of speedy support; the elector palatine was amused with promises; and the king of Prussia cajoled by a show of confidence, both to open a negotiation with the elector of Bavaria, and to increase the amount of his own contingent. In a word, every precautionary measure was adopted which appeared in any degree calculated at once to divert public attention from the important blow about to be struck, and to render it, when it did fall, irresistible and decisive.

In conducting these negotiations, Marlborough spent the interval between the 19th of January and the 21st of February; he then reimbarked for England, where affairs scarcely less urgent or less complicated demanded his attention. The discontented state of Scotland, joined to the differences which prevailed in the cabinet itself relative to the bill of occasional conformity, had by this time induced Nottingham to bring matters to a crisis, by requiring the immediate dismissal of Somerset and Devonshire as the price of his own continuance in office. Serious alarm was entertained both by Godolphin and Marlborough, that her majesty, whose partiality to Nottingham was well known, might yield to this demand; but Anne, though strong in her personal predilections, was a princess of high spirit, and sensitively alive to insult. Instead of entering into any discussion with the minister who had thus trampled upon her dignity, she threw herself at once into the arms of his opponents; and, accepting his resignation, transferred her whole confidence to the party of which Marlborough was at the head. No delay was exhibited by Marlborough and Godolphin in turning this act of their mistress to account. Shaking themselves entirely free from the high tory

faction, they at the same time studiously avoided even the appearance of coalition with the whigs, and formed an administration devoted, as was believed, to their own views, by advancing Harley to the office which Nottingham had quitted, and creating Henry St. John secretary at war.

These important arrangements were yet incomplete, when, on the 19th of April, Marlborough embarked at Harwich, accompanied by his brother general Churchill, the earl of Orkney, lord Cutts, and other officers of distinction. He reached the Hague on the 21st, and devoted nearly a month to the removal of numerous difficulties which still encumbered his designs. Among other happy measures, he contrived to rid himself of the presence of the field-deputies, by making from the states no demand except for the auxiliary troops; and he blinded both them and the margrave of Baden, by affecting to approve of a plan which the latter sent in for the campaign on the Moselle. All these points were adjusted while he yet sojourned at the Hague. On the 5th of May we find him at Utrecht, on the 10th at Maestricht, and on the 18th in presence of his assembled army at Bedburg. He reviewed his troops here, which amounted in all to fifty-one battalions and ninety-two squadrons; and having previously instructed the Prussians, Lunenburgers, and Hessians from the Rhine, as well as eleven Dutch battalions at Rothweil, where to join, he began, on the morning of the 20th, his eventful and well-disguised march.

Our limits will not permit us to follow, stage by stage, the daring and skilful movement which carried the allied army, in the course of ten days, from Bedburg to Mentz. We must content ourselves, therefore, with stating, that neither the fears of Overkirk, excited by Villeroi's passa·e of the Meuse, nor intelligence that Tallard had crossed the Rhine, detained the duke of Marlborough more than a few hours, or diverted him from his purpose. He still kept his eye steadily fixed upon the relief of Austria; and still, by the excellence of his ar-

rangements, led both friends and foes to imagine, that Bonn was to form the base of his ultimate operations. Thus, while the French were marching columns at one moment towards the Moselle, and another in the direction of Alsace, the roads leading to the Danube were left unguarded; and every facility of communication between prince Eugene, the margrave, and Marlborough was happily obtained and secured.

From Mentz, after a halt of some days, during which he gradually opened out his designs to the heads of the allied corps, Marlborough took the direction of Ladenburg. Here he crossed the Neckar by bridges which he had ordered previously to be constructed, and advancing as far as Erpingen, he despatched urgent instructions to the princes Louis and Eugene that they should watch the Rhine, so as to hinder the threatened passage of Villeroi and Tallard, whose armies were understood to be on the eve of forming a junction. Meanwhile, he himself pressed on to Gross Gartach, where he again traversed the Neckar, and arriving on the 10th at Mondelsheim, received there a visit, for the first time, from Eugene and count Wratislaw. They remained with him three days, before the expiration of which prince Louis likewise came in; when all the arrangements necessary to their future operations were definitively settled. It was determined that Eugene should observe the Rhine, his own corps being reinforced by the addition of the Danish division; while Louis, who claimed the privilege by right of seniority, should act in union with Marlborough, the generals assuming the chief command each on alternate days.

On the 14th the columns were again in motion, the allied generals having departed to their respective commands; and the same evening Marlborough established his head-quarters at Ebersbach. Here he was compelled to halt during six entire days, in anxious expectation of the arrival of prince Louis, against whom the elector of Bavaria, after sending his baggage to Ulm, was reported to have made a movement across the Danube. Nor was

this the only unpleasant rumour which tended to harass a mind already supplied with more than adequate employment. Information arrived that Overkirk, after penetrating the enemy's lines near Wasseige, had been compelled, by the timidity of his colleagues, to fall back; that the states-general were in the utmost alarm, in consequence of the expected return of Villeroi to the Netherlands; that Villeroi and Tallard were actually in contact at Landau; and that some great enterprise was inevitable. These, it must be confessed, were rumours not calculated to raise the hopes of a general situated as Marlborough then was, with the long and rugged defile of Gieslingen between him and the only force to which he could look for co-operation or support. Nevertheless, they either did not or appeared not to discompose, in the slightest degree, the order of his thoughts. While, to satisfy the states, he issued instructions for the assembling of a flotilla of boats upon the Rhine, he busied himself in forming magazines at Heidelsheim and Nordlingen; after which he made ready to advance with his cavalry and lighter infantry to the assistance of prince Louis. On the 20th, however, more accurate intelligence arrived, that Louis was in full march upon Westerstetten: instantly the troops were ordered under arms, and the pass being cleared on the 21st, by noon on the 22d the long wished-for junction was effected between Launsheim and Ursprung.

While Marlborough was thus bringing to maturity his able and patiently-devised project, the elector of Bavaria, who had been reinforced, so early as the 19th of May, by a strong corps of French troops from Tallard's army, kept principally within his entrenched camp at Ulm. One or two movements he had indeed made, chiefly with a view to facilitate the approach of his allies; but these, besides that they were followed by no memorable results, gave little proof of energy or talent either on his side or on the side of the margrave of Baden, in whose presence they were effected. The case was widely different now. No sooner was the veil withdrawn, which, during so

protracted a period had concealed the object of Marlborough's movements, than the elector became greatly alarmed, and removed with all haste from Ulm, to a line still more defensible between Lawingen and Dillingen. The latter change of ground took place on the 24th of June, the very day when the allied generals arrived at Elchingen and Langenau; and Marlborough was, in consequence, enabled to pass without risk, on the 26th, as far to the eastward as Herbrechten. In this position he halted till the reserve of his infantry, under general Churchill, came up; and it was found, on reviewing the whole army, that it mustered 96 battalions, 202 squadrons, with a train of 48 pieces of cannon, and 24 pontoons.

The hostile armies were now within two leagues of one another; yet the movements made on both sides plainly indicated that a decisive battle, if fought at all, would not take place on the arena already occupied. On the one hand, the allies, filing to the right, exhibited a disposition to seize Donawerth, and to convert it into a *place d'armes*, preparatory to an invasion of Bavaria; on the other hand, the elector seemed willing to run the utmost hazards rather than witness the accomplishment of a design so formidable. A corps of 10,000 infantry, supported by 2500 cavalry, was accordingly despatched from his lines, with orders to fortify and hold to the last extremity the heights of Schellenberg; while messenger after messenger was sent out to hurry the advance of marshal Tallard, who from his quarters at Strasburg had promised to support the elector. Marlborough was not kept long in ignorance of these precautionary measures. Convinced that all now depended on celerity of movement, he passed the electoral camp in column of march, on the 1st of July, and halted that night within fourteen miles of the unfinished works on Schellenberg.

Though it was yet the height of summer, a succession of heavy rains had so broken up the roads, that not artillery and baggage only, but the infantry themselves, found it a hard matter to proceed. Multitudes of strag-

glers were continually left behind. Nevertheless, Marlborough perceived, that if he hoped to force the passage of the Danube at all, an attempt to do so must be made ere the enemy's entrenchments should be rendered perfect, and themselves reinforced by numbers superior to his own. Under these circumstances, he selected 130 men from each battalion, amounting in all to 6000 infantry; added to them thirty squadrons of choice cavalry, and three regiments of imperial guards, and putting himself at their head, set out, at three o'clock in the morning of the 20th, with the avowed intention of storming the heights. The rest of the army being entrusted to the guidance of prince Louis, received instructions to follow with all convenient speed, and to act, as each brigade should arrive, according to the circumstances in which those preceding it might stand. Such were the orders issued by the British general, on whom the chief command had devolved; and these orders all ranks, from the margrave down to the private sentinel, prepared cheerfully and zealously to obey.

At the appointed hour, Marlborough with his select corps set forward. About nine o'clock the advanced guard, consisting wholly of cavalry, arrived within cannon shot of the enemy's position, which the general proceeded immediately to reconnoitre, and which he found, though as yet imperfectly fortified, and in many parts open, to be upon the whole exceedingly formidable. The Bavarians were posted on the summit and along the sides of the Schellenberg; a hill which rises gradually to the height of several hundred feet, and overhangs Donawerth, on the left bank of the Danube. This post, naturally commanding, they had strengthened by a chain of works, which extended from the covered way of Donawerth on the left, included an old fort on the brow of the hill, and swept round, embracing the whole of the summit, to the very bank of the river. In front of the position, to the right and left, the ground was every where open, being broken by a ravine on the side of Donawerth, and crossed by a rivulet; but immediately

before the centre stood the thick wood of Boschberg, stretching away from the very verge of the entrenchment, and expanding gradually in the direction of Monheim. Finally, the great road leading from Nordlingen through Donawerth to Augsburg passed to the west of the position, whilst several lines of tents on the opposite side of the river showed that ample support was at hand, in the event of the troops now in possession being overpowered by superior numbers.

Having ascertained all these particulars, and observed where the enemy's principal batteries were erected, Marlborough returned to his troops, whom he had ordered to halt, for the purpose of refreshment, and to permit the stragglers and weary to join. Sufficient time having been afforded for the accomplishment of these ends, he made his dispositions for the attack, by throwing masses of infantry across the Wernitz into the wood; and arranging the cavalry as far as practicable under cover, yet sufficiently near to support their dismounted comrades. Beyond the village of Berg, to which the enemy had set fire, a battery was planted, which soon opened with effect; while a reserve of eight battalions was disposed so as to prolong the line to the right, in case the assaulting column should fail to embrace a sufficient extent of the enemy's works.

For some time general d'Arco, who commanded the united Bavarian and French forces, was deceived into a belief that he saw before him only a reconnoitering party of horse, and that no serious attempt to molest him would be made before the morrow. Under this persuasion, he would not permit his troops to intermit their labour on the entrenchments; but when the heads of columns began to debouch, and the allied artillery opened, the delusion, if such it may be called, was dispelled. After a few moments of apparent irresolution, he ordered his people to their arms; his guns replied to those of Marlborough with great alacrity; and as the hostile lines approached one another, the conflict began in earnest. Nothing could exceed the gallantry of the

English, or the cool and collected deportment of their leader. Though mowed down by grape, and repeatedly driven back to the verge of the ditch, they returned on each occasion with fresh vigour, and continued the assault in spite of the loss of almost all the principal officers, besides a fearful carnage among the men. At last the cavalry, led on in the most brilliant style by general Lumley, rushed forward to support the infantry. They rode within a short space of the works, then threw themselves from their horses, and pressed forward sword in hand; yet it is doubtful whether even their devotion would have availed, had not timely aid arrived at this juncture. Prince Louis, who had followed with the main body of the army, approached the scene of conflict. He passed the Wernitz below Berg, drew up under the walls of Donawerth, and penetrating by an unfinished angle of the works between the castle and the town, interrupted the enemy's communications, by turning their position to the left. The effect of this movement was instantly felt in the quarter where the British fought. The resistance of the enemy gradually abating, the assailants rushed on with double resolution, and in a few moments were in full possession of the entrenchments, which had been so long and so obstinately defended. The rout was now as complete as the carnage attendant upon it was dreadful. The bridge by which the fugitives endeavoured to escape across the Danube broke down under their weight; so that out of the whole number engaged, amounting in all to 13,000 or 14,000 men, scarcely 3000 rejoined the army of the elector.

Marlborough received, as he deserved, the highest encomiums for the promptitude with which he entered upon this battle, and the steadiness and perseverance with which he brought it to a successful termination. His loss was indeed severe; for, in addition to the fall of many officers of rank and merit, his casualties amounted to 1500 killed, and 4000 wounded; yet when the advantages resulting from the victory are considered, even at this cost, it must be admitted to have been

cheaply purchased. Had he hesitated, or delayed his attack for twenty-four hours, not only would the lines have been rendered ten times more formidable, but the arrival of a strong reinforcement would have placed the passage of the Danube beyond his reach, and thus defeated the main end of all his previous movements. Victory, on the other hand, laid open the rich and hitherto uninjured plains of Bavaria to his foragers; it disconcerted all the arrangements of the enemy; gave fresh courage to his own troops, as well as to his allies, and furnished him with an excellent base for ulterior operations. With one drawback, however, it certainly was attended. The coldness which had all along subsisted between prince Louis and the British general, and to which the dissimilarity of their natural tempers gave rise, ripened into positive aversion. Nevertheless, this misfortune, if such it could be termed, was more than compensated to Marlborough by the applause both of friends and enemies. From the latter he received the highest compliment which a successful general can expect, by becoming to them an object both of dread and abhorrence; while the former, especially the emperor, openly spoke of him and addressed him as the preserver of Germany, and the greatest hero of his age.

The immediate consequence of this victory was the abandonment of Donawerth by the elector, after an abortive attempt to destroy the magazines, and his hasty retreat to Augsburg. He was induced to leave thus exposed the whole of his own territory, from an apprehension that if he endeavoured to cover even Munich, Marlborough might succeed in throwing himself upon the line of road by which Tallard was advancing, and, while he prevented a junction between the French and Bavarian armies, act against each with his whole force, and destroy them in detail. There cannot be a doubt that, so long as he looked to a determined continuance of the war, sound policy pointed to this mode of proceeding; yet it brought heavy calamities upon a country which for

the space of sixty years had not witnessed the presence of an enemy. Marlborough lost no time in repairing the bridge over the Danube; he laid his pontoons judiciously upon the Lech; and by the 7th was in possession of Neuburg, into which he threw a garrison of 3000 men. Thus were ample supplies of bread from the rich province of Franconia secured, while, extensive depôts being established at Donawerth, all risk of privation was averted.

The elector had left 400 men in the small but strong town of Rain, which standing upon the main road from the Lech, threatened seriously to incommode the allied communications. On the 13th, the place was invested by a detachment under the count de Frise, and on the 16th it surrendered. The army now began its progress into the interior; and halting on the 18th at Aicha, occupied Friedberg, within an easy march of Augsburg, Unfortunately, however, a train of battering cannon, for which Marlborough had repeatedly applied, and which the margrave had long ago promised to furnish, failed to arrive; and as without it any effort to obtain possession of Munich would have been futile, Marlborough resolved to try with the elector the effect of negotiation. But though his propositions were at first so well received as to excite hopes of an ultimate accommodation, they were suddenly broken off, ere any arrangements could be made; and Marlborough, in obedience to the barbarous system of warfare prevalent at the time, ravaged the whole of Bavaria up to the very gates of the capital.

Meanwhile marshal Tallard, to whom advices of the critical situation of the elector had been transmitted, broke up from his encampment on the Rhine, and, after a fruitless effort to reduce Villingen, forded the Danube at Mosskirk, and emerged into the plains between Ulm and Memmingen. Leaving Ulm to the north-west, he pushed rapidly upon Biberbach, where patrols from the Bavarian army met him; and his line being extended, the two corps became soon afterwards united. His march, however was neither unnoticed nor disregarded

by prince Eugene: that officer, apprehensive for the consequences, instantly moved in a parallel direction, and arrived with his corps of 18,000 men on the plains of Hochstadt, almost at the very moment when the French opened their first communications with the elector. Nevertheless, the chances were decidedly in favour of the enemy, had they known how to take advantage of them. Their position was central, commanding the string of the arc, at the extremities of which Marlborough and Eugene were posted; and it required but a prompt and bold movement to place them between the allies. Happily for the renown of our great commander, they allowed the fortunate moment to pass; and neither Marlborough nor Eugene were men likely to permit a moment of such hazard to return.

Equally unwilling to relinquish the fruits of past successes, and indisposed to sacrifice Eugene, Marlborough formed the daring resolution of marching by Aicha towards Neuburg: his camp was accordingly pitched at a place called Eknach, where he was met by prince Eugene; and a council of war being held, the chiefs came to the conclusion that neither should Eugene's corps be drawn absolutely into Bavaria, nor that of Marlborough carried across the Danube, till the designs of the enemy had become more perfectly developed. In the mean while, however, it was agreed that prince Louis should be detached with a sufficient force to undertake the siege of Ingolstadt, and that the ground between the Paar and the Lech should be occupied as a defensive position, in order to cover that operation, and protect the bridges at the confluence of the Lech and Danube. Such were the arrangements entered into on the 7th of August. On the 9th, the margrave took his departure, and on the same day Marlborough, alarmed by intelligence that the enemy were looking towards the Danube, moved upon Exheim. Here every doubt was removed as to the intentions of Tallard and the elector; for they were ascertained to be in full march upon Dillingen, from whence they could at any moment attack

and overwhelm the small force left on the plains of Hochstadt.

All now depended upon celerity of movement on the part of Marlborough, and a judicious disposition of his troops on that of Eugene. To have retreated towards the Rhine would have doubtless secured the safety of the latter; but then the bridges and depôts must be abandoned; and Marlborough, cut off from his supplies, would be left to maintain himself as he best could in a country every where hostile. Trusting, therefore, to the well known activity of his colleague, Eugene fell back no farther than the Kessel, in rear of which, having a range of difficult ground before him, he took post. In the mean time, Marlborough was making vigorous efforts to sustain him. At midnight on the 9th, a corps of twenty-eight squadrons, under the duke of Wirtemberg, set out from the camp, with orders to pass the pontoon bridge at Merxheim and unite with the prince's cavalry: two hours later, general Churchill, with twenty battalions and the whole of the artillery, followed by the same route; and by dawn on the 10th, the duke himself with the remainder of the army set forward. They encamped that night between Mittelstadt and Peuchingen, not far from Rain.

Marlborough had just thrown himself upon his bed, when an express arrived from Eugene, to announce that the enemy had crossed the Danube, and that the prince was in hourly expectation of being attacked. Another and another messenger followed, each bringing reports more and more urgent, that the line of the Kessel was indefensible, that the cavalry alone watched it, that the infantry were falling back upon Schellenberg, and that nothing short of an immediate junction could save the army of the Rhine from destruction. Instantly the troops were under arms, the baggage packed, and the tents struck; and ere midnight the whole were moving in two columns, one by the route of Merxheim and the pontoon bridge, the other across the Lech and Danube, upon Donawerth. At six the same evening the patrols from the several divisions fell in with Eugene's army,

and by ten o'clock at night the armies were united and in position, with their left upon the Danube, their right at Kessel-Ostheim, and the river Kessel covering their front. At an early hour on the morning of the 12th (the baggage having come up during the night), Marlborough and Eugene, who had determined on occupying a position in the vicinity of Hochstadt, pushed forward under the escort of the grand guards, to reconnoitre. They had proceeded as far as Schweningen, when they came suddenly in presence of some squadrons; and, in order to ascertain the exact force of the party, they mounted the tower of Dapfheim church. From that commanding station they beheld the staff of the enemy's army marking out an encampment at the distance of something less than three miles in their front. The ground was strong by nature, being every where elevated, rendered shaggy here and there with underwood, and protected by the defile of Dapfheim; it was advantageously covered, too, by the river Nebel, which, though narrow, is difficult of passage, in consequence of the muddiness of its channel and the marshy nature of its banks; whilst two or three water mills, as well as the villages of Blenheim, Oberglauh, and Lutzingen, offered admirable points of defence both to the flanks and the centre. It seemed, indeed, as if any effort to turn such a line must inevitably fail; for while the Danube swept along the right with a deep and broad stream, the left was scarcely less efficiently protected by precipitous ravines and impenetrable thickets. Nevertheless both Marlborough and Eugene determined upon an attack. As it seemed, moreover, to them that every moment's delay would serve to render a position, sufficiently formidable in itself, more and more secure, they resolved that the decisive step should be taken immediately; and they hurried back to the camp, to issue the necessary orders, and to superintend such preliminary measures as, under the circumstances of the case, appeared advisable.

The whole of the 12th was occupied in levelling certain inequalities of ground, in constructing bridges across the rivulets, and particularly in filling up a ravine

formed by the course of the Reichen, not far from the village of Dapfheim. A sharp skirmish, likewise, between the enemy's cavalry and the piquets and covering party which protected these operations, gave animation to the scene, and produced some excitement; but in other respects all seemed quiet, both in the allied camp and within the enemy's lines. The scene was widely different as soon as midnight passed. Then it was that Marlborough, who had solemnly received the sacrament from the hands of his chaplain, issued orders for the troops to muster, and in two hours afterwards the baggage being sent back to Reitlingen, the tents were left standing, and the allied army began its march.

The combined corps of Marlborough and Eugene, which was estimated as not exceeding 52,000 men, with fifty-two pieces of cannon, moved from their ground, and passed the Kessel in eight columns of attack. On the right were two divisions of infantry, supported by their guns, and followed by a like distribution of cavalry, which, amounting in all to eighteen battalions and seventy-four squadrons, acted under the orders of prince Eugene. To them the task was allotted of driving the enemy from Lutzingen, either by penetrating through the woods, or by direct assault; while at the same time they were instructed to threaten Overglauh, and occupy the attention of the corps drawn up between that post and the extreme left. In the mean time, while Marlborough, at the head of forty-eight battalions and eighty-six squadrons, prepared to move likewise in four columns, against the centre to the right; while the piquets, instead of joining their respective corps as they advanced, were instructed to compose a separate column, and after covering the march of the artillery along the great road, to storm the village of Blenheim. Such were the arrangements made over-night, in accordance with which the army broke up, as has just been described; Marlborough's corps being directed to form on the great road between Weilheim and Kremheim; while that of Eugene, passing along the skirts of the hills in rear of Wolperstetten,

Berghausen, and Schwenenbach, prolonged the line to the extremity of the valley as far as Eichberg.

From the postscript of a letter written by marshal Tallard on the morning of this memorable day, it is evident that no occurrence could have been less anticipated in the Gallo-Bavarian camp than an attack. Though the drums of the allies were distinctly heard beating the *générale* at 2 o'clock A. M., the idea of a grand movement seems not for one moment to have been entertained; indeed, the impression was, that Marlborough would retire upon Nordlingen, at the manifest hazard of losing all that he had risked so much to attain. No patrols therefore were sent out, nor was any other precautionary measure adopted; nay, the very cavalry were permitted to go forth at their usual hour, unharnessed and unarmed, to forage. Whence the notion of the retreat to Nordlingen arose, we are left at liberty to draw our own conclusions: we know only that some deserters passed over to the enemy's outposts on the evening of the 12th, with intelligence to that effect. It has been concluded from this, either that these men were themselves purposely misled, or that they purposely misled the enemy. But however this may be, it is very certain that both Tallard and the elector were completely deceived; and as the morning chanced to be unusually hazy, the allies were already close upon their patrols ere so much as a suspicion began to be entertained that a great battle was at hand.

It was about seven o'clock in the forenoon when the fog dispersed, and the heads of Eugene's columns became visible as they moved along the base of the heights in rear of Berghausen. The French and Bavarians stood promptly to their arms; signal guns were fired to recall the foragers; and marshals Tallard and Marsin, with the elector and the rest of the chiefs, mounting in all haste, galloped from station to station, and exerted themselves to range the several corps in battle array. As they were superior both in numbers and in the natural strength of the ground which they held, the

chances of success were decidedly in their favour; and had sufficient warning been given, it is far from improbable that the result of the action might have been different from what it was. But seldom has a great army, commanded by experienced leaders, and covered as this was by a chain of posts at due distances from the main body, been, in effect, more thoroughly surprised. No plan of defence appears to have been previously arranged; every thing was left to the impulse of the moment; and hence more than one vital error was committed, both in the distribution and wielding of the troops. Thus, taking it for granted that the Nebel was impassable from Oberglauh to the mills, the centre of the line was made to consist entirely of horse, the infantry being posted at each flank, with guns ranged here and there as a commanding eminence seemed to invite. As the assailants drew near, however, Tallard saw enough to satisfy him that Blenheim would be the main point of attack; he therefore crowded into it not fewer than twenty-eight battalions of infantry, besides twelve squadrons of dragoons, some of them dismounted. Most of the avenues leading to the village had already been palisadoed; he caused the remainder to be blocked up with wagons, carts, casks filled with stones and earth, boards, doors, shutters, and other encumbrances. A whole brigade lined the hedges to the left; the churchyard was strongly occupied, and every facility of communication from post to post was afforded by bridges thrown hastily over the Meulweyer. This done, he ordered several hamlets, with all the mills, of which the allies might, by possibility, avail themselves, to be set on fire; and, placing a division of *gendarmes à cheval* upon the extreme right, he instructed its leader to charge the English so soon as a certain number of the infantry should have passed the Nebel.

While he thus overloaded his right, and exposed his centre to insult, Tallard scarcely interfered at all with the arrangements which the elector and marshal Marsin saw fit to make for the support of the left. These, ex-

tending their cavalry, so as to communicate with Tallard's by the right, occupied Oberglauh with piquets of infantry; while thirty battalions, among which were the Irish brigade, formed a line in its rear. Cavalry succeeded next, interlaced here and there with infantry, and strongly supported by batteries of cannon; while on the left of the whole was a brigade of foot, partly extended among the underwood and broken ground, partly in close columns, and ready to move where most needed. There was a second line in rear of the first, near the ground on which the tents stood; but its order was little if at all different from that assumed by the front line.

The allied columns having reached their points of formation, began immediately to deploy, under a heavy fire from the enemy's cannon, to which their own, as occasion served, made answer. While this was going on, Marlborough with an eagle's eye surveyed and noted the defects in the enemy's arrangements. He saw that Blenheim and Oberglauh were both strong in themselves, but that they were too far removed either to support one another, or to sweep the intervening space with a destructive flanking fire. He observed that the Nebel was left almost entirely unguarded throughout this interval; for the cavalry were drawn up along the brow of the heights beyond, and scarce a gun could be brought to bear upon the bed of the stream itself. He was at no loss, under such circumstances, as to the course which it behoved him to adopt. The mass of his cavalry was so disposed as to pass the rivulet here, closely followed, however, and supported by a strong corps of infantry; whilst, at the same moment, a furious assault upon Blenheim would prevent any succour from being sent to the point threatened. Nothing, however, could be done till Eugene's fire should be heard on the right; and hence, after forming his lines, and causing an adequate supply of fascines to be prepared, he gave orders that the chaplains of the several battalions should perform divine service at the heads of their respective corps.

Noon had passed, when an aide-de-camp arrived from

prince Eugene, with information that he was ready to begin the attack. Marlborough chanced at the moment to be seated on the ground, eating with his personal staff and several generals of division a hasty meal. He sprang with the utmost alacrity into his saddle, and in a tone of voice which conveyed to all that heard him an assurance of victory, exclaimed, "Now, gentlemen, to your posts!" In five minutes from the utterance of that sentence the whole line was in motion, and in less than half an hour the battle raged with incredible fury from one end of the field to the other.

The village of Blenheim, threatened on three different sides by lord Cutts's division and the brigade of general Rowe, set every effort of its daring assailants at defiance. Secure behind their barricades and entrenchments, the garrison poured in a fire so murderous, that no courage could bear up against it; and the storming party, after reaching the very palisades, were driven back with the loss of almost all the superior officers and two thirds of the men. The French gendarmes, seeing this, rushed from their station on the right, and would have utterly destroyed the remnant, had not general Lumley despatched five squadrons to their support. These charged, broke, and dispersed the gendarmes, only to be themselves overthrown by superior numbers. But by this time a brigade of Hessian infantry had formed. They gave their fire with steadiness, and such terrible effect, that the enemy recoiled beneath it; and in the hurry of the flight, left behind them a number of prisoners, besides the colours of the corps which had led and suffered so much in the assault.

While this was going on, and squadron after squadron threatened Blenheim on the left, Marlborough ordered general Churchill with his division of infantry to pass the Nebel at Unterglauh; a village which, as it lay in front of the line of their position, the enemy had, with others, set on fire. The general easily possessed himself of a stone bridge, by which he traversed the rivulet, and marching between two rows of still burning cottages,

began to form on the opposite bank. Simultaneous with this movement was the advance of the main body of the cavalry, who, casting fascines and boards into the stream, rendered the bottom comparatively hard, and struggled through, though not without extreme difficulty, exposed all the while to an enfilading fire from the guns above Blenheim. They were as yet unformed, when the enemy's horse rushed down the steep, charged, broke, and drove them to the brink of the stream. Certain destruction must have overtaken them there, had not the infantry, by this time in good order, wheeled to the left, and checked the assailants by a fire of musketry, as close as it was well directed. By this means the fugitives were enabled to draw together, while a reserve of cavalry, passing the stream, rode furiously upon the French as they retired, and completed their overthrow. Repeated charges now took place, in which sometimes one party, sometimes the other, were successful; while the artillery on both sides kept up a murderous fire, and the carnage was dreadful.

Hitherto the sound of firing had not been heard beyond the distance of half a mile from Blenheim: the rapid and judicious advance of the allies upon Oberglauh and the heights near, occasioned a fearful extension of the tumult. Every inch of ground was, however, disputed with inconceivable obstinacy. A corps of eleven battalions, led on by the prince of Holstein-Beck, beginning to pass the stream above Oberglauh, was charged and very roughly handled by the Irish brigade. Its absolute dissolution, indeed, would have taken place, had not Marlborough led up a fresh division to its support, at the same time that, by a happy movement of the imperial cavalry, he overthrew Marsin's horse, and took his infantry in flank. But the success of this manœuvre was decisive. Throughout the entire centre the rear was now forced; Oberglauh and Blenheim were both, to a certain degree, invested, and the left wing of the allied army was enabled to form in perfect order, upon the communications of the enemy.

Prince Eugene, all this while, was warmly but not very successfully engaged with the Bavarians, who held the left of the enemy's position. After suffering severely from their cannon, he caused a battery to be stormed by his Prussians and Danes; who carried it in gallant style, only to be driven out again, with great slaughter, by a charge of cavalry. To cover their retreat, and give them time to rally, Eugene led his cavalry forward, who gained at first some advantage; but falling unexpectedly within the range of a heavy and enfilading fire, they in their turn gave way and fled. It was to no purpose that the prince exerted himself, riding from rank to rank, and entreating the men to halt; a panic had fallen upon them, and they never drew rein till they had repassed the Nebel, and relinquished all the ground which in the earlier part of the day they had gained. Fortunately, however, Marlborough's right was by this time so far advanced, as to command the village of Oberglauh, and to threaten the elector's left. The position of that corps enabling Eugene to rally at leisure, he once more led his people to the assault, and was once more disappointed and mortified to find his cavalry, in which he mainly trusted, give way, and quit the field. In a transport of rage and shame, he placed himself at the head of the infantry: these followed him with a gallantry and resolution worthy of their chief; and, after a sanguinary struggle, succeeded in driving the enemy through the wood and across the ravine beyond Lutzingen.

It was now five o'clock in the afternoon; the Nebel was every where crossed; and the left wing under Marlborough had formed anew, with the cavalry in front, and the infantry supporting. In this order they advanced, masking Blenheim and Oberglauh; while Tallard endeavoured to oppose them, by interlacing his infantry and cavalry in one extended line. This disposition was instantly perceived, and promptly met; three battalions of Hessian foot moving into the intervals between the squadrons; and the whole, under cover of a heavy cannonade, pressed forward. A tremendous collision en-

sued, in which the allies recoiled at first a space of sixty feet; but recovering their courage, and admirably sustained by their reserves, they in the end bore all before them. Tallard now saw that the fate of the day was determined. Fighting no longer for victory, but for safety, he rallied his broken squadrons behind the tents, and despatched urgent messages both to the elector and to Marsin for assistance: but these officers were themselves too hard pressed to be able to comply with his requisition. He next strove to secure the retreat of the corps which he had, with an excess of caution, shut up in Blenheim. He sent an aide-de-camp to the officer in command, with peremptory orders to withdraw; but the aide-de-camp never reached his destination. He was swept away with the living torrent which now pressed with irresistible fury upon his chief; and Blenheim, by the utter rout of the corps to its left, became isolated. All was now confusion and dismay in the French army. Without orders, destitute of leaders, the men dispersed and fled; multitudes were cut down, or surrendered to the cavalry; while a number scarcely less considerable perished in the Danube, while vainly struggling to pass.

On the left, likewise, the rout, though less complete, was not less certain. The elector, unable to face his own adversary, and aware of the progress which Marlborough was making, drew off in all haste, after having set fire both to Oberglauh and Lutzingen, spiked his guns, and destroyed his ammunition. It was well for him that, while filing along the skirt of the wood towards Morselingen, his troops were mistaken by Marlborough and his staff for those of Eugene. This, and this alone, suspended a charge of cavalry, which, had it taken effect, must have utterly destroyed them; and hence it came about, that he was enabled, under cover of the night, to draw off the wreck of his fine army on the road to Dillingen.

The battle was won; and there remained in the hands of the victors not only the baggage, artillery, and standards

of the vanquished, but many thousand prisoners, among whom marshal Tallard himself was included. Blenheim, however, still held out; and the corps posted there was so complete in every respect, as to render the attempt to carry it by assault extremely hazardous. Under these circumstances, Marlborough, after disposing his means of attack, esteemed it right to summon the commandant; who, after some demur, and an endeavour to obtain more advantageous terms, surrendered at discretion. This was all that seemed wanting, to render the victory of Blenheim one of the most complete of which any tradition remains in military history. Upwards of 12,000 of the enemy had fallen on the field; a like number were wounded; and if desertions and other casualties be estimated as they ought, his total loss cannot be computed at less than 36,000 men. But it is not merely by the amount of the killed and missing alone that the consequences of a great overthrow like this are to be estimated. There is a moral effect in defeat still more tremendous than the physical effect, — a loss of confidence and self-possession, such as cannot by any means be compensated. To that, in its fullest force, the Bourbons and their adherents became subject; whilst the allies, exulting in the idea of their own superiority, and justly proud of their leader, esteemed themselves capable of undertaking and carrying through any undertaking. Nevertheless, these advantages, incalculably important as they were, cost the lives of many brave men, whom Marlborough could ill spare. The prince of Holstein and brigadier-general Rowe were, indeed, the only officers of rank slain; but the killed amounted in all to 4500, and the wounded to full 7500 men.

Darkness had fairly set in, ere the sound of firing ceased to be heard; and the allies were compelled to bivouac in the open field, not far from Hochstadt. The blaze of their fires stretching far and wide in the horizon, infused such terror into the garrison, that on the first summons Hochstadt opened its gates, and at early dawn on the following morning the troops marched

through, to a position between Wittislingen and Steinheim.

In spite of his great anxiety to follow up the victory by a rapid pursuit, Marlborough found the army so completely disorganised by the effects of a great battle, that the repose of some days became absolutely necessary. He made no effort to counterwork nature; but turned the interval to account, by establishing an hospital for the wounded, and by dividing and otherwise disposing of the prisoners, to the chief of whom, particularly to Tallard himself, the most delicate attentions were paid. This done, the troops again took the field, and pushed upon Ulm; but the elector, who had retreated thither with the wreck of his army, immediately withdrew, and on the 21st the allies were encamped at Sefelingen. Here, again, they halted the space of a week, during which the margrave repaired to the camp, and here a plan of ulterior operations was, after a good deal of delay, arranged.

While adjusting their differences, and speculating upon future conquests, the allies were amused by a negotiation into which the elector, or rather the electress, of Bavaria drew them. We can scarcely suppress a smile, when we find the duke of Marlborough, in his private correspondence, claiming credit for an excess of feeling on the occasion, and attributing his anxiety as to the ultimate issue of the convention, to the amiable desire of seeing a family rendered comparatively happy. It might be that the gallant chief was "very sensible how cruel it is to be separated from what we love;" but it would be drawing too much upon the credulity of mankind to imagine that any one could for a moment believe that he who demanded as the price of the lady's safety the surrender of Ulm and all the fortresses dependent on it, rated the private happiness either of the husband or the wife at an extravagant value. The fact seems to have been, and we are not disposed unnecessarily to condemn his policy, that Marlborough hoped, by working upon the fears of the elector, to obtain posses-

sion, without the cost of time or blood, of these important places. He was disappointed to a certain degree; for Ulm stood a siege. Yet was the end worthy of an effort to accomplish it; nor should we have noticed it even thus far, but for the conviction, which the whole transaction forces upon us, that in all his correspondence, private as well as public, Marlborough may be suspected of writing not more for the instruction of individuals, than for the attainment of some objects affecting his own fortunes or personal character.

The elector and marshal Marsin having fallen back on the road to Friburg, it was suggested by Marlborough and Eugene that the war should be carried, without delay, into the country beyond the Rhine, while Ulm should be masked by a corps withdrawn from Ingolstadt, under the orders of general Thüngen. It was not without much persuasion that prince Louis could be brought to accede to this proposition; for the siege of Ingolstadt was already far advanced, and he experienced considerable disinclination to raise it: nevertheless, when Augsburg sent in its submission, he became at last satisfied that other places would follow the example, and he yielded with a good grace to the wishes of his allies. On the 28th of August, therefore, the whole army, with the exception of Thungen's division, marched in three different columns through the circle of Suabia. None of these met with the slightest opposition, unless indeed a demonstration by the enemy's cavalry on the heights above Philipsburg may be accounted such; and on the 8th of September they were all re-united in a strong position near Spire.

At the urgent entreaty of the margrave it was determined to lay siege to Landau, and to commit the management of the enterprise entirely to him. For this purpose the allies moved on the 9th towards the Queich; while marshal Villeroi, who occupied a fortified camp upon its banks, abandoned his entrenchments, and fell back upon Langencandel. He broke down the bridges in his rear; but their destruction occasioned but a temporary delay

to the allies. A few boards thrown over the chasm enabled the infantry to traverse without accident; while the cavalry and guns passing by the fords, the whole pitched their tents on the ground abandoned by the enemy. Next morning the troops were again in march, and Villeroi again refused a battle, by retreating in all haste, first behind the Lauter, and eventually to the Motter. This was the less expected, that the position of Langencandel happens to be one of the most formidable in the north of Germany, being covered with thick woods, deep ravines, and impervious marshes; nevertheless it afforded ample proof that the effects of the victory at Blenheim were felt in others besides the routed army, and it left the allies at liberty to follow up their own schemes, without incurring the smallest risk of immediate interruption. On the 12th of September, Landau was accordingly invested by the corps d'armée under prince Louis; while Marlborough and Eugene established themselves at Cron-Weissemburg, so as to cover the siege.

While the attack of Landau went on with the listlessness and languor which at that period characterised all the military operations of the Austrians, Marlborough, on whom nature had bestowed a constitution far from robust, was labouring under a severe indisposition, the consequence of fatigue and numerous privations. He had been attacked by fever previous to the battle of Blenheim, the progress of which seems to have been arrested by the necessity of exertion alone. But the excitement subsiding, it returned with such violence as to occasion serious uneasiness among his medical attendants. Judicious treatment, however, aided by habits remarkably temperate, finally overcame the disease; and after a confinement of something less than a fortnight, he was once more in a condition to appear at the head of the army. But he recovered only to find that Landau, of which he had long ago anticipated the reduction, still continued to hold out, and that the prospect of its submission was almost as remote as ever. This circumstance

was particularly annoying, inasmuch as it threatened seriously to interfere with all the plans which he had formed, both as to the present and the next campaign. Nevertheless, he bore the disappointment with his usual temper, and exerted himself to compensate as far as possible, by his own activity, for the indolence or incapacity of his coadjutor.

Weary of a state of idleness, and unwilling that the enemy should be allowed to recover from the panic with which recent events had affected them, Marlborough no sooner found himself capable of exertion than he committed the charge of the covering army to Eugene; and, at the head of a light corps, amounting to 12,000 men, set out upon a secret expedition. It had all along been his wish to push his conquests this season as far as the banks of the Moselle, so as that the next campaign might open with the invasion of France itself; and, as he had calculated on a more speedy reduction of Landau than actually occurred, no distrust as to the accomplishment of this object had hitherto been entertained. Now the case was different. Landau still held out; the enemy were drawing detachments both from the Netherlands and the Upper Rhine; and there appeared every reason to apprehend that a large army would be assembled, to dispute with him the occupation of the cantonments which he designed to seize. Under these circumstances, he determined to divide the covering force; to leave the larger portion under Eugene within the lines at Weissemburg, while he himself should endeavour, at the head of a light corps, to anticipate the enemy by occupying the posts of Treves and Traerbach. Every preliminary measure being arranged with the sagacity and foresight which eminently belonged to him, Marlborough, on the morning of the 14th of October, began his daring march. On the 26th, he reached St. Wendal, distant about eight leagues from Treves, where intelligence of the approach of 10,000 fresh troops to cover the place was communicated to him. He had traversed a country singularly wild and inhospitable; and both his men and cattle

were suffering greatly from fatigue; yet he felt that this was not a time to refresh them; and he again set out before daybreak on the 28th. By noon on the 29th, Treves was in sight; and before sunset the enemy's garrison had evacuated the citadel, and the place was his own. Not a moment was lost in pressing 6000 peasants, whom he employed to strengthen the old fortifications, and throw up new, while he himself marched against Traerbach, which was held by a French battalion of 600 men. It was promptly invested, reduced, and, like Treves, occupied by a garrison: after which Marlborough returned, with the loss of scarcely a man, to the camp at Cron-Weissemburg.

The above mentioned event, which occurred on the 4th of November, was soon followed by the surrender of Landau, and a campaign closed, than which none had hitherto been marked by successes more brilliant or unexpected. The prospects of the allies, at its commencement, were indeed gloomy beyond description. Defeated at all points, with his provinces every where open to invasion; harassed, too, by a rebellion at home; and threatened in his very capital, nothing short of absolute submission seemed capable of retaining the emperor on his throne; while the withdrawal of his name from the league must have inevitably led to the speedy separation of the other branches of the confederacy. He was now relieved not only from the immediate pressure of his enemies, but from all dread of their return. The power of the elector of Bavaria was annihilated; his territories were overrun, and all his principal towns and fortresses taken; while the French, on whom he relied, were driven out of Germany, and appalled by the prospect of war at their own doors. It was a consummation so little anticipated, that men scarcely knew whether to regard it as a reality or a dream; but, to do him justice, the emperor was not satisfied to exhibit his gratitude to his illustrious deliverer in words. Once more was the honour of a principality pressed upon Marlborough, with

the full sanction of his own sovereign; but being still unaccompanied with the more solid honorarium of a grant of lands, the gift was, as it had already been, declined.

In describing the professional difficulties which Marlborough was called upon to surmount, we have drawn but a faint outline of the many crosses and embarrassments against which, throughout the whole of this memorable campaign, he was called upon to bear up. At home, the violent of both parties,—the ultra-tories, as in modern phraseology they would be termed,—and the ultra-whigs, equally hated him, and equally exerted their utmost efforts to deprive him of the confidence of his sovereign and the support of his country. By the former, indeed, his march into Germany was represented as an act of daring treason, which might justly subject its perpetrator to the penalties of impeachment; nor did the victory of Blenheim itself suffice to silence their clamour, though it compelled them to give to that clamour a somewhat novel direction. Where was the benefit of such a triumph? The king of France had, doubtless, lost a single battle; but, grievous as the catastrophe might appear in London, it would affect his power no more than the removal of a bucketful of water would affect the navigation of the Thames. Such was now the cry among the discontented, of whom lords Rochester and Nottingham were at the head; and it must be confessed that there were in the ministry itself some who exhibited but a lukewarm zeal in defending the reputation of their own general.

While this order of things prevailed at home, and the duchess was continually pressing him with entreaties to coalesce with her friends the whigs, the state of the war in other quarters drew heavily upon the anxiety and care of Marlborough. In Portugal, nothing had been done to fulfil the high hopes originally excited by that alliance. Schomberg, the commander of the British contingent, found, on his arrival at Lisbon, that there were neither horses nor accoutrements with which to equip an army; and that the only force enrolled consisted

of undisciplined peasants, the *ordinanzas* or local militia of the country. To add to his disappointment, these levies were commanded by general Das Minas, an officer jealous of his own dignity, and ignorant of the first principles of his art; while Fagel, the Dutch commander, showed every disposition to sacrifice the public good rather than control his own irritable and capricious temper. The consequence was, that Spain, so far from suffering an invasion, sent 50,000 men under the duke of Berwick across the frontier, which overran the open country, reduced many fortresses, and made themselves masters of Castel-Branco on the Tagus. On Marlborough was imposed the arduous task of soothing the pride of the Portuguese, of allaying the quarrels between them and their allies, and of infusing something like vigour into their councils. With this view he caused Schomberg to be recalled, and obtained the appointment of lord Galway as his successor. Yet even this step, though it sufficed to appease internal dissensions, failed in restoring matters to a healthy condition.* The enemy were, indeed, compelled to evacuate Portugal, but no such diversion was created on the side of Spain as to occasion the withdrawal of a single man from Italy or the Low Countries.

Meanwhile the duke of Savoy, after witnessing the reduction of Vercelli and Ivrea, had fallen back with his little army behind the Crescentino, whence he exerted himself to throw supplies of provisions and men into Verrua, now closely invested. Faithful to his engagements, however, he made no attempt to avert the anger of Louis: he applied, on the contrary, for succour with great earnestness, both to Marlborough and Leopold; and though they equally professed to take the liveliest interest in his fate, the means of averting it were left to be suggested or arranged by the British general alone. Nor could a

* It was during this wretched campaign that Gibraltar, now so justly valued, fell by accident into the hands of the English, by whom it had well-nigh been abandoned again, as an useless encumbrance, and a heavy drain upon the fleet and army.

more difficult office be imposed upon any man, circumstanced as Marlborough then was. The auxiliary troops in the pay of the maritime powers could not be drafted for a winter campaign in Italy, because it was expressly stipulated that they should not serve out of Germany; it was equally impracticable to take a detachment from the army in the Netherlands; even money failed to elicit farther aid from the petty princes in Germany; whilst the emperor, exhausted by the efforts which he had been called upon to make at home, possessed neither troops nor stores disposable for distant expeditions. Under these circumstances, Marlborough turned his eyes anxiously, and not without distrust, to the king of Prussia; and well aware that every attempt to negotiate by letter would be treated with coldness, he determined, as soon as the troops should be disposed in winter quarters, to undertake a journey in person to Berlin.

On the 15th of November, when the ground was covered with snow, and a severe frost rendered travelling not less unpleasant than dangerous, Marlborough began his journey. He reached Berlin on the 22d, and immediately demanded and obtained an audience; but though graciously received, and treated with the utmost personal kindness, he found it no easy matter to accomplish the end which alone he had in view. Prussia was jealous of the movements of the king of Sweden, against whom Poland had applied for support; and the apprehension lest his own states might be invaded, rendered the king exceedingly averse to lend any portion of his army for a campaign in Italy. Nevertheless, by dint of urgent remonstrances, coupled with a pledge that England would guarantee Prussia against attack, Marlborough succeeded in bearing down the scruples of the ministers; and 8000 men were ordered to march to the assistance of the gallant but over-matched Victor Amadeus.

Having effected this important object, and persuaded the emperor to assign a residence to the electress of Bavaria, with a suitable revenue, in Munich, Marlborough prepared to revisit England, where his presence

was urgently solicited by Godolphin and the leaders of his own party. He took, however, the precaution, first of all, to revisit Hanover, where he remained only so long as seemed necessary for assuring himself of the good-will of the elector; after which he hastened to the Hague, and on the 11th of December embarked. On the 14th he landed, bringing in his train marshal Tallard and other prisoners of distinction, together with the standards, cannon, and trophies of various kinds acquired in the recent contest: and his reception, both by the queen and the people, was altogether such as his eminent services entitled him to expect. It is true, that even now the spirit of party ran high, and that Rochester, with his friends, would have slighted his merits, by coupling them in the same address which spoke in laudatory terms of the services of sir George Rooke; but the voice of the nation was against them. Whatever some men's opinions might be as to the rectitude of Marlborough's political conduct, his behaviour in the field demanded unqualified approbation; — and approbation the most unqualified was bestowed upon it by all ranks and degrees in the community. Besides voting him their thanks, the houses of parliament petitioned her majesty that she would be pleased to bestow some suitable recompence upon her general; and the manors of Woodstock and Wootton were in consequence granted to him and his heirs for ever. On the part of the city of London, again, a grand civic entertainment testified the sense which was there entertained of his extraordinary services; while processions, illuminations, public thanksgivings, and other shows, at once gratified the pride of the general, and amused the people. Finally, orders were issued that a palace should be built at the public expense, on the estate recently assigned to Marlborough; and the mansion being in due time completed under the care of sir John Vanbrugh, it received the appellation which it still retains, viz. the castle of Blenheim.

It would lead us into discussions foreign from the design of this memoir, were we to give any account of

the great political contests in which, during the winter of 1704–5, Marlborough was engaged. Let it suffice to state, that while the timidity of Godolphin and the petulance of Harley rendered his own party weak and divided, the whigs, steadily uniting under their leaders, the junta *, gained ground from day to day; till in the end they forced themselves into power, in defiance of the well-known hostility of the duke, and the strong and undisguised personal antipathies of the queen. A variety of changes were gradually effected in the persons of those holding minor offices, both at home and abroad. In the war department, sir George Rooke, being superseded, was succeeded by sir Cloudesley Shovel, a violent whig, but a popular officer; and sir John Leake and sir George Byng, steady supporters of the cause, were likewise promoted to commands. Several whigs were, at the same time, introduced into subordinate places in the government, among whom may be enumerated Mr. Walpole, afterwards so celebrated. But the greatest triumph of all was the removal of Buckingham, to which, though Marlborough had for some time sanctioned it, the queen could not till now be brought to consent; while a promise was extorted from the minister that sir Nathan Wright, the lord-keeper, should be dismissed, and the great seal transferred to Mr. Cowper. To all these arrangements Marlborough gave his assent, without striving to conceal the chagrin which accompanied it; but he long and steadily refused to admit lord Sunderland to any office of trust or responsibility: yet even in this instance stern necessity at length prevailed. Violent as Sunderland was, and diametrically opposed on most points to the views of his father-in-law, Marlborough was in the end compelled to receive him; because to his party, and to his alone, could he now look for efficient support in carrying on the war, in the issues of which he believed the liberties of Europe to be involved.

The immediate effect of these concessions was to ob-

* These were the earls Somers, Wharton, Halifax, Orford, and Sunderland.

tain a ready grant of supplies, and to afford the means of maturing, with unusual promptitude, the preparations necessary for another campaign. Of that campaign the plan had already been arranged by Marlborough, Eugene, and prince Louis. And on the 31st March the former set sail from Harwich, for the purpose of carrying it into execution. His voyage was tedious, and in some degree hazardous; for the wind blew sharply against him, and he suffered so severely from sea-sickness as to be unfit for a day or two after landing to attend to business. Yet were these but the commencement of a series of crosses and disappointments which had well-nigh overcome even his patience. It had been agreed that 90,000 men should assemble between the Moselle and the Saar on the first approach of spring; that, establishing their magazines at Treves and Traerbach, this mighty force should penetrate by a double route into Lorrain, the sovereign of which duchy was, according to Marlborough's favourite expression, "heart and soul with the allies;" that one column should march under the English general along the course of the Moselle, the other under the margrave of Baden by way of the Saar; and that Saar-Louis should be invested ere the French had time to take the field. All this was very admirable in theory; yet Marlborough was again doomed to feel, that, though liberal of their professions and promises, his allies were not more exact than they had formerly been in fulfilling them. After combating with extraordinary temper, and finally overcoming, the constitutional timidity of the Dutch, he hurried forward by way of Maestricht, to the cantonments of his own army, where he found matters in a condition as cheerless as it is possible to conceive.

Though the first days of May were passed when he reached the lines, Marlborough had the mortification to discover that not only had no preparations been made for active operations, but that the most common measures of precaution and defence were neglected. Instead of 90,000 men, something less than 30,000 were alone disposable; and even for these, horses, cars, and other

munitions of war were shamefully wanting. Treves and Traerbach, so far from being stored with necessaries, lay in a state next to unprovided; and the desertion to the enemy of the officer on whom the care of supplying them had been imposed, left no room to doubt as to the cause. Nor was this all. The margrave, whose duty it was to remedy these evils by personal exertions, exhibited a strong disposition to thwart the man whom he chose to regard more as a rival than a coadjutor. There were no Austrian troops in readiness. The petty German princes were indifferent to further success, and the margrave himself became indisposed and unable to meet the British general in a conference. It is evident, from the tone of Marlborough's correspondence at this juncture, that his enthusiasm, great as it was, had well-nigh given way. Yet he mastered his temper; and seeing that the gigantic means of which he had been assured were not forthcoming, he made ready to turn to the best possible account the resources within his reach.

It so happened that at this crisis the emperor Leopold sickened and died; and Joseph, the gallant and high-spirited king of the Romans, mounting the throne, hopes were entertained that a new and better system of acting would be adopted. Under this impression, Marlborough lost no time in acquainting the new sovereign of his situation; and within a brief space peremptory orders were issued that all the princes subject to the Austrian crown should give their ready assistance in forwarding the views of the English general. But though the conference which he had so long solicited in vain was at last granted by the margrave,—though fresh promises were made, and fresh protestations offered, Marlborough soon saw that the accomplishment of the former, as it depended entirely on the sincerity of the latter, was as remote as ever. In a word, he was deceived and disappointed on all hands. The mighty projects which he had contemplated, requiring resources both of men and material which he found himself unable to command, were of necessity abandoned, and he prepared to

enter upon the campaign with a painful consciousness that its results would disappoint his friends and gratify his enemies.

In the meanwhile, the French monarch, instead of yielding to the blow which had overtaken him at Blenheim, exerted all his energies to remedy that disaster. During the close of the preceding year no measures either of conciliation or vigour had been neglected, to restore order in the Cevennes, and to suppress commotions which at once threatened to spread into the heart of the kingdom, and afforded a favourable opening to the aggression of its foreign enemies. The agent employed on this occasion was marshal Villars, whose proceedings were at once so prompt and so judicious, that all communication between the insurgents and the English ceased; and the leaders of the former, being left to themselves, were fain to accept pardon, or to seek an asylum in foreign countries. A prodigious advantage was thus gained by Louis, whom it left free to redouble his efforts against the allies, and to send armies into the field more numerous and better appointed than had yet been brought into play in any quarter of the theatre of war. In the Low Countries, the elector of Bavaria, assisted by Villeroi, took the field at the head of 75,000 men, with whom he stood ready to act on the offensive so soon as Marlborough should approach the Moselle. The whole country in his rear, moreover, was intersected, in case of a reverse, with lines and entrenchments; while marshal Marsin, covering the Upper Rhine with 30,000 men, had it in his power to carry assistance wherever it should be most needed. Nor was the French monarch an inattentive observer of the preparations which had been so imperfectly carried on by the formation of magazines at Treves. Justly calculating that from this quarter the allies would make their chief effort, he instructed Villars, as soon as the Cevennes should be tranquillised, to move thither; and the delay to which Marlborough was exposed coming to the aid of this arrangement, it was effected without difficulty or

danger. Long before the English were in a condition to break up from winter-quarters, Villars had arrived at the scene of action, and after skirmishing with the corps cantoned near Treves, collected his army in a strong position admirably adapted for covering the broken country between the Moselle and the Saar.

While these things were going on, Marlborough, after visiting the Dutch general Overkirk at Maestricht, and inspecting the fortified camp of Stolhoffen, gave orders that his own troops should concentrate upon Treves; a post which was reached by the most remote of his detachments on the 1st of June. On the 3d, the English and Dutch crossed the Moselle at Igel, and forming a junction with the allies, the whole passed the Saar in two columns at Consaarbruch. There was an exceedingly difficult country in their front, the defiles of Tavernen and Onsdorf, defensible by a resolute band against any superiority of numbers; yet Marlborough, putting himself at the head of the right column, pushed forward with so much rapidity, that he traversed it ere the enemy could determine on the proper mode of resisting the attempt. No halt was made on the open ground into which the column now debouched. They pressed forward, in spite of an equipment disgracefully deficient, with a steadiness and decision which struck terror into the mind of Villars; and the consequence was, that, without firing a shot, they made themselves masters of one of the strongest positions in this part of Germany. Still, the great object which Marlborough had hoped to attain was placed absolutely beyond his reach. Though reinforced here by 4000 horse under the duke of Wirtemberg, as well as by 7000 palatines in British pay, his numbers fell so far short of those of the enemy as to render the issue of a battle, even on favourable ground, exceedingly doubtful; while Villars, as if conscious that a mere numerical superiority was useless, declined a battle altogether, except on ground of his own choosing. The latter accordingly retired upon a range of wooded heights which extend from Haute Sirk on the right to Chartreuse

and the Nivelle on the left, where with each flank secured, and his front covered by impassable ravines, he communicated at once with Luxembourg, Thionville, and Saar-Louis.

For nine days the hostile armies faced each other; Marlborough still clinging to the hope that the margrave would arrive with his corps, and determined in that case, provided a supply of horses and heavy cannon should come in, to make a dash for the passage of the Nied. Nearly a week elapsed, however, ere any certain tidings of his coadjutor reached him; and when they did, they tended only to excite hopes which were never destined to receive their accomplishment. One hour a courier made his appearance with intelligence that prince Louis would reach Birkenfield on the 13th; an officer was scarcely despatched to meet him, ere fresh despatches communicated the fact that the margrave was about to quit the army altogether, his health requiring that he should drink the waters at Schlangenbad. In like manner the neighbouring princes, instead of horses and other means of transport, sent excuses more or less valid, though they one and all took care to secure such terms for themselves as even to their own unscrupulous eyes appeared sufficiently advantageous. Thus was Marlborough baffled in all his projects by the very men whose interest as well as duty, it was to forward them; whilst opportunities were permitted to pass unimproved, on the return of which the most sanguine could scarcely venture to calculate.

Marlborough was in this state of bodily inactivity and mental disquiet, when a messenger from general Overkirk arrived with advices which produced on his part an immediate change of plan. It has been already stated that the elector of Bavaria and marshal Villeroi, the head of 75,000 men, threatened the Low Coun- . To oppose, or rather to watch, their move- ts, general Overkirk occupied an entrenched camp Maestricht, with an army, both from physical and moral inferiority, quite incapable of attempting any

enterprise of moment. The enemy, aware of his weakness, advanced boldly upon the Meuse; attacked and carried by assault the fortress of Huy; and, marching upon Liege, made themselves masters of the town, and laid close siege to the citadel. The utmost alarm was excited by these operations, not only in the lines before Maestricht, but through the whole of the states. Nothing short of an invasion, to be followed by an absolute conquest of the northern provinces, was anticipated; and it was more than hinted that Holland, in order to avert an immediate danger, might, without disgrace, negotiate a separate peace. It was under the influence of this universal panic that general Overkirk sent to inform Marlborough of the predicament in which he stood; while Marlborough, aware that there is no reasoning against terror when fairly excited, determined to sacrifice his own opinions to the necessities of the moment. Without communicating to any one the nature of his intentions, he issued orders that the troops should be under arms a little before midnight on the 17th; and a strong corps of cavalry being appointed to watch the enemy, the whole began a silent but rapid march towards the rear.

A journey of eighteen miles carried them to Consaarbruch, where they halted for a day, in order that the designs of the general in chief might be fully explained to his subordinates. Here general d'Aubach, the commander of the Palatine contingent, was put at the head of eleven battalions, and as many squadrons, with positive instructions to defend to the last extremity the magazines at Treves and Saarbruck; while the rest of the army, under the immediate guidance of Marlborough, continued its march in the direction of Maestricht.

Once, and once only, was the progress of the troops delayed by a report that Villars had detached largely to the support of the army before Liege. It is not possible to determine what were the general's precise intentions in ordering this halt; whether he desired merely to

alarm the enemy into a recall of the detachment, or intended, in case the detachment should pursue its route, to double back upon Villars, and attack him; but however this may be, its consequence was an immediate order that the troops sent out from the position at Haute Sirk should return. Marlborough soon discovered this; and he lost not a moment in using his information aright. He resumed his march in three separate columns, the better to secure celerity of movement, and the whole re-united on the 25th not far from Duren. Here the acceptable intelligence reached him, that the enemy, alarmed by his sudden approach, had raised the siege of the citadel, evacuated Liege itself, and returned towards Tongres. He instantly quitted his own army, and hurried forward to Maestricht, where he concerted with Overkirk an offensive movement, while yet the Gallo-Bavarians should be encumbered in their retreat.

The march of the allies was so well calculated, that though they followed routes far apart, they came into communication, as had previously been arranged, at Haneff; but Villeroi and the elector made no pause to receive them. Though superior in point of numbers, they held the name of Marlborough in too much respect to hazard a battle, except under circumstances which would absolutely ensure success; and they withdrew as he approached, without venturing to show a front, till they found shelter within their lines. Marlborough was not slow in forming his plan of operations. Posting the main body of the army so as to keep the enemy in check, he sat down with a select division before Huy; and such was the vigour with which his approaches were pushed, that on the 11th of July the place opened its gates.

The satisfaction which he would have derived from this success was more than overborne by the reported misconduct of general d'Aubach, to whom the important charge of covering the magazines on the Nivelle had, as we have related, been entrusted. That officer, instead of maintaining himself to the last extremity, was no sooner

threatened by a weak French detachment, than he abandoned all hope, and fled, burning and destroying the stores which it had cost so much labour to collect. It was scarcely possible to account for this proceeding on any other grounds than those of treason; yet, though mortified beyond measure, as his correspondence proves, Marlborough would not even now give up all for lost. It is true that the scheme on which he had founded so many hopes must of necessity be relinquished. A hard task he had found it to bring matters even into an imperfect form; and the idea of again accomplishing such an end, now that the very nucleus round which to gather was swept away, could not for a moment be entertained; nevertheless, with the energy and decision which belong only to minds of the loftiest order, he resolved to shift his ground, and to strike a blow where least of all it would be expected. In fact, he meditated, seeing that other chances had failed, an attack upon the enemy's works; so realising, if possible, the vision which had crossed his mind in former times, and under circumstances widely different.

The position at this time occupied by the combined armies of the elector and marshal Villeroi was so well covered both by natural and artificial defences, as to be regarded by the most experienced generals of the day as impregnable. Resting its right upon Marché aux Dames on the Meuse, it passed by Gerbise to Wasseige on the Mehaigne, from whence it stretched along the left bank of the Little Gheet, by Mierdorp and Heilisheim to Leuwe. From Leuwe, again, it extended, almost in a straight line, to Haelem, a village situated at the conflux of the Gheet and the Demer, where, bending backwards in an obtuse angle, it followed the course of the latter river to Diest, Sichem, and Aerschot. Here the Demer was crossed by a bridge, between which and the fortified town of Lierre a chain of works extended; whilst a continuation of the chain carried on the defences to their support on the extreme left, the strong and important city of Antwerp. Thus, wherever a marsh or stream

intervened, the engineers had ably taken advantage of it, by carrying the outline as far as possible along its edge; while here and there, forts, redoubts, and other places of arms were constructed, upon which the defenders might, if hard pressed at any point, fall back. It must be confessed, that such a barrier, garrisoned by not less than 70,000 men, was not to be contemplated by an assailant without respect; yet the position exhibited one great and striking error, which the eagle eye of Marlborough failed not to detect. It was too extensive to be manned at all points even by an army of 70,000 men; and hence it lay open to the assault of any one who possessed sufficient genius to deceive, and sufficient promptitude to avail himself of his own combinations.

Having carefully reconnoitred the position, Marlborough determined to hazard an attack, where, from the numerous obstacles to be surmounted, both natural and artificial, it was fair to calculate that danger would be least apprehended. Between the posts of Leuwe and Heilisheim ran the Little Gheet, a dull and sluggish stream, whose steep banks were hedged in on both sides with swamps and morasses. Covered by these natural entrenchments stood a breastwork, which, in addition to a deep ditch, was strengthened by batteries and redoubts; while in rear of all were certain rising grounds, upon which, independently of all other defences, a resolute stand might be made. It was of this formidable point that the British general made choice as a fitting theatre for his projected exploit; and to the accomplishment of a design at once so hazardous and so important all the resources of his active mind were bent.

As a step preliminary to all others, it behoved him to obtain from the authorities at the Hague, permission to act, to a certain extent, independently of the advice of the Dutch generals. This, too, he must bring about, preserving all the while a prudent silence touching the nature of the movement about to be made; and not ever, perhaps, throughout the whole series of operations, was a task imposed on him more arduous or more delicate;

nevertheless he accomplished it, almost as much to his own surprise, as to the subsequent indignation of his coadjutors; after which he opened out his plans, in strict confidence, to Overkirk alone. No entreaties could, however, prevail upon that officer to take any decisive step except with the approbation of a council of war. A council was accordingly called, at the manifest risk of having the whole plan either controverted or betrayed; in which the two generals contrived matters so well, that though they still kept their subordinates in the dark, touching the main object of their meeting, they obtained from them an assurance of support in any undertaking.

To give occupation to the minds of his own troops during the discussion of these points, Marlborough caused rumours to be circulated that a march to the Moselle or the Rhine was in contemplation; and the story obtained the more ready acceptance, that the corps lately employed in the siege of Huy was not moved to the front. On the 17th of July, Overkirk passed the Mehaigne with his corps, and advanced upon Bourdine; while Marlborough, pushing on detachments to the very edge of the ditch between Meffle and Namur, moved, as if for the purpose of supporting him. Villeroi became jealous of his extreme right. He drew thither, from other points, a corps of 4000 men, in expectation of an immediate assault; and by weakening his centre, brought about the very end which his opponent had designed to effect. Marlborough was not slow in taking advantage of the opening thus afforded. The corps hitherto stationed on the Meuse, being promptly marched from its cantonments, was formed into an advanced guard under able leaders; while Marlborough himself, at the head of his own English and German army, made ready to support it. The same night, without any previous notice given, the whole began their march; each trooper being directed to carry a truss of hay on the croup of his saddle, and all continuing profoundly ignorant as to the nature of the service on which they were about to be employed.

Eight o'clock had barely passed, when the advance began to move; at nine, Marlborough with the main body followed; while Overkirk, repassing the Mehaigne by a pontoon bridge, fell in, as he had been appointed to do, in the line of march. There was neither fascine nor gabion with any of these columns. The very act of preparing such implements might, as Marlborough well knew, have excited suspicions of the project in contemplation. It was to the trusses of hay alone, borne by the cavalry, that the general looked for the means of crossing the enemy's ditch; nor was he deceived either in the applicability of these instruments, or in the valour and resolution of his men. With as little of confusion as usually accompanies a night march, the troops performed their journey; and at four in the morning found themselves in presence of the enemy. There was a dense fog in the air, which contributed something to the advantage of the assailants. Under cover of this they traversed the morass, cleared the villages of Neer-Winden and Neer-Hespen, took possession of the bridge of Elixheim, and carried the castle of Wange. Then rushing forward in three columns, they passed the Little Gheet; and ere the enemy were made fully aware that danger threatened, the ditch was crossed, and the line of entrenchments penetrated.

So far, things had succeeded beyond Marlborough's most sanguine expectations; but the alarm now spread, and while the rear of the assailants were yet struggling through the obstacles opposed to them, a strong corps was observed to form on the high grounds above Oostmal. A heavy cannonade soon opened upon the Germans and English, by which some loss was sustained; while a general movement on the part of the enemy indicated a design of following up the impression thus made, by a more decisive attack. Marlborough put himself instantly at the head of the few squadrons of horse which had made good their passage. With these he charged, broke, and drove back the advancing line; and, though himself more than once repulsed, he con-

trived to maintain the contest till a sufficient force was enabled to form for his support. By and by the Dutch came up, when the whole pressed forward in overwhelming numbers; and the enemy, after a random fire, retreated in confusion, leaving the whole of this section of their lines in the hands of the allies.

While these things were in progress, Villeroi and the elector, on whom the retrogression of Overkirk had not been lost, suffered an excess of anxiety and alarm. Ignorant where the storm would burst, though well aware that it was about to burst somewhere, they remained that night under arms, and arrived next morning at the scene of action only in time to perceive that they were too late to retrieve the evil consequences of their own negligence. The immense chain of fortifications, which had cost so much labour and expense to throw up, was no longer tenable; they therefore drew off their troops, passed the Dyle in all haste, broke down the bridges in their rear, and took up a new position under shelter of the river.

It formed part of the stupendous plan as arranged by Marlborough to prevent the execution of this retrograde movement. He intended to make no pause after penetrating the lines till he should gain the strong position of Parc, where, throwing himself between Villeroi and the Dyle, he might separate one of the enemy's wings from the other; but the Dutch generals, less gratified with the result of the day's operations than offended that their sanction had not been previously sought, refused to march when ordered. They asserted that the men, worn out by the exertions of the last twenty-four hours, were incapable of any thing further; and they pitched their tents, in defiance of the entreaties and expostulations both of Marlborough and Overkirk. Not all the encomiums which poured in upon him upon from every quarter whither intelligence of his victory extended, served to reconcile the duke to this measure. He complained of it at the moment, as threatening to frustrate the entire object of his devices; and the result proved,

that, in the estimate which he then formed of its tendency, he was not actuated by the workings of excessive chagrin.

The fate of empires has not unfrequently depended upon the judicious or injudicious use of a single day. On the present occasion, the loss of four and twenty hours may be truly said to have cost Marlborough a second victory; for though he reached Parc on the evening of the 20th, the enemy were already behind the Dyle; and the immediate commencement of a course of wet and stormy weather rendered them secure from all immediate molestation. Villeroi failed not to take advantage of this interval, as well by fortifying the weakest points in his new line, as by striving to free his troops from the depression which had seized them; and the stubbornness of the Dutch generals, if no worse principle may be laid to their charge, effectually seconded all his efforts. When the rains at length subsided, and Marlborough proposed to force the passage of the lines, these gentlemen stoutly objected to the measure. Being overborne by the arguments of their nominal chief, they at last consented, provided no risk should be run in the attempt; they even went so far as to move their troops in the direction of the points where the passage was proposed to be made; but when the day of action arrived, they positively refused to engage. According to the arrangements previously laid down, the duke of Wirtemberg was to construct a bridge at Corbeck, while general Heukelom, traversing the river at Neer-Ische, should carry the village by assault; and they were both to be supported by the Dutch and English, as these could be respectively brought to bear. Marlborough has left it upon record, not only that the Dutch failed to execute their part of the agreement, but that they betrayed the whole plan to the enemy. Be this, however, as it may, we know from the best authority that all the manœuvres of the English general failed to draw the attention of Villeroi from his left. On the morning of the attack, likewise, though at first all went on as could be

desired; though the duke of Wirtemberg, throwing a bridge over the stream at Corbeck, established himself, with 500 grenadiers, on the opposite bank; though general Heukelom was in possession of Neer-Ische with an entire brigade, and his artillery, superior to that of the enemy, kept their columns at bay, the Dutch determined that neither attack should be supported. It was to no purpose that Marlborough, whose troops lay farthest from the scene of action, hurried forward to ascertain the causes of delay. He was held in earnest conversation by Slangenberg, the most inveterate of his personal enemies; while the rest sent instructions to the officers in command of the detached corps that they should fall back. These orders, however unlooked-for and distasteful, were obeyed; and the allied forces returned to their camp, having sustained the disgrace of a repulse, with the loss of scarcely 100 men in killed and wounded.

The mortification produced by such an unlooked-for issue to plans arranged with so much care, can scarcely be said to have received any increase from the malignity with which the blame of failure was cast upon the commander-in-chief. Taught by nature to hold his passions under control, Marlborough paid to these calumnies very little heed. Nay, he permitted them to run their course, rather than incur the hazard, by any public contradiction, of wounding the feelings of the states, or thoroughly alienating those of their generals. But the annoyances to which he was in the sequel made subject, proved too heavy for endurance. After consenting to hazard a second attempt at the points lately attempted, the Dutch again violated their stipulations, and proposed in their turn that the enemy's left should be assailed, a section by far the most defensible in their line. Marlborough, though he could not refuse to take this proposal into consideration, foresaw that it would lead to nothing. He accordingly determined upon a total change of system, and he despatched his trustworthy adjutant-general, baron Hom-

pesch, to the assembly at the Hague, for the purpose of obtaining the sanction of the states in its adoption.

To do them justice, the states-general seem not to have been ignorant of the motives by which their own officers were guided throughout the late operations. They received, therefore, in good part, the complaints of Hompesch, but all his arguments failed to extract from them an order which should empower Marlborough to act for the future independently of the approval of the field-deputies. The latter gentlemen were indeed instructed never, except in the most urgent cases, to summon a council of war; yet were they fully authorised to check any movement, no matter how critical or important, till they should themselves be convinced of its expediency. Now, as Marlborough justly stated in his private correspondence, no benefit was secured to him by these instructions. The field-deputies, being civilians, and ignorant of the business of a campaign, could form no judgment, even in the most trivial case, except by consulting such as possessed more information than themselves: and as they would naturally turn for advice to their own countrymen alone, all real power would still remain in the hands which had hitherto so unworthily used it. Still, Marlborough was not of a temper to give way under any difficulties. In the sanguine hope that he might again "cheat them into victory," he gave orders that the tents should be struck; and on the 14th of August began his march, in three columns, towards the sources of the Dyle.

The object of this movement was to turn the flank of that position, his efforts to carry which, by an attack in front, had hitherto failed. It led him away, indeed, from all his depôts and magazines; but as he had taken care to provide bread enough for six days' consumption, he anticipated from that circumstance no evil. Nor had he miscalculated the time required for the full accomplishment of his object; for the 16th found the whole army united at Genappe, and on the 17th head-quarters were established at Fischermont in the vicinity of the

forest of Soignies. Meanwhile the enemy, who remained not long in ignorance of Marlborough's designs, made haste to change their order. They established themselves behind the Ische, so as that their front should be protected by the stream; threw their left towards the Dyle, and leaned their right and rear for support upon the forest: thus hoping to cover Brussels, for the safety of which they were jealous; at the same time that they lost not their own hold upon the Dyle.

After a trifling skirmish at Waterloo, since so famous in military story, and some delay in bringing up the artillery, occasioned by the perverseness of Slangenberg, the allies began to penetrate the forest; which, not less to their surprise than satisfaction, they found every where pervious to infantry, with here and there a good road for the transport of guns and carriages. At an early hour in the evening of the 18th, two columns debouched into the plain between the Ische and the Lane; a third, under general Churchill, defiled to the left, and following a causeway that led towards the convent of Groenendale, found a division of the enemy entrenched behind an abatis, and halted for further orders. In the mean time Marlborough, accompanied by his principal staff officers, closely examined the enemy's dispositions. He saw that the ground in front of Over-Ische afforded peculiar advantages to an assailing force, and that Holberg, though the main key of the position, was but slenderly provided with troops. His arrangements were made in a moment. As fast as the infantry came up, they were formed in columns of attack, one threatening the former, another the latter of these points; while the cavalry, partly to draw attention elsewhere, partly for the purpose of seizing such opportunities as might offer, was moved *en masse* towards Neer-Ische. But, at the moment when all things were ready, when the guns, so long delayed, had arrived, and the troops waited only for the signal, the Dutch deputies, according to their usual custom, interfered. It was to no purpose that Marlborough assured them of victory, explaining that

the whole of the enemy's allignment had been examined; they could not consent to risk a great action till after their own generals had been consulted. The consequences may be anticipated. After wasting many hours in fruitless debate, after refusing to be guided by the opinion even of Overkirk, and absolutely scouting that of Marlborough, certain individuals were despatched from their own body to reconnoitre, who delayed to send in any report till darkness had closed around them. Upon this the troops, who had remained all day under arms, were ordered to encamp; and the principal officers, in no very agreeable mood, returned to their respective quarters.

It had been asserted during this memorable conference, by those envious of the duke's renown, that the points of attack selected by the British general were absolutely impregnable: the officers employed in making the reconnoissance just alluded to, adopted a similar opinion. Their report being handed to Marlborough, he exclaimed in bitterness of heart, "I am, at this moment, ten years older than I was four days ago." Nor were the determinations of the morrow different; for even Overkirk seems at last to have surrendered his own judgment to that of his intemperate rival, Slangenberg. Nothing therefore remained, except to abandon at once a project which had received all but its accomplishment, and to withdraw the troops from a country where the means of subsistence were wanting. On the 19th, this disastrous step was taken; on the 24th, the allied armies were in cantonments between Lower Wavre and Corbais; and the end of the month saw them stationed in their old quarters between Bossut and Meldert.

If we except the capture of Leuwe, and the demolition of that portion of the lines in its vicinity, nothing farther was effected this season by the allies. Marlborough, worn out in body and irritated in mind, experienced, indeed, few inducements to embark on fresh enterprises; but he felt that the moment had arrived when the interests of the common cause, not less than

the respect due to his own reputation, demanded from him a novel style of communication with the governments under which he acted. Quitting the army, therefore, and retiring to Tirlemont, the mineral waters of which had been recommended to him, he wrote, both to London and the Hague, in strong terms; and his complaints were not slow in making a deep impression upon those to whom they were addressed. On the part of the British cabinet it was resolved, that a formal remonstrance should be laid before the states-general, and a better method of action peremptorily insisted upon; indeed, the nobleman selected to carry the remonstrance to the Hague was named, and the day of his departure fixed. But the more sober judgment of Marlborough saw that, however well intentioned, such a measure could lead to no good; he entreated the queen to suspend the execution of her design till the effect of his own statements should appear: and the result proved that he acted, on the present occasion, with his usual foresight and temper. The states-general could not deny that some of their officers had treated Marlborough with shameful disrespect: Slangenberg, as the most troublesome, was immediately removed from his command; nor could all the interest which he possessed procure for him again employment in the public service.

Towards the end of October the campaign came formally to a close, by the establishment of the troops in winter quarters; but a measure which brought rest to others, brought no relaxation, either of body or mind, to Marlborough. Throughout the entire summer, and amid all his own vexations, the state of things in other quarters had afforded to him constant anxiety; for, in spite of a few successes in Portugal and Spain, the issues of the contest were far from advantageous to the allies. In Italy, for example, the French arms proved eminently victorious; the emperor, complaining of poverty, and the neglect of his friends, professed himself incapable of further exertion; while the king of Prussia spoke of recalling his contingent, on the ground that the

subsidies promised by the maritime powers were withheld. Meanwhile, the court of France opened a secret negotiation with the states-general, for the purpose of drawing Holland into the conclusion of a separate peace; and at home, the struggle between the whigs and tories continued with unabated violence. There was not one of these various matters which failed to be brought, in an especial manner, under the cognisance of Marlborough. Eugene wrote to him in a style more reproachful than he had ever previously used; count Wratislaw, the emperor's prime minister, made use of terms still more warm; and even the king of Prussia adopted a language which left but small room to question his desire of freeing himself from the trammels of the league. In like manner, the war party at the Hague appealed to him, as alone capable of preserving their country from the disgrace which threatened to overtake it; while Harley, Godolphin, St. John, and the duchess plied him with constant reports as to the progress which his own or their enemies were making in public favour. Of these last complaints he took as little notice as the circumstances of the times would allow: he threw his influence, indeed, into the scale of the party which seemed best disposed to support the line of policy which he had himself chosen; and while he overcame his own prejudices against some of the individuals composing it, he laboured to remove those of his royal mistress. But of the libels which were ceaselessly poured forth against himself he seldom deigned to take notice, trusting to his own acts as the best vindication of the motives from which they sprung. One prosecution, and only one, was conducted in his name to a successful issue. A Mr. Stephens, a clergyman of the established church, was convicted of a gross libel, and, besides paying a fine, condemned to the pillory; but, by the duke's desire, he was, on acknowledging his error, excused from the most degrading part of his punishment. "I am very glad," says Marlborough on this occasion, when writing to the duchess, "you have prevailed with the queen for

pardoning Stephens; I should have been very uneasy if the law had not found him guilty, but much more uneasy if he had suffered the punishment on my account."

With affairs in this state, it was strongly urged upon Marlborough, that nothing short of his personal interference at the several courts, could by any possibility keep the alliance together. The emperor wrote repeatedly to this effect: Eugene pressed the same truth upon his attention; and even Godolphin, though anxious on many accounts for his return to London, saw the matter in a similar light. Marlborough himself, moreover, could not but perceive that affairs were fast approaching to a crisis; and neither ignorant of his own powers of persuasion, nor disposed with false modesty to under-rate them, he determined to follow the course which circumstances poined out. The troops were no sooner disposed, if not in quarters, at all events in a safe position, than, armed with full powers from the governments both of England and Holland, he made ready for his journey. He had previously visited the Hague during the month of September, where his presence alone sufficed to defeat the intrigues of the French emissaries; and now, on the 22d of October, he gave up the command to Overkirk, and took the road to Vienna.

Passing through Dusseldorf, amid the enthusiastic plaudits of the people, Marlborough made a brief stay at Bernsberg, that he might negotiate with the elector palatine an increase of his contingent, as well as prevail upon him to march them into Italy. He perfectly succeeded in both objects, after which he pushed on to Frankfort, where he held a long and confidential communication with the margrave of Baden. His next halting place was Ratisbon, where he embarked upon the Danube, and he finally arrived at the capital of the Germanic empire on the 12th of November. Nothing could exceed the cordiality and warmth of his reception. The emperor raised him at once to the rank of prince, conferring upon him at the same time the lordship of Mindelheim: the nobles vied with one another in the

attentions which they heaped upon him; and the common people greeted him, as often as he appeared, with shouts and acclamations of applause. But the most gratifying event attending his sojourn, was the facility with which he obviated difficulties, and bore down the prejudices that had threatened to interrupt the general union. In a word, he satisfied the emperor that England was not less sincere than ever; that Holland beheld with disgust the artful proceedings of the enemy, and that both powers were ready to fulfil their engagements, or, in case of need, to surpass them. Thus was Joseph roused from the despondency which had begun to affect him; and a portion of the stipulated loan being opportunely advanced, the most perfect concord succeeded to distrust and misgiving.

Having happily completed this great work, as well as prevailed upon the emperor to adopt a more liberal policy towards Hungary, Marlborough set out for Berlin, where he was welcomed with a degree of cordiality which the recent letters of the king had hardly prepared him to expect. Capricious as Frederick was, and at the present moment more than usually inclined to change, Marlborough contrived, by the application of an extraordinary address, to mould him to his will. The orders which had been issued for the recall of the Prussian corps from Italy were revoked; the casualties which it had sustained during the war were commanded to be supplied; and he himself was honoured with a sword of great value, a diamond ring being at the same time presented to lord Sunderland. On one point alone the Prussian monarch remained immovable. His personal antipathy to the margrave of Baden was such, that he would enter into no standing engagement as to the continuance of a Prussian force in his army; nor was it without the most urgent entreaties that he was hindered from withdrawing at the moment the regiments then serving on the Upper Rhine.

From Berlin Marlborough bent his steps to Hanover, where a game different in kind, but scarcely less dif-

ficult of management, awaited him. We have alluded in another place to the changes which were by degrees effected in the councils of queen Anne. We have spoken of the gradual advance of the whigs into power; of the substitution of several individuals belonging to that party in the room of the tory holders of place; and finally, of their triumph, by the removal of sir Nathan Wright from the office of lord-keeper, in order that Mr. Cowper might be advanced to that dignity. This appointment was speedily followed by others not less decisive. Lord Sunderland came into power; he was now ambassador at the court of Vienna; and Godolphin, Harley, St. John, and the moderate tories, making a virtue of necessity, finally threw themselves into the arms of the whigs. That the queen would have ever become reconciled to her new ministers is in the highest degree improbable, had her late adherents acted with common prudence and common honesty; but their irritated feelings led them into a line of conduct which before long reconciled her to the change, and covered themselves with obloquy.

Among other questions agitated during this important session was one which involved the propriety of inviting to England the elector and electress of Hanover, on the ground that they were the presumptive heirs to the British crown, and the guardians of the protestant succession. Had this proposition been brought forward by the whigs, no blame could have attached to them. In their estimation every measure was expedient which held out the prospect of adding fresh barriers to the possible return of the ancient family; but for the tories to advocate such a step, hateful as they knew it to be to the wishes of the queen, and diametrically opposed to their own avowed principles, was indeed the reverse of creditable. Yet they pressed the point upon both houses with a pertinacity and eagerness which gave proof that their sole actuating motive was hostility to their rivals. To the honour of the whigs be it recorded, that they resisted the motion with manliness and vigour. The question was accordingly lost in the house of commons by a considerable majority,

and the queen's affections, for a time at least, were alienated from those whom she had been hitherto accustomed to trust.

As far as the interests of England were concerned, the issue of this struggle was advantageous; but it gave great umbrage in Hanover, exciting in the mind of the elector a particular jealousy of Marlborough and his friends. These, however, were too politic not to devise a measure which might in some degree make amends for this apparent dereliction of principle. A bill was prepared, having for its object the naturalisation of the electoral family; and the draft of it being sent to Marlborough, he conveyed it on the present occasion to Hanover. Of the instrument thus intrusted to him, this able politician made the best use. Though received at first with coldness, and even upbraided as a faithless friend, he succeeded in an inconceivably short time in overcoming the doubts of the court, and he departed, after a sojourn of a few days only, in full favour both with the elector and his mother.

On the 15th of December, Marlborough reached the Hague. He had already cleared away the chief difficulties which threatened to oppose him there, and found little to call for the exertion of those powers which he knew so well how to employ. Nevertheless, he was in no hurry to depart. He desired to see the measures agreed to by the states in process of execution; and he lingered among them, in spite of his own anxiety to revisit England, till that desire was gratified. Early in January, 1706, however, he took ship, and on the 7th made his appearance in the house of lords, charged with authority by the Dutch to disown the acceptance on their part of any overture from France, and to mature the preparations and arrangements necessary for the opening of a new campaign.

Not at any previous period in his public life had Marlborough greater apparent reason to congratulate himself on the preponderancy in the councils of his sovereign of the party of which he was at the head. The whigs,

moderating their violence, and adapting themselves with ready complaisance to the state of the times, carried every question with triumphant majorities. The moderate tories, including Marlborough in the list, gave the right hand of fellowship to their new supporters; while the people at large, believing the reconciliation to be sincere, were every where satisfied. The high tories ceased in a great measure to be listened to or respected, and all classes seemed bent on a vigorous prosecution of the war. Nor is this circumstance greatly to be wondered at. However hardly pressed their allies might be, the English had embarked of late in no enterprise, except with success. Gibraltar, after sustaining a protracted siege, had repulsed the assailants; Peterborough had added much to the glory of the English army in Catalonia; and the merits of Marlborough himself were never more justly appreciated than by the present house of parliament. We cannot, therefore, be surprised that the voice of wrangling ceased for a time to be heard; or that the nation, remarkable above all others for its proneness to faction, should, during a brief space, act in unison, "The kingdom," says a writer whose judgment was not marked by prejudice in favour of the whigs *, "was blessed with plenty; the queen was universally beloved; the people in general were zealous for the prosecution of the war; the forces were well paid; the treasury was punctual; and though a great quantity of corn was exported for the maintenance of the war, the paper currency supplied the deficiency so well, that no murmurs were heard, and the public credit flourished both at home and abroad."

The remarkable intimacy which subsisted between the queen and the duchess of Marlborough has been more than once alluded to in the course of this memoir. So long as the tories continued popular and prudent, this romantic friendship suffered no abatement; for the queen, aware of the strength of her favourite faction,

* Smollett.

took in good part all the attacks made upon them by the duchess. In proportion, however, as the whigs gained ground, the applications of lady Marlborough in their favour became distasteful, till, in the end, a positive coldness sprang up between the queen and her correspondent. The knowledge of this fact, communicated to him as it was through various channels, had created in the duke much uneasiness. He had repeatedly striven, though without effect, to moderate his wife's political zeal, and being himself as much indisposed to adopt her opinions as his royal mistress, he experienced a twofold degree of mortification at the result. Now, however, the case was widely different. The queen, justly offended by the steps recently taken by the tories, professed to have become a convert to her friend's opinions; and Marlborough saw, or fancied that he saw, a brilliant prospect before him of court favour both at home and abroad. It was with no ordinary satisfaction, therefore, that on the return of spring he once more quitted England, though aware that the difficulties which awaited him at the seat of war were neither few in number nor inconsiderable in amount.

On the 25th of April, Marlborough reached the Hague. He had sailed from the Downs, determined at all hazards to transfer the seat of war to Italy, whither the exigencies of the duke of Savoy, not less than the prospect of acting with prince Eugene, called him. But he soon found that to a project so daring, however judicious in itself, insuperable obstacles were opposed. The Dutch feared to have their own frontier exposed, and were reluctant to supply either the men or money requisite for so remote an expedition. The courts of Berlin and Hanover, which he had so lately reconciled to the league, were again violently alienated; the former by the remissness with which subsidies were paid, the latter through the intrigues of the tories. To neither of them, therefore, could he look for support. Indeed, it needed all his management, including the suppression, on his own responsibility, of a public letter from queen

Anne, to hinder an open rupture between the latter power and England. The Danes and Hessians, again, though hitherto abundantly flexible, were resolute not to move towards the south; while the emperor would listen to no other proposal than that Marlborough should resume the command of the forces on the Moselle, and prosecute the enterprise which had been reluctantly abandoned in the last campaign. Nor were these the only or the most mortifying disappointments to which he was subjected. In Spain, Peterborough, gallant as he was allowed to be, had become offensive to all around him by the extravagancy and haughtiness of his manners. On the Upper Rhine, the prince of Baden, obstinate and perverse as ever, had spent the winter without any regard to the events which must follow; while in Italy the imperalists had sustained a signal defeat, which it required all the vigilance and activity of Eugene, not to retrieve, but to mollify. It was but a poor counterpoise to these disasters, that an expedition was contemplated, which, by landing between Blaye and the mouth of the Charente, promised to produce a serious diversion in the Cevennes. While the authorities in London were discussing the prudence of this step, the enemy were already in the field. Marshal Villars, reinforced by Marsin's corps, suddenly advanced to the Upper Rhine, forced the German lines on the Motter, and drove the margrave behind the Lauter, after which he reduced Drusenheim and Haguenau, where the principal magazines were laid up, and made ready once again to overrun the Palatinate.

While vainly striving to obtain the sanction of the allies to the proposed march upon Italy, Marlborough had not been regardless of the gradual withdrawal of portions of the enemy's force from the lines behind the Dyle; neither had he been neglectful of an instrument by no means the least efficient in war,—the proper use of money. He had opened a communication with one of the principal inhabitants of Namur, and was in treaty for its betrayal; but it was not till intelligence arrived

of the advance of Villars into the Palatinate, that he consented to relinquish entirely his own scheme, and to enter upon a second campaign in Flanders. Then, however, on the urgent entreaty of the states-general, and their assurance that the field-deputies would be guided in all things by his will, he sacrificed his own wishes; and putting himself at the head of the combined English and Dutch armies, he advanced upon Tirlemont, where he assumed such a position as would enable him at once to watch the proceedings of Villeroi, and take advantage of any movement in his own favour which might be made in Namur.

It does not appear whether or not the plot of M. Pasquier became known to the enemy; but the advance of the allies in this direction so alarmed them, that a large body of their best troops were recalled from Germany, and the army of Villeroi strengthened to 62,000 men. Marlborough, on his part, calculated on bringing into the field 60,000 of all arms; so that, in point of numbers, no great disparity existed between them. But while his forces were made up, with the exception of the allies, of the offscourings of almost all nations, those of his opponent were composed of chosen regiments, exclusively French or Bavarian. So confident, indeed, was Louis in the superior organisation and equipment of this force, that he gave positive orders that every risk should be run in the event of Namur being seriously threatened; and Villeroi, conceiving that no alternative between the loss of that city and a battle remained, left his strong position on the Dyle, and advanced to meet the threatened danger.

On the 20th of May the Dutch and English forces occupied a common encampment at Bilsen; on the 22d their right lay at Borchloen, their left at Corswaren; and the same evening they were strengthened by the arrival of a Danish corps, which had been ordered up from the rear by forced marches. It was high time that this seasonable reinforcement should come in; for the country people brought numerous reports that the enemy were

in motion; and his own scouts assured Marlborough that they were already across the Great Gheet, and advancing towards Judoigne. Not a moment was lost in turning the information to account. Hoping to come up with them in a country which afforded no decided advantages to either party, Marlborough ordered the line of march to be formed at an early hour on the following morning; and at dawn the whole army set forward in eight columns, in the direction of the sources of the Little Gheet. A heavy and incessant rain, which fell during the night, had so much injured the roads, that the advance of the several columns proved both slow and irregular. Frequent halts, for the purpose of closing up the rear, were necessary; and, in some places, the guns and ammunition wagons were carried forward only by dint of extraordinary exertions. A thick fog, likewise, by rendering remote objects indistinct, served not a little to perplex the general; for his patrols were incapacitated by it from doing their duty, and during several hours he received no reports. At last, however, colonel Cadogan, who, with 500 cavalry preceded the columns, beheld, from the high grounds above Mierdorp, several masses, both of horse and foot, on the plain of St. André: he despatched an officer in all haste to communicate the fact to Marlborough, and a halt being ordered, the general rode forward to reconnoitre.

The fog, though gradually clearing away, still hung in the sky, and so impeded the vision, that Marlborough was unable to determine whether the squadrons in question constituted the rear of the enemy in retreat, or were thrown out to cover some formation; he accordingly commanded the march of his own columns to be resumed: but the latter had barely crossed the demolished lines between Wasseige and Orp-le-Petit, ere the whole mystery received its solution. The enemy were now seen ranged in order of battle along a position of no ordinary strength; indeed, they were in possession of the very ground which it had been one great object of Marlborough's advance to occupy with his own troops. Of

the nature of this post, and of the dispositions assumed to maintain it, a few words will suffice to convey a sufficiently accurate idea.

The tract of country which lies between the sources of the two Gheets, the Mehaigne, and the Dyle, forms the most elevated point in the great plain of Brabant. These streams, finding at first but little descent, render the ground marshy towards their rise, partially swampy along their whole course, and in some places impassable. They are all surmounted by steep banks, though those of the Great Gheet are most abrupt; while the ground rising suddenly above them, forms a sort of table-land, the surface of which is varied with gentle undulations, and dotted with clumps and coppices. The particular portion of this table-land, which formed the scene of the present conflict, is intersected, almost in the middle, by the Little Gheet; towards the east it is known as the plain of Jandrinœuil; towards the west it is called the position of Mont St. André; an appellation which it borrows from the name of a village on the Gheet, which forms nearly an equilateral triangle with Autreglise and the tomb of Ottomond. From this tomb or barrow, again, which crowns the highest point in the plain, and overlooks the marshes bordering the Mehaigne, the position extends as far as Ramilies, near the head of the Little Gheet; and then, following the course of the rivulet, is continued to the rising ground on which the village of Offuz stands: from Offuz it bends forward on the left bank of the stream, stretching along the verge of the eminence to Autreglise, where, or rather in the fork produced by the confluence of the Jauche and Little Gheet, it terminates. Several excellent roads penetrate this position, both on its flanks and by its centre, of which the principal are, that which leads from Wassiege by Branson, Boneffe, and Franquinay to Tavieres, the shady avenue or Chemin Brunehault, and the road from Foulz to Autreglise, as well as to Offuz.

When the heads of Marlborough's columns, clearing the village of Mierdorp, debouched into the plain of

Jandrinœuil, the enemy were discovered in two lines, the first of which occupied the ground just described, while the second supported it a little in the rear. The left, which consisted entirely of infantry, extended between the Jauche and the Little Gheet, from Autreglise to Offuz; the centre, likewise composed of infantry, took post from Offuz to Ramilies; while the right, which was made up of 100 squadrons of cavalry, occupied the open space in front of the tomb of Ottomond, between Ramilies and the Mehaigne. Each of the villages of which we have spoken was, moreover, strongly garrisoned; into Ramilies alone twenty battalions were thrown; while a brigade was detached to Tavieres in order to secure the extreme right, and clouds of skirmishers lined all the hedges from Franquinay to that point. Marlborough scanned these dispositions with a rapid but skilful glance; and seeing the great defect which attached to them, he made haste to take advantage of it.

The left of the enemy, being planted in the rear of a morass, though safe from all direct attacks upon itself, was necessarily immovable, at least for offensive purposes. The right, again, if the brigade posted at Tavieres be so considered, was too much detached either to give or receive support; while the whole line, being formed upon the arc of a semicircle, was liable at all points to be assaulted in superior numbers, by a force manœuvring along the chord. It was perfectly evident, too, that the heights on which the tomb of Ottomond stands formed the master-key of the position; for, were these once carried, the assailants would not only uncover the flank of the cavalry, but be able to enfilade all the posts to the left. To this great object, therefore, Marlborough directed his attention; and the measures which he adopted for the purpose of effecting it, proved as successful as they were admirably conceived.

As the columns came up, he formed them into two lines, with the left on Boneffe and the right on Foulz. The enemy's light troops retiring as these came on, impeded not the advance for a moment, and at one o'clock

in the day the artillery on both sides began to open. In the midst of this cannonade, the British, Dutch, and German infantry, composing the right of the line, broke suddenly into column, and pushed rapidly forward as if to carry Autreglise by assault. Villeroi became jealous of his left, and hastily withdrawing from his centre, sent several brigades to support the menaced point. This was precisely the movement which Marlborough intended him to make. In a moment orders were despatched to the right, by which its farther advance was arrested. The leading battalions alone kept their ground in extended order along the brow of the heights, which they had just ascended; while those behind, filing quickly to the left, passed under the screen of the same heights to the point of real attack. Here they gave a preponderating superiority to the allies; and the attack began in earnest. A corps of infantry, after dislodging the skirmishers about Franquinay, invested Tavieres on every side. A mass of cavalry, under Overkirk, passing by their rear, bore directly upon the enemy's horse; while twelve battalions, in columns of companies, supported by twice as many in line, assaulted Ramilies with indescribable fury. Villeroi now became aware that he had been out-manœuvred in the beginning of the action. He saw that his right, not his left, was in danger; and he exerted himself to the utmost, in the hope that he might yet repair an error of which the consequences threatened to be fatal.

One of his measures was to dismount twenty squadrons of dragoons, and to send them to the support of the brigade in Tavieres. With these Overkirk unexpectedly fell in, and cut them to pieces. The first line of French cavalry next advanced; it was charged, broken, and overthrown; but the second, coming up while Overkirk's corps was disordered by the pursuit, succeeded, for an instant, in restoring the battle. At this critical juncture Marlborough himself appeared, leading on seventeen squadrons: these dashed among the enemy's cuirassiers, and a desperate contest ensued. Still the enemy, though

their schemes were manifestly deranged, fought bravely. The batteries too, from Ramilies and the heights beyond, played fatally among the assailants; and the slaughter on both sides was great. It was at this moment that Marlborough, after ordering up every disposable man from the right, led on a charge in person, in which he had well-nigh lost his life. Being recognised by some French troopers, they rushed furiously upon him, and, cutting down all before them, placed him in the midst of a throng. He fought his way out sword in hand; drove his horse at a ditch, and was thrown heavily in the leap; but he soon mounted another, though his secretary, who held the stirrup, was struck dead at his side by a cannon ball.

The allied cavalry having rallied, and again advancing to the attack, were again boldly met by the Bavarian cuirassiers, when twenty fresh squadrons from the right suddenly appeared coming at speed over the plain. These, drawing up in line on the right of the allied force, with a steadiness which furnished no doubtful evidence of their valour, struck such a panic into the enemy that they would not abide the shock. They turned their horses' heads and fled; and the height of Ottomond, the great object of the struggle, was crowned. Meanwhile Ramilies was bravely assailed, and as bravely defended. General Schultz, who commanded the attacking corps, forced back some Swiss battalions, and gained the skirts of the houses. He then rushed upon the troops which occupied the enclosures, drove them with precipitation into the village; and, following close upon their heels, made himself, in the end, master of the place. It was to no purpose that the marquis de Maffei rallied two regiments of Cologne guards, and maintained, for a while, with singular obstinacy, a hollow road hard by. Borne down by superior numbers, as well as taken in flank, he was, after a desperate struggle, dislodged, and his troops, charged by cavalry while broken in their flight, were almost to a man destroyed.

On their right and centre the enemy were now com-

pletely defeated; yet the effort made to obtain this success had been gigantic, and the confusion in the ranks of the victors themselves was consequently great. To remedy this, Marlborough made a halt, of which Villeroi endeavoured to take advantage, by forming a second line out of the remains of his shattered squadrons in the rear. But the ground on which he strove to effect this formation was cumbered with baggage; carts, ammunition wagons, and whole strings of bat-horses blocked it up, and all his exertions proved ineffectual either to clear them away or to form apart from them. Marlborough was not blind to the advantages which such a state of things afforded him. The cavalry were again ordered to charge; they obeyed the order with infinite good will, and in five minutes the plain was covered with dead bodies, horses riderless, and fugitives fleeing for their lives. Nor were the troops farther to the right inattentive observers of what passed. One column perceiving the enemy to diminish from before them, made good the passage of the swamp, and charged, and took with little loss the village of Autreglise. Another rushed upon Offuz, which they found evacuated; then, pursuing their success, fell headlong upon the enemy's rear-guard, and utterly destroyed it: in a word, the battle, which had lasted with scarcely any intermission during a space of five hours, was won. The enemy were in full flight, broken and disorganised; for of the few who halted to fight at all, by far the greater number fought only for quarter, and were made prisoners.

The pursuit being continued by the whole army as far as Meldert, a halt was commanded, of which both men and horses stood sorely in need. Besides the march previous to the commencement of the action, and the fatigues which they had undergone in fighting, they had now advanced full five leagues from the field of battle; and hence the day's journey could not be computed, at a moderate calculation, to fall short of five and twenty miles. The state of the wounded, likewise, and the attention due to the prisoners, required this

step to be taken; yet were the light cavalry instructed to press on, nor did they once draw bridle till they reached the vicinity of Louvain at two o'clock in the morning. As might be expected from the fury and duration of the strife, the loss on both sides was tremendous. Of the allies there fell 1066 killed, and 2567 wounded; in the former of which lists were included 82, and in the latter 283, officers; yet was this a trifle when compared with the amount of casualties on the other side, where 13,000 men died or were taken. Among these were many officers of rank, such as the prince of Soubise and Rohan, a son of marshal Tallard, and a nephew of lord Clare, who was shot dead early in the action; while 80 standards, the whole park of artillery, with baggage, tents, and other equipments, became the spoil of the conquerors.

The immediate consequences of this great victory were the surrender of Louvain, Brussels, Mechlin, Alost, Lierre, and almost all the chief towns and cities of Brabant. In Flanders, likewise, the tide ran strongly in the same channel, for Ghent and Bruges both opened their gates, and Daun and Oudenarde following the example, the country in general professed allegiance to the house of Austria. Antwerp, Ostend, Nieuport, and Dunkirk, however, still held out; and to the reduction of these Marlborough lost no time in addressing himself. Had he adopted the advice of Godolphin, his first effort would have been against Dunkirk; but holding cheap the selfish policy which dictated that measure, he resolved upon beginning with the siege of Antwerp, after which Ostend was for many reasons selected as the most advisable theatre of operations.

He was in the act of arranging matters for the former of these enterprises, when two pieces of intelligence reached him, both of which were well calculated to cheer him forward in the great work which he had undertaken. Of these, one informed him of the brilliant successes of Peterborough in Catalonia; the other made him aware that a schism had broken out between the Walloon

and French regiments which composed the garrison of Antwerp. Marlborough was not slow in turning to account an occurrence so propitious. He advanced against the place; the appearance of his troops brought matters to an issue; and the French regiment being permitted to depart with their baggage and arms, this important city was delivered up without the firing of a shot. Marlborough then hurried back to the Hague, where success had brought on a line of policy scarcely less mischievous than any which had yet been adopted. With his usual skill, he contrived to appease the cupidity in which alone it originated, after which he made ready to carry his victorious troops against Ostend.

From the tone of his own correspondence, not less than from the strength of the place, it is evident that Marlborough anticipated an obstinate resistance in this enterprise; but he was deceived, for the siege cost him only the loss of 500 men, and a consumption of eight days from the opening of the trenches. His next effort was against Menin. Surrounded on all hands by a flat, which could, under ordinary circumstances, be flooded at the will of the commandant, this place was regarded by friends and foes as absolutely beyond the reach of insult; yet here, as elsewhere, fortune, or, to use his own more accurate language, divine Providence, fought for Marlborough. A drought of unusual severity set in almost as soon as he had determined on the siege. It continued without intermission throughout the whole period of his operations, and thus enabled him to push his approaches, as against a city on an arid plain, close to the crest of glacis. A breach was in consequence effected, and an assault threatened, upon which the governor opened his gates, having cost the besiegers by the obstinacy of his defence not less than 3000 men. It is not the least striking occurrence in this siege, that on the very day after the allies took possession of the gates, rain began, and continued till all the canals and ditches in the neighbourhood became literally overcharged with water.

From Menin, a corps, under the guidance of general Churchill, marched against Dendermond. It opened its gates on the 5th of September, and on the 16th Ath was invested. Meanwhile the duke de Vendome, who had succeeded Villeroi in command of the army of Flanders, assembled a large force upon the Scheld, and gave out that he intended, so soon as the allies should be embarrassed with this undertaking, to attack them in their lines, and avenge the disgrace of Ramilies. Nothing could have been more agreeable to Marlborough than the realisation of this boast; for his troops were full of courage, flushed with recent successes, and reposed boundless confidence in their leader: but though the enemy ventured, on one occasion, to push a reconnoitring party as far as his lines, they drew off again in all haste so soon as he showed a disposition to meet them. The consequence was, that the siege went on with all possible regularity, Marlborough himself encamping at Leuwe to cover it; and on the 5th of October, after a gallant but fruitless defence, the town opened its gates. Such was the last victory achieved in this campaign. It completed the conquest of Brabant and Flanders; an issue which, at the opening of the war, the most sanguine could not have anticipated; and it raised the reputation of Marlborough to a height never before attained by any general in modern times.

Towards the end of October, Marlborough left his army for a few days, that he might visit Brussels, where he was received by the civic authorities with transports of joy. He was compelled, however, to decline the honour which the emperor had pressed upon him, namely, the dignity of governor of the conquered provinces; because he perceived that his acceptance would give serious offence to the Dutch, whose views were as selfish in prosperity as they had been narrow in adversity. He returned, therefore, on the 31st, to camp, and in the beginning of November distributed his troops into quarters; the English at Ghent, the Danes at Bruges, and the Prussians and Lunenburgers along the line of

the Demer. His next business was to appoint to particular commands the officers on whom he could most perfectly depend. Overkirk was nominated general in chief of the Low Countries, Tilly was sent to Louvain, Salisch to Mechlin, and Churchill to Brussels; after which the duke himself set out for the Hague, whither matters of the most urgent moment called him.

With the solitary exception of Spain, where dissensions among the allied generals wrought more mischief than the sword of the enemy, the campaign of 1706 had been in all quarters adverse to the French interests. Prince Eugene, strongly reinforced by the troops procured for him by Marlborough, suddenly passed the Alps, formed a junction with the duke of Savoy, engaged Marsin in his lines before Turin, and defeated him with the loss of 9000 men. Then doubling back upon the Milanese, he cleared it of the enemy till he had in a great degree re-established, both there and elsewhere, the fortunes of his imperial master. It is true that in Germany, prince Louis of Baden, worn down with disease, and a prey to the wilfulness of his temper, carried on hostilities with less of decision than might have been expected at his hands. Nevertheless, the continual drafts which were made from Villars's army, left him without the physical means of taking advantage of the openings presented; and hence the war, if it proved not absolutely favourable to the cause of the allies, was at least not against them. Louis XIV. began, therefore, to apprehend that, great as his military resources were, they had at last been over-matched. He applied himself, in consequence, to the exercise of that diplomatic skill, for which, not less than for ambition, he stands remarkable; and he managed matters with such address as to sow the seeds of discord among the confederates, at a moment when above all others union appeared most attainable.

The well-known anxiety of the Dutch to secure a strong frontier, had, during the last few months, extended to the acquisition of an enlarged territory. They flat-

tered themselves that it was by their exertions principally that Brabant and the Netherlands had been wrested from the grasp of France; and, with the selfish policy which has guided them ever since they became a nation, they more than insinuated that a portion at least of the conquests ought to be given up to them. As a matter of course, the emperor opposed himself in the most determined manner to every proposal of the kind: England, too, was by no means desirous that her maritime rival should become more powerful than she was, though her jealousy of France readily induced her to guarantee the possession of a defensible border. Of all these dispositions and contradictory views the king of France remained not in ignorance; and he made haste, so soon as the disastrous issues of the campaign appeared, to avail himself of the opening which they afforded.

The summer was yet young when information reached Marlborough that the French were endeavouring to negotiate a separate treaty with the states-general. As far as, by letters, and occasional short visits to the Hague, he could baffle these intrigues, he failed not to do so; but towards winter affairs had assumed such a face as seriously to alarm all who wished well to the protestant succession. It is true that Louis undertook to acknowledge Anne as queen of England, and that he talked of renouncing the claims of the duke of Anjou on the crown of Spain, provided an equivalent could be found for him among the provinces of Italy; but as he made these proposals to the Dutch, and the Dutch alone, no reliance whatever could be reposed on them. Nor is this all. Aware of the feeling of the Hollanders touching an extension of the republic into the Low Countries, the French monarch scrupled not to feed their hopes by assurances of a determined interference on his part in the accomplishment of that great object. Such reasoning fell not unheeded upon the ears of the men composing the states-general. They began to assume a tone in their communications with the allies different from wha

they had hitherto employed, and serious fears were in consequence entertained that the dissolution of the league was not very remote.

The unpleasant sensations excited by this state of things were far from receiving relief from a consideration that Holland was disposed to regard England as too powerful, now that her great rival was weakened. The undisguised aversion, likewise, which she experienced and expressed towards the emperor produced much uneasiness at the court of St. James's: indeed, Godolphin himself appears, at one moment, to have regarded affairs as desperate, though he carefully maintained a tone of confidence in his correspondence with the pensionary. Marlborough alone continued sanguine. He had triumphed over too many difficulties to succumb under those which now pressed upon him; and his spirit and prudence led to the result which he had anticipated. With consummate skill he bent all the different parties to his own views. The states and the emperor were re-united; the former were solemnly engaged to stand or fall with the allies; and a negotiation which had for some time been in progress with the elector of Bavaria was abruptly broken off. Thus, as far as human foresight could extend, the most effectual measures were adopted to guard against the operations of treachery or self-interest, and the attention of all the powers was turned with apparent good will to the providing of adequate resources against the opening of a new campaign.

Perplexing as these matters were, they can hardly be said to have given Marlborough greater uneasiness than the state of parties and the cabals for office which went on at home. We have alluded elsewhere to the partial disgrace of the tories; to the nomination of Mr. Cowper as lord-keeper, and the appointment of lord Sunderland as ambassador at Vienna. The whigs, not content with obtaining a share in the patronage of the crown, now insisted upon the whole, and made their first attack by demanding that sir Charles Hedges should be removed from the office of secretary, and lord Sunderland ap-

pointed in his room. The duchess of Marlborough, with her usual violence and spirit, espoused the cause of her son-in-law. Godolphin, hopeless of support from the tories, took the same side, and both together overcoming the scruples of the duke, prevailed upon him likewise to interfere. The queen, however, swayed partly by her own feelings, and partly instigated by the secret advice of Harley and St. John, gave a steady refusal to the proposition. It was to no purpose that Godolphin threatened to resign, or that the duchess sought to alarm her mistress with assurances of the hostility of the party, and the necessary triumph of France, in the negotiations which she was known to conduct. Anne resolutely adhered to her determination of holding something like an even balance between the factions, and met every argument with reasons, which, if they failed to convince the judgments of her correspondents, left them no room to doubt of her own firmness. Even Marlborough's letters produced no effect; and though parliament was on the eve of meeting, and a fierce opposition was prepared, she persisted in excluding Sunderland from the situation which alone he would accept. It was this course of conduct on her part, coupled with certain ambiguous expressions in their own letters, that first led Godolphin and afterwards the duke to suspect the sincerity of their two protégés. By the duchess both Harley and St. John, but particularly the latter, had long been regarded with distrust; by Godolphin they were now viewed at least with suspicion: Marlborough alone attributing their equivocations to the force of circumstances rather than to the spirit of absolute treachery. Nevertheless they persisted in the line which they had adopted, keeping the queen steady in her opposition to the minister; nor was it till Marlborough arrived in London, and by a personal appeal overcame her antipathies, that she broke through the spell by which their counsels had bound her. This event, however, which occurred on the 18th of November, gave a novel turn to the whole course of public affairs. The

queen's firmness gave way. Sunderland was appointed secretary, Mr. Cowper was raised to the peerage, and an administration formed on a basis avowedly whig. It is true that Marlborough and Godolphin still belonged to it, and that the latter was raised to the dignity of an earl; but they were equally become converts to whig principles, if not abstractedly, without doubt in practice. Harley and St. John, indeed, continued to keep their seats, but they were the only tories of note permitted to fill places of distinction and responsibility in the new cabinet.

It is scarcely necessary to state that the reception which Marlborough met from all ranks and classes of his countrymen was, on the present, as it had been on previous occasions, in the highest degree flattering. The houses of parliament voted him their thanks; the city of London feasted him; his trophies were carried in triumphal procession to St. Paul's, amid the shouts and plaudits of the people. Not only was the estate of Woodstock entailed, at his own desire, upon the title, but a bill was passed which rendered the honours and dignities conferred upon himself hereditary through the female line; the sons of his daughters, with their sons for ever, being appointed heirs according to their seniority. It is somewhat remarkable that, though sufficiently anxious on this head, Marlborough expressed no desire that the name of Churchill should be assumed by his successors. That dotage, if such it deserves to be termed, had ceased to actuate him for some time; but he took care, besides securing to his duchess a life possession of the estate of Woodstock, to see that the pension of 5000*l.* a-year which had been granted to him and his heirs out of the revenues of the post-office, should likewise be enjoyed by her in the event of her widowhood.

It belongs not to the biographer of Marlborough, considered as a British general, to enter much at large into a consideration of the political questions which during the period of his eminent services agitated the parliament

and the nation. Of the motives, for example, which directly guided the promoters of that great measure, the union between England and Scotland, different opinions may be held; but the measure itself must now be admitted on all hands to have brought incalculable benefits upon both countries. From the first moment of its suggestion, Marlborough cordially supported it. He saw that if any thing could put an end to the jealousies and mistrust which hindered one portion of the empire from perfectly coalescing with another, this and this alone would do so; and while he undervalued the difficulties which opposed themselves immediately to the undertaking, he took a comprehensive and just view of the benefits which in after ages would arise out of it. Marlborough was not mistaken in the estimate which he had formed both for the present or the future. The church, of which the downfall had been confidently predicted, continued not less secure than ever; prejudices and antipathies long fostered gradually gave way; and the people, learning to regard themselves as one, rose both conjointly and separately to a height of prosperity to which, had no union taken place, they could not have attained. It is but an act of justice to the memory of Marlborough to state, that the part which he played in the discussion of this great question goes far to exculpate him from some charges of secret treachery and double-dealing. That he stands not free from blame at the commencement of his career, we have already taken occasion to show; but it is evident that no man, circumstanced as he was, would have laboured to effect the union, had he not fully made up his mind to stand or fall with the preservation of the protestant succession.

These great measures were yet in progress, and Marlborough, ever attentive to his duty, was at the same time making his arrangements for the next campaign, when not his attention only, but that of the allies in general, was somewhat painfully roused by the appearance of a new actor on the stage of public affairs. Charles XII. of Sweden, one of the most extraordinary men whom

Europe has ever produced, was now in the full career of his successes. After vigorously defending his country against the attacks of its invaders, and compelling the king of Denmark to sign a disgraceful peace, he had burst into the Russian territories on the shores of the Baltic, where, with a disparity of numbers scarcely to be credited, he overthrew the Muscovites in many battles. He marched next into Poland, and dethroned Augustus, that he might confer the crown upon Stanislaus Leczinski; after which he directed his course into Germany; and was now, with his victorious legions, in cantonments at Alt Ranstadt. From this point he commanded, rather than invited, the other powers to give their sanction to his proceedings. All eyes were instantly turned towards Charles. It was evident that, should he covet the distinction, he possessed ample means of becoming the arbiter of Europe; for into whatever scale he might choose to throw the weight of his power, its opposite must kick the beam. While, therefore, the eccentric warrior gave vent to his personal feelings, by charging the emperor Joseph with numerous political crimes, the rest of the confederates laboured under the painful impression, that the machinations of Louis, of which they remained not long in ignorance, had effectually gained him over to the side of France. Even Marlborough was far from feeling easy on a point so critical; and as he could not himself at this season of the year undertake a journey to the Swedish head-quarters, he employed general Grumbkow, a Prussian officer, in whose penetration he reposed great confidence, to discover, if possible, the bent of Charles's inclinations. The letter which this gentleman addressed to the duke after his return from Leipzig, where he met the Swedish monarch, is too curious to be omitted: —

"My lord duke, Berlin, Jan. 11. 1707.

"I returned yesterday from Leipzig, and I deem it my duty to give your highness an account of my journey. Last Sunday week I departed from hence, and arrived

the Monday at Leipzig. On the next day I waited upon the king at his dinner. I was much surprised at the manner in which the table was served; and I do assure your highness that the fare with which M. de Hompesch regaled you, was divine in comparison with this. On the following day I saw king Augustus at dinner with the king of Sweden: the latter appeared pleased and contented, the other disconcerted and pensive. The repast continued, according to custom, only a quarter of an hour, during which an unbroken silence was preserved, which I attributed to the consideration that there was only time to swallow some morsels in haste. On Saturday I visited count Piper, and after an hour's conference we sat down to dinner; and as his fare was much worse than that of his royal master, your highness may judge of my wretched situation. Count Piper is rude and boisterous, and has all the manners of a pedant, without his learning... I conversed with him on all subjects, and particularly dwelt on the confidence which your highness reposes in the word of the king his master. He said, 'That English lord is a brave and intelligent man; the English and the allies are extremely fortunate that he is their general: the king my master esteems him infinitely.' He then said that his master was not prodigal of promises, but kept his word most religiously; adding, that those who were not inclined to believe him, need only let him follow his own way.

"Having insensibly turned the discourse on the great designs of the king his master, he said, 'We made war in Poland only to subsist; our design in Saxony is to terminate the war; but for the Muscovite, he shall pay *les pots cassés*, and we will treat the czar in a manner which posterity will hardly believe.' I secretly wished that he was already in the heart of Muscovy.

"After dinner he conveyed me in his carriage to the head-quarters, and presented me to the king. His majesty was standing in a small apartment, dressed in the Swedish fashion. I made my bow, and having received proper instructions, accosted him boldly, that

I esteemed myself very fortunate in paying my respects to a sovereign, who was so renowned in Europe for his distinguished actions, valour, and equity. He asked me whence I came, and where I had served. I replied, and mentioned my good fortune in serving three campaigns under your highness. He questioned me much, and particularly about your highness and the English troops; and you will readily believe that I delineated my hero in the most lively and natural colours. Among other particulars, he asked me if your highness yourself led the troops to the charge. I replied, that as all the troops were animated with the same ardour for fighting, your highness was not under the necessity of leading the charge; but that you were every where, and always in the hottest of the action, and gave your orders with that coolness which excites general admiration. I then related to him that you had been thrown from your horse; the death of your aide-de-camp Brinfield, and many other things. He took such pleasure in this recital, that he made me repeat the same thing twice. I also said, that your highness always spoke of his majesty with the highest esteem and admiration, and ardently desired to pay your respects. He observed, 'That is not likely; but I should be delighted to see a general of whom I have heard so much.'"

There was nothing in this to satisfy the minds of those chiefly interested, as to the designs or dispositions of the Swedish monarch; nor did the future correspondence of the same officer, though filled with flattering guesses and surmises, allay their natural fears. Aware, as they were, that a confidential agent from Louis had visited Alt Ranstadt, and made acquainted, through one of those trusty spies whom Marlborough kept constantly in pay, with the very substance of his communications, they experienced the utmost uneasiness as to the result; nor would any thing satisfy either the emperor or the elector of Hanover, except a personal interview between Marlborough and Charles. Marlborough readily yielded to the wishes of the crowned heads. Having

obtained the sanction of his own court, he departed for the Hague, as soon after the close of the session as circumstances would allow; whence, after communicating his designs to the Pensionary, as well as to several leading men in the states, he set out on the 20th of April towards the Swedish camp.

With consummate address, Marlborough adapted both his language and his manner to the peculiar temperament of Charles. He spared no degree of flattery, to which the Swedish monarch lay remarkably open; yet he never once committed either his own sovereign, or the other powers whom he represented; nay, even when Stanislaus was introduced to him, he contrived at once to gratify his host, and to avoid every thing approaching to a public recognition of the title of that prince. In like manner, while apparently entering into all the romantic views of Charles touching a protestant league, and the general redress of wrongs throughout Germany, he managed to convince him that the moment for effecting these good works was not yet come; and that the balance of power must first be restored in Europe, ere the internal condition of any particular state could with propriety be taken into consideration. Voltaire has asserted that the English general, when first ushered into the presence of the Swedish monarch, found the latter attentively examining a map of Russia; and that, from this single circumstance, he became at once aware that Louis's intrigues had failed. This statement is altogether incorrect. No such spectacle was ever beheld by Marlborough, nor were any such conclusions drawn from it; it was to his own adroitness in diplomatic conversation, and to that alone, that he was indebted for the knowledge that Charles would not interfere in the contest between France and her enemies. He returned to the Hague, visiting Berlin and Hanover by the way, on the 8th of May, having been absent on this important mission not more than eighteen days.

Notwithstanding the successful issue of this delicate affair and the general assurances of support which he

received from all quarters, Marlborough saw, with indescribable mortification, the summer months of 1707 one after another steal on, without an opportunity being afforded of effecting any thing worthy of his own renown, or correspondent to the zeal by which he was actuated. The Dutch had again relapsed into their old habit of distrust, and again empowered the field-deputies to thwart the general in all his movements. They scarcely concealed, indeed, that in a further prosecution of the war they felt no interest; and if they did not positively receive overtures of peace from France, they acted as if to such a consummation their hopes were mainly turned. Though superior, or at least fully equal, to the enemy, both in the numbers and the quality of his troops, Marlborough was not allowed, during many months, to hazard a single aggressive movement. A variety of marches were, indeed, effected, for the purpose of covering the principal towns of Brabant; and more than once the duke cherished a sanguine hope of forcing his confederates to a battle; but just as the object of his combinations began to develope itself, the deputies interfered, and the enemy escaped from the toils. This was particularly the case on the 27th of May, when, after a series of able manœuvres, he had succeeded in bringing the hostile armies into presence, near Nivelle. Because the pass of Ronquieres was strongly occupied, through which it would be necessary to penetrate, a council of war determined that a battle should not be hazarded; Marlborough was in consequence compelled to fall back to Beaulieu, that he might protect Brussels and Louvain from insult.

Having induced the enemy, by this movement, to relinquish their designs, Marlborough advanced again as far as Meldert, Vendome moving at the same time in a parallel direction towards Gemblours. These changes of ground occurred so early in the season as the 31st of May; yet it was not till the month of August that any serious effort was made, on either side, to bring matters to the crisis of a battle. On the one hand, Vendome,

though both able and enterprising, held his adversary in too much respect, to risk the slightest opening, of which he could not but believe that advantage would be taken; on the other hand, Marlborough, harassed by the senseless opposition of the Hollanders, found his energies cramped, and his speculations useless. The consequence was, that the entire summer was permitted to pass in a species of armed truce, as distasteful to the feelings of the British commander, as it was injurious to the cause of which he stood forth the principal defender.

It was not, however, in the supineness of those with whom he more immediately acted, that Marlborough found ample cause of complaint, and fruitful sources of anxiety. In Spain the allies had suffered a fearful reverse, their army being almost entirely destroyed at Almanza; and the only chance of restoring matters lay in the immediate advance of the imperial troops into Provence, by the passes of the Apennines. This measure Marlborough ceased not to urge by every argument in his power, both upon Joseph and the duke of Savoy. But between these two personages an excessive jealousy had arisen. The emperor, looking to his own interests alone, preferred securing the conquest of the Milanese to every other consideration; while Victor Amadeus threatened to withdraw entirely from the league, were not his particular wishes consulted, and his views of aggrandisement realised. It was to no purpose that Marlborough impressed upon all parties the benefits likely to accrue upon the conquest of Toulon. With a jealousy of the maritime powers, as narrow as it was ill-timed and unjust, they both affected to treat the project as tending to the benefit of England alone; and though they could not venture positively to pronounce against it, they nevertheless postponed its accomplishment from day to day. Nor were the shameful dissensions which prevailed among the different commanders in Catalonia subjects of trivial concern to Marlborough. Peterborough had long ago been suspended, and was now a wandering intriguer from court to court. Lord Gal-

way, his weak and unfortunate successor, was become not less unpopular than he; and the temper of the king, as well as the state of his party, gave conclusive evidence that no British officer, at least, would be able to restore confidence or unanimity.

In like manner the turn which affairs had lately taken in Germany was far from gratifying. The margrave of Baden, after a long and painful illness, died; and the army there being left without a commander, sustained a signal defeat. The strong position of Stolhoffen was stormed and carried; and Villars, bursting into the Palatinate, spread horror and dismay around. Almost at the same moment the disputes between the emperor and the king of Sweden, which it had cost so much trouble to allay, were revived; nor were they finally settled, except by the assumption of a tone on Marlborough's part more decided than he had yet seen proper to employ. So many misfortunes befalling at one and the same moment preyed strongly upon the mind of the general; yet were they but as a drop of water to the sea, when compared with the uneasiness and chagrin which the intelligence received day after day from home occasioned.

Something has been said in another part of this sketch, touching the growing alienation of the queen from the duchess of Marlborough, and the unconquerable aversion experienced by her majesty towards the whigs. Over the latter feeling, the semblance of a victory had been gained during the last session of parliament; and so long as the duke remained in England, even the former seemed to be suspended; but he had scarcely quitted the court ere both the one and the other revived with increased violence. That Harley and St. John secretly encouraged the queen in her prejudices, lady Marlborough had long asserted, and Godolphin, if he refused to go along with her to the full extent of conviction, was not free from suspicion. It needed but the occurrence of an event in itself neither extraordinary nor important to attest the full truth of her

assertions, and to convince even Marlborough himself that he no longer possessed the confidence of his sovereign.

Long before any positive coldness arose between them, lady Marlborough, weary of a continual attendance at court, had recommended to the queen a poor relative of her own, the daughter of a reduced gentleman, by name Abigail Hill. Mrs. Hill, educated in high tory principles, soon made herself agreeable to her royal mistress, and, as usually happens in such cases, was not mindful in her prosperity that a debt of gratitude remained due to her first patroness. She not only encouraged the queen in resisting the political demands of lady Marlborough, but directed her attention, with very unnecessary minuteness, to all the most offensive expressions in her grace's letters, till in the end she succeeded in effecting an absolute transfer of the royal favour to herself. Harley was neither slow to perceive, nor backward to avail himself, of this circumstance. Being equally with the duchess related to Mrs. Hill, he found no difficulty in contracting with her the closest intimacy; and he contrived, through her influence, to establish an authority over the mind of the queen more despotic than he had hitherto exercised.

Though the designs of Harley and the new favourite were not concealed from the eyes of others, the duchess, either blinded by pride or confident in her own judgment, persisted in believing that there was nothing in their conduct capable of exciting alarm. Under this delusion she continued to labour till information unexpectedly reached her, that Mrs. Hill, without condescending to consult her original patroness, had given her hand in marriage to a Mr. Masham, a gentleman in the queen's service, who, not less than herself, owed all his success in life to the duchess. Then, indeed, this high-spirited woman began to suspect that her relative had played false. She wrote warmly, and perhaps haughtily, to the queen; received a cold and caustic reply; and became aware that her suspicions were not groundless.

Nor was it long ere other and more convincing proofs were afforded that the queen had thrown herself into the arms of a secret faction. Two bishoprics, with certain other valuable pieces of church preferment, fell vacant. The ministers, and among the rest Marlborough and Godolphin, recommended able men of whiggish principles for promotion: their advice was not only not adopted, but sir William Dawes and doctor Blackhall, both of them avowed tories, not free from suspicion on the score of jacobitism, were nominated to the sees. It was in vain that Marlborough and Godolphin remonstrated warmly against such appointments, holding out threats that, should they take place, their own resignation must follow. The queen persisted in asserting her right to exercise the prerogative according to her own will; and the two friends were completely baffled.

The consciousness of loss of influence which followed upon this proceeding was not the only nor the most harassing evil which rose out of it. The whigs, who had never reposed absolute confidence in Marlborough, avowed their belief that he was now deceiving them, and gave loose to the animosity which they had for some time suppressed, but had never been able to overcome. It chanced that to the repeated applications of lord Halifax for some office which he might hold together with the auditorship of the exchequer, Marlborough had steadily opposed himself. A great deal of altercation had taken place between them, producing its customary effect, coldness and alienation. An open rupture now occurred, which led to consequences exceedingly painful to the feelings of Marlborough. His brother, admiral Churchill, a jacobite at heart, and, as such, abhorred by Halifax and the whigs, became exposed to prosecution on a charge of neglect of duty; nor were the intercessions of the duke in his favour, though made in a tone more humble than might have been assumed, so much as honoured with a reply.

Undermined by Harley, and distrusted by the whigs,

Marlborough saw that his influence was on the wane; nor was it any gratification to him that almost every post brought him assurances that his enemies were not likely to use much delicacy in the exercise of such power as they possessed. The supplies and recruits necessary to keep his army effective were either held back altogether, or afforded with a sparing hand. Plans suggested by him were scrutinised with a closeness to which he had heretofore been unaccustomed; and his wishes as to the choice of persons for different employments abroad were not always obeyed. It soon appeared, moreover, that the tory party had not confined their intrigues to the court of St. James's alone: Marlborough found himself out of favour with the elector, at a moment when, above all others, he had a right to expect the contrary*; nor was it but by the application of consummate address that he succeeded in removing the impression which his highness had received.

In conducting the voluminous and irksome correspondence arising out of a state of things so unsettled, the summer of 1707 was chiefly spent. It is true that no man could exhibit more of temper or discretion than Marlborough; for even lord Peterborough, who visited him on his way home, failed in drawing him into the utterance of one rash or unguarded expression. Yet was his satisfaction great, when, in the month of August, the prospect of more active operations opened upon him; not merely because he hoped, by a brilliant victory, to recover the confidence of the queen, but because the very act of superintending the movements of the army in the field promised to divert his thoughts into a more agreeable and important channel. The circumstances which led to this renewal of the campaign, if we may so speak, were these: —

The emperor, after completing the conquest of the Milanese, at length consented to hazard an attempt

* Marlborough had, not long before, with great difficulty, obtained for the elector of Hanover the command of the army on the Rhine, vacated by the death of the margrave of Baden.

upon Toulon; and prince Eugene was commanded, at the head of 35,000 men, to penetrate into Provence for that purpose. Towards the end of June the march began, an English fleet sweeping the coast at the same moment. The enemy offered no resistance; and on the 26th of July, Eugene pitched his tents in the camp of Valette, in the immediate vicinity of the place. Had an assault been given that night, there is every reason to believe that Toulon would have fallen, for the fortifications were decayed, and the garrison intimidated; but Eugene, declining to adopt this course, attacked it in form, though unable, by reason of the paucity of his infantry, to complete the investment. The consequence was, that the French made haste to collect an army for the purpose of raising the siege; and towards the completion of it, Vendome received orders to detach thirteen battalions and twelve squadrons. Marlborough no sooner became acquainted with the march of this detachment, than he resolved to bring Vendome to battle; and the deputies being with difficulty persuaded to sanction the measure, he concentrated his army upon the Dyle.

The corps composing the allied army having been a good deal scattered, it was the evening of the 8th ere they made good their consolidation. On the 10th the river was passed, and on the 11th head-quarters were established at Genappe. Vendome was not left long in ignorance of this movement; and guessing the reason, he instantly put his columns in motion, and abandoned his lines at Gemblours. He pushed upon Seneff, Marlborough marching at the same time towards Nivelle; but the latter movement was no sooner communicated to him than he again ordered his people under arms. He retreated now with such precipitation, that, in spite of the efforts of count Tilly, whom Marlborough detached with a select corps to harass him, he gained, almost without firing a shot, the strong position of St. Denis, where, covered by the confluence of the Haine and one of its chief tributary streams, he ventured to make a

short halt. Marlborough had scarcely begun to threaten, ere he again quitted his ground, never pausing till he had gained Chievres, whence a single day's journey would carry him beyond the Scheld, and into possession of the chain of forts which command it. Marlborough heard of this march with extreme regret. He could not interrupt it, being detained by showers, which rendered the roads impassable to artillery. Nevertheless, his quarters were fixed on the 14th at Soignies, where a succession of rainy weather kept him stationary for a fortnight. On the 1st of September, however, he was again enabled to move. That night he was at Ath, on the 5th he crossed the Scheld above Oudenard, and on the 7th reached Helchin, the enemy retiring with the utmost celerity behind the Marque, where an entrenched camp was formed under the guns of Lille. In this attitude both parties remained for some time; the allies anxious to seize the slightest opening for battle, while the French were especially on their guard that no such opening should be afforded.

Things were in this state, when intelligence came in of the absolute failure of the attempt upon Toulon, and the return of the allies into Italy. The happy moment, which Eugene had permitted to pass by, never returned; and whether it was that he felt little interested in the operation, or that his means were shamefully inadequate, the siege, when formally begun, made no progress. At last the assembling of a large army in his rear compelled him to abandon the enterprise. He embarked his artillery and stores with all haste in the English fleet, and retreated, as he had advanced, by the Col di Tende. Having reduced Susa, and thus secured the avenue into Piedmont, he suddenly broke up his army; sending the imperialists into Lombardy, embarking the Palatines for Catalonia, and permitting the Hessians to return into Germany.

Though deeply mortified by the result of this expedition, of which he had been the prime mover, and from which he had anticipated so many advantages,

Marlborough still continued to exert himself to restore, if possible, that good feeling between the courts of Vienna and Turin, to the absence of which he justly attributed the present misfortune. It was clear, indeed, that on the side of Provence nothing was now to be gained; still, if he could prevail upon the allies to nominate Eugene to the chief command in Spain, he looked forward to better things there; and to the accomplishment of this great end he directed all his diligence and ingenuity. It was not, however, an easy matter to overcome the jealousies of princes so proud and so unreasonable as those with whom he had to deal. The negotiation was therefore still incomplete, when the approach of winter brought the campaign to an end; and it behoved him to make arrangements, previous to his own return to England, against the next. With this view, he met the elector of Hanover and count Wratislaw at Frankfort. He then visited the Hague, and held a conference with the states-general, after which he returned for a short space to his army, still in position at Helchin. About the middle of October, however, the weather being fairly broken, both parties, as if by common consent, quitted the field; and the duke, leaving his lieutenants to dispose the several brigades in winter quarters, set out again in his travelling carriage for the Hague.

Having spent about a fortnight here, Marlborough set sail for London, where he arrived on the 7th of November (old style). He found the feuds in the cabinet more bitter than ever, and a division among parties such as had never existed since the Revolution. Both whigs and tories, though fiercely opposed to one another, seemed to have united their efforts against himself and the lord treasurer; while they equally espoused the cause of Peterborough, and equally assailed the character of admiral Churchill. We cannot pause to describe, even shortly, the turbulent proceedings in both houses during the first month of the session. Let it suffice to state, that the most insidious efforts were

made to cast reflections on Marlborough himself; that it was seriously proposed to weaken the army in Flanders, by detaching from it 15,000 men for service in Spain; and that not the least active in these intrigues against the peace and honour of his patron was Mr. secretary Harley. The queen, moreover, with the obstinacy which characterised her, insisted on nominating her own friends to the vacant sees; nor could all the remonstrances of Marlborough and Godolphin prevail to effect a change in this determination. At last, however, the treachery of Harley became so palpable, that one course only remained for them to adopt. They formally resigned; refused to attend a cabinet council when summoned; and Harley, incapable of conducting the affairs of the nation alone, solicited permission to retire. Great efforts were made to mix him up in the treason of his clerk, Gregg; but they failed; nevertheless, his retirement from office served as the signal for a renewal of perfect confidence between Marlborough and the whigs.

Unanimity was hardly established, when the nation at large became alarmed by the threat of an invasion from France, for the purpose of restoring the exiled family to the throne. The most energetic preparations were made to meet and repel the danger. Marlborough, by virtue of his authority as commander-in-chief, not only sent every disposable man to Scotland, but recalled ten battalions from Flanders; while the admiralty equipped a fleet, in a space of time unprecedentedly brief, against which the enemy could make no head. Numerous arrests, moreover, took place: the duke of Hamilton with other suspected persons were committed to the Tower; Edinburgh castle was strongly garrisoned; the habeas corpus act was suspended, and the nation declared to be in a state of war. These measures were attended with the most perfect success. The chevalier St. George, having with difficulty put to sea, found himself watched at every station by the English squadrons; and after vainly attempting to land both in the Forth and at Inverness, was compelled to return to Dunkirk. It needed

but this to complete the triumph of Marlborough over all his enemies. In spite of the increased and increasing hostility between the queen and the duchess, the latter of whom treated her sovereign with very little delicacy, Marlborough, if he recovered not the confidence of the crown, obtained that of the people; and when the approaching dissolution of parliament set him free to resume his place at the head of the army, it appeared as if his influence were at least as extensive as it had been at any previous period.

On the 2d of April (O. S.), 1708, Marlborough reached the Hague, where, with prince Eugene, who had been recalled from Italy, and the pensionary Heinsius, he arranged the plan of the campaign. It was agreed that a great effort should be made in the Low Countries, but that the design should be masked by the formation of two grand armies; one under Marlborough in Brabant, the other under Eugene on the Moselle: that while the elector of Hanover acted defensively on the Rhine, Eugene should march suddenly to the westward, and, forming a junction with Marlborough, that they should force the enemy to a battle; the consequences of which, should it prove successful, they justly estimated at the highest. Many difficulties must, indeed, be surmounted, ere the scheme could be realised; such as the persuading the elector of Hanover to act a secondary part; the obtaining of large supplies from the emperor and the elector palatine; and the keeping completely in the dark all the members of the Dutch government, except the pensionary. Nevertheless, by dint of great personal exertions, by visiting Hanover, yielding somewhat to the prejudices of its sovereign, and alternately flattering and curbing the petulance of the other parties, these illustrious warriors finally succeeded in bringing their project to bear. No doubt this success, on Marlborough's part at least, was not effected without the endurance of some alloy: he had scarcely quitted his native shores when feuds and dissensions again began; and his return was eagerly solicited, not by the duchess only, but by Godolphin and

the heads of his own party. Yet, though fully sensible to the benefits which might have attended a compliance with the request, he was also keenly alive to the dangers likely to follow, should he, at such a crisis, abandon the seat of war. He, accordingly, sacrificed what may be termed party interests to the public good; and leaving the whigs to imagine what they pleased, and the tories to carry on their intrigues free from interruption, he continued at his post as generalissimo of the allied armies.

During this interval the French monarch, encouraged by the results of last campaign, was straining every nerve to bring into the field a force superior, on all points, to that of the allies. In the Low Countries, Vendome still held the command, though there were joined to him in authority the dukes of Burgundy and Berri, with the chevalier de St. George, who acted as a volunteer, and was followed by a number of his chief adherents. His troops were recruited to the amount of 100,000 men; and he received instructions to assume the initiative, while other and not less prudent precautions were taken in order to give to him a decided superiority. It had long been ascertained, that with the government of the Dutch the people of the Netherlands were discontented; secret negotiations were, in consequence, opened with some of the most influential inhabitants of the great towns, and a plan for the betrayal of them into the hands of the French was arranged. So prudently, moreover, was the affair managed, that of the full amount of their danger the allies were not made aware till the power of guarding against it had been taken away; and hence their earlier arrangements were made under the double disadvantage of a want of cordiality among acknowledged friends, and the operations of determined treachery among secret enemies.

Having received from prince Eugene a promise that he would join him ere the month expired, Marlborough repaired, on the 9th of May, to Ghent. He had reviewed the British division cantoned there, and issued orders that it should march to the place of general ren-

dezvous near Brussels, when an accident opened out to him the particulars of a conspiracy, of which he had not, for some time past, been without suspicion. A woman was detected in the act of putting a letter, under very peculiar circumstances, into the post-office: she was seized, and the letter opened and read; when the whole details of a plot for the admission of a French force into the citadel of Antwerp became manifest. Marlborough lost no time in defeating a design which, had it been fully accomplished, must have seriously affected the issues of the war. He hastened to the camp, whither a continued and excessive drought hindered the more remote of the detachments from immediately following; and made such dispositions as the case would allow for opposing the threatened advance of the enemy.

Meanwhile Vendome, disconcerted by the failure of his attempt upon Antwerp, made a forward movement to Soignies, where, at the distance of three leagues from the English lines, he halted. A great and decisive action appeared inevitable; for the enemy considerably surpassed the allies in numbers, and it was well known that Marlborough had determined not to decline a battle, should such be offered. An excess of prudence, however, or the expectation that more might be effected by manœuvring than by fighting, induced the enemy to keep aloof. They suddenly broke up their camp, and filed rapidly to the right through Bois Seigneur Isaac to Brain l'Allieu; where, in a position which placed them on the flank of Marlborough, and in some degree threatened both Brussels and Louvain, they again stood still. The duke received intelligence of their situation on the 31st. Doubtful of their intentions, yet justly apprehensive for the safety of Brussels, he fell back with all haste upon Anderlecht; where his tents were scarcely pitched ere further information came in, which indicated a design on their part to attack Louvain. The allies had lost several marches by their retrogression to Anderlecht; nevertheless Marlborough determined, if possible, to anticipate the enemy, and to save so important a place.

He put his columns in motion that very night; and marching without a check through a perfect deluge of rain, he contrived, by noon on the second day, to reach the strong position of Parc: here he established himself, fixing his own head-quarters in the abbey of Terbank, while those of Overkirk were in the suburbs; and so perfect was his triumph over the calculations of Vendome, that the latter resumed his ground at Brain l'Allieu without venturing to strike a blow.

From the 4th of June, the date of his arrival at Parc, up to the beginning of July, Marlborough was, by a chain of unlooked for disappointments, kept idle. Eugene, unable to control the unruly passions of the elector, found it impracticable to march, as he had promised; and without his assistance, Marlborough was in no condition to act on the offensive against a general so wary, yet so bold, as Vendome. It was to no purpose that he despatched courier after courier to hasten Eugene in his arrangements. That officer, harassed by the jealousies of his coadjutors, could only lament the necessity which restrained him; while, to use the expressive language of the duke himself, "the slowness of the Germans was such as to threaten the worst consequences." At last, however, it pleased the elector to become reconciled to the state of things under his own particular control. Eugene was thus set free to follow the bent of his own inclinations; and the long looked for movement of the army of the Moselle towards Brabant began. But, though conducted both with skill and rapidity, it came too late to hinder the occurrence of more than one untoward event, of which a few words will suffice to convey a sufficiently accurate idea.

Allusion has already been made to the general dissatisfaction of the Flemings under the harsh and oppressive government of the Dutch. There was scarce a town of any importance in which the French had not their agents; and all looked to the present crisis as offering peculiar facilities for the accomplishment of their wishes. Vendome entertained a similar opinion. He calculated that,

could he make himself master of Ghent, which commanded the course of the Lys and the Scheld, as well as of Bruges, the very centre of Marlborough's water communications, a greater object would be accomplished than even a victory in the field might attain; whilst the reduction of Oudenard, which must without doubt follow, would entirely destroy the connecting link between Flanders and Brabant. Such were the projects which he carefully meditated during the protracted delay of his illustrious adversary at Louvain; and to their fulfilment, so soon as his arrangements were complete, he devoted all his strength and talents.

On the evening of the 4th of July the French army broke up from Brain l'Allieu, and marched rapidly upon Hall and Tubise, where it was intended to pass the Senne. At dawn on the 5th, several light corps fell off from the main body, one of which, proceeding quickly towards Ghent, took possession of the town and invested the citadel. Within six hours from the fall of this important place, Bruges likewise surrendered to a similar detachment acting under the orders of the count de la Motte; while Damme, which the same officer immediately summoned, rejecting his offer, he attacked and took by storm the fort of Plassendael, on the canal. To these enterprises, an English division under general Murray, which lay at Mariekirk, could offer no effectual opposition; and even a body of cavalry, which Marlborough sent out to support it, arrived too late. Marlborough was not less chagrined than indignant at the manner in which these successes were obtained. Leaving useless complaints, and not less useless alarm, to be expressed and experienced by the authorities at Brussels, he determined to check the enemy at all hazards; and with this view put his columns in motion, at an early hour in the morning of the 5th.

The allies reached Tubise just in time to witness, without being able to prevent, the passage of the Senne by the enemy. A like issue attended the pursuit towards the Dender, of which Vendome likewise made good

the passage, losing 300 men of his rear guard, and almost all his boats and pontoons. Serious apprehensions were now entertained for Oudenard, of which the works were imperfect, and the garrison feeble; nevertheless, that nothing might be omitted for its preservation, Marlborough instructed general Chanclos, who commanded at Ath, to draw what detachments he could from all the fortresses near, and to throw himself with these, and a squadron of dismounted dragoons, into the place. Chanclos obeyed his instructions with great alacrity, and Oudenard was rendered secure against a *coup de main.*

A variety of evolutions now took place, having for their common object the occupation of the strong position of Lessines on the Dender, by which the approaches to Oudenard may be said to be commanded. On one hand, Vendome, after investing Oudenard on two sides, and ordering up a train of heavy artillery from Tournay, quitted a post where for some days he had lain; on the other, Marlborough, leaving 4000 men to secure Brussels, broke up his camp at Ath, and pushed upon Herfelingen. The enemy had taken the initiative in these movements; the distance which they were required to traverse fell, moreover, considerably short of that which the allies behoved to compass; while the Dender lay between Marlborough and the ground in the occupation of which his safety was involved. Nothing daunted by these considerations, Marlborough, whom Eugene had joined, though without a single company or squadron in his train, began his march in four columns, at two o'clock in the morning of the 9th of July. He accomplished five leagues without making a pause; he gave his troops five hours to rest; and at the beating of the tattoo was again in full march, a strong advanced guard preceding him. This body, of which general Cadogan was at the head, made such despatch, that by midnight it crossed the Dender, on bridges constructed by the troops themselves; thus securing the camp of Lessines, just as the heads of the enemy's columns arrived in

sight, and holding it till the main body was in a condition to take up the ground.

The consternation of Vendome, when informed that the allies had prevented him in his design, was great beyond conception. He had calculated certainly on the disinclination of Marlborough to expose the towns in his rear; and made no doubt of being able to press the siege of Oudenard at leisure, should he once establish the covering army at Lessines. He was petrified on learning that all his opinions had been formed on mistaken grounds. Marlborough was not only master of the defence of Oudenard, but had boldly thrown himself between the enemy and their own frontier. It was a step on the possible occurrence of which no one had reckoned; and it produced a degree of alarm among the French, which Vendome found it impossible to restrain. Orders were promptly issued for a retrograde movement upon Gavre, where crossing the Scheld it was determined to restore the communications which had been thus unexpectedly cut off.

For some time back serious misunderstandings had existed between the dukes of Burgundy and Vendome. The state into which their affairs were thrown by the decisive manœuvre of Marlborough tended in no degree to restore harmony; and as the allied generals were not ignorant of the fact, they were not remiss in striving to take advantage of it. No sooner, therefore, was it ascertained that the enemy were moving towards Gavre, than Marlborough resolved to follow, with the double intention of delivering Oudenard from investment, and, should a favourable opportunity offer, forcing Vendome to give battle. With this view, a strong advanced guard, under general Cadogan, was ordered to march at daybreak on the 15th. It was given them in charge to clear the roads, to construct bridges near Oudenard, and to establish themselves across the Scheld; and at eight o'clock on the same morning the main body was commanded to move, with the whole of the cavalry in front, and the artillery in rear. Every thing was done with con-

summate skill and regularity. At half past ten Cadogan reached the Scheld; by noon the bridges were complete; and the whole of his cavalry, with twelve battalions of foot, took up a position along the high road that extends between Eyne and Bevere.

While the allies were thus striving to anticipate the enemy, the latter, in absolute ignorance that two leagues only divided them from Marlborough's advance, were leisurely crossing the river. They made good their passage about noon, after which they turned to the left, and somewhat disorderly, because in fancied security, began to move. No great while elapsed ere the heads of the columns, as well as several foraging parties which they had sent out, became visible to Cadogan. He charged the latter with his cavalry, drove them back in confusion, and was himself charged in turn by a corps of French dragoons; upon which he retired again to his position, where he became an object of suspicion and dread to the enemy, who believed that the whole of the allied army stood before them. They accordingly halted; and observing at the moment a heavy column of horse in the act of crossing the river, drew in their patrols, in order to avoid exposing them to the attack of superior numbers.

It was well for Cadogan and his little corps that a difference of opinion among the French generals kept them from either falling on more boldly towards their front, or hazarding an attempt upon the bridge. Had either step been taken, the advanced guard must have perished; for the main body was far in the rear, and not all the exertions of Marlborough and Eugene succeeded in bringing it into the line for a space of two hours. With the cavalry, indeed, which led the way, Marlborough pressed forward so soon as the perilous situation of Cadogan became known, and by traversing no inconsiderable portion of the way at full gallop, he succeeded in coming up just as the enemy appeared in order. But the infantry, wearied with past exertions, and encumbered with knapsacks and blankets, marched more slowly; in-

deed, the leading companies succeeded not in gaining the bridge till past three in the afternoon. Each corps, however, as it arrived, whether horse or foot, was moved promptly into position; and six guns being planted in battery on a commanding eminence, the whole assumed, by degrees, an imposing attitude.

The tract of country about to become the site of one of the most obstinate battles in modern times, is not only remarkable for its great military strength, but for its picturesque beauty and high state of cultivation. It has been described by one of the most classical of Marlborough's biographers, and on the authority of an eye-witness, in terms which we cannot pretend to alter but for the worse. "At the distance of a mile north of Oudenard," says Dr. Coxe, "is the village of Eyne. Here the ground rises into a species of low but capacious amphitheatre. It sweeps along a moderately sized plain, southward, to near the glacis of Oudenard, where it is crowned by the village of Bevere, and numerous windmills. Turning westward, it then rises into another broad hill, under the name of the Boser Couter; and the highest point is near a tilleul or lime-tree, and a windmill overlooking the village of Oycke. From thence the ground curves towards Marolen; and the eye glancing over the narrow valley watered by the Norken, is arrested by another upland plain, which trends by Huyse, gradually sinking till it terminates near Asper. A line representing the chord of this semicircle would commence about a league from the confluence of the Norken with the Scheld, and traverse the plain of Heurne, which is nearly as high as the amphitheatre itself. Within this space, two scanty rivulets, gushing from the base of the hill of Oycke, at a small distance asunder, embrace a low tongue of land, the middle of which rises into a gentle elevation. The borders of these rivulets, and a part of the intervening surface, are intersected with enclosures, surrounding the farms and hamlets of Barwaen, Chobon, and Diepenbeck. At the source of one is the castellated mansion of Bevere or Brian, at

that of the other the hamlet of Rhetelhoeck, situated in a woody and steep recess. These streams uniting near a public house, called Schaerken, proceed partly in a double channel along a marshy bed to the Scheld, near Eyne. The Norken, rising near Morlehem, beyond Oycke, runs for some distance almost parallel to the Scheld; then passing by Lede, Mullem, and Asper, it meets another streamlet from the west, and terminates in a species of canal, skirting the Scheld to a considerable distance below Gavre. The borders of the Norken, like those of the other rivulets, are fringed with underwood, coppices, and thickets; and from Mullem to Herlehem the woods are skirted with avenues. Behind, are enclosures surrounding a small plain, which terminates beyond the mill of Royeghem. Between these is a hollow road, which leads up to the hill of Oycke." Such was the arena on which Marlborough and Vendome were destined at length to try their skill: the former taking post, as fast as his brigades came up, along the high grounds between Bevere and Mooreghem mill; the latter stretching across the plain from the hill of Asper on the left almost to Wanneghem on the right.

While their line was forming in the order just described, the enemy kept a corps both of infantry and cavalry in Eyne, of which they had taken possession when they drove back Cadogan's horse. Marlborough had no sooner brought an adequate force into position, than he gave orders to attack the village; and the service was gallantly executed by Cadogan's division. The infantry descended the hill, crossed the rivulet near Eyne, while the cavalry passed a little higher up, and penetrating to the rear, cut off all communication between the troops within the village and those without. A sharp contest ensued; but it ended in the total defeat of the enemy, three entire battalions of whom laid down their arms, while eight squadrons were broken and cut to pieces as they strove to escape across the Norken. This blow served to convince the French leaders that a general action was unavoidable; and they resolved, in opposi-

tion to the opinion of Vendome, to give rather than receive the charge.

Had any thing like unity of purpose existed even now between the dukes of Burgundy and Vendome, the issue of this great battle might have been different; but to the last they continued to thwart one another. Burgundy commanded a strong corps to pass the Norken, and to occupy the rising road between the rivulets of Diepenbeck and Chobon. General Grimaldi, who led this attack, approached the brink of the stream; but finding that a mass of Prussian cavalry was prepared to receive him, and that a column of British infantry were fast approaching to their support, he drew off again and took post near the mill of Royeghem. Meanwhile, Vendome seing the danger of bringing on an action at the point where the enemy would have most desired to be attacked, directed his left to advance; but the order being countermanded by Burgundy, no movement took place. It was now Marlborough's turn to change his ground. He had seen, not without divining its cause, the threatened attack by the right; he suspected that another and a more formidable would soon follow, and he resolved to meet it by making such dispositions as the nature of the ground would allow. Twelve battalions were promptly moved up from Eyne to support the light troops which lined the hedges about Groenevelde, while a further force of 20 battalions, under the duke of Argyle, threw itself upon Schaerken. It was high time that these corps should be at their posts. The enemy, strengthened by large drafts from the left, gradually prolonged the line to the right, till they completely outflanked the allies, and then advancing at quick time attacked every hedge, field, and farm-house with the utmost fury. A fierce and obstinate battle ensued. It was fought, too, either hand to hand, or by the fire of musketry alone; for such was the precipitancy with which both sides rushed into battle, that scarcely a field-piece could be brought to bear.

While this struggle was going on, Marlborough with-

drew brigade after brigade from his right, and throwing each fresh division as it arrived to the left of those last formed, he gradually shifted his ground so as to render the point assailed not the centre, but almost the extreme right, of his line. His next measure was to keep the enemy's left in check, by drawing up along the edge of the morass which skirts the Norken, a body of Prussian horse, while with his own left he manœuvred to overlap the enemy's right, and cut it off. Some desperate fighting attended the progress of this masterly evolution: a corps of cavalry which he sent forward to clear the plain about Royeghem, was annihilated by a fire of musketry from the enclosures; in like manner his infantry suffered heavily while dislodging the French tirailleurs from the hedges and coppices about the castle of Bevere and Schaerken, yet was the design completely successful. Marshal Overkirk, pushing rapidly with his Dutch divisions round the slope of the Boser Cauter, gained the mill of Oycke, where he brought up his left shoulder till he had completely turned the enemy; while Argyle, carrying every thing before him, broke off all connection between the troops at Groenevelde and those behind the mill. Thus was the right of the French army separated entirely from its centre and left; the only road of communication being by the mill of Royeghem, and the ravines and passes of Marolen.

Daylight, which had long been waning, now totally disappeared; yet the combat was sustained with a degree of obstinacy rarely equalled. The battalions fought singly, in open fields, behind hedges and ditches, or in gardens, barn-yards, and other enclosures; and the horizon seemed on fire with the ceaseless flashes of their musketry. But they fought by no means upon equal terms. The left of the enemy, encumbered by the morass, could bring no support to their comrades on the right; while the allies, doubling round that devoted wing, swept it on both flanks, in the rear and in front, with murderous volleys. As day closed in, however, the effects of the darkness were gradually experienced by themselves in

a very awkward manner; they aimed their fury one upon another; and it required all the activity of the generals and other officers to check such a fire after it had once begun. To stop the carnage, indeed, it became necessary to cease firing altogether; and the enemy, gladly availing themselves of the pause, stole off as they best could from the field of battle. In this juncture, Eugene, with happy forethought, commanded the drums of his own battalions to beat the French *assemblée*; and instructed the refugee officers that served under him, to call aloud the numbers and titles of such regiments as they knew to be in the field. The measure was attended by the most successful result: multitudes of fugitives dropped in by ones and twos upon the Dutch and British line, and they were all, to the amount of some thousands, made prisoners. Nevertheless, the enemy's loss was both directly and proportionally less severe than might have been expected: Vendome, indeed, seeing that all was lost, withdrew his people with admirable coolness; and though he failed in collecting immediately about himself more than 20,000 men, his exertions undoubtedly saved the lives of three times that number. The total loss of the vanquished has been computed at 6000 killed and wounded, with 9000 prisoners; nor did that of the victors fall short of 5000.

The retreat of the enemy was disorderly in the extreme; for though the right had scarcely been engaged, a panic fell both upon men and officers, which Vendome found it impracticable to control. Scarcely an effort was made to form a rear-guard; while the whole mass, joining the fugitives from the battle, fled pell-mell along the road to Ghent. It was impossible for Marlborough, so long as darkness endured, to attempt any pursuit; but on the first blush of dawn, forty squadrons were sent out, who hung upon the enemy's rear, cut off both stragglers and baggage, and created serious alarm throughout their ranks. It was of the utmost consequence, likewise, that an unfinished line of walls, which connected the Scheld with the Lys between Ypres and Warneton,

should be seized; and of these general Lottum, who commanded the detached corps, made himself master. Such was the state of affairs, when Eugene departed for Brussels, in order to hasten the march of his own army. Marlborough likewise, after seeing to the wounded and prisoners, broke up, and on the 16th of July established his head-quarters at Werwick, with his left at Comines, and his right extended towards Menin.

In the meanwhile, Vendome had fallen back behind the canal of Bruges, where he was joined by the duke of Berwick at the head of a large reinforcement; and his army again amounted, at a moderate computation, to 100,000 men. Here he made haste to entrench himself; for though France lay exposed to insult, almost to her very centre, it was scarcely to be feared that Marlborough, cut off from his supplies by way of Ghent, would venture to leave Lille and Tournay in his rear. Nor was Vendome deceived in this supposition. By Marlborough himself, indeed, the propriety of carrying the war into the enemy's country was strongly urged; and the practicability of doing so was fully demonstrated by the facility with which town after town submitted to the parties sent out for the purpose of levying contributions. Nevertheless, even Eugene considering the design as too hazardous, he abandoned it, and applied himself to the task of out-manœuvring his opponents, and laying siege to Lille: and it was a task attended with difficulties of no ordinary magnitude. Not to mention that, in point of numbers, the enemy had in the field an army superior to his, Marlborough was cut off, by the occupation of Ghent and Bruges, from all water communication with Antwerp. Every gun, therefore, every wagon, every round of ammunition and entrenching tool, must of necessity be transported from Holland by land; and when the delay and inconvenience attending such a procedure is considered, it cannot surprise us to learn that the idea was held in utter ridicule by the French officers.

Lille, the capital of French Flanders, was, at the

period of which we are writing, considered to be one of the strongest places in the world. Situated upon a swampy plain, it was begirt by works constructed under the eye of Vauban, who had added greatly to their defensibility by the erection of a citadel even more regular than the town itself. It was garrisoned by 15,000 excellent troops, under the command of marshal Boufflers, an officer conspicuous among his compeers for the talent and obstinacy with which he had defended more than one fortified place. It was against this city, covered by a field force of 100,000 men, that Marlborough and Eugene proposed to commence operations; and that, too, in the face of all the difficulties arising out of remote magazines, and the dangers likely to attend the transport of stores. When it is stated that the nearest depôt was Brussels, a city twenty-five leagues distant from the scene of action; that the stores necessary at the very opening of the siege required 15,000 horses to convey them; and that the train, when in motion, covered fifteen miles of road, some notion will be formed of the risks attending its progress, through a country possessed chiefly by the enemy: and when it is further stated, that this prodigious train made good its journey without the loss of so much as one man or one horse, the genius of him who planned, not less than the vigilance of those who executed, the march, will, we presume, receive from every reader the highest commendation. Yet such is the fact. Though the enemy were well aware of the very day when it was intended that the whole should set out, and saw the train more than once during its progress, such was the accuracy of Marlborough's calculations, that they were never able so much as to hazard an attack. The convoy set out from Brussels on the 6th of August, and on the 12th came into the allied camp at Helchin, whither Marlborough had advanced to meet it the day before.

In no trifling degree influential towards the safe-conduct of this important convoy was prince Eugene. That gallant chief, after concerting matters with Marlborough,

had rejoined his own army at Brussels, with which he manœuvred so as to distract the attention of the enemy; and he now arrived, to make final dispositions for the investment of the place. These were speedily accomplished. The prince of Orange having on the 11th surprised the abbey of Marquette, already occupied all the space between the Upper and the Lower Dyle; while Eugene, crossing the Marque to communicate with him, gradually drew on the circle till it became complete, and placed Lisle in a state of blockade. The conduct of the siege was thus entrusted to him, Marlborough taking upon himself the care of covering it; and he had under his command an army composed of 50 battalions of infantry, with a train of 120 battering guns, 40 mortars, 20 howitzers, and 400 ammunition wagons.

We left Marlborough, after the retreat of the French beyond the canal of Bruges, encamped at Werwick. On the 15th of July he moved to Menin, and, as we have just stated, again shifted his ground on the 12th of August, by marching upon Helchin. Here the great convoy from Brussels reached him; and here, for the double purpose of protecting Eugene's dispositions, and watching the progress of such fresh supplies as were approaching, he remained till the 23d. On the morning of that day, however, he passed the Scheld at Pottes, and fixing his head-quarters at Amougies, threw himself on the line of communication between the armies of the duke of Berwick and Vendome. But these generals, determined at all hazards to form a junction, marched by circuitous routes one towards the other; Vendome crossing the Scheld at Ninove, while Berwick moved from Mons through Herine. On the 30th they accordingly united in the plain between Gramont and Lessines, and on the 2d of September were in position between Blandin and Willemeau, with 140 battalions, and 250 squadrons, amounting in all to 110,000 men. A corps of 20,000 had been left, under the count de la Motte, to cover Ghent and Bruges.

Marlborough was soon made acquainted with this

formation; and not doubting that the next movement would lead round the source of the Marque into the country between that river and the Dyle, he made dispositions to meet and avert the threatened danger. He recrossed the Scheld, marched in a direction nearly parallel to that followed by the enemy, and arrived on the 4th of September in a position which he had previously selected, having his right in the village of Noyelles, and his left in Peronne. Nor was he deceived in the notion which he had assumed as to the designs of Vendome; for that enterprising chief doubled round the Marque by the very route anticipated, and appeared in front of the allies within the space of two hours after they had taken up their ground. Here he halted; and here, for the space of twelve days, both armies continued stationary.

While these movements were in progress, Eugene was pressing the siege with all the diligence which an inadequate equipment, and an engineer department the reverse of perfect, would allow. On the 22d of August, about eight o'clock in the evening, the trenches were opened; on the following night, the chapel of St. Magdalen, which the garrison had converted into an outwork, was stormed and taken, and the parallel being extended, two batteries were thrown up, which opened their fire at daylight. The night between the 24th and 25th was spent in tracing out the second parallel, and obtaining such cover as would permit the men to work by day; and an additional battery of cannon, as well as several mortars and howitzers, began to play the same evening. On the 26th, soon after dark, the garrison made a desperate effort to recover the chapel; they succeeded, and razed it to the ground. But the progress of the several attacks was not interrupted for a moment. The third parallel was drawn to the river on the 27th, and fresh batteries being constructed and armed over night, the whole began to batter in breach at dawn, on the morning of the 28th. There was a fortified mill near the gate of St. Andrew, from the occupation of which the besiegers expected great advantages. It was gallantly

carried on the 29th; but the fire from the town came so murderously upon it, that the assailants were compelled to retire. The same thing took place next day; upon which Eugene commanded that it should be burned, and the garrison could not hinder the order from being obeyed.

By this time, the whole of the battering guns were mounted; and their fire, besides subduing that of the enemy, effected a wide breach in the salient angle of the counterscarp of one of the hornworks. It was stormed that night; and, in spite of a defence in the highest degree creditable to the garrison, a lodgment was effected. Fresh approaches were immediately pushed towards other portions of the works, which a vigorous sortie, executed on the 10th of September seemed scarcely to retard; and new batteries being erected, a sap was at the same time run in the direction of the covered way. As, however, the latter occurrence did not befall till the 17th, Marlborough, who visited the trenches on the 18th, expressed himself grievously disappointed with the progress made; but on the 20th, the works being considerably advanced, another assault was hazarded. It put the besiegers in possession not only of part of the covered way, but of a demi-bastion, and several places of arms; though with a loss which, in the eyes of some, more than counterbalanced the advantage obtained, inasmuch as it fell not short of 2000 men.

We have already stated, that while the covering army under Marlborough occupied a position between Noyelles and Peronne, the combined forces of Berwick and Vendome took up a corresponding allignment in their front. The right of the enemy extended towards Ennevelin, and their left rested upon Gondecourt; and all their proceedings led to the belief that a desperate effort would be made to raise the siege. During the interval between the 5th and the 7th, for example, strong working parties were employed in clearing out the defiles and repairing the roads; and at an early hour in the morning of the 10th, their whole line was in motion. But Marl-

borough had not wasted the breathing space thus afforded to him. Besides moving up a considerable reinforcement from the besieging army, he had devoted night and day to the strengthening of his position, and now stood secure behind a chain of field-works, which it would have been nothing short of insanity to attempt. The village of Seclin, indeed, in advance of his extreme right, was attacked and taken; but no farther hostilities were hazarded. The same thing occurred more than once, from the 10th to the 15th; the French repeatedly reconnoitring Marlborough's lines, and, as it would appear, with little satisfaction to themselves; when they suddenly withdrew entirely from his presence, and fell back upon Bachy Berse. On the 16th they were encamped on the other side of the Marque, between the windmill of Pottes and Aubert la Trinité.

Accurately corresponding with these movements were the attitudes assumed by Marlborough. The 16th saw him thrown back upon his left, and occupying a new line between Peronne and Forest. He thus faced his adversaries, though on a new front; and when they again marched to their right, he likewise filed to the left, till, on the 20th, his camp extended from Leèrs to Treffry.

It was in the midst of these evolutions that the hornwork of Lille was assaulted and taken, as has just been described, after a severe struggle. Among the wounded on that occasion was Eugene himself; a misfortune which caused great regret to Marlborough, and imposed upon him a double load of care and anxiety. There was no officer, possessed at once of sufficient rank and talent, to whom the conduct of the siege could be entrusted; and hence he was called upon not only to observe Vendome, but likewise to keep the besieging corps to their duty. He was not inattentive to either class of these important trusts. Every morning saw him on horseback at the first blush of dawn: when all was quiet in front, he rode back to the lines; and he returned again every evening, that he might be at hand to observe such measures as his skilful antagonist might adopt. By thus appearing, as

it were, at all points where danger threatened, or labour was to be endured, he infused so much of his own zeal and energy into those around him, that on the 23d the whole of the tenaillons fell, together with a large portion of the covered way.

We have had frequent occasion to point out that Marlborough, like a master-spirit, not only managed the affairs of his own particular province, but in a great degree conducted the war, by his counsel and advice, on all points of the arena. The attack on Toulon having failed, and matters becoming daily less and less satisfactory in Spain, he had proposed that a diversion should be made in favour of the Netherlands, by landing a body of troops in Normandy. Unfortunately, the command of the expedition was entrusted to general Erle, an officer su' 'ently intelligent and brave as a second, but quite in'ompetent tc guide an independent force, by reason of his excessive dread of responsibility. The appearance of a few bands of irregular troops along the b'ach serv' ' to alarm him into a persuasion that no good ould acc fi n tl measure; he there' refused to permit e a pt at landing, and returned to the Downs, af'er a profitless absence of a few weeks. Marlborough was morti'ied ' h occurrence; yet, with characteristic energy, h ug to turn even failure to account. He caused Erle's division to be landed at Ostend, whence alone it was now prac cable to procure materials for the siege; nd he found the general highly useful in collecting and forward g stores, in spite both of the distance and the difficulti hich attended their transport.

Though the siege proceeded more slowly than was expected, the enemy had not o ly suffered much in the loss of their outworks, but began to experience a deficiency of powder and other necessaries for a protracted defence. They found means to communicate their situation to Vendome, who strained every nerve for their relief, till, perceiving that all other devices failed, he adopted the following bold but hazardous expedient.

He caused a body of cavalry to load their horses each man with a bag containing forty pounds of powder on the croup of the saddle. By following a circuitous route, they passed unperceived along the flank of Marlborough's army, and dashing at an interval in the lines of the besieging force, endeavoured to cut their way into the town. They were vigorously and promptly opposed; yet, though multitudes fell, the greater number contrived to make good their passage, amid the plaudits of the very men who strove to check them. The supply, which came very seasonably, was received with thankfulness by the governor; and the fire from the town, which had of late slackened, was renewed with fresh vigour.

The French generals, hopeless of raising the siege by violence, endeavoured now to place the besiegers in a state of blockade, by cutting the sluices of the canals, inundating the low lands, and closing up the several avenues which led to Brussels and to Antwerp. The road to Ostend, alone remained open, yet even it was threatened; and it became a matter of the first consideration that an ample convoy should be sent up, while yet the means of so doing were within reach. Erle was accordingly instructed to prepare every disposable horse and wagon, and to load them all with such munitions as the place contained; while general Webb, at the head of 6000 men, was detached as an escort for their protection. The rumour of these proceedings no sooner went abroad, than Vendome and Berwick broke up from their camp, and manœuvred to intercept the supply. Marlborough was not slow on his part in meeting them with counter-movements. Like the pieces upon a chess-board, these great armies shifted from post to post; while the leaders of each strove to conceal the real means by which the one sought to destroy, the other to secure, the valuable prize. On the one hand, the count de la Motte was commanded to march from his camp of observation at Brussels, and to lead 22,000 men upon the expected escort; on the other, Cadogan, with twelve battalions and 1500 chosen horse, marched by a

parallel road to support it. On the 27th of September the convoy quitted Ostend; it crossed the canal of Nieuport at Leffinghen the same night, and directing its course by Slype and Moerdyke, sought to defile through Cochlaer, under cover of the wood of Wynendale. From that moment the utmost vigilance was needed in every officer and man attached to the escort. Webb, with singular promptness, threw 1600 infantry into Oudenburg, just in time to save it from La Motte. Meanwhile the cavalry under Cadogan was at Hoghlede, sending out parties as far as Ichteghem, where some squadrons of French horse were seen, though they did not risk an encounter. Cadogan immediately hastened to Tourout, upon which Webb had commanded the escort to concentrate; and the whole being brought together, they marched upon Wynendale. Here the heads of La Motte's columns became visible in a plain, through an opening between the wood and a low coppice. Webb instantly pushed forward his cavalry to occupy their attention, and, throwing two regiments into the woods on either flank, formed in two lines, so as to lean his right upon the castle of Wynendale. In this position he awaited La Motte, who came on with great show of resolution, in very superior numbers. The action was severe while it continued, but it was short. The corps stationed in the woods, as well as a cloud of skirmishers, whom Webb had disposed with admirable judgment among the brushwood, reserving their fire till the enemy's line was passed, opened, at a few yards' distance, with murderous effect upon the flank, and threw them into a state of disorder, from which they could not be recovered. They broke and fled, in spite of the exertions of their leader to rally them; and the convoy which had passed in the interval by the rear of the wood, came in without the loss of a single wagon to Menin. Immediately the labours of the siege were resumed with fresh energy; and Eugene being now able to superintend them in person, hopes of a speedy and glorious termination were encouraged.

A new expedient was devised by Vendome for the purpose of averting the threatened danger. He moved with a cônsiderable detachment from the Scheld; passed through Ghent; joined count de la Motte between Moerdyk and the canal which connects Bruges with Plassendael; ôpened the sluices there, as he had done elsewhere, and laid the whole country under water to the very border of the Dyke. He then reinforced the garrison of Nieuport; and establishing a post of 1000 foot and 600 horse in rear of Leffinghen, completely cut off all communication between Ostend and the lines. Marlborough no sooner heard of these designs, than he endeavoured to prevent them; but he was too late. The entire face of the country resembled a large lake; and it was only by packing ammunition in skins, and conveying these in flat boats, that farther supplies could be sent up. A curious kind of warfare was the consequence, boat engaging boat, and wagon contending with wagon; nevertheless supplies were still procured, though with increased hazard, and in diminished quantities.

Things were in this state, when marshal Overkirk, at once the ablest and the most tractable of the Dutch commanders, died. Marlborough lamented him both on public and private grounds, and obtained for his son a continuance of the pension which the father had received from the British government; but though naturally feeling, he was not in a situation to permit the indulgence of useless sorrow. Lille still held out; while the indefatigable Vendome, by surprising the important post of Leffinghen, cut off the last link which connected the besiegers with the depôts. Had Boufflers been aware of this circumstance, it is highly probable that he would have continued his defence; for though the body of the place was breached, and an assault threatened, the garrison was numerous, and the means of resistance ample: but he was not aware of it. On the 22d of October, therefore, after sixty days of open trenches, he proposed to capitulate; and, as an act of justice to his gallantry and skill, was permitted to name his own terms. He

yielded up the town; and retired, to sustain a second siege with the remains of his garrison, into the citadel.

The French troops were scarcely withdrawn, and the allies put in possession of the town, ere the attack of the citadel began, with all the vigour which the exhausted state of the magazines would permit. To recruit these, moreover, numerous parties were from time to time sent into France, which swept away corn, cattle, and other necessaries, from the open country; while Marlborough, as he had previously done, maintained a commanding position, so as to cover both the besiegers and their foragers. As any direct effort to interrupt the siege was esteemed hopeless, Vendome and Berwick made haste to devise a new plan of operations. They determined to make a dash upon Brussels, where the principal magazines of the allies were deposited; and as a strong party among the inhabitants favoured their design, they entertained slender doubt of its accomplishment. While, therefore, they themselves continued to hold their entrenched camp along the course of the Scheld, thus separating the allied army from the point threatened, they directed the elector of Bavaria, who had recently returned from the Rhine, to march from Tournay, upon the capital of Brabant. The elector, at the head of 15,000 men, arrived before the place on the 24th of November, and immediately summoned the governor to open his gates. It was fortunate for the confederate cause that the command of a place so important had been entrusted to an officer of courage and experience. M. Paschal rejected the enemy's proposal with disdain; and though his garrison amounted to scarce 7000 men, at once maintained himself against their approaches, and overawed the disaffected among the burghers.

With the intuitive readiness of a great general, Marlborough had foreseen this attempt, and was prepared, so soon as the enemy's plans were developed, to counteract it. He had caused reports to be circulated of an intended breaking up of his own army for the winter; which were the more readily credited, in consequence of the removal

of the field artillery to Menin, and the ostentatious selection of quarters for himself and his staff at Courtray. As his first march likewise led in the direction of the latter town, even his own people were deceived; while the enemy, secure as they imagined themselves to be, ceased to exercise even common vigilance. But in the midst of these false impressions, he suddenly bent his steps towards the Scheld, of which, under the very guns of the enemy's advanced works, he made good the passage at three points. Assembling his whole force on the heights of Oudenard, he advanced against the corps entrenched there, and drove it, almost without firing a shot, back upon Grammont. The road to Brussels was thus opened, and Marlborough lost no time in seizing it. Sending back Eugene to resume the siege, he pushed with the remainder of the army towards Omberg; and occupying with a strong detachment the town of Alost, arrived himself on the 29th at Brussels. The elector precipitately retreated, leaving his cannon and wounded behind; and Marlborough entered the city in triumph.

This brilliant manœuvre being executed, and ample stores forwarded to Lille, Marlborough withdrew to the Rhine, in a position outside of which he continued inactive till the beleaguered fortress submitted. It capitulated on the 11th of December; and the enemy, naturally concluding that the campaign was at an end, broke up for the winter. But, advanced as the season was, Marlborough felt that not yet could repose be granted to his weary troops. Though himself labouring under a severe indisposition, he formed the bold design of recovering both Ghent and Bruges; and on the 18th of December the former city was invested, Eugene covering the attack with the corps recently employed at Lille. Vendome had thrown a strong garrison into this place, and instructed La Motte the governor to imitate the example of Boufflers, by holding out to the last extremity: but his instructions were inadequately fulfilled. On the 24th, the trenches were opened; on the 25th, a feeble sortie

failed to arrest the progress of the workmen; and on the 30th, when the batteries were ready to act, the governor proposed to capitulate. He was admitted to terms, such as would not have been granted had the season of the year been more favourable to the besiegers; and Ghent once more acknowledged the sovereignty of Austria.

On the very day which witnessed the evacuation of Ghent, a deputation of magistrates arrived from Bruges, with the welcome intelligence that from it also the French garrison was withdrawn. The example was followed by the troops in Plassendael and Leffinghen who abandoned their posts without waiting to be threatened. Thus were all the places which had been lost during the earlier part of the campaign recovered; after which, Marlborough and Eugene, leaving to count Tilly the charge of lodging the men in cantonments, departed for the Hague.

While this memorable campaign was in progress, events occurred elsewhere, calculated none of them to enliven, many to excite the disgust of our great commander. In Spain and Italy, the war, if it assumed not an absolutely unfavourable aspect, made little progress; in Germany, no advantage was taken of the enemy's acknowledged weakness; the elector of Hanover in undisguised ill-humour resigned his command; Victor Amadeus became daily more and more selfish; the king of Prussia, beginning again to complain of honours and bribes withheld, threatened to diminish his contingent; and the pope, after excommunicating the emperor, levied troops, and commenced hostilities. Meanwhile, the state of parties at home became daily more and more embarrassing. Partly by his own imprudence, partly through an excess of zeal in the cause of his patron prince George, admiral Churchill rendered himself so obnoxious, that his very brother was at last compelled to counsel his retirement from office; while the whigs made use of every victory, only for the purpose of paving the way to another.

At length the prince of Denmark died, and the party

which he had supported, sometimes with greater goodwill than discretion, lost its chief rallying point. Somers now came into office as president of the council; Wharton was appointed lord lieutenant of Ireland; and lord Pembroke advanced to the dignity of lord high admiral. These promotions were speedily followed by a palpable and rapid loss of influence on the part of Godolphin. Directing her original dislike of the whigs towards the minister by whom she had been induced to accept their services, the queen now looked upon the noble treasurer with an unfriendly eye; while Halifax and Sunderland plagued him with constant cabals, seeking their own advancement at every expense of the public service. Thus deserted by his sovereign, and exposed almost singlehanded to the persecutions of his political enemies, Godolphin ceased not to importune Marlborough with entreaties to return; a mode of proceeding in which, strange to say, he was ably seconded by the duchess. It was a serious cause of chagrin to Marlborough, that the state of affairs on the Continent would not permit him to obey these solicitations; so serious, indeed, that even the sudden change of tone perceptible in the correspondence of the duchess scarcely sufficed to console him under it.

Sanguine hopes had been encouraged, both by the duke and the treasurer, that now at length, when the active season of the year was expired, the former would be enabled to pass over to the assistance of his party. These hopes were not realised; for the states refusing to sanction the departure both of Marlborough and Eugene, and the latter claiming the right of withdrawing during the earlier winter months, Marlborough could not, however anxious, dispute the point. He remained, therefore, at the Hague up to the middle of February; exerting himself all the while to restore unanimity among the allies, and to smooth away every impediment to a successful opening of next campaign. Nor were his exertions misplaced. By judicious management the king of Prussia was restored to good humour; the pope was pacified; and the exorbitant pretensions of the

duke of Savoy, if neither gratified nor set aside, were at all events eluded.

In the meanwhile other and not less delicate causes of anxiety arose. The pressure of the contest in which she had so long been engaged began now to be severely felt by France, where the total destruction of foreign commerce, together with a constant drainage of supplies for the armies abroad, were productive of great suffering among all classes in the community. In spite, moreover, of his successes in Spain, Louis could not but feel that on the whole the results of the war had been unfavourable to him; and he looked forward, not without serious apprehension, to the return of summer. Under such circumstances, he began to direct his views to the re-establishment of peace; not, as he had hitherto done, by seeking avowedly to alienate the allies from one another, but by proposing terms so favourable, that doubts of his sincerity could scarcely fail to be excited. Of these proposals, as one by one they were brought forward, Marlborough took care that his own government should be made acquainted; and when, in February, 1709, he crossed over to London, he brought with him information so ample, that by many he was believed to come in the capacity of mediator in a definitive treaty. We cannot pretend to give of these transactions the full and accurate details which their importance may seem to demand; but the following may be taken as a brief epitome of the progress and result of this negotiation.

On the present, as on every previous occasion, Louis began by making to the states and the empire such overtures in secret as the reports of his spies led him to believe would best conduce to the furtherance of his own wishes. To the Dutch, for example, he professed his readiness to relinquish Spain and the Indies, the Milanese and the Netherlands, provided he could obtain the kingdom of the Two Sicilies for his grandson. He added to this an assurance that the question of the boundary should be adjusted to the perfect satisfaction of the states; and that numerous commercial advantages

should be secured to them. While his emissaries held this language at the Hague, the pope was commissioned to inform the emperor that the duke of Anjou would readily yield to the archduke Charles both the Spanish-Italian territories and the Netherlands, provided he were permitted to retain the sovereignty of Spain itself and the Indies. These insidious and artful proceedings, though not long concealed from Marlborough, excited in his mind far less of uneasiness than arose out of others which succeeded them. The enemy, perceiving that little was to be done by intrigues which bore upon their face the stamp of insincerity, adopted a new expedient; and, by an affectation of perfect openness, endeavoured to rouse into action those jealousies which a sense of common danger kept dormant. It was accordingly requested, in the name of the French king, that plenipotentiaries should be privately received, by whom such proposals of peace might be submitted as would be agreeable to all the allies. Assurances were, moreover, given, that no question connected with Spain, the Indies, Milan, or the Low Countries, would be permitted to stand in the way of an accommodation; that a satisfactory barrier would be granted to the Dutch; and that Louis would award to each of the powers adequate satisfaction on every point where their pretensions were reasonable. Upon this basis, and upon none other, was it now proposed that negotiations should be opened; and the exhausted condition of their country rendering the states-general well disposed to adopt it, to Marlborough the question was referred for ultimate decision.

Marlborough was not unaware that, among other charges brought against him by his enemies, he had been accused of protracting the war for the mere gratification of his own avarice. We are well inclined to believe that the charge, if not absolutely groundless, was grossly exaggerated; yet is it just to allow that both Marlborough and the duchess gave frequent and glaring proofs that there were few things in life which they valued so much as money. On the present occa-

sion, however, whatever the duke's inclinations might be, he possessed both rectitude and tact enough to decline the dangerous responsibility thus pressed upon him. The question of peace or war was referred without reservation to the queen's government; and Marlborough stood forward in the single and obvious character of a diplomatist or public agent only. A great deal of correspondence passed in consequence between him and the treasurer, while he yet lingered at the Hague; and after he returned home, the propositions of the French monarch formed the principal subject of discussion between him and his colleagues.

On the 1st of March, 1709, Marlborough arrived in London; on the 2d he took his seat, amid the warm congratulations of the assembly, in the house of lords. He received, as usual, the thanks of parliament, and voted for the "act of grace;" a decree of the legislature which determined that no man should be called to account for the part which he might have acted prior to a certain date, in any disputes relative to the succession. But from the queen he received no marks of kindness, nor even of civility. The influence of Mrs. Masham, the violence of the duchess, and the humiliating position into which she was thrown with respect to the whigs, seem to have completely alienated Anne from her ancient favourite; while the whigs themselves scrupled not to demonstrate, by every imaginable proceeding, an absolute distrust in their half-tory coadjutors. Both Marlborough and Godolphin were treated with studied coldness. Individuals the most decidedly opposed to them in every respect were advanced to offices of trust; till at last both the general and the treasurer felt that they continued in office by sufferance only; nay, the very victories achieved by Marlborough had manifestly lost their lustre in the eyes both of the government and the people. It was under these distressing and humiliating circumstances that Marlborough was invited to return to the Hague, for the purpose of carrying on the negotiation, of the report of which he had been the bearer; at the same time that it was more

than broadly hinted to him that the people of England required a peace both honourable and of speedy conclusion.

Marlborough visited the Continent twice during the spring of this year, and twice returned to London, in order to explain the order of his conduct, and receive fresh instructions. Nor were these precautions by any means uncalled for. In the first place, the French monarch left no artifice of diplomacy untried, for the purpose of blinding and over-reaching the allies. At one moment he proposed to dismember Spain; to resign a large portion of it to Charles of Austria, and to reserve the remainder for his grandson. At another, he held out on the subject of the Dutch frontier alone; refusing to give up the very places of which, above all others, it appeared to Marlborough that the command ought not to remain with France. Nor were other and less worthy temptations wanting. The marquis de Torcy, Louis's agent, scrupled not to try the fidelity of Marlborough with the offer of bribes to an enormous amount; from which, according to the narrative of Torcy himself, the English general turned away with coldness and dignity. No reproaches were, indeed, cast out against the French diplomatist. At that age, and under such circumstances, reproaches would have been absolutely thrown away; for bribery was then the grand argument to which all men yielded; and Torcy, in applying it to Marlborough, only tried him by the very same test which he had himself found effectual in numberless instances. But Marlborough took no notice of the offers; contenting himself with profound silence, or instantly diverting the conversation into some other channel. Finally, he brought forward the ultimatum of England, to which the rest of the allies subscribed; and it was formally handed for consideration to the French monarch. Spain, the Indies, and the Milanese, were demanded in absolute integrity by king Charles; two months only were allowed to Philip for the evacuation of Spain; the recognition of the queen's title to

the throne of England, the expulsion of James from the soil of France, and the dismantlement of Dunkirk as a fort, were claimed ; a number of strong places, both in the Low Countries and elsewhere, were required to be conceded ; and besides a variety of stipulations in favour of the duke of Savoy, a treaty of commerce between France and England was suggested. Last of all, it was stated, that if, at the close of two months, Spain were not evacuated by the French troops, and the strong holds in Italy and the Low Countries possessed by Dutch or German garrisons, the armistice should immediately cease. It must be confessed, that these were harsh terms, when submitted to a sovereign still exceedingly powerful, and during many years accustomed to dictate to his neighbours. We cannot, therefore, be surprised to find that they were without hesitation rejected, and that the negotiations which depended upon them were abruptly concluded.

We are not ignorant that on Marlborough was laid, by the party writers of his own time, the chief blame of forcing France into a renewal of the war. Probably he was far from mourning over the occurrence, either as a public or a private calamity : but let justice be done. His own correspondence, given to the world by archdeacon Coxe, distinctly proves that he considered many of the conditions as harsh and uncalled for. In favour of some, he had, indeed, taken his ground ; and from that neither bribes nor arguments could prevail upon him to move. He insisted upon the necessity of disuniting for ever the crowns of France and Spain ; and on the subject of the dismantling of Dunkirk he was not less decided ; but to the suspicious and short-sighted policy which sought to impose upon Louis the necessity of withdrawing beyond the Pyrenees within the space of two months, he stood avowedly opposed. " I have as much mistrust for the sincerity of France," says he, in a letter to Godolphin, " as any body living can have ; but I will own to you, that in my opinion, if France had delivered the towns promised by the preliminaries,

and demolished Dunkirk and the other towns mentioned, they must have been at our discretion; so that if they had played tricks, so much the worse for themselves; but I do not love to be singular, especially when it was doing what France seemed to desire." This, with many other remarks, more especially in his letters to the duchess, prove to demonstration that Marlborough was not disposed to throw unnecessary impediments in the way of peace. Nor ought the fact to be kept out of view, that, in conducting this negotiation, he was only one of two commissioners. Lord Townshend landed along with him at the Hague, on the 18th of May; and ceased not to take his full share in all the conferences and epistolary correspondence which ensued.

During the whole of the period occupied in conducting these negotiations, both Louis and the allies, as if aware in what they would terminate, left no measures untried in order to recruit their respective forces, and bring them early into the field. On the side of the confederates, indeed, the remissness usual among belligerents of their class produced its wonted effect. Marlborough found not the continental powers only, but England herself, ill disposed to continue the expenditure necessary towards the efficiency of the army; nevertheless, he contrived so far to recruit his corps, that, when all hope of accommodation died away, he was enabled to count upon a disposable army of not less than 110,000 men. Nor were the French more inactive on their part in restoring the losses sustained in previous campaigns. Marshal Villars, one of the most fortunate if not the ablest of their generals, was now at the head of affairs. He commanded an army in no respect inferior, if it failed to exceed, that of the allies; and he occupied an allignment which seemed to place him beyond the reach of molestation, at the same time that it effectually covered the north-eastern frontier of France. He lay in rear of a chain of fortified villages, between Douay and Bethune, having his right covered by canals and morasses, and his left by streams and swamps;

while the post of La Bassée, strengthened by numerous field-works and redoubts, constituted a convenient *point d'appui* for his centre.

It was the 12th of June when Marlborough and Eugene, who, on the breaking off of the negotiation, had hurried forward to Brussels, found themselves in a condition to quit that city and move to the front. On the 13th they arrived at Alost, where a flying camp was formed, and during some days were employed in reviewing the separate divisions of the army. But it was not till the 21st that the state of the roads, rendered impassable by a succession of heavy rains, enabled them to concentrate upon a line between Courtray and Menin. Here a sort of council of war being held, the possibility of forcing the enemy's entrenchments was considered, as well as the policy of reducing one or more of the strong towns which covered the northern frontier of France; and as the former project appeared beset with many difficulties, from which the latter was free, it was arranged that for the present the operations should be confined to a campaign of sieges. Finally, as the first choice lay between Ypres and Tournay, of which the one was, beyond all comparison, more important than the other, it was resolved to begin with Tournay, care being taken so to guide their marches, that Villars might be held in suspense, if not deceived into a belief that Ypres was actually threatened.

Our limits are too narrow to permit a detailed account of the several masterly movements which followed this determination. We must content ourselves, therefore, with stating, that by pushing his battering train up the Lys, while his troops in three columns passed the Dyle, Marlborough led Villars to expect either that Ypres would be placed in a state of siege, or that his own position would be attempted. In order more effectually to guard against the former event, the French took ground considerably to their left; while they withdrew, at the same time, a portion of the garrison from Tournay, and

placed it *en potence* on the space thus vacated. Marlborough no sooner became aware of these changes, than he directed the heavy guns instantly to descend the Lys; he then ordered back his baggage on the road to Lille; ostentatiously summoned a council of war; and on the 26th gave out, that by dawn the following morning the enemy should be attacked at the post of Bassée. But that very night his real plan developed itself. Having led his columns so close to the French outposts that both men and officers held their breath in momentary expectation of the signal gun, he suddenly turned to the left, and passing rapidly in two columns by Pont à Bovines, and Pont à Tressin, took the road to Tournay. The place was partly invested before noon on the 27th, by general Lumley's division; soon after sunset, Eugene's corps arrived; and at an early hour next day, the piquets were driven in, and a line of circumvallation formed. So well, indeed, had the whole matter been arranged, that a large foraging party sent out from the garrison, with several officers of rank, fell into the hands of the allies; being surprised by the advanced guard while scattered in the fields, and, with their cattle and corn, made prisoners.

Before they began to move, Marlborough and Eugene divided their forces into two *corps d'armée*, of one of which, their relative strength being nearly equal, each took the command. According to previous agreement, Marlborough now sat down before the town, while Eugene took post between him and the enemy; and as soon as the battering cannon and stores could be brought into camp, the siege formally began. It was a toilsome and a perilous service; so perilous, indeed, as to draw from Villars an expression of thankfulness that his illustrious opponent had adventured upon it: but Villars proved himself at once ignorant of the resources which a genius like that of Marlborough can command, and wilfully blind to his own improvidence. The town of Tournay held out only twenty days from the opening of the trenches. On the 29th of July it was surrendered; and

the garrison withdrawing into the citadel, it, in its turn, became the object of a fierce attack.

At the period of which we are now treating, though the science of fortification had arrived at a high state of perfection, the art of attack was as yet comparatively little understood. Of mines, in particular, the greatest horror was entertained, because the means of discovering and counter-working them were unknown; and the process of sap, now so well defined and so easily applied, could scarcely be regarded as methodised. On the citadel of Tournay, however, Vauban had exhausted all his skill; it presented in consequence no ordinary obstacles to the assailants. Mines beneath mines covered it on every side; contregardes, tenaillons, lunettes, and other outworks protected the body of the place; and a complete set of galleries and covered ways rendered each point defensible, by the facility with which others could communicate with it. In pushing their approaches against such a fortress the allies sustained heavy losses, and experienced repeated checks. Several detachments which, after a great deal of difficulty, had established themselves in the outworks, were one after another blown up; and a whole battalion, after taking possession of what was supposed to be the grand mine, suffered a similar fate. Nevertheless, Marlborough continued to press the siege with determined resolution and activity. He had assented, ere ground was broken, to a proposition, on the part of the governor, that a piece of art so masterly should be spared, provided Louis would permit its gates to be opened in the event of the non-arrival of succour within a given time. As soon, however, as the French monarch rejected the proposal, Marlborough employed every expedient then known to reduce it; nor was M. Surville less resolute in defending, than the English general in attacking. From morning till night, and from night till morning, assaults were continually hazarded and met; and the arena of the strife was not unfrequently under ground, among the galleries and branches of the mines.

While this furious siege lasted, Villars, at once afraid to quit his lines, and anxious to bring relief to the beleaguered citadel, pursued that wavering and middle course, which, whether in politics or in war, has never yet led to any fortunate result. Previous to the investment, Marlborough had taken care to establish a chain of posts on the Lys, by means of which his communications with Menin, Ghent, and Bruges were kept open. Against these the French marshal contented himself with sending out detachments; and though he succeeded in surprising one, he could neither retain it nor make the slightest impression upon the rest. A corps from the allied camp, indeed, no sooner moved to the support of these posts, than the hostile column retreated, razing the works of Warneton, of which they had made themselves masters, and leaving both Comines and Pont Rouge uninjured.

It was now the end of August. By dint of extraordinary courage and perseverance, the approaches were pushed to the crest of the glacis, and a practicable breach, or one which appeared to be practicable, was effected in the body of the citadel. Dispositions were indeed made to give the assault, when, at daybreak on the 31st, a white flag was seen to float from the enemy's alarm post: at first, however, M. Surville's requisitions proved such, that, anxious as the allied generals were to bring the service to a close, they could not for a moment entertain them. The firing was accordingly resumed, and continued with increasing fury throughout the 1st, the 2d, and part of the 3d of September; but towards evening on the latter day the governor again requested terms, and his demands being more moderate, they were granted. In consequence of this capitulation, the citadel of Tournay opened its gates on the 5th; the garrison, after marching out with all the honours of war, laid down their arms in the ditch; and the men being allowed to retain their knapsacks, the officers their swords and baggage, the whole became prisoners of war. In consideration, however, of the extreme gallantry which they had

displayed, the allied chiefs declined to transport them to foreign countries; they were, on the contrary, sent back to France, under a promise that they would not serve again till exchanged: and promises being then, whatever they may be now, regarded as sacred, the treaty was on both sides faithfully fulfilled.

We have alluded to the apparent supineness of marshal Villars during the progress of this operation, and to the petty skirmishes by which alone he gave occupation to the covering army; it is not, however, to be imagined that he lay all the while inactive, or that he ceased to consider the consequences which threatened, should the allies prove successful in their present undertaking. Many an anxious glance was, on the contrary, turned towards the country behind him, into which he could not but anticipate that Marlborough, so soon as the fall of Tournay set him free, would endeavour to penetrate; and the means of providing for its security occupied, as they deserved, a large share of his attention. The lines which originally connected Douay with Bethune were extended on either flank, till the left rested upon St. Venant, the right upon the Scheld; ditches were dug, numerous abatis spread, and breastworks thrown up, from the vicinity of Valenciennes to Mons; and similar works falling back again from Mons towards the Sambre, formed a sort of triangle, of which Mons was the apex. Nearly thirty leagues of country was thus embraced by fortifications more or less formidable; and the passages of the Scarpe, the Scheld, the Dyle, the Haine, and the Trouille, were guarded. But the very extent of this allignment afforded, to a leader like Marlborough, the utmost facility of acting against it; for no army that ever took the field could watch it in force from extremity to extremity. Marlborough was not unaware that every thing would depend upon his taking or missing the lead in the pending operations; and hence, after maturely calculating his chances, he resolved to strike a blow where it should fall at once most heavily and least expected.

On the 31st of August, before the citadel fell, lord Orkney was detached, at the head of all the grenadiers in the army, together with forty squadrons of horse, towards St. Ghislain on the Haine. Of this post, which commanded the passages of the river, he was directed to attempt the surprise; while, in the event of failure, he was to occupy the woods of Etambruges and Bandour, and to mask the intended movement of the main body. A second corps, which mustered 4000 infantry, with 60 squadrons, was, on the 3d of September, sent in the same direction. Its commander, the prince of Hesse-Cassel, was instructed to pass the Haine, and to invest Mons on the south-west, should he find that lord Orkney's attempts had succeeded; and in case St. Ghislain should still hold out, he was to follow a circuitous route by Nimy and Obourg, and effect his purpose by forcing the ill-guarded lines on the Trouille. At nine the same evening, general Cadogan, moving with forty squadrons, followed on the same track. At midnight, the whole of the covering army struck its tents; while the besieging force, leaving twenty-six battalions to see the terms of capitulation executed, and to watch Villars, crossed the Scheld by the town bridge. On the 4th, a junction was formed between the besieging and covering armies at Brissoeul; on the 5th, in spite of a violent storm of rain, the march was continued towards Siraut; and lord Orkney coming in on the same day, after an unsuccessful demonstration before St. Ghislain, the whole took up a position facing towards the west, about four miles in rear of the Haine.

Meanwhile the prince of Hesse, with extraordinary diligence and address, was following up the secondary manœuvre chalked out for him. Finding that lord Orkney had failed, and that St. Ghislain held out, he moved promptly to the left, and ascending the Haine as far as Nimy, doubled back under cover of the wood of St. Denis, and passed the stream not far from Obourg. This took place at two in the morning of the 6th: the troops rested for a few hours among the meadows and

orchards, and at seven they were again in motion. At ten they began to cross the hill behind St. Simphorien; at eleven, the Trouille was passed near Espiennes, and by noon the enemy's works were penetrated, without the firing of a shot. A French corps, under the chevalier de Luxembourg, which Villars had sent from Condé, arrived just in time to see the chain broken; and, apprehensive that the whole of the allies were coming on, made no effort to oppose them; on the contrary, they precipitately retreated; while the prince, filing to the right, fixed his head-quarters at the abbey of Beliant; and by throwing out posts as far as Jemappe, completely interposed himself between Mons and the French army.

These several movements were in progress, and in some degree far advanced, ere Villars began to act in opposition to them. It was not, indeed, till the 3d of September that he quitted the lines of Douay, at the head of the cavalry of his right wing; and it was two in the morning of the 4th ere he reached Louvain. Here he halted; for his infantry, which he had commanded to follow, were far behind, and it became necessary to direct a movement of his left wing which should place it on the ground vacated by the right. On the 5th, however, he again took the direction of the Trouille; but the appearance of the allies at Simphorien alarmed him, and he precipitately fell back. Like Luxembourg, he received an impression that the whole of the confederate army was in his front; and hence the prince of Hesse, though threatened by a force in every respect overwhelming, was permitted, without so much as a skirmish, to effect his object. It is scarcely necessary to add, that Marlborough allowed his opponent no leisure to discover his mistake. His columns were in motion from Siraut at early dawn on the 6th; intelligence of the success of the advance served only to accelerate their progress; and before sunset, Mons was invested, and the army in position between Obourg and Hyon.

That night both Marlborough and Eugene spent with the prince of Hesse in the convent; for their anxiety to

congratulate him on his conduct and good fortune would not permit them to rest till they had paid to him the compliments which he so richly merited.

The condition of Mons was at this time such as to render it quite incapable, unless powerfully relieved from without, of effecting any serious resistance to a besieging force. Wretchedly supplied with military stores, and held by a garrison both numerically weak and sickly, it had been regarded by Villars rather as an hospital than a post; yet was its position with reference to the lines of Douay in the highest degree important, and the necessity of preventing it from capture imminent. It was fair to conclude, therefore, that the enemy would use every exertion to re-establish their communications with it; and the event proved that, in arriving at this opinion, the allied generals had not reasoned on mistaken grounds. Villars so sooner discovered his error, than he made the most strenuous exertions to remedy it. A few brigades alone being left to watch the entrenchments, the whole of his disposable force was drawn to his right, till he could muster in position between Montroeul and Attiche 130 battalions and 260 squadrons, with a train of 80 pieces of cannon. On the 9th, moreover, he was joined by marshal Boufflers, who, though his superior in rank, volunteered, on the present occasion, to serve under him; and Boufflers, not less than Villars himself, being a prodigious favourite with the troops, the enthusiasm of all was excited to the highest. It was accordingly given out that even a general action would not be shunned, should other means of relieving Mons fail; and the satisfaction which the army experienced at the prospect of bringing matters to an issue was signified by a *feu de joie* in the camp. Marlborough was not ignorant either of his adversary's designs, or of the excellent spirit which prevailed among his soldiers. In his own army he also reposed unbounded confidence; and he lost no time in bringing its scattered corps within reach one of the other, and disposing them along a plateau where they could all act together.

While the enemy lay between Montroeul and Attiche, with an advanced corps at Bousou, and patrols extending beyond Wasmes, Marlborough was not without suspicion that he intended to manœuvre, for the purpose of throwing reinforcements into Mons by the road which passes Jemappe. In order to prevent this, he detached a division of the infantry, supported by guns and cavalry, to Quaregnon and the heights above St. Ghislain, himself occupying a line with his left at Quevy and his right at Ciply. But he had not long effected these arrangements, when the firing in the French camp, together with the movement of some cavalry corps, gave rise to a report that Villars was advancing. A fresh disposition was in consequence judged advisable; and columns of march were formed, for the purpose of covering the four grand defiles of Aulnoit and Blaregnies to the east, and Wasmes and Bousou to the west; but as the whole moved in magnificent array over the undulating heights, which give a peculiar character to the plain of Mons, the advanced guard fell in with a body of French hussars, and the rumour of an immediate attack obtaining strength, the march was suddenly countermanded. The heads of the British columns instantly bore inwards, those of the imperialists taking an opposite direction; and while the light troops of both continued to skirmish throughout the day, a new order of encampment was issued. Prince Eugene, jealous of the defile of Jemappe, passed on with all his troops to Quaregnon; while Marlborough took ground with his right in front of the village of Genly, and his left thrown back again to its original position at Quevy.

The hostile armies were now encamped at a distance of less than two leagues from one another, on a plateau which may be described as forming an irregular parallelogram, with the towns of Mons and Bavay, and the villages of Quevrain and Givry as its angular points. Encompassed in some degree by four rivers, the Haine, the Trouille, the Honeau, and the Hon, the country composing this parallelogram presented the appearance of a hilly surface; through which many lesser streams

forced their way along the bottoms of waving ravines or deep hollows. Extensive woods clothed the face of the country, with here and there an opening laid out in culture: villages, hamlets, and detached farm-houses were likewise scattered over it; and towards the east, in the immediate vicinity of Malplaquet, lay a heath of some extent. If looked at with the eye of an ordinary traveller, the whole space well deserved to be accounted beautiful; if with the glance of a soldier, it was, indeed, peculiarly striking. There were not more than four defiles by which the troops could pretend to make their way from the base between Bavay and Quevrain towards Mons; there were but two through which an army, after closing up to the line of wood between Laniere and Bousou, could be assailed; and hence, either for attack or defence, it were difficult to imagine a tract more fertile in strong military positions.

Of the arrangements adopted by Marlborough, for the purpose of blocking up these defiles, we have already spoken, as well as of the circumstances which induced him to suspend the manœuvre. Villars was soon informed of the latter event. He heard likewise that the passes on the left were covered, while those on the right were still open; and he determined to seize the latter, as a means of commanding the road towards the Trouille. With this view he detached, a little before dusk on the evening of the 8th, a corps of cavalry to occupy the interval between the woods of Laniere and Blaregnies; a second corps, composed of the ordinary reliefs for the guards, followed that night; and by early dawn on the 9th, the whole army marched in four columns towards the same point. Still, the outposts on the heights of Bousou were not withdrawn. It was an object of the first importance that the march to the right should be masked, and the allies kept in suspense as to the quarter where danger really threatened; and as the broken nature of the country afforded the utmost facility to the measure, the patrols were left at their stations without any support. The consequence was,

that at ten o'clock the columns reached the glen or pass of La Louviere without molestation. There they halted; the grenadiers and some light battalions, supported by two brigades of cavalry, crossing the heath of Malplaquet to the wood of Laniere, where they drew up facing the open space of Aulnoit, in front of the position occupied by Marlborough's divisions.

While these arrangements were in progress, Marlborough and Eugene, escorted by thirty squadrons of horse, proceeded as far as the mill of Sart to reconnoitre. The reports of their own scouts which met them here, not less than the attitude of the enemy's piquets, led them at first to believe that the road by Jemappe was threatened; but no great while elapsed ere they learned from more authentic sources that a very different manœuvre was in contemplation. The chiefs instantly separated; Eugene turning off towards Quaregnon, while Marlborough made haste to throw forward his own corps into the mouth of the menaced pass. In the most perfect order, and with admirable despatch, the change of ground was effected. An easy march brought the left of the British troops to the wood of Laniere, while the right rested upon Sart; and the French columns arriving simultaneously on the plain of Malplaquet, an immediate battle seemed inevitable; yet nothing of the kind took place. Marlborough would have attacked, it is true, because he saw by the dust in the enemy's rear that his army was still in march, and the ground being narrow, his own inferiority in point of numbers would not have been felt. But the Dutch deputies, as usual, interfered. After a trifling cavalry skirmish, therefore, and a cannonade productive of no decisive result, both parties pitched their tents; Marlborough establishing his head-quarters at Blaregnies, while Villars took possession of Malplaquet.

From the 9th to the 11th, no event of importance befell, further than that Eugene's corps, recalled from Quaregnon, came in to the camp; and Villars, instead of attempting to force a passage through the defile, began

strongly to fortify himself in its gorge. In prosecution of this scheme, he covered the highest ground in the opening of Aulnoit with redoubts, and entrenchments, and throwing his wings forward into the woods on each side, placed them also behind a chain of breastworks. By these means his order of battle became concentric, that is to say, he assumed the form of a crescent, so as to bring a heavy weight of cross-fire on the space immediately in front of his centre; and he disposed his battalions with so much judgment, that there was not a marsh, rivulet, or other natural encumbrance, which was not, to a greater or less degree, turned to account. Such was his first line or more advanced position, every approach to which was rendered difficult by the interposition of abatis and ditches; his second, or line of support, ran from Malplaquet on the right, to the Chaussée de Bois in rear of the wood of Taisnière on the left. His cavalry, again, with the exception of twenty-five squadrons, which held an open space in rear of the right, drew up in several lines from the heath to the farm of La Folie; while his artillery, after planting twenty pieces in one battery on the summit of a height in his centre, he distributed all along his line among the several field-works that protected it. In this order, scarcely daring to hope that he would be attacked, yet himself determined not to act on the offensive, he lay upon his arms during two whole days, one half of his troops being employed with the spade and pick-axe, while the other half stood accoutred ready to defend them.

Since the commencement of the war two such armies as now faced one another had never been brought into the field. In point of numbers, neither could, perhaps, boast of any decisive superiority, for they mustered each about 100,000 combatants; and if the artillery of the allies surpassed that of Villars in amount, every advantage of position and arrangement was with the French marshal. But it is not on these grounds alone that we speak of the hosts arrayed in the vicinity of Malpla-

quet, as affording a more than ordinarily attractive subject both to the poet and the historian. All the chivalry of Europe seemed to have taken part on one side or the other. In the ranks of the allies we find, besides Marlborough and Eugene, count Tilly, the commander of the Dutch contingent, the princes of Orange and Hesse-Cassel, generals Schulemberg, Bulau, Lottum, Albemarle, Vichleu, and Fagel; besides Cadogan, Argyle, Lumley, the prince of Avergne, Dohna, Oxenstiern, Spaar, Rantzau, Aurochs, Withers, Stair, Grovestein, and Hamilton. Each of these held an elevated rank, and commanded a division or a brigade; while, among the inferior officers, we find such names as the prince royal of Prussia, Saxe, Munich, and Schwerin. In the French camp, again, might be found Boufflers, the experienced and the brave Artagnan, better known in after-times as the celebrated marshal de Montesquiou, De Guiche, marshal de Grammont, Puysegur, Montmorenci, Coigny, Broglio, Chaulnes, Nangis, Isenghien, Duras, La Motte Houdancourt, Albergotti, and Pallavicini. St. Hilaire, likewise, and Folard, both renowned in the annals of science, were there; and, though last not least, the chevalier St. George. With the exception of the unfortunate representative of the house of Stuart who served only in the capacity of a volunteer, there was not one out of all this illustrious list but lent the aid of his great talents, as well in arranging as in commanding the troops: well, therefore, might it be said, that, in the operations which ensued, not the skill of the two commanders only, but that of all the ablest officers of the age, was fairly and deliberately brought to trial.

It has been stated, that from the 9th to the 11th no event of moment occurred; we should have expressed ourselves more accurately had we said that no hostile movements were made, nor any further skirmishes permitted. Not that the allies were all this while idle. They met, on the contrary, in frequent councils, when the propriety of acting decisively and at once was discussed; and they ordered from Tournay the battalions

that had been left to receive the submission of that citadel, and to dispose of the prisoners. Finally, a plan of attack was arranged, and detailed instructions given to the commanders of the several columns which were to lead and support it; and their proper stations being assigned to all, to infantry, cavalry, and guns, the whole lay down, on the night of the 10th, in anxious expectation of the morrow.

Marlborough had carefully reconnoitred the enemy's lines, so as to make himself fully acquainted both with their excellences and their defects. He saw that neither the right nor the centre of that formidable position could be assailed with effect, so long as the troops on the left held their ground; and, beset with difficulties as the manœuvre of turning them seemed to be, he resolved to attempt it. With this view, the division from Tournay of which general Withers was at the head, received instructions not to join the camp, but to pass through the wood of Blangies by a by-path, and so gaining the enemy's rear, or at all events their extreme left, to take them in reverse at the farm of La Folie. Meanwhile, forty battalions from Eugene's army, under the immediate command of baron Schulemberg, were to attack the left flank of the wood of Taisniere, and at every expense and hazard to force it. To support this advance, not fewer than forty pieces were to be planted, the fire from which should bear upon the wood; and strong working parties were ordered to cover them just before they began to play, from the effect of an enfilade by epaulements. Simultaneously with these operations, a double attack was to be made upon the works which Villars had thrown up in the wood of Taisniere; one brigade passing from Mons by the Sart road round a morass to the left, while a division under count Lottum assaulted the opposite flank. Finally, both the centre and right were to be threatened; the former chiefly by cavalry, the latter by three corps of infantry, under the command of the prince of Orange, general Dohna, and general Welderen; though they were all equally instructed not seriously to engage

till they should receive positive directions so to do from the commander-in-chief. Such is an imperfect outline of the dispositions made by Marlborough, and of the instructions issued to his lieutenants during the night of the 10th: it remained to be seen how far these could possess both temper and intelligence sufficient to act up to them.

At three o'clock in the morning of the 11th, full two hours before dawn, the allied troops got under arms, and, forming into open squares of divisions, listened with profound attention to the performance of divine service. As soon as this was ended, the guns began to move, and in less than an hour were all arranged in position. One heavy battery of forty pieces was planted in advance of the farm of Cour-Tournant, and, protected on the left by an epaulement, looked towards the enemy's works which covered the wood of Taisniere. Another, of nearly equal weight, marching to the left, prepared to act against the farm of Bleron, and the breast-works and redoubts which supported it; while the remainder were distributed along the whole line, according as the nature of the ground, and the aspect of the enemy's entrenchments, seemed to require. Meanwhile both infantry and cavalry broke into order of march, the several columns diverging towards the points against which each was to act, till, having closed up to the advanced posts, they assumed a new disposition, preparatory to the grand advance. All, moreover, was done in profound silence and perfect order. Scarcely a word was spoken, either by officers or men, beyond the few sentences necessary for the purpose of directing the movements; for even the rude jokes which usually accompany similar openings were, as if by common consent, suspended. As daylight came on, a dense fog, which overhung the open country, continued, for a while, to skreen the hostile armies from one another. It proved so far advantageous to the allies, that it enabled them to complete, without molestation, their complicated arrangements; but it did not for one moment keep the

enemy in doubt as to the work which they should be called upon to perform. The heavy lumbering of artillery, the trampling of hoofs, and the measured tread of infantry, had been heard for some hours by the piquets; and Villars, made aware of the circumstance, drew out his magnificent array in confident anticipation of a battle. There was, therefore, no backwardness on the part of the French, nor any absence of preparation, when the mist, slowly dispersing, exposed the dispositions which Marlborough had made. The first shot, on the contrary, which was fired that day came from their grand battery, of which we have already spoken, as covering the heights in the opening of Aulnoit; and it was immediately followed by a heavy cannonade, more alarming for a time than it proved fatal.

The cannonade had continued about half an hour, and a few lives were lost on both sides, when Marlborough directed his left to advance for the purpose of making the preconcerted demonstration on the enemy's right and centre. One Dutch column of nine battalions, commanded by the prince of Orange, accordingly pushed on, threatening an angle of the enemy's works close to the wood of Laniere; while another, which consisted of twenty-two battalions, under count Lottum, made a similar movement upon the centre. So soon, however, as he had arrived within the extreme range of grape, the prince of Orange halted, while Lottum, bringing up his left shoulder, suddenly formed in three lines, with his face towards the right flank of the wood of Taisniere. Meanwhile, Schulemberg led his division against the left of the same wood also in three lines; while lord Orkney made ready to occupy the space left vacant, with fifteen battalions more. And now the signal was given, by a general discharge from the grand battery. It was promptly and gallantly obeyed; and in ten minutes the columns of attack were in motion.

While Lottum's corps advanced with a slow and orderly step round the left of the grand battery, that of Schulemberg skirted the wood of Sart, and pushed di-

rectly upon the projecting point in the enemy's left wing. Almost at the same moment the brigade from Mons penetrated into the wood; and being unnoticed during the excitement occasioned by Schulemberg's approach, gained ground in the same direction. As yet, however, not a musket had been fired on either side. The Austrians, indeed, suffered severely from a ceaseless discharge of grape, while struggling over the broken ground which lay in their front; but it was not till they had arrived within pistol-shot of the lines, that the French infantry began to act: then, indeed, a volley was given; it fell in with dreadful effect; for the French, leaning their pieces over the parapet, felt themselves to be in a great measure secure, and took cool and deliberate aim. The Austrians recoiled beneath the storm; they even retreated a space of 200 yards, in spite of the strenuous exertions of the officers: nor was their order perfectly restored throughout the remainder of the battle. Nevertheless, their courage and confidence soon returned; they extended their files so as to outflank the entrenchments, and carry their extreme right round a morass, to which Villars had in some degree trusted as impervious; where, falling in with the brigade from Mons, they attached it to themselves. The whole line then advanced again, under an incessant discharge of musketry, which they promptly returned; and the slaughter on both sides was terrible.

This attack was scarcely begun, when Lottum, quickening his pace, fell furiously upon the point which he had been directed to assail. A perfect tempest of musket balls greeted him, yet he pressed steadily forward: and, clearing a ravine as well as a shallow bog, rushed with fixed bayonets against the parapet. For a moment his leading companies were in possession of the work, but it was only for a moment. Villars was here in person; he rallied his broken troops, led up a fresh brigade to their support, and charged, fairly sweeping the allies before him. But the works were scarcely emptied, when a new attack developed itself; a portion of the second

line of the allies being brought up in the interval between Lottum's and Schulemberg's corps, while the farm of La Folie, on the extreme left of the whole, became threatened by the arrival of Withers's division. A fierce and desperate struggle now ensued. Marlborough arrived in person, to aid it with a strong body of cavalry, which covered the flank of Lottum's division; and the enemy at last gave way. Their flank menaced on two points, and their rear gained at La Folie, they could no longer maintain the more advanced angle of their lines; and they accordingly abandoned it, though in excellent order, and took post behind an abatis in the wood.

All this while, the divisions of the prince of Orange and lord Orkney rested on their arms within half-cannon shot of the enemy. They did, indeed, all that was required of them, so long as they kept the right and centre of the French from moving; for it was to his success on the left, and the consequences likely to accrue from it, that Marlborough mainly depended: but the prince of Orange was brave and impetuous; and he began, at last, to grow weary of his situation. Without waiting for orders, and in defiance of the wishes of marshal Tilly, he led on his people, and made a dash to win the entrenchments by which the wood was covered. Nothing could exceed the gallantry of this corps. Headed by the Scottish brigade, under lord Tullibardine, they rushed forward, in defiance of a murderous fire of all arms; and, without so much as halting to draw breath, forced their way to the top of the breast-work. But before they could deploy, they were in their turn charged, beaten back, and very roughly handled. A like fortune attended an equally brilliant assault, by which, for a moment, one of the enemy's principal batteries was won. The Dutch corps, which effected it, were attacked by Boufflers in person, cut down by hundreds, and repelled; while a second battery, opening upon their flank, made fearful havoc among them. Having lost upwards of 2000 men in killed, besides a much larger number wounded, the wreck of this magnificent

corps was compelled to retreat; nor could all the efforts of the prince avail, to lead them a second time to destruction. Nor was the fate which attended baron Fagel's division different. Like the troops on its left, this fine body of men charged and carried the fortified enclosure at Bleron, only to be driven out again by superior numbers; while Boufflers, heading some squadrons, committed dreadful slaughter as they fell back in confusion.

Things were in this state, and many urgent messages had been sent to recall Marlborough, and from his own right, when he arrived, followed by a numerous staff, on the spot. He was almost immediately joined by Eugene, to whom intelligence of these disasters had likewise been communicated; and both exerted themselves to restore order and bring back confidence to the men. They had in some degree effected this, and were in the act of pointing out to the generals that there was no necessity for active operations in that quarter, when a staff-officer arrived, his horse covered with sweat, to announce that the enemy were assuming the initiative both at La Folie and in the wood of Taisniere. The truth is, that Villars, anxious to recover his ground on the left, had repeatedly applied to Boufflers for such a reinforcement as should enable him to do so; and finding that no battalions were sent, he at last, though with extreme reluctance, weakened his centre. Marlborough saw in a moment the great error of which his adversary had been guilty. While he flew, therefore, in person, towards the right, for the purpose of cheering the troops there, he directed lord Orkney to advance with his battalions; a cloud of cavalry being instructed to support him, as well as to occupy the flat ground beyond, so soon as an opening should be made. The happiest results attended both endeavours. The troops on the extreme right, animated by the presence of Eugene, not only repelled the enemy's attack, but gained ground on them: La Folie was furiously assailed; the wood was again the scene of a close and desperate struggle, in which for a time the enemy prevailed, till Villars him-

self, while gallantly leading a charge of bayonets, received a severe wound above the knee. Meanwhile lord Orkney, bearing down all opposition, penetrated a chain of redoubts which covered the French centre. The cavalry, sweeping through the intervals, spread themselves upon the plain ; the grand battery of forty guns, breaking off into two divisions, flew to the right and left, and brought an irresistible cross-fire on the enemy's reserves; yet these, which consisted entirely of horse (for the infantry was all drawn off to the flanks), bore up against the storm nobly. They even charged the allied squadrons, of which but a portion found time to form, though without producing the slightest impression ; and they retired only when the hope of support evaporating, they saw themselves exposed to absolute annihilation.

The formidable position which Villars had laboured with so much diligence to strengthen was no longer tenable. Pierced in the centre, and turned on the left, the French saw themselves menaced on every side ; while their general, borne wounded from the field, was incapable either of extricating them from their difficulties, or retrieving the fortune of the day. Still, they were far from yielding to despair. Boufflers, made aware of the condition in which affairs stood, flew from his own post on the right, and collecting a mass of 2000 of the élite of the cavalry, the garde de corps, gendarmes, and others, endeavoured to drive the allies before him. Their horse he overthrew and dispersed ; their infantry, however, drawn up upon the captured redoubts, threw in such a fire as no troops whatever could withstand ; and again were the choicest of the cavaliers of France compelled to turn their backs. One more effort was made. A body of infantry was withdrawn from the works in rear of Bleron, and marched hastily to the left ; while at the same time the squadrons were re-formed, and led back to the charge. But it was now too late. Marlborough was at hand with a reinforcement of English horse, which swept the garde de corps from the field ; the infantry, checked by a murderous discharge from the guns on the

right and left, staggered and stood still; while at the same moment the prince of Orange, having discovered that the force in his front was diminished, bore down simultaneously with the prince of Hesse. In ten minutes the entrenchments were won, both at Bleron and in the wood of Laniere, and the entire allignment, cut into morsels, ceased to be defensible.

Boufflers saw that the battle was lost, and made all his dispositions for a retreat. It was conducted with the utmost regularity, in three columns; the whole being covered by a strong reserve under Luxembourg; and as the allies were too much exhausted to press them in their march, little or no loss was sustained. One column crossed the Hon at Taisniere; another filed through the woods in a parallel direction, till, arriving at the plain in front of Bavai, they there united: the third again withdrew towards Quesnoy, passing the Honeau at Audrignies; and the whole finally re-assembled by dawn the following morning, in a position between Quesnoy and Valenciennes. With respect, again, to the allies, they pursued no farther than the heath of Malplaquet, and the level grounds about Taisnière; where, worn down by the exertions which they had made, and oppressed with sleep, they spent the night in bivouac.

It is not very easy to determine the exact amount of loss sustained by either army in this memorable battle. If we may give credit to Villars, there fell of the allies 35,000 men; while in the French lines not more than 6000 or 7000 casualties could be reckoned: but a statement so glaringly ridiculous carries upon the very face of it more than a sufficient refutation. The truth we believe to be, that while the confederates had to lament in killed and wounded about 20,000 soldiers, the enemy found themselves weakened to the amount of 15,000 only; a proportion not incredible, when the strength of their position is considered. Be this, however, as it may, we know that the victory of Malplaquet, though of the greatest moral consequence, was purchased at an expense of life not before equalled during the war; indeed, the defeated Frenchman

found consolation under his reverses in being able to assure his sovereign that a few more such defeats would deliver him from all apprehension of protracted hostilities. Nevertheless, the political results even of so murderous a triumph were exceedingly gratifying. Marlborough was at once set free from all risk of molestation while occupied in the siege of Mons; and the fall of that place, it was justly calculated, would open out to him the road to still greater and more important conquests.

Having halted only so long as was necessary to secure their prisoners and provide for the wounded, the allies proceeded to resume the investment of Mons; Marlborough re-establishing his head-quarters near Beliant, while Eugene again took post at Quaregnon. A corps of 30 battalions and as many squadrons was then placed under the immediate command of the prince of Orange, for the purpose of conducting the siege; and the utmost exertions were made to bring up from Brussels guns, stores, and entrenching tools. But a succession of violent rains materially impeded the progress of the convoys. The country, likewise, around Mons being naturally swampy, a good deal of difficulty was experienced in commencing operations; so that the 25th of September arrived before the state of the weather would permit the trenches to be opened. From that date, however, all things went on favourably. Boufflers, though assisted by the talent and enterprise of Berwick, did not venture to molest the allies, who pushed their approaches with equal skill and industry. On the 9th of October a two-fold lodgment was effected in the covert way. Batteries were then erected, and a heavy fire kept up, under shelter of which the trenches were carried, on the 16th, to the edge of the counterscarp. On the 17th, several outworks were stormed and taken, and on the same day the breaching batteries began to fire; and on the 20th, his defences being ruined, and the body of the place laid bare, the governor surrendered. This was the last military operation performed during the present season; for the

weather, which had fairly broken, rendered a longer continuance in the field impossible. While, therefore, the French separated into two corps, — 50 battalions and 100 squadrons taking post under Berwick, in the vicinity of Maubeuge; the remainder, with Boufflers at their head, covering Valenciennes and Quesnoy,—Marlborough abandoned a design which he had formed, of acting against the former city ; and after regulating the tour of outpost duty, as well as establishing a code of signals and a chain of alarm-posts, sent back his army to winter quarters. The English were thus established at Ghent, the Danes at Bruges, and the Prussians on the Meuse; the Dutch and other contingents retired to Brussels, Louvain, and the towns near ; while the generals themselves set out for the Hague, to concert measures at leisure against the opening of the next campaign.

The campaign of 1709, though less brilliant than most which had preceded it, proved upon the whole extremely favourable to the cause of the league. By the reduction of Tournay and Mons, the conquest of Brabant and Flanders became complete, and a fortified line was interposed between the enemy and the important places in its rear. In like manner, the burden and expense of the war were, in great measure, removed from the Dutch provinces ; the French being driven within the limits of their own country, and forced to depend on the resources which they could drain from thence. Yet it was only in the Low Countries, where Marlborough and Eugene guided their strength, that the confederates may be said to have reaped this year any decided advantages. On the Rhine, no event of importance befell, except that a corps under count Merci, which had succeeded in penetrating into Alsace, permitted itself to engage a superior French force between Minnengen and Brisach, and was destroyed. In Spain, the war every where languished ; the French party obtaining a few trifling successes in one quarter, while their rivals prevailed in another ; and on the side of Dauphiné, the increasing animosity between the emperor and the duke of Savoy paralysed every ex-

ertion. The French, feebly attacked, retired into the passes of the mountains, where they took up a position for the defence of their own frontier; nor was the slightest effort made to dislodge them. All this, it will readily be imagined, gave great uneasiness to Marlborough; yet this was not the only, nor perhaps the chief source of anxiety to which he was exposed. The state of parties at home became every day less and less satisfactory; indeed, it was impossible for him to shut his eyes to the proofs which were continually afforded, that the influence both of his adherents and of himself was rapidly declining.

It is not for us to describe transactions in detail, of which the history belongs rather to the political than the military biographer of Marlborough. Enough is done when we state, that the whigs, becoming daily more and more importunate, forced the duke, much against his will, again to espouse their cause; and that, by his entreaty, lord Orford came into office as chief commissioner of the navy, having as his subordinates sir George Byng and sir John Leake. As a matter of course, the removal of the earl of Pembroke gave great offence to Harley and Mrs. Masham. They ceased not to vent their spleen daily, by working upon the personal prejudices of the queen; while the duchess, too proud to conciliate, though not sufficiently so to hold aloof, injured the cause of her friends by her very zeal in their favour. It was to no purpose that the duke besought her to adopt a new method of acting towards her sovereign. She persisted in asking, in the most arrogant tone, favours for herself or others, most of them scarcely worth obtaining, till at last she was abruptly informed that the queen desired not to treat her as a friend, though it should never be forgotten that she was wife to the duke of Marlborough.

A few days after receiving this severe but merited rebuff, the duchess took the extraordinary step, of which she has herself left a memorial on record. She drew up a copious narrative of the commencement and progress of the connection which had so long subsisted between

the queen and herself. She interlarded it with extracts from the Whole Duty of Man, illustrative of the duties of friendship; introduced into it a portion of the exhortation in the church service to the due reception of the Lord's supper; and adding a passage from Jeremy Taylor on the virtue of charity, sent the whole to the queen. "If your majesty will read this narrative of twenty-six years' faithful services," said she, in the letter which accompanied the memorial, "and write only in a few words that you had read them, together with the extracts, and were still of the same opinion as you were when you sent me a very harsh letter, which was the occasion of my troubling you with this narrative, I assure you I will never trouble you more on any subject but the business of my office." With a woman of Anne's strong feelings, it was not likely that such a course should produce other than an effect diametrically the opposite of what was sought. She became daily more and more estranged, not from the duchess only, but from all who chanced to possess her confidence; insomuch that even Marlborough himself began to be regarded with a coldness amounting to little short of distaste.

Harley, an acute and heartless intriguer, failed not to turn to the best account the imprudence of his rival. Not content to join the tories and the jacobites in decrying the military services of Marlborough, he managed to excite a strong feeling against him as a negotiator; at one moment condemning the proposed preliminaries, as not sufficiently advantageous to England; at another, censuring him for the rupture of negotiations which Louis had refused to continue. Meanwhile, various methods were tried, and that not without success, to sow dissension among the whigs themselves. Lord Rivers, at one period the professed spy upon Harley himself, was purchased; the duke of Somerset was gained by flattering his vanity; and even the cautious and calculating Shrewsbury was worked upon, if not to abandon his party, at least to weaken the tie which bound them together. Of all these events Marlborough was regu-

larly informed by Godolphin; yet it was at this very moment that he chose to hazard a request, for which we find it difficult, on the score either of wisdom or propriety, to devise an excuse. Feeling that the high ground of royal favour on which he had hitherto stood was sliding from beneath his feet, Marlborough began to think of fortifying himself by other means against the anticipated attacks of his enemies. In an evil hour, though warned to the contrary by lord chancellor Cowper, he applied for a patent which should secure to him for life the office of captain general. His request was of course rejected, and he became all at once an object of suspicion, misplaced but not unnatural, to his sovereign.

The recollection of this impolitic step was still fresh in the queen's memory, when Marlborough, after a brief sojourn at the Hague, took ship for England. He seems to have been not unconscious of the delicate predicament in which he stood; at least, his parting address to the states manifestly implies that he anticipated but an indifferent welcome in his own country. "I am grieved," said he, "that I am obliged to return to England, where my services to your republic will be turned to my disgrace." Like the declarations of most men who write or speak according to the dictates of outraged feeling, this assertion contained an almost equal share of truth and falsehood. His services to the republic were not the cause of the disgrace into which he had fallen; for that he might blame in part the extravagances of the duchess, in part his own want of firmness and consistency. Yet were these services such as ought to have secured him from any mortification, even if the grounds of complaint against him had been stronger than they were. On the 8th of November he landed at Aldborough in Suffolk, and on the 10th arrived in London, amid the cheers of a delighted populace, who, to do them justice, were not yet taught ingratitude by the waywardness of their superiors, either in court or parliament.

No other proofs that he had fallen into disfavour were at first exhibited than might be gathered from the some-

what formal civility of the queen. The lords and the commons, as heretofore, tendered him their thanks, and a liberal sum was voted to meet the contingencies of next campaign; but no great while elapsed ere an opportunity offered, of which her majesty was persuaded to avail herself. The office of constable of the Tower fell vacant, and to supply the vacancy belonged in an especial manner to the commander in chief. Marlborough designed the place for the duke of Northumberland; but, at the suggestion of Harley, lord Rivers applied for it, and, by a gross breach of good faith and fair dealing on the part of the court circle, obtained a promise of the appointment from the queen. Marlborough strongly remonstrated; but could obtain no other satisfaction than an assurance that her majesty could not intend any personal slight to him, because she had exercised her undoubted prerogative under the firm conviction that the mode of doing so was approved by his grace. As Marlborough had, in a loose conversation, insinuated that, provided the queen chose to appoint lord Rivers, he would not object, it was impossible to argue the point farther; he therefore bore with this affront as well as he could. But a second was soon put upon him, to which he found it impossible to submit. To the colonelcy of the Oxford Blues, which was likewise vacant, he received orders to appoint colonel Hill, an officer who had seen little service, and whose chief claim consisted in his standing in the relation of brother to Mrs. Masham. Marlborough's indignation could not any longer be suppressed. He demanded and obtained an interview; pressed upon the queen the injustice of the proceeding; and finding his wishes treated with coldness, quitted the presence in disgust. He immediately withdrew to Windsor Lodge with the duchess, and declined any longer to act as one of her majesty's council.

A tedious and difficult negotiation ensued, for the purpose of repairing this breach, of which it were out of place in a work like the present, to give even an outline. We content ourselves, therefore, with saying, that

Marlborough was restrained from formally sending in his resignation by the mistaken fears of Godolphin and his adherents; that, after repeatedly declaring that he would not again act as a public man till Mrs. Masham was dismissed, he was prevailed upon to relinquish the determination; and that a sort of compromise was effected, the queen giving up to him the appointment in dispute, while he abstained from pressing his demand relative to the favourite. From Marlborough himself it seems never to have been concealed that, by adopting this middle and unsatisfactory course, he gave up, in point of fact, all to his enemies. To the public in general, he appeared to have prevailed; for the colonelcy was bestowed upon a deserving soldier, for whom he all along intended it; but both the commons and the cabinet were not slow to perceive that her majesty was, in point of fact, the gainer. Hill was consoled for his loss of military rank by a pension of 1000*l.* a year; and the duke was, by a variety of trivial circumstances, taught to feel that his political importance was on the wane.

We have nothing to do, in our present sketch, with the silly affair of Dr. Sacheverell. A furious high-churchman, preaching before a jacobite lord mayor, thought fit to maintain, in its extravagance, the principle of non-resistance; and, as a necessary consequence, to censure, in no measured terms, the conduct of those by whom the Revolution was effected. The whigs, sensitively alive to rebuke, saw fit to make the matter a subject of parliamentary enquiry; and the doctor, in spite of Marlborough's recommendation to the contrary, was impeached. The whole proceeding served only to elevate into undeserved importance a man conspicuous for nothing except his zeal; while it afforded an opening to Harley, of which he failed not to take advantage, for drawing more and more upon the ministry the hatred both of the queen and the people. Sacheverell was, indeed, found guilty by a small majority, and sentenced to three years' suspension; but when a farther proposition was made, to render him incapable of accepting

preferment, the motion was rejected by 60 votes to 59. Nor was this all. With one consent the people espoused his cause. They greeted him with shouts of approbation as often as he appeared in public; they crowded round the queen's chair (who went every day *incognita* to witness the trial) with "God bless your majesty; we hope you are for Sacheverell and the church!" and they exhibited oak leaves in their hats, in token of their approval of the tenets for preaching which the doctor was arraigned. In a word, the tory principles gained ground in all quarters; the queen herself openly avowed them; and the whigs, with whom Marlborough was now entirely united, felt, as an unavoidable consequence, that the moment of their downfall was at hand.

The trial of Sacheverell was yet in progress, when Marlborough, whose presence operated as a powerful restraint upon Harley and his friends, was, by a politic arrangement of the tory faction, removed to the Continent. Louis had again opened a negotiation for peace; and appeared so bent upon the accomplishment of his object, that the states, at all times suspicious, entreated that the duke might be sent over, to assist in the deliberations which were going on at the Hague. Nothing could occur more opportunely for the enemies of that great man. His friends, moreover, in their excessive desire to advance what they believed to be his interests, were urgent in pressing a compliance with the message; and the queen was petitioned by the house of commons to hasten his departure. She attended to the request, though not in a manner the most gratifying to its object; and Marlborough set out early in the spring for the Continent. After a rough passage, he landed at Brill on the 2d of March, 1710; and on the 4th arrived, in no very agreeable frame of mind, at the Hague.

Every reader of history must be aware that the conduct of Louis on the present occasion was, if sincere, remarkable for its moderation and candour. He accepted the preliminaries suggested by the allies, with a single exception; that is to say, he was prepared not only to

make great sacrifices of territory, to dismantle Dunkirk, and to recognise the boundary selected by the states; but he declared himself willing to relinquish his grandson's claim upon Spain, provided only Sicily were granted as a compensation. It appears that Marlborough, contrary to the opinion which long prevailed, advocated the wisdom of negotiating on this basis; but both the emperor and the duke of Savoy so strongly opposed the measure that his judgment was over-ruled.* Preparations were accordingly made on both sides to refer the decision of the dispute to the sword; and very early in April, a period not hitherto esteemed convenient for military operations, the armies began, as if by mutual consent, to assemble.

The plan of campaign, concerted between Marlborough and Eugene, was framed on the most gigantic scale, and promised, if followed up with diligence and ability, to lead to decisive results. In the Netherlands, it was proposed to begin with the siege of Douay; an important place on the Scheld, which, besides communicating by water with Amsterdam itself, was admirably situated as a base of future operations. Douay reduced, the allies were to proceed against Arras, the last in the triple line of fortresses which covered the frontier; after which, they were to lay siege to Calais and Boulogne, in conjunction with an armament sent from England on purpose to co-operate with them. Meanwhile Dauphiné was to be invaded from Piedmont, and the disaffected protestants, who abounded in that province, incited to take up arms. A descent was likewise to be made on the coast of Languedoc, from whence the people of the Cevennes should be roused into action; and a chain of communication being formed along the Drome, through the valley of Crette and by the Vivarais, all the insurgents were to act in unison and together. On the

* The behaviour of the allies towards the French plenipotentiaries on this occasion seems to have been both iniquitous and impolitic. They were grossly insulted, kept in a species of imprisonment at Gertruydenberg, and their very letters were opened and read. The French complained bitterly of such treatment, and not without reason.

side of the Peninsula, too, a great blow was to be struck: in a word, there was but one section of the vast arena where the war should be permitted to languish, namely, on the Rhine. As it was not to that quarter that the allies looked for events at all calculated to effect the general issues of the war, it was determined to support there only a corps of observation, of which the numbers were to be reduced to the lowest efficient scale, by the withdrawal of large detachments towards the Netherlands, and their incorporation with the grand army about to penetrate into Artois.

The conferences of Gertruydenberg were still in progress, when Marlborough and Eugene, assembling 60,000 men at Tournay, prepared to open the campaign. Having recovered the fortress of Mortagne, a little post on the Scheld, of which the enemy had taken possession, they distributed their forces into four columns, and advanced in the direction of the canal which connects Douay with Lille; threatening, at the same time, the passes of the Upper Dyle. On the 21st, the bridge of Pont à Vendin was seized by the prince of Wirtemberg, at the head of 15,000 men; the same day Marlborough made good his passage; while Eugene, crossing at Saut and Courières, came again into communication with his illustrious coadjutor on the plain of Lens. That night the troops lay on their arms: for marshal Montesquiou, who commanded 40 battalions and 20 squadrons, though he had not ventured to defend the canal, was understood to be near at hand; nevertheless, when on the morrow the allies again pushed upon the Scarpe, Montesquiou retired before them. He precipitately crossed the Senzet, took the road to Cambray, and left them at liberty to follow up at leisure their own devices. Thus, without having been compelled to fire a shot, Marlborough found himself in command of the formidable entrenched camp, upon the construction of which Villars had expended so much both of time and labour; and established in a position from which he might at once effect the blockade of

Douay, and hold in check any force that might move for its relief.

At an early hour in the morning of the 24th, Douay was formally invested. On the northern side of the town, general Cadogan, with a corps of English, seized and kept possession of Pont à Rache on the canal of Marchiennes, from which he communicated by the left with Marlborough, and by the right with Eugene. The latter of these chiefs, taking up the line, covered the western front by pitching his camp between Auby and Equerchain; while the former, partly by patrols, partly by a judicious selection of posts, masked both the eastern and southern faces. Immediately the piquets were driven in, and the circle gradually closing, the infantry drew their first parallel on the 28th, while the cavalry found quarters among the villages which stretch from Auby to Bouvigny.

These preliminary measures being duly taken, a double attack commenced, one directed against the gate of Equerchain, the other against that of Ocre. The approaches were pushed with great vigour, in spite of a furious sortie; and the batteries were all constructed and ready to receive the guns so early as the 7th of May. On the 9th, not fewer than 200 pieces of artillery arrived in the camp, of which a large portion was immediately mounted; and by early dawn on the following morning, a heavy fire opened. But the dangers which menaced Douay, of which he entertained a just conception, seemed at last to rouse Villars from a supineness not easily explained. He had concentrated in and around Cambray so early as the first of May, to the amount of 153 battalions and 262 squadrons; yet it was not till now that he exhibited any disposition, either by manœuvring or by violence, to relieve the place. On the 20th, however, when the allies were already approaching the covered way, he put his columns in motion. He caused several bridges to be constructed upon the Scheld; he occupied in force the castle of Oisy, not far from Arleux, and made every demonstration of a medi-

tated attack somewhere in the vicinity of Dechy; for the purpose, as it ultimately appeared, of drawing the attention of Marlborough to the country between the Scheld and the Scarpe. But finding that the allies took no notice of these proceedings, he suddenly changed his plan, and, crossing the Scarpe, assumed a new position not far from Arras. It was thus placed beyond a doubt, that the succours with which he designed to refresh the place would, if thrown in at all, arrive from the side of Lens; and to frustrate that object, Marlborough and Eugene immediately directed their attention.

Marlborough and Eugene, fully anticipating that a place so important as Douay, one of the keys of the second fortified line, and held by 8000 men, would not be suffered to fall without at least an effort to save it, had drawn the outline of two fortified positions; one, which should cover the besieging force on the east, from Arleux to the Scarpe, the other, which protected the western camp, from Vitry to Montigny. In the interval, between these lines they assembled, on the 24th, the whole of their army, with the exception of 30 battalions which continued the siege, and 12 squadrons by which Pont à Rache was guarded. Here it was proposed to wait the event; because a march of six hours would carry them into either line, according as circumstances might require; but on the 25th, intelligence arriving of Villars's movement on Arras, an immediate change of ground took place. The columns, getting under arms, passed the Scarpe at several points where bridges of communication had been constructed, and threw themselves into the western line; while Marlborough fixed his head-quarters at Vitry on the extreme left, and Eugene established himself at Hernin Lietard on the right. Yet no battle was fought. Villars advanced, it is true, on the 1st of June, within musket-shot of the allied outposts; but despairing of success, immediately fell back to a position between Fampoux and Noyelles. Finally, after manœuvring a few days, under the vague hope that some fortunate event might

befall, that ground was, in its turn, abandoned, and a retrogression as far as Arras took place. Marlborough did not consider it necessary to follow the French marshal, or to withdraw his attention for a moment from the business of the siege. The corps employed in the latter service was, on the contrary, strengthened, and incited by every inducement of praise and rivalry to increased exertion; and so well were the wishes of the general seconded by the exertions of those under him, that all things went on to admiration. On the 22d, the trenches being carried to the nearest attainable point, a sap was begun; and on the 26th, Douay capitulated. The garrison, reduced to 4500 men, with the brave governor Albergotti, were permitted to march out with all the honours of war; and became prisoners under a stipulation, that they should be exchanged on the very first opportunity.

In the mean while, the state of parties at home wore, every day, an aspect less and less agreeable to the views and interests of Marlborough. The duchess, by the extreme imprudence with which she required a direct promise of office for her daughters, widened the breach which already subsisted between herself and the queen; and then forcing her majesty to grant an interview, which had been repeatedly declined, brought about a bitter and irreconcilable personal quarrel. As a necessary consequence, the queen gave herself up with increased readiness into the hands of Mrs. Masham and Harley. The whigs, as a body, became more than ever distasteful to her; and she determined, at all hazards, though by slow and cautious degrees, to expel them from office.

The first act in pursuance of this plan was to remove the marquess of Kent from the office of lord chamberlain, and to bestow it, without so much as consulting Godolphin, upon the duke of Shrewsbury. Godolphin, a timid and undecided man, remonstrated against this proceeding, and pointed out the results which were likely to arise from it; yet he permitted himself to be used as a

tool by Harley and the tories, in soothing down the indignation of his colleagues. Her next measure had for its tendency the humiliation of Marlborough himself; by showing him that, even in his own particular department, he possessed no real influence. After forcing the French lines, Marlborough transmitted, through the customary channel, a list of such officers as appeared to him deserving of promotion. It chanced that, of the colonels recommended for advancement to the rank of brigadiers, the list stopped short within one of the name of colonel Hill; while major Masham was under the line of demarcation by three. The queen positively insisted that both should be preferred; and, in spite of strong remonstrances on the part of both Marlborough and Walpole, she carried her point. As they had done in the case of Shrewsbury's appointment, the whigs proved again false to themselves. In the idle expectation of conciliating, where firmness alone could have availed, they persuaded the duke, much against his own inclination, to sanction this most unusual and mischievous proceeding; and Hill and Masham were each of them preferred, to the manifest weakening of the whig interest, and the undisguised triumph of Harley's faction. But they could not prevail upon the duchess to consummate this triumph, by consenting to a reconciliation with her rival. That was a degradation to which this high-spirited woman would not submit: and it is certain that as an opposite proceeding could not have produced any good effect, so her steady adherence to her own opinions led to no evil.

Having succeeded thus far, without bringing on the crisis, for which affairs were as yet scarcely ripe, the tories proceeded to hazard another advance, still more bold and more illustrative of their ultimate designs. Lord Sunderland, the son-in-law of Marlborough, and the staunchest if not the ablest whig in the cabinet, was dismissed; and lord Dartmouth, the son of a jacobite, and himself strongly suspected of attachment to the exiled family, honoured with the seals of office. It would

occupy much more of space than the plan of the present work could sanction, were we to describe the series of plots and counter-plots which preceded this arrangement. We must be satisfied, therefore, by stating, that Marlborough, betrayed in part by Shrewsbury and Somerset, in part misled by the timid views of Godolphin, consented, after a lengthened correspondence, to endure even this disgrace, and to continue, at least during the remainder of the campaign, in the command of the army. But he did so with a perfect prescience of the coming downfall of his party: every post brought him intelligence that the violence of the duchess, and the boldness of the tories, now decidedly superior to their rivals, both in numbers and influence, must ere long bring about a dissolution of the parliament; and hence, as he himself expressed it, "how was it possible, after the contemptible usage he had met with, to act as he ought to do?"

Such was the condition of affairs at home: the whigs distracted and dismayed; the tories gaining ground every hour; the queen openly avowing principles which she had all along been believed to hold; and the duchess of Marlborough, by an indiscreet renewal of a correspondence as useless as it was unbecoming, increasing the personal hostility of the sovereign; when Marlborough and Eugene, having allowed their troops to refresh a few days after the fall of Douay, began to follow up the plan of ulterior operations which they had arranged. On the 10th of July the allied army concentrated upon the left of the Scarpe, and next morning began their march towards Aubigny: but they soon found, on reaching Vimy, that Villars had so posted himself as to render Arras safe from molestation. He occupied an entrenched camp, which, extending from Arras towards the Somme, was itself in part protected by the course of the Crinchon; and presented such a front, that to attack him with forces not numerically superior to his own, would have augured not of bravery, but of folly. The chiefs instantly abandoned their design upon Arras: they manœuvred to seize Hesdin on the Canche, but were pre-

vented; after which they pushed upon Bethune, and placed it in a state of siege. Villars made no decisive effort to save it. He contented himself, on the contrary, with extending his line so as to secure the interior, and frustrated, by a succession of petty enterprises, the threatened landing near Calais; so that Bethune, left to itself, surrendered, with a garrison of 9000 men, on the 28th of August.

The siege of Bethune was still in progress, when Harley and the tories, feeling themselves secure in their seats, advised the queen to give the final blow to whig influence. On the 7th of August, Godolphin was dismissed; and on the 8th, the queen herself wrote to acquaint Marlborough of the disgrace of his ancient friend and colleague. In the bitterness of his mortification, Marlborough would have instantly resigned, had he not been persuaded by Godolphin to believe that his own honour was implicated in the successful termination of the campaign; and the same system of reasoning which served to keep him in office then, sufficed to continue him there when all the rest of his party withdrew. But he served now under very different circumstances, and in a frame of mind widely different from that which was once accustomed to cheer him. St. John, his ordinary correspondent in the new cabinet, employed towards him a tone of dictation doubly distasteful, because he was unaccustomed to it; while his credit at the foreign courts was diminished in exact proportion to the want of confidence exhibited towards him by his own government. Even the bankers at the Hague hesitated to advance money, as they had been accustomed to do, on his bare requisition; and his troops, wretchedly supplied from home, fell, as it was unavoidable that they should, far in arrear with their pay. The consequence was, that desertions, which till now had hardly been known, began to occur too frequently; while sickness, the inevitable attendant on want of wholesome sustenance during a campaign, made sad havoc in his ranks.

Marlborough was deeply affected by this unlooked-for

and unmerited change in his public position; nor was the information conveyed to him as to the conduct of the new government with reference to his private affairs, calculated to console him under his mortifications. No means were, it appeared, neglected, in order to mortify his feelings and destroy his influence; the very building of his palace at Blenheim was suspended, because the treasury refused any longer to advance the funds required; nay, the workmen were encouraged to plague both him and the duchess for payment of those arrears for which the government was responsible. Marlborough endured all this with extraordinary temper and dignity: he refused, indeed, to contribute one shilling towards the cost of a fabric, the erection and fitting up of which had been undertaken by the nation, except that he directed the duchess to get it plainly but sufficiently roofed in, and to fit up only so many apartments as they were likely to require for their own use; yet he never once so far forgot himself as publicly to complain. In his correspondence with his private friends, he did not of course conceal his sentiments; but to St. John his letters were all dignified, manly, distant, and official. Nevertheless, it were folly to deny that his energy and genius were alike cramped by the chagrin under which he laboured. Not even when advised by Godolphin to attempt the conquest of Boulogne, and so to secure a passage towards the enemy's capital, could he muster resolution to hazard so bold a stroke. Like other men who act under an authority which is jealous of them, he shrank from the possibility of failure, lest he should be accused of wilfully incurring it; and he lost, in consequence, for the first and only time in his life, an opportunity of striking the greatest blow with which France had as yet been threatened.

It was the wish of Marlborough to force Villars to a battle, with which view he closely reconnoitred his left, the weakest point in the position; yet even it was unassailable. He proposed next to invest Aire, a place of considerable strength on the Lys, and held by a nume-

rous garrison; and as St. Venant lay in a line at a moderate distance from it, he consented, at Eugene's suggestion, to carry on against both simultaneous attacks. On the 3d of September, the army marched from Bethune for this purpose; on the 5th, St. Venant, on the 6th, Aire, was invested; the former by twenty battalions and five squadrons under the prince of Orange, the latter by forty battalions and as many squadrons under the prince of Anhalt. But the sieges had not proceeded far when a heavy calamity befell. An extensive convoy of ammunition and guns, on its march from Ghent, was surprised and destroyed by the enemy; nor was it without a serious loss of time, and the exercise of more than common activity and zeal, that the means of carrying the services to a successful close were obtained. Still, as the French army continued immovable, Villars having been compelled to withdraw in consequence of his wound, and marshal Harcourt, his representative, not choosing to risk a general action, the allies were enabled to retrieve their loss. On the 29th of September, St. Venant opened its gates, being reduced, by the fire of the besiegers, to great extremity; and though Aire held out for some time longer, during which time more than one murderous sortie was effected, it also was in the end compelled to capitulate. And high time it was that Marlborough's jaded and ill-supplied army should be relieved from the toil of military operations. Independently of their losses in killed and wounded, which fell not short of 7000 men, their allies had suffered terribly of late from sickness, brought on by constant exposure to cold and heavy rains, and aggravated by the absence of wholesome food; while Harcourt, though he would not venture upon any extended enterprise, harassed their foraging parties by continual skirmishes, and kept the outposts constantly on the alert.

On the 8th of November, Aire capitulated; on the 13th, the garrison, marching out with the honours of war, became prisoners. To receive these brave men, and to transport them to St. Omer, was the last act of the cam-

paign; for the rains continuing with unabated fury, it was deemed necessary to withdraw the troops into winter quarters. Marlborough disposed his army in three grand divisions, at Brussels, Malines, and Liege; and entrusting the command at these several places to the prince of Hesse-Cassel, the earl of Athlone, and count Tilly, departed, as usual, for the Hague.

In spite of the reduction of so many strong places,—of Douay, Bethune, Aire, and St. Venant,—it must be acknowledged that the campaign of 1710, even in the Netherlands, failed to produce the results which had been anticipated from it. A line of works, not less formidable than those already pierced, still covered the French frontiers; and the army which manned them, having sustained no disaster, presented a bold and unbroken front to its enemies. The loss of life sustained by the allies was, on the other hand, great; and the change of councils in England had not failed to stir up misgivings in the minds not of the English general only, but of his confederates. It was whispered, and very commonly believed, that queen Anne had offered the command of her army to the elector of Hanover; and that nothing except the refusal of that prince to concur in putting so gross an insult upon Marlborough, had hindered the latter's recall. It would have been strange, had men, situated as the confederates were, failed to receive of Marlborough's influence an unfavourable impression; and hence, though they all united in entreating that he would not resign his situation, they in many instances received his applications with an indifference not previously exhibited. Something has been said elsewhere of an offer, on the part of Charles of Spain, to confer upon Marlborough the dignity of governor of Spanish Flanders, and of the refusal of the latter to accept a situation which threatened to involve him in feuds and jealousies with the Dutch. Times were now, however, changed. The general saw that his sovereign's favour was withdrawn from him; that his power to direct her councils no longer existed; that the party with which

he had so long acted was overthrown, not again to rise; and that his prospects of an honoured and easy retirement were overcast. He now applied for that very office which he had once declined; and his application, if not rejected, was evaded.

Nor is this all. The emperor of Austria, distrustful of the English cabinet, and in some degree insulted by the correspondence of St. John, appeared to transfer a portion of his indignation from the real culprits to Marlborough; while Prussia, Holland, and the other confederate powers manifestly regarded the alliance as shaken. There were many rumours afloat respecting a secret negotiation between the cabinets of St. James's and the Palais Royal; and the grounds on which they rested were, to say the least of them, too specious not to warrant a good deal of uneasiness. It was not, therefore, in consequence of the comparative poverty of his triumphs in the field alone, that Marlborough looked upon the campaign of 1710 as unsatisfactory. The seeds of other and more important failures seemed sown; and every day promised to bring them more rapidly to perfection.

Mortifying as these things were, it was still more unsatisfactory to be aware that, throughout every part of the extensive arena on which the affairs of the allies were conducted, they wore at the close of the summer a not less melancholy aspect. On the Rhine, as nothing had been anticipated, the achievement of no conquest produced neither surprise nor disappointment. In Piedmont, however, in Languedoc, among the people of the Cevennes, and in the Peninsula, all the schemes which had taken so much time and diligence to concert proved abortive. The duke of Savoy, dissatisfied as usual with the emperor, refused to take the field; and the general to whom he entrusted the command of his troops did nothing. The protestants of Languedoc and the Cevennes, disappointed by the protracted absence of the allies, rose before the time, and were put down; while the expedition sent to support them reached its destination only

to learn that it came too late. In the Peninsula, likewise, a campaign which opened by the achievement of two brilliant victories, ended in total defeat; for the army which led Charles in triumph into Madrid, permitted itself to be surprised and destroyed.*

Thus on all sides had events befallen widely different from those on which Marlborough had counted; and his return to the Hague could not of course be attended with the satisfaction which had formerly marked it. Yet was he far from relaxing either in his zeal or exertions to advance the public interests. He applied, on the contrary, all the energies of his mind to the soothing of rankled feelings among the allies, and the preparation of means against another spring; and if his progress was not such as it used to be, he had at least the gratification to discover, that by Eugene and the pensionary, as well as by the powers at large, he was still personally held in the highest respect and admiration.

Marlborough quitted the Hague on the 23d of December, and, after a stormy and dangerous passage, landed at Solebay on the 26th. On the 28th he arrived in London, where it was his intention to seek at once an interview with the queen; but his person being recognised by an individual in the street, some voices exclaimed, "God bless the duke of Marlborough!" and his carriage was instantly surrounded by a clamorous and admiring crowd. In this manner he was led, as it were, in triumph to Montagu House, within the walls of which he confined himself till the populace had dispersed. But the reception which awaited him in other and more influential quarters was of a widely different nature. The queen, cold and reserved, put a stop to all remonstrance on his part, by first observing, that she desired the continuance of his services; and then adding, in a harsh tone, "I must request you would not suffer any vote of thanks to you to be moved in parliament this year, because my ministers will certainly oppose

* At Brihuega, where Stanhope with his corps of 6000 English were made prisoners.

it." These ministers, again, though they could not refuse to wait upon him, left no means unemployed in order to convince him that the day of his triumph was gone. St. John had the insolence to lecture him on the impolicy as well as impropriety of deserting the tories, and allying himself with the whigs. Nay, he even presumed to advise, in affected candour, and in the language of patronage, that his grace would again change sides, and become a tory. In a word, the illustrious Marlborough saw himself in the condition of a discarded favourite, whom his sovereign still permitted to hold ostensible rank in her service, because the reputation which attached to his name was necessary for the purposes of her ministers; at the same that, by studied neglect and positive insult, he was made daily to feel, that of real influence he retained not a tittle.

We are not called upon to describe the series of vexatious and humiliating acts which preceded and accompanied the dismissal of the duchess from the royal household. Too much of insolence there had certainly been in the behaviour of that extraordinary woman; and something, perhaps, of weakness the duke himself displayed, in his endeavours to avoid or defer the blow: but on the memory of queen Anne the whole proceeding casts the deepest disgrace; for it is well known that her own feelings not less than the advice of her favourites led to it. Neither shall we pause to condemn the conduct of the new parliament, which not only refused to vote its thanks to the greatest man of his age, but could listen to the covert sarcasms which were heaped upon him by the noble lord who stood forward as the eulogist of lord Peterborough. It is sufficient for our purpose to record, that, influenced partly by the entreaties of Godolphin and prince Eugene, partly by his own sense of what he owed to his country and to himself, Marlborough submitted, under a thousand contumelies and crosses, to retain the command of the army in Flanders; and that he consulted freely with the very men who exulted in the success of their intrigues against him,

as to the plans which it would be prudent to follow in the prosecution of the next campaign. Yet was all this done under a degree of oppression and irritation which seriously affected his health; and he had the additional mortification before long to learn that the breath of popular applause is neither more valuable nor more enduring than court favour. A systematic order of attack both on his public and private character was organised, to which some of the ablest writers of the day shamelessly lent themselves. Prior and Swift assailed him in the Examiner, St. John occasionally taking part in the strife; and with such ability was the press directed, that the populace, always the dupes of a few able and generally unprincipled men, were led to regard him as a traitor and a coward, whom they had so long worshipped as a hero. It is true that Marlborough was not without literary supporters. Maynwaring, Hare, Steele, and Oldmixon wielded their pens in his defence; but as their ability fell far short of their zeal, the attempt served only to bring both themselves and their patron more and more under the lash of the most biting satirist of his own or almost of any other age. The great man, who had preserved his composure under all the slights cast upon him by ministers, — who did not refuse to vindicate, with calmness, his own policy against the attacks of his enemies in parliament, broke down, in a great degree, beneath the repeated assaults of this coarse and unsparing libeller. He alludes in many of his letters to the "villanous way of printing, which stabbed him to the heart;" and from a dread of that, much more than of any other species of annoyance, he placed a restraint both upon his own conduct and on the proceedings of the duchess.

While they thus harassed their general by means of their adherents both in and out of parliament, the ministers voted ample supplies for the war, at the same time that they carried on a secret negotiation through an obscure catholic priest, for the purpose of putting a speedy end to hostilities. From all knowledge of this

intrigue, Marlborough was of course excluded; indeed, his situation at home became in the end so irksome, that, independently of the dictates of duty, a strong desire to free himself from mortifications which he could neither avoid nor disregard, induced him to hasten the period of his departure. Having respectfully, though coldly, taken leave of the queen and her advisers, he set out on the last day of February, and on the 4th of March arrived at the Hague: but he came a very different man in all respects from what he had been on every previous occasion. No longer the guide, but the servant, of the cabinet, he was carefully excluded from the management of every transaction which bore not directly and immediately on military operations; nay, so anxious were the tories to convince both him and the allies of his absolute loss of influence, that they appointed as their agent at the Hague itself, lord Raby, the most bitter of his political enemies. Thus thwarted on every side, and reduced, according to his own phrase to the condition of "white paper," Marlborough prepared to enter upon a campaign, of which it was impossible to doubt that it would be his last.

We have said, that, previous to his return to England, in the winter of 1710, Marlborough had arranged his plan of future operations; Eugene, as usual, cordially co-operating, and the pensionary continuing warmly to support him. These had so far been adhered to, that he now found the army exceedingly efficient; while, on the side both of Spain and Piedmont, every assurance was given that a powerful diversion would be effected in his favour. The troubles in Hungary, likewise, being appeased by the treaty of Zatmar, the emperor found himself at liberty to take the field against the common enemy with increased effect; and Eugene, rejoicing in the event, was prepared to conduct large reinforcements into the Netherlands in person. But the flattering prospects thus held out, — prospects which neither the treachery nor the ingratitude of the government at home could obscure, — were suddenly overcast by an event, of

all others, the most unfortunate which could have occurred at such a moment. The emperor Joseph sickened with small-pox, and, being improperly treated, died, in the 35th year of his age. Charles of Spain instantly declared himself a candidate for the throne of the Cæsars; and to secure his elevation became, with his adherents and partisans, a matter of much more importance than the vigorous prosecution of the war. Even Eugene, deep-seated as his abhorrence of French ambition was, considered himself bound to suspend his march till this vital question should be settled; and hence Marlborough felt that he must at all events begin the campaign, deprived both of the able counsels of his old colleague, and of a very large portion of the troops on whose presence he had calculated.

It was while labouring under the gloomy forebodings to which so many cross accidents were calculated to give rise, that Marlborough, after a delay of something more than a month at the Hague, set out to join the army. On the 30th of April he quitted Tournay, whither he had repaired a few days previously, and fixed his head-quarters at Orchies, between Lille and Douay, where the divisions were already concentrated. Here the troops were passed in review, to the amount of 184 battalions and 364 squadrons; and by four o'clock in the afternoon of the 1st of May, the campaign may be said to have opened.

As it was the great object of the French monarch to prevent the irruption of the allied forces beyond the interior line of fortresses which covered the frontier on the side of Arras and Cambray, Villars had employed the latter part of the preceding campaign in forming a chain of works, the strength of which had been greatly increased during the close months of winter. The entrenchments thus constructed ran from Namur on the Meuse, by a sort of irregular line, to the coast of Picardy. Extending along the marshy banks of the Canche, they leaned for support on the posts of Montroeul, Herdin, and Trevent; while the greater fortresses of Ypres,

Dunkirk, Gravelines, Calais, and St. Omer, lying in their front, rendered the approaches both hazardous and difficult. Wherever a stream fell in with the direction of the allignment, it was carefully dammed and otherwise rendered defensible; every morass was deepened, either by letting in water from the larger rivers, or by cutting drains which threw their contents upon it; while here and there, where an open plain occurred, a series of breast-works and redoubts were erected, so as to block up the pass, except against very superior numbers. Early in spring, Villars quitted Paris, whither he had repaired to be cured of his wounds, after the suspension of active operations; and, fixing his head-quarters at Cambray, waited to observe the first movements of the allies, in order that he might regulate his own strictly-defensive proceedings accordingly.

The concentration of Marlborough's divisions in and around Douay induced the French marshal to collect at an opposite point; and he accordingly pitched his tents along that concave portion of his lines which, beginning at Bouchain, terminated near Monchy le Preux. Here he believed himself, and not without reason, to be secure from the danger of an attack; for the fortresses projecting beyond his flanks effectually covered him, while they afforded ample facilities for that war upon convoys in which he immediately engaged. The consequence was, that during a space little short of three weeks, in which the two armies faced each other, he contrived to inflict more than one serious loss upon Marlborough. Yet Marlborough bore these disasters with the most perfect equanimity. Having arranged his plan of campaign, he treated all minor affairs as things unworthy of more than a passing thought, while he directed the great powers of his mind to the accomplishment of a single object; which, as a necessary consequence, he at last fully attained.

There were two spaces in the gigantic position of Villars more vulnerable than the rest; though these were both of them abundantly strong: one by the

coast, which would infer the necessity of masking several important fortresses; the other about midway between Bouchain and L'Ecluse. After maturely considering the chances, Marlborough made up his mind to attempt the latter; first, because the nature of the country between Cambray and Bouchain would enable him to take the lines in reverse; secondly, because by the reduction of Bouchain and Quesnoy he should at once lay open France up to the very gates of Paris. With this view, he advanced, on the 2d day of May, to a new position, of which the right *appuyed* on Ferin upon the canal of Douay, while the left was thrown back to the hamlet of Fenain, immediately in front of the wood of Près Tanlu. He was thus placed abruptly and without disguise opposite to the point threatened; a circumstance which does not often occur in a campaign of manœuvres: while Villars, concentrated before him, naturally looked with a suspicious eye to almost every other section in his own lines.

Such was the state of the war, one rather of expectation than of action, when on the 23d Eugene arrived in the camp, in sufficient time to take part in the entertainment which Marlborough gave to his army, in commemoration of the victory at Ramilies. The two chiefs were as usual candid and open to each other; but though the prince examined the details of Marlborough's projected operations, and cordially approved of them all, the condition of Germany would not permit that he should lend the aid of his great talents in carrying them into execution. The object of his coming, indeed to himself a painful one, was to cripple Marlborough, by removing from him a large portion of the force, on the efficiency of which he had been led to calculate. Even this circumstance, however, though embarrassing in no ordinary degree, took away neither from the zeal nor the determination of the English general. He knew that to his own government he was become an object of jealous abhorrence; and hence that every proceeding on his part would be scrutinised with the most

malicious exactitude; and he resolved that no opening should be afforded even to the bitterest of his enemies to assert, that he had permitted a sense of private injustice to interfere with the discharge of his public duty.

Having tarried nearly three weeks in Marlborough's camp, Eugene on the 13th of June directed his contingent, amounting to not less than 30,000 men, to be under arms, and in line of march, before dawn on the following morning. Marlborough so far turned this lamented separation to account, that he also gave instructions for his own corps to assemble; and while thirty squadrons occupied the heights of Sailly, so as to mask the movements which went on in their rear, both the German and the Anglo-Batavian armies struck their tents. Eugene, having bidden farewell to his comrade in many triumphs, now took the road to Tournay; while the duke, filing to his right, passed the Scarpe, and emerged into the plain of Lens. The troops halted in position, with their right at Lieven, on the Souchet, and the left towards Equerchin; and as it formed no part of the general's scheme to disguise the evolution, they were speedily followed by the enemy. Villars no sooner became aware of the movement, than he also broke up from his camp. He marched rapidly towards his left, in the rear of the chain of redoubts, till he had placed himself exactly opposite to Marlborough, with his left upon Montenencourt, his centre at Arras, and his right appuyed by the rugged banks of the Coqueel. Yet though the allies lay exposed in an open plain, and by frequent reconnoissances showed their readiness to engage, Villars would not hazard an attack. He was restrained, as it afterwards appeared, not more by the removal from his own camp of some of his best corps, both of horse and foot, than by the positive commands of his sovereign; and hence a second interval of something more than a month occurred, during which the armies looked at one another, without engaging in any thing more serious than occasional affairs of foragers and convoys.

There were two posts occupied by Villars in advance

of his main line, which threatened seriously to interfere with Marlborough's projected operations,—namely, Arleux and Aubigny,—the one on the causeway which leads to the bridge over the Senzet, at Pallue, the other in front of Aubanchœil-au-bac, likewise on the Senzet. These it was essential to reduce; not, indeed, that they might be held by the allies, for that would have alarmed without weakening the enemy; but that they might be recovered again by the French, and ultimately destroyed. They were accordingly attacked with great fury by detachments sent out for the purpose; and they were both carried, with the loss of a few lives on the part of the assailants. The allies, after dismantling Aubigny, instantly began to strengthen Arleux, by enlarging its *enceinte*, and surrounding it with fresh outworks; while a camp of reserve being established on the glacis of Douay, every demonstration of a desire to retain the conquest was given.

For some days all was quiet; but on the night of the 9th of July, Villars arranged and executed a complicated movement, with such address, that he surprised the camp before Douay, and killed or made prisoners about 200 men. Marlborough could not conceal a natural chagrin that his troops should have exercised so little vigilance; yet was he far from lamenting the issue of the affair. On the contrary, he anticipated from it a serious increase to the confidence of the enemy, already somewhat excessive; and he manœuvred so as to turn to the best account any error of which they might be guilty. Having reinforced the garrison of Arleux, and mounted ten guns on the ramparts, he suddenly withdrew the detachment which had hitherto supported it; and assembling all his forces on the other side of the Scarpe, left the post to stand or fall by its own resources. Nor was this all. As if anxious to find out some more convenient field of operations, he moved on the 20th to a still greater distance; and halting that night not far from Bethune, took up a fresh position

on the 21st, with his right at Etrée Blanche on the Quelle, and his left at Bouvriere.

Though sorely puzzled by these eccentric evolutions, because at a loss to surmise what end they were designed to serve, Villars esteemed it prudent to watch his illustrious opponent with all his strength. With this view he took ground in a direction parallel to that followed by Marlborough, till, by placing his right at Montenencourt, and his left at Oppy, he had manned the formidable works which connected by a belt of iron the Scarpe with the Canche. Nevertheless he was neither regardless nor indifferent to the exposed situation of Arleux. He caused it to be fiercely attacked by a corps of sixteen battalions and as many squadrons, under Montesquiou: it was won, after a desperate resistance, and, as the English general had anticipated, immediately levelled with the earth. Thus, though at a considerable expense of life, was one important device of Marlborough realised, and a free passage opened for the developement of that grand manœuvre, on the result of which the fate of France appeared to turn.

When intelligence came in that Arleux had fallen, and that a corps from the French army had moved to the Sambre, Marlborough affected an extraordinary degree of chagrin. He shunned the society of his generals, held little or no intercourse with his personal staff, and gave out, on every convenient occasion, that he should avenge these disasters, and save Brabant, by forcing Villars, at all hazards, to a battle. Meanwhile he silently despatched reinforcements to general Hompesch at Douay; caused his own baggage to be escorted to the same place; and commanded six days' bread to be secretly prepared and forwarded to the camp from Lisle; then, after ordering his heavy artillery to the rear, he broke up at an early hour in the morning of the 1st of August, and advanced in eight columns towards the enemy's lines. That night he halted at Pont de Retreuve, where on the extreme left of the line his head-quarters were fixed; but next day he was again, with all possible

ostentation, in march. Finally, he took up a position at a league's distance from the lines, with his left at Villers aux Bois, and his right near Bailleul, where the cavalry were ordered to provide themselves with fascines, and the infantry warned that it would ere long be their part to use them.

While the mass of the horse were busied in obeying these directions, brigadier-general Sutton marched secretly from the camp, at the head of a strong detachment of infantry, and the whole of the field-artillery, except four light pieces. This movement, of which no one could guess the object, occurred on the 3d; and on the 4th, Marlborough in person executed a close reconnoissance, under the escort of a corps of grenadiers and eighty squadrons of cavalry. He advanced on this occasion within cannon-shot of the enemy's works, pointing out to the generals who accompanied him certain points, as those which they would be required to carry; and the whole cortège returned to camp about noon, in the full expectation of a decisive battle on the morrow. The same idea was entertained both by Villars and his troops, all of whom anticipated a great and easy victory; for it was as well known to them as it was to the allies that Marlborough had denuded himself of artillery. Marlborough, however, had a widely different game to play. The tattoo was yet sounding, when orders passed quietly through the allied camp that the tents should be struck, and the troops, formed in columns of march, left in front; nor did half an hour elapse ere the whole were in rapid and silent movement towards Vitry on the Scarpe. Yet they passed not from their ground without effecting one more manœuvre, of which it was the tendency to distract Villars, and keep him jealous of his position. A few squadrons of well mounted horse passing briskly to the right, swept round by Sart-le-bois, Sace, and Houvigneul, so as to alarm the enemy's left; and then falling back with the same precipitation which marked their advance, formed themselves into a rear-guard to the columns.

Some hours prior to the general move, Cadogan, attended by forty troopers, had quitted the camp, for the purpose, as was given out, of superintending certain arrangements, which, on the eve of a decisive battle, prudence rendered necessary. The real object of his mission was to join general Hompesch, who had now under his orders twenty-two battalions with 2000 horse, and to co-operate with him in an attempt to seize the causeway at Aubanchœil-au-bac, by which the enemy's lines were intersected. The very best success attended this daring but masterly manœuvre. Cadogan made such haste, that he reached Douay long before midnight. Hompesch's troops were instantly in movement, and by three o'clock in the morning the Senzet was crossed, and the works which defended it surmounted. All, moreover, was done without a shot being fired, or a single casualty occurring; for Villars, not dreaming that there could be danger at so great a distance from his enemy's head-quarters, had, with very blamable negligence, left the post of Aubanchœil-au-bac unguarded.

Marlborough, who marched at the head of the leading column, had passed the Scarpe, when a despatch from Cadogan communicated the welcome intelligence that the lines were actually in his possession. He sent urgent and repeated orders to the infantry that they should quicken their pace; while he himself, followed by fifty squadrons, pushed forward at a trot. The day was just breaking, that is to say, five o'clock had struck, when the glad tidings reached him; at eight he was across the Senzet, and joined by the whole of his field-train, which thus arrived in good time to support the detached corps in case of an attack. Of an attack, however, there was no danger. Villars had, it is true, become aware, so early as eleven o'clock on the preceding night, that the allies were moving; and his scouts assured him that the direction of the march was to the eastward: yet the appearance of the cavalry on his left confirmed him in the suspicion that it was nothing more than a feint, and that he should after all be attacked where he stood on the first

return of light. Though he kept his men under arms, therefore, he permitted no reconnoissance to be hazarded, lest an affair of posts begun in the dark might lead to a general assault, and he should thus be deprived of his great superiority in cannon. But Villars, like many other tacticians, had permitted his own plans so completely to engross his attention, that to those of his enemy he was blind. He continued under this delusion till two in the morning; and then awoke from it only to be convinced that the opportunity of baffling an active and intelligent opponent was lost.

Irritated by the consciousness that he had been beaten at his own weapons, the French marshal put himself at the head of his cavalry, and flew at the utmost speed of his horses towards the point of danger. One by one his troopers fell behind; and when with reckless haste he had traversed the defile of Saulchy, he found himself with little more than 100 men, in the midst of the allied outposts. His escort, charged by superior numbers, surrendered to a man, and himself escaped almost by a miracle; but he had seen enough to assure him that the error of which he had been deceived into the commission was beyond remedy. Not the cavalry and field-train alone, but the infantry also of the allies were in position within the lines, with their left on the Gauche near Vesey, and their right in the hamlet of Bantigny; and as his own people came up stragglingly, it would have convicted him of absolute frenzy, had he so far forgotten himself as to hazard an attack. He accordingly halted in rear of the defile, and in no very enviable frame of mind passed that night, as he had done the preceding, under arms.

Astonished at an achievement which far surpassed their most sanguine anticipations, the Dutch and Austrians, contrary to their usual practice, urged Marlborough to attack; but this he declined to do. His troops had marched on the preceding night ten leagues without a halt; they were, therefore, in no condition to receive, far less to give a battle; besides, his views pointed elsewhere

than to an engagement, which must be fought under imminent risks at the best, and which, if lost, would have utterly destroyed him. He, therefore, spent that night in bivouac; and though he advanced on the following day a couple of miles on the road to Cambray, the movement was not designed for any thing more important than a feint. It had the effect of restraining Villars from passing the Scheld; and enabled Marlborough himself to complete, unmolested, eight pontoon bridges, across which, before noon on the 7th, he led his columns. Thus were the means prepared, in the face of an army numerically superior to his own, for the investment of one of those places which it formed part of his gigantic design to reduce; and though the movements requisite in order to take advantage of these were, doubtless, not without hazard, the excellence of his dispositions sufficed to neutralise it. Marlborough led his infantry under the guns of Cambray; the shot from which occasionally reached him; yet he made such excellent use of his cavalry, in the occupation of commanding eminences, that Villars did not venture seriously to molest him.

It was late before the passage of the river was made good, and midnight was at hand, when, amid the pelting of a violent storm, the allies reached the plain of Avesnes le Sec. Here, destitute of all shelter, the troops lay down; but at eight next morning they were again under arms, and, filing into a new position, drew up, with their left extended along the Ille from Douchy to Haspres, and the right thrown back at an obtuse angle, and in a direction towards Houdain. At the same time, various detachments which had been left on the Senzet were called in. A piquet of grenadiers alone, indeed, continued for a few hours to hold the Roman camp, a post of some importance on the left of the Scheld; but towards evening it also was withdrawn, and the last of the bridges on which the army had crossed was removed. Thus was the ground occupied, by preventing the allies in the seizure of which, Villars might even yet have retrieved his fortunes; for so long as the right of the

Scheld was closed against him, not even the forcing of the lines could have enabled Marlborough to effect the investment either of Bouchain or Valenciennes.

Brilliant as their successes had been, there yet remained many and serious obstacles to be overcome ere the allies could complete their lines of circumvallation, or open their trenches against Bouchain. Situated upon two rivers, the Senzet and the Scheld; of which the former bisects, while the latter covers the eastern face of the town, Bouchain was protected not only by a circle of formidable entrenchments, but by marshes and swamps, through which the only roads of communication were narrow causeways, in no ordinary degree defensible. The situation of Villars, moreover, afforded numerous opportunities of throwing succours into the place; for the enemy occupied the whole extent of the angle between the Senzet and the Scheld, and began promptly to entrench there. Besides, the western front was still open, and it rested with Villars either to keep it so, by traversing the Senzet in force; or, retaining his fortified camp, to straiten in their lines such divisions as Marlborough might detach for the purpose of pressing the siege in that quarter. Now, when to all this is added the circumstance, that a garrison of 6000 chosen men manned the works; that they were commanded by an officer of tried courage and ability, and amply supplied with stores, money, and provisions; it will, we think, be admitted, that nothing but courage of the highest order could have prompted any man to undertake a service so hazardous as that in which the allies were about to embark.

To the many difficulties which were likely to attend the siege, Marlborough was fully alive; and sensible that these could be overcome only by the utmost promptitude of action, he made haste to complete his arrangements. On the morning of the 8th, a bridge was laid upon the Scheld at Neuville, below the town, by which sixty squadrons passed, and took possession of the heights of Vignonette, across which the road from Douay runs. Meanwhile Villars, throwing thirty bat-

talions over the Senzet, made himself master of the hill above Marquette, and began to erect a series of works, which should at once keep open his own communications with the town through the swamp and its southern front, and render any attempt by the allies to push the approaches in that direction abortive. Marlborough was not slow in obtaining information, as well respecting the progress of these works as touching the design which they were meant to serve. He determined to storm them ere they should be completed; and with this view general Fagel, at the head of a strong corps both of horse and foot, was passed silently over the river. But the skilful dispositions of Villars thwarted him. Not only was there collected at Wavrechin a force greatly superior to that of Fagel, but the allied piquets at Ivry were suddenly attacked; and Marlborough was compelled to countermarch in all haste, that he might be at hand to repel the danger. Villars, it appeared, had either obtained information of Fagel's movement, or he anticipated it. He accordingly crossed the Scheld at Ramilies with a large portion of his army; advanced, under cover of night, as far as Ivry; and was now manœuvring to bring on a decisive action, by which he hoped to destroy the allies in detail. But Villars, active as he was, could not boast of a superiority, even in that respect, over his rival. Marlborough, who had accompanied Fagel in person, no sooner heard the report of cannon, than he guessed its cause; and, withdrawing under the fire of the works, repassed the Scheld, and resumed his station on the right bank, ere a serious attack could be hazarded.

Though baffled in this attempt, and reduced to the necessity of covering his own camp with a chain of field-works, Marlborough neither despaired of ultimate success, nor relaxed one effort to effect speedily an enterprise, in the accomplishment of which he may be said in some degree to have staked his reputation. He strengthened himself on the right bank by securing a chain of works from Houdain to Ivry, and from Ivry to the Selle near Haspres; while at the same time he instructed Cadogan,

who returned, when the immediate danger passed away, to pursue a similar course on the left. He thus secured himself from molestation, by the very same process which closed up all the avenues of approach to Bouchain, except one. Upon that one he next turned; and a trial of skill, which has not many parallels in military history, immediately began.

We have alluded to the position taken up by Villars on the northern bank of the Senzet, and the diligence with which he entrenched there a corps of infantry. In order to render abortive any effort on Marlborough's part to interpose between that corps and the town, three redoubts were marked out; of which it was the object to form a sort of chain of communication towards the place at right angles with the line in which the works of the besiegers must be drawn. This occurred during the night of the 13th; and the propriety of the measure became apparent, when the return of day showed the allies in the act of leading their breast-work forward from the height above Marquette into the interval which would have been otherwise left unguarded. But the precaution of Villars came too late. That very day his unfinished redoubts were stormed; and in spite of a heavy fire both from the town and the entrenched camp, the besiegers carried their zigzag down to the edge of the morass. Batteries were now thrown up, and guns brought to bear upon almost every foot of the causeway; yet the causeway itself could not be closed, without another and still more daring effort.

It has been stated above, that the space between the two rivers consists entirely of a marsh, through which a causeway, or raised road, conducts the traveller from Bouchain to Cambray. The better to secure this, Villars erected a battery at Etrun, the fire from which swept directly down the road; and he posted there a battalion of six hundred men, which he supported in the rear by a brigade of three thousand. Marlborough saw that, to complete the investment of the town, it would be necessary to make himself master of this battery. With incredible labour

and diligence, two fascine roads were constructed through the marsh from the banks both of the Scheld and Senzet, and on the night of the 16th, six hundred chosen grenadiers were ordered to turn them to account. These boldly advanced, till the paths ended; they then plunged into the swamp, and though covered with water to the shoulders, they struggled forward without firing a shot. They rushed with their bayonets upon the battery, and, at the cost of six lives only, drove the enemy from their guns. Not a moment was lost in converting the barrier thus won into a place of defence. The battery, closed in the rear, became, ere morning, a redoubt; and Bouchain ceased to hold any communication with the army of marshal Villars.

From this time forth the siege of Bouchain was pressed with all the activity and diligence for which the illustrious Marlborough stood conspicuous. The trenches were opened on the night between the 21st and 22d; three separate attacks were pushed on the eastern, the western, and southern faces of the town; a tremendous train of cannon, mortars, and cohorns shook the ramparts to pieces; and outwork after outwork, as it yielded to the fire, was stormed and taken. Neither the repeated attempts of Villars to penetrate the entrenched camp, nor the vigorous sorties of the besieged, retarded the progress of the operation for one hour; and at last the governor felt himself reduced to the stern necessity of proposing terms of capitulation. They were peremptorily rejected; the bearer of the flag being instructed to inform his commandant that an unconditional surrender could alone save the town from the horrors of an assault. Hard as these conditions were, there was no possibility of evading them. On the 14th of September the remains of the garrison, amounting to 3000 of all ranks, marched out, and laid down their arms in the ditch, when the men were immediately transported to Tournay, the officers to Holland, as prisoners of war.

During the continuance of this arduous operation, no movement of importance occurred on any other point in

the theatre of war. An effort was indeed made by the enemy to recover Douay by surprise, which failed; and a detached corps of the allies was attacked and routed at Houdain, with the loss of many prisoners, among whom Bourke the Prussian minister was included. Different encounters between foraging parties, with an occasional affair of posts, likewise gave cause of excitement among those remoter divisions whose situation necessarily precluded them from taking part in the labours of the siege. But from none of these did any memorable result occur. It were, however, unjust towards the memory of the great man whose military life forms the subject of this article, were we to omit an anecdote, so far connected with his professional character as marking the deep sense which this soldier, amid the full career of victory, retained of what is due to distinguished piety and high literary renown. The estates belonging to the see of Cambray, of which the illustrious Fénélon was bishop, lay within reach of every marauding party that might issue from the allied lines: Marlborough not only stationed a guard at the château to protect it from violence, but caused his own wagons, under escort of his own dragoons, to carry the good bishop's corn as far as the suburbs of the city. "Ce fut ce sentiment," says the French biographer, "qui, connu d'Alexandre, conservu, au milieu des ruines de Thébès, et la maison et la famille de Pindare."

It was the anxious wish of Marlborough to take advantage of what yet remained of the season for active operations, by following up the capture of Bouchain by the investment of Quesnoy; with which view he ceased not, during the latter days of the siege, to press both the Dutch and English governments for supplies and means of transport. The latter he found exceedingly averse to come into his wishes; nor did any great while elapse ere intelligence reached him which served to account for a resistance which he had by no means anticipated. Of the secret negotiations which even now were carried on between the cabinets of St. James's and the

Tuilleries, some notice has already been taken. These proceeded for a while, though tardily, with abundant good fortune; Prior, the poet, being despatched to Paris for the purpose of adjusting one or two points which alone stood in the way of a definitive arrangement. But this step, to which both Oxford and St. John trusted as an effectual preservative against any immature disclosure, proved peculiarly disastrous in its issue. Prior, landing at Deal on his return, was arrested by the mayor as a spy, and being destitute of passports underwent a close and severe examination; the consequence was, that the great secret which the queen's ministers had so long laboured to keep from the general-in-chief of the queen's armies, got abroad; and Marlborough, informed of it, became at once satisfied relative to the conduct of the Dutch, and the very false position in which he himself stood. He saw that he was betrayed by his own government; and every hope of bringing the war to the glorious termination on which he had a right to calculate, faded away. His design on Quesnoy was abandoned: he remained, indeed, in position around Bouchain a space of three weeks, during which the breaches were repaired, the trenches filled up, and the navigation of the Scarpe as far as Douay rendered secure; but he no sooner ascertained that Villars had previously withdrawn, than he too broke up his camp, and placed the troops in winter quarters.

The campaign of 1711, though distinguished by a display of talent almost superhuman on the part of Marlborough, cannot be said, even in the Low Countries, to have led to any decisive results. The lines, which the vanity of Villars tempted him to describe, in a letter to his sovereign, as the *ne plus ultra* of his illustrious opponent, were indeed penetrated, and one of the strongest of the range of fortresses which covered the French frontier was reduced. These were, doubtless, brilliant exploits; yet was the strength of the enemy's columns unbroken, and a second line remained to be forced ere France should lie open to serious injury from those who

now threatened her. It is true that both objects might have been attained, had the plans suggested by Marlborough been adopted, and common support afforded him. So confident, indeed, was Louis of this, that he proposed to take the field in person; and, at the head of his last corps of reserve, to fight at once for empire and life under the walls of Paris. But a calamity from which his exhausted means could not in all human probability have shielded him, was averted by the selfish and short-sighted policy of those to whom the queen of England, in an evil hour, had entrusted the management of her affairs. Marlborough, checked in the full career of conquest, quitted the army in disgust; and Louis found himself, within a few months afterwards, in a condition to treat with the allies on terms of something more than equality.

But if the issue of the contest in the Netherlands was thus unsatisfactory, still less cheering were the prospects which the close of the season opened out elsewhere. In Spain, where the command of the British contingent had devolved on the duke of Argyle, the summer was wasted in inactivity; for the departure of Charles to ascend the Austrian throne, which the death of his brother rendered vacant, seemed to paralyse all exertion. In Portugal, if we except the recapture of Miranda de Douro by the combined troops under lord Portmore, no enterprise of moment was attempted; while on the Rhine, not less than in the districts adjoining to the Alps, the campaign may be said to have been one of demonstration alone. The duke of Savoy did indeed make an effort, by pushing upon the frontiers of Provence, where he was ably and vigilantly opposed by marshal Berwick: but as autumn drew on, both his zeal and energy relaxed, and he fell back, without striking a blow, to his old positions. Thus, through a total want of confidence which the confederates began to experience each in the other, and all in Great Britain, was the season permitted to pass unprofitably away; which, had a different spirit prevailed, must have consummated the downfall of Bourbon su-

premacy, and the permanent establishment of a balance of power in Europe.

With the close of this campaign ended what, in strict propriety of speech, deserves to be accounted the professional life of Marlborough. To narrate at length the remainder of his career, may seem to belong to another besides his military biographer; yet is the story so interesting in itself, as well as so redolent of moral instruction, that to offer of it something more than a meagre outline of dates, may, perhaps, be permitted even here. We are the more encouraged in adopting this course, from the recollection that our proceeding can in no degree interfere with any other department, at least, in this series of works. When Marlborough ceased to be a British general, he ceased also to be a British statesman; it is in his private capacity, therefore, as a man who had played his part on the stage of public life and quitted it, that we must henceforth regard him. In that light we now purpose to follow his fortunes.

Something has been said at various stages of this memoir, of the virulence with which the hero of Blenheim was assailed by a host of prejudiced and vindictive writers, who abhorred the man because they disliked his political principles. In proportion as the power of the tories attained to consistency, the ferocity of these attacks became more and more flagrant; while there were enlisted on the same side charges more serious than any which even Swift had ventured to bring forward. The intelligence that his recent victories were treated with contempt; that the forcing of the enemy's lines was called "the passing of the kennel;" that whatever credit belonged to it was attributed to general Hompesch; and that the capture of Bouchain itself was stigmatised as a wanton sacrifice of 16,000 men: this Marlborough received with comparative indifference. From the commencement to the conclusion of his active career, he had been more or less accustomed to find his merits decried; and hence, though naturally sensitive to a degree quite extraordinary, he had learned

to bear such injustice with philosophy. But he was now doomed to suffer wrong in a quarter where hitherto the voice of scandal itself had not assailed him. It was more than insinuated that, in summing up the accounts of the army, an excess of expenditure to the amount of 33,169*l.* had been detected; and that, as none of the contractors could explain how so large an outlay should have taken place, the general must answer for it at his peril. Marlborough was stung to the quick by this flagrant attack upon his honour. He lost not a moment in vindicating himself from the infamous charge, by producing a warrant, under the sign manual of the queen, for sums applicable to secret services, from year to year, more than commensurate to the supposed deficiency; and so conclusive were the terms of his defence, that, unscrupulous as his enemies were, not one among them ventured at that moment to renew their accusations either orally or in writing.

When the painful necessity of defending his moral character overtook him, Marlborough was already at the Hague, whither he had returned, on his way to England, early in November. On the 14th of that month, he quitted the seat of the Dutch government, and, embarking at Brill, reached Greenwich on the 17th, where he immediately landed. As it was the anniversary of the inauguration of queen Elizabeth, a day on which the populace were accustomed to parade the streets in a tumultuous manner, effigies of the pope, the devil, and the pretender being carried before them, and eventually burned; Marlborough, unwilling that his enemies should discover in his conduct even the shadow of imprudence, remained at Greenwich in a species of seclusion till the morrow. He then proceeded to Hampton Court, that he might pay his respects to the queen; after which, with the best judgment and most honourable feeling, he waited, one after another, on the ministers. Yet all this circumspection availed not to hinder his name from being joined with those of the other whig leaders, in a ridiculous story, scarce credited

at the moment, of conspiracies and plots. The truth was, that the tories, apprehensive of a burst of religious zeal, put a stop to the customary processions, and seized the effigies; while their libellous adherents invented and gave publicity to statements, the very absurdity of which has long ago consigned them to oblivion.

Meanwhile the most strenuous efforts were made both by lord Oxford and St. John, to win over Marlborough into an approval of their general policy. Every inducement which they accounted likely to avail, was held out to him; but Marlborough, conscious that a coalition with them must for ever degrade him in his own eyes and in those of posterity, steadily resisted their attempts. The whigs had already taken their ground, in condemning the terms of the projected peace; and as these were not less objectionable to Marlborough than to them, he made no delay in assuming his place among their body. In this he was promptly followed by Godolphin, lord Nottingham himself not long afterwards adopting a similar course, till the opposition became in the end so formidable, as to threaten the ministry with destruction. It was in vain that a charge of monstrous peculation was brought forward against the late government. That was ably met by a pamphlet from the pen of sir Robert Walpole, in which the writer distinctly showed that the defalcations which the tories would have laid to the charge of their predecessors, had been accumulating since the reign of Charles II., and that the entire balance against the late cabinet came not up to four millions, for every shilling of which a voucher could be produced. The consequence was, that Oxford and his friends, failing on the ground where they imagined themselves most secure, found it no easy matter to bear up against the furious invectives by which their foreign policy was assailed; and as the whigs brought to their aid the ministers both of the states-general and the elector of Hanover, the issue appeared, at one moment, more than doubtful. Nor can it be disputed that, in departing from the original basis of the coalition, the tory administration

did sacrifice their country's honour. It was a fundamental article in the treaty of alliance, that a prince of the house of Bourbon should not sit on the throne of Spain. To attain that object, more than any other, all the blood and treasure expended in a ten years' war had been supplied; and now lord Oxford consented to open a negotiation with Louis, on the bare understanding that the latter would use every reasonable effort to hinder the crowns of France and Spain from being united on the same head. No wonder, then, that the declamations of the whigs, ably seconded, as they were, by the remonstrances of foreign powers, should have produced a strong effect in the country; or that the ministers, driven to their last shift, should have determined to throw the most flagrant wrong into the scale, rather than permit matters to follow the inclination which they must have otherwise assumed.

Things were in this state when the parliament met, of which the first proceedings held out no favourable augury to the cabinet. Though supported in the house of commons by a majority more than usually preponderate, in the lords they found themselves defeated on the first motion for addressing the queen, chiefly through the manly eloquence of Marlborough. Mortified at this result, and still further perplexed by the double-dealing of Somerset and others, on whom they had counted, they strove to compensate for their political weakness, by working, both publicly and in private, on the personal fears and prejudices of the sovereign. They reminded her that she had but to choose between themselves and a faction which, if it had enslaved her before, would, when restored to influence, prove doubly tyrannical. They threatened her with a renewal of the duchess of Marlborough's impertinences; assured her that the whigs desired nothing so much as to take vengeance for the disgrace which they had temporarily suffered; and throwing out certain mysterious hints affecting the present and future condition of her own family, they succeeded at last in luring the queen into the toils. Not a moment was then

lost in effecting the disgrace of Marlborough. When he presented himself at court, he was received with marked coldness, and the charge of peculation being revived and brought forward in a more tangible shape, the house of commons was instructed judicially to entertain it. By and by, a report came out, by which it was made to appear, that there was a very large deficiency in the general's accounts; and as the necessity of putting him on his trial was gravely asserted, the queen was persuaded to dismiss him from all his employments, under the pretext of leaving the avenues of public justice open. Finally, twelve new peers were created, by whose aid a majority in the upper house was secured, and Oxford and St. John were enabled a little longer to carry on the government, to mislead their mistress, and to disgrace their country.

The foundation of the charge brought by the queen's ministers against the most illustrious man of his age and country, rested, in the first instance, on the deposition of sir Solomon Medina, one of the principal contractors for supplying the allied armies with bread. This person stated, "that from 1707 to 1711, he had paid to the duke of Marlborough, for his own use, on the different contracts for the army the sum of 332,425 guilders; that he was obliged to supply twelve or fourteen wagons gratis, for the use of the duke himself; that on each contract he had presented Mr. Cardonel, his grace's secretary, with a gratuity of 500 ducats; and that he had paid Mr. Sweet, deputy-paymaster at Amsterdam, a separate allowance of one per cent. on all the monies he received." The same individual further deposed, "that Antonio Alvarez Machado, the preceding contractor, had advanced the like sums, in the same manner, from 1702 to 1706;" and the commissioners appointed to investigate this case, computed from these data that the duke of Marlborough had received and embezzled in the space of ten years, 664,851 guilders four stivers, making in sterling money, as has already been stated, 63,319*l.* 3*s.* 7*d.*

But the malice of Marlborough's enemies ended not

here. He was likewise accused of having illegally appropriated to his own use the sum of 282,366*l.*, by deducting two and a half per cent. from the pay of the foreign auxiliaries, on a warrant unnecessarily concealed, and giving no account to the public as to the mode in which it was expended.

Such is the substance of that infamous report, which, in defiance of his grace's letter written from the Hague, the commissioners of public accounts laid before the house of commons; and it was on such ground as this that queen Anne consented to strip of all his public employments, a man who, whatever his conduct might have been to others, had during a long life served her with the utmost fidelity and success.

Our limits will not permit us to give of these disgraceful transactions the full account which, as matters of history, they deserve. We must content ourselves with stating, that though it was distinctly shown that the very same perquisites had been enjoyed by king William; though the ministers of the foreign powers averred that the per-centage was a free gift awarded by their masters; though the royal warrant authorising him to accept the gratuity was produced by Marlborough's friends, and evidence was adduced that a very large share at least of the monies arising out of it had been expended in procuring intelligence; a majority of 270 against 165 was found in this packed house of commons base enough to determine, first, "that the taking several sums of money, annually, by the duke of Marlborough from the contractors for furnishing the bread and bread-wagons, in the Low Countries, was unwarrantable and illegal;" and, next, "that the deduction of two and a half per cent. from the pay of the foreign troops in her majesty's service, is public money, and ought to be accounted for." The resolutions being communicated to the queen, she replied, "that she had a great regard for whatever was presented to her by the commons, and would do her part to redress whatever they complained of." This was followed by an order to the attorney-

general to prosecute the duke of Marlborough; and preparations for putting him on his trial in the court of queen's bench were immediately and ostentatiously made.

The conduct of the duke all this while was such as became his high renown and extraordinary merits. His dismissal from the queen's service, conveyed in a letter written by herself, he received not without indignation, yet he replied to it in a calm and dignified tone. To the suggestions of those who urged him, in imitation of lord Somers, to vindicate himself before the house of commons, he turned a deaf ear. The only step, indeed, which he conceived it not derogatory to his own character to take, was to sanction the compilation of an authentic narrative of his case, and to permit its publication. Never did any document carry upon its face stronger marks of truth; never was any party pamphlet more generally read and approved. The house of commons itself, though severely and justly censured, dared not vote the statement a libel, and not a member endeavoured, because not a member was able, to answer it. Nor were the ministers more fortunate in the minute investigation which they instituted as to the mode in which the general had disposed of vacant commissions. They found, that while numerous abuses had existed, and had even been considered as justifiable, during the reign of king William, Marlborough had never acted except with openness and propriety; and their failure here tended not a little to weaken the force of their grand charge, not only with the public at large, but among the most prejudiced of their own adherents.

The events thus described took place during the month of December, 1711: on the 5th of January, 1712, prince Eugene, the illustrious colleague of Marlborough, arrived in London. He was the bearer of a strong remonstrance from the emperor against the peace which the British cabinet seemed bent on concluding; and his presence, though it served not to divert the ministers from their design, seriously incommoded and displeased

them. His honourable conduct towards his old companion in arms gave in particular excessive umbrage to the cabinet, by whom a direct attempt had been made to separate him from Marlborough's society; and he became in the end exposed, together with his friend and the whig leaders, to the foulest and most unfounded calumnies. Fresh stories were got up of intended conspiracies, in which Eugene and Marlborough were to be the chief actors. The queen was to be seized, the capital set on fire, Oxford and his associates put to death, and the elector of Hanover advanced to the throne. We blush for the credulity of our countrymen, both then and at a later period, when we find that the credibility of this tale depended entirely on the assertion of Plunket the jesuit spy, yet that it was believed at the moment, and found a place as true in the written memorials of such men as Swift and Macpherson.

Disgusted with the conduct of those in power, and hopeless of effecting a change, Eugene returned to the Continent on the 17th of March. He had remained long enough in London to witness the commencement of those invidious attacks by which the commons strove, with too much success, to alienate the feelings of the English people from their allies; and he quitted it under the humiliating impression that, if the war should be carried on at all, it must be conducted without any aid either in men or money from England.

With the events which followed upon this radical change of system in the king's councils, every reader of English history is acquainted. Neither the equivocations of Louis, nor the remonstrances of the confederate powers, could divert Oxford and his colleagues from their purpose, which they continued to pursue with unabated constancy, even after the death of the dauphin had rendered it next to impossible that the crowns of France and Spain should not devolve upon the same individual. Peace they were determined to have, let its attainment cost what it might; and to accomplish that end, they consented to receive assurances, which the French

monarch himself, while in the act of affording them, confessed that circumstances might render altogether nugatory. In like manner, though they despatched the duke of Ormond to succeed Marlborough in the command of their army, they secretly instructed him not to undertake any hostile operation, because a treaty was then in progress, of which the conclusion might hourly be expected, provided neither a defeat nor a victory intervened to cast insuperable obstacles in the way. The consequence was, that Eugene, after arranging an admirable plan of campaign, found himself paralysed at the very moment when it behoved him to strike, Ormond positively refusing to take part in a battle, and consenting, not without demur, to assist in the siege of Quesnoy.

Powerful as the ministers were in both houses of parliament, they could not succeed in suppressing a burst of indignation which attested the impression made on the minds of all honourable men by conduct so unprincipled as well as unexpected. Out of doors, one feeling and one feeling only, seemed to prevail; while in the lords a keen debate arose, in which lord Halifax, the duke of Marlborough, the duke of Argyle, and earl Poulett, bore each a very conspicuous share. The latter nobleman, indeed, so completely transgressed the rules of decency and order, that he left to the hero of Blenheim but one resource in order to vindicate his personal honour from reproach. After defending the measures of government, lord Poulett went on to say, that "no one could doubt the duke of Ormond's bravery; but he does not resemble a certain general, who led troops to the slaughter, to cause a great number of officers to be knocked on the head in a battle, to fill his pocket by disposing of their commissions." On many previous occasions Marlborough had been compelled to bear up against the libellous insinuations of party writers, who accused him of protracting the war for the basest purposes; but an insult so gross and so personal as this had never till now been offered to him by one of

his peers. He received it with perfect composure, did not so much as reply to it, but immediately on quitting the house sent lord Mohun to demand, in the language of the day, that earl Poulett "would take the air with him in the country." Lord Poulett became alarmed. He could not conceal his agitation, nor the cause of it, from his lady; and intimation of the affair being communicated to the secretary of state, the earl was placed under arrest. Finally, the queen interfering, and laying her commands on Marlborough that he would not prosecute the matter further, an apparent reconciliation took place; and the most illustrious man of his age was saved the mortification of appearing in the field, as the personal antagonist of one whose very name would have been long ago forgotten but for this act of atrocious iniquity and meanness.

With the disastrous and discreditable results of the campaign of 1712 we are no farther concerned than as they afford the best evidence of the extent of loss which the allied armies suffered by the removal from his post of their old and trusty commander. Betrayed by the English, on whom he had heretofore been accustomed to rely, Eugene sustained one defeat after another, till all the fortresses which the genius of Marlborough had wrested from them were recovered by the enemy. To these disasters it is, indeed, true that Ormond was not a witness; for, in obedience to instructions communicated from home, he had already drawn off with his native army to Dunkirk: but he left the auxiliaries behind, because these brave men chose to sacrifice their arrears of pay rather than be partakers in the disgrace to which their comrades were made subject. Meanwhile the peace, which it had been the object of the tories to conclude, was negotiated amid a thousand delays and difficulties; difficulties originating not more in the opposition of the whigs and their friends, than in the duplicity and wiliness of the French court. It had the effect at once of giving energy to Louis, and paralysing the efforts of the allies in all quarters; because the weaker

powers were, one after another, prevailed upon, either by bribes or menaces, to follow the example of England, and accede to an armistice. Utrecht was accordingly fixed upon, as a convenient point for the meeting of a congress; during which, articles of a general pacification might be drawn up, and signed by the ministers of the belligerent crowns.

Though stripped of all the influence which depends on office, Marlborough was still a thorn in the sides of the tory ministers; and the most ungenerous methods were devised for the purpose of rendering his situation irksome, and distracting his attention from public business. The press, scarcely less venal then than now, poured out a torrent of mercenary libels on his reputation. He was particularly accused of setting the example of party duels; and the quarrel which occurred between the duke of Hamilton and lord Mohun, with all its distressing consequences, was, in defiance of truth and common sense, laid to his door. Steps were taken to carry into effect the prosecution recommended by the house of commons; and the workmen employed at Blenheim were again encouraged to sue him for the payment of their wages. We have already taken occasion to observe, that nature had endowed this great man with a temperament peculiarly sensitive; we are not therefore surprised to find that these things cut him to the heart. Still, he bore them, if not without suffering, at least without complaint, so long as his friend Godolphin leaned upon him for those comforts which an ungrateful country denied him. But Godolphin, who had long laboured under a distressing and mortal complaint, died at last in the duke's house at St. Alban's. From that time Malborough's resolution seems to have been taken; and he set himself at once to the task of carrying it into effect.

Having vested his estates in the hands of his sons-in-law, as trustees, and consigned 50,000*l.* to the care of his friend general Cadogan, with instructions to lodge it in the Dutch funds, Marlborough applied to the go-

vernment, through the medium of Maynwaring, for a passport which might enable him to travel. It will scarcely be credited that even this miserable boon was not conceded without difficulty and hesitation. We learn from two letters addressed by the minister to Maynwaring, that attempts were made to deter her majesty from acceding to the request of her ancient favourite; and that, had not Oxford been actuated by a better spirit than swayed some of his colleagues, they might have proved successful. On the 31st of October, however, the deed in request was transmitted, and Marlborough made no delay in acting upon it. He took leave of his family and friends; and on the 27th of November, in the sixty-sixth year of his age, became a voluntary exile. Nor ought the fact to be concealed, however disgraceful to the country, that this illustrious man was permitted to take his passage in a common packet-boat, without any of those honours being paid to which his high rank and eminent services were entitled. He embarked at Dover under no discharge of cannon from the batteries; indeed, the only salute offered was that which the feelings of the master of the vessel prompted him, of his own accord, to pay.

If the feelings of Marlborough were wounded by the indifference to his departure displayed at home, the reception which awaited him abroad could not fail of bringing some degree of consolation along with it. So soon as the vessel entered the harbour of Ostend, and the knowledge that it bore so illustrious a freight obtained publicity, every thing was done which the authorities and the people could devise in order to testify the satisfaction experienced by all classes. The artillery from the town, the forts, and the shipping, thundered forth a welcome; guards of citizens thronged the quay, and the streets and avenues which led to it; the garrison stood to its arms; and the governor in person, followed by the principal military and civil functionaries, waited upon the landing-place to receive him. Thus attended, he led, through the midst of applauding thousands,

to the house of the chief magistrate, where he was sumptuously entertained, and treated with all the respect usually shown to crowned heads alone. Nor was his reception dissimilar in any one of the places through which he found it necessary to pass on his way to Aix la Chapelle. Parties of horse patrolled the country between Antwerp, and Maestricht, to warn the inhabitants of the several towns and villages of the coming of their illustrious guest; and the shouts of the populace, the waving of handkerchiefs, nay, the very outpouring of tears, marked, wherever he went, the estimation in which he was held. At Aix la Chapelle, moreover, he was visited daily by persons of the highest rank from the neighbouring provinces, of whom one, the duke de Lesdiguières, was so much delighted, that on his return home he said to the abbot de Guilestre, "I can now say that I have seen the man who is equal to the marshal de Turenne in conduct, to the prince of Condé in courage, and superior to the marshal de Luxembourg in success."

Marlborough had quitted England alone; for what cause does not exactly appear; and he continued to reside in a species of incognito at Aix la Chapelle for some time. From this point he communicated both with prince Eugene and his friends at home; receiving from the former continued assurances of esteem, and from the latter information of events as they befell: but he was compelled, early in February, 1713, to withdraw to Maestricht, in consequence of a rumoured conspiracy to seize his person. Here the duchess joined him; when the danger, if such there ever was, having blown over, he removed to Frankfort on the Maine, where he fixed his temporary abode. But though blessed with her society, which to the last he valued more than any other thing upon earth, even here he was not permitted to repose in peace. Fresh charges were continually brought against him at home — as, that he had caused the troops to be mustered as complete when they were defective; that he bribed the commissioners to share in the guilt; and then pocketed the excess of pay issued. Of t

he was duly informed through a channel which might be regarded as demi-official; and hence he could not refuse, however irksome to himself, to refute the calumnies, and to overwhelm the calumniators with shame.

Among other excursions in which he indulged, one carried him to Mindelheim, the principality which the emperor had conferred upon him, and which he had been permitted by his own sovereign to accept. This occurred in the month of May, 1713; and the inhabitants of the district showed, by the enthusiasm with which they received him, that to the order of things which he deemed it right to establish, they were not opposed. But Marlborough was doomed to suffer wrong at the hands of every potentate whom he had served; those who derived the chief benefit from his services proving the most ungrateful; and to this general rule the emperor, in spite of the best exertions of Eugene, formed no exception. The treaty of Utrecht led to his dismissal by his native sovereign from the honours and offices which he had so long held under the British crown: the pacification of Baden stripped him of his principality of Mindelheim. After vainly opposing himself, single-handed, to the power of France, the emperor was reduced to the necessity of opening a negotiation, which led to a final adjustment of the differences between the two courts, and the recovery by the elector of Bavaria of his original position in the empire. Now, as Mindelheim formed part of the electoral states, and no exemption in Marlborough's favour would be admitted, he found himself all at once stripped of a territory from which he derived a yearly revenue of 2000*l.* sterling; at first under assurances that a compensation would be afforded elsewhere; but finally with the empty declaration that the rights and honours attaching to him as a prince of the empire should be faithfully guarded. It was to no purpose that Marlborough protested against an arrangement, as discreditable to the cabinet of Vienna as it was injurious to himself. For a while he was met by evasions and pro-

mises, which became every day more and more vague, and in the end not even a subterfuge was employed to cloak over the act of injustice which robbed him of his German dominions.

The above occurrence took place in the spring of 1714, when Marlborough, residing at Antwerp, watched with no common anxiety over the destinies of his native country. The increasing infirmities of the queen, the divided state of her councils, and the extraordinary disruption of parties perceptible in the new parliament, all seemed to portend that a mighty crisis was at hand. On the one hand, Oxford, though holding aloof from a junction with the jacobites, appeared reluctant to take any step which might render the succession of the electoral family secure; Bolingbroke, on the contrary, made no secret of his design to bring back the exiled prince; and he found both in Mrs. Masham and his royal mistress ready if not able supporters. Both parties made haste to open negotiations with Marlborough and his friends; and they vied with one another in the extent of offers made, for the purpose each of gaining him over to his party. We cannot pause to describe in detail the intrigues and counter-movements which followed: with the results which flowed out of them, in the resignation of Oxford, just before the queen expired, every reader of English history is acquainted.

Whatever disposition Marlborough might have formerly entertained to reinstate the house of Stuart on the throne, from which he had been mainly instrumental in expelling them, we find no trace even of wavering during the progress of events to which allusion is made in the preceding paragraph. He had suffered too much wrong at the hands of the tories to experience any personal leaning towards them; and he was too profound a judge of the aspect of the political horizon, not to see that the cause of the Stuarts, despite of Bolingbroke's zeal, was desperate. He gave in, therefore, without reserve, his adherence to the court of Hanover, and he received from the electress a blank commission as general in chief of all her forces,

so soon as her accession should occur. Thus assured of the favour of his future sovereign, he exerted himself strenuously in paving the way for the quiet transfer of the British crown from the head of one queen to that of another. The garrison of Dunkirk was prepared, immediately on receiving intelligence of Anne's decease, to pass over, under his own guidance; while Cadogan and Stanhope were both instructed to act with similar decision at home. But for the employment of such means all necessity was obviated, by the unexpected and unusual promptitude of the duke of Shrewsbury; aided as it was by delays in the management of his cabal by Bolingbroke, for which it is not easy to account.

Such was the train into which affairs were brought, the partisans of the electress being ready to act at a moment's notice, when the sudden death of that venerable princess gave a somewhat new turn to Marlborough's fortunes. The elector had never forgiven the fancied slight which the duke and Eugene put upon him, by concealing from him the plan of the campaign in 1708; and hence, though he did not refuse to keep up a good understanding with the former, now that a crisis was approaching, he was far from treating him with the boundless confidence which his mother had displayed. Oxford, too, who as yet held the reins of government, was not backward in working upon the prejudices of the Hanoverian prince, by bringing before him the correspondence which Marlborough had formerly held with the members of the rival house. But the elector, though he received such communications freely, was too cautious to suffer any public manifestation of his prejudices to escape; and the stream was already setting so strongly in his favour, that he needed only to lie still, while events worked for him, as it were, of their own accord. Finally, the dismissal of Oxford taking place, Bolingbroke made haste to arrange a new administration friendly to his own designs and those of his party. But even his preparations were as yet incomplete, when the queen was seized with that violent paroxysm

from which she never recovered. It was then that Shrewsbury, who was present at the meeting of the privy council which determined that a new treasurer should be appointed without delay, consented, at the suggestion of the whig members, to accept the staff of office; and the queen, during a lucid interval, confirming the choice of her advisers, all Bolingbroke's schemes became in an instant defeated. Troops were ordered to march on the metropolis; an embargo was laid on all the ports; a fleet was sent to sea under the earl of Berkeley; and a messenger despatched to Hanover, with an urgent request to the elector that he would proceed without delay to Holland, whence an English frigate could, at an hour's notice, transport him to England. In a word, every arrangement was made with such diligence and effect, that when, on the 1st of August, the queen expired, George I. was proclaimed king without opposition.

Marlborough, warned of coming events, had moved his residence to Ostend, where, on the evening of the very day on which the new sovereign was proclaimed, intelligence of all that had happened, reached him. He put to sea on the following morning, the duchess and all his household attending him; and he landed at Dover amid every demonstration of public rejoicing which could be exhibited. Next night he slept at Sittingbourne, where he learned, to his excessive chagrin, that his name was not included in the list of lords justices; nevertheless, he preserved his composure, and pursued his journey on the morrow, with the intention of entering London in privacy. But his friends were not disposed to omit a public display of their sentiments on an occasion so propitious. A numerous cortège of carriages and horsemen met him, by whom he was conducted in a sort of triumphal progress across London bridge, and the city volunteers falling in, the whole moved through the great thoroughfares, amid loud shouts from the populace of "Long live king George! long live the duke of Marlborough!"

Marlborough delayed but a few days in London, that he might be sworn in as member of the privy council, and take the oaths and his seat in parliament; after which, in a frame of mind not far removed from disgust, he retired to Holywell. Here the high-spirited duchess besought him, as she herself tells us, on her knees, never to hold office under a sovereign who could thus neglect him at the outset; and, according to the same authority, he formed a determination to live on civil terms, indeed, with the court, but neither to solicit nor accept any employment. But the resolution of Marlborough was not proof against the allurements of that ambition which, whether it be or be not "the last infirmity of noble minds," unquestionably adhered to his. He consented to assume, soon after the king's arrival, the insignia of commander in chief and master-general of the ordnance; and though admitted to little share in the management of state affairs, he continued to the day of his death to discharge the duties of routine attached to these offices.

The great tale of Marlborough's public life is told; for though he continued to exhibit himself on the stage for some years longer, he took no very prominent part in the piece which was acted there. When the adherents of the exiled prince raised the standard of revolt in 1715, he adopted, as commander in chief, all the precautions which the exigencies of the moment seemed to require. He placed ample means at the disposal of the officers employed to quell the rising, and assisted them in their campaign with his advice; but he was not required to take the field in person, and felt no inclination to volunteer in the service. In like manner, when the guards broke out into complaints, because their clothing accorded not with the taste of the wearers, Marlborough promptly interfered to pacify them; and by a happy union of decision and kindness, brought them back from a state bordering on mutiny, to perfect order and submission. But these were the only transactions worthy of a place in the page of history, in which he again appeared. In other respects his duties required no

more than that he should, from time to time, issue orders, inspect accounts, and pass a regiment or brigade under review; and to these, dull and uninteresting as they must have been, he confined himself. Even his attendance in parliament was given rather as a matter of course than of choice; and if he aided in conducting the prosecution against Oxford, he was likewise, according to Macpherson, at least a main instrument of its abandonment. How far the charges brought against him by the compiler of the Stuart Papers be or be not well founded, we leave to others to determine. Dr. Coxe has, with great energy, declared them to be groundless; and though the doctor has furnished us with but doubtful evidence in support of his assertion, we are very willing to give to it all the credence which it seems to merit.

The stream of public events has hurried us on so rapidly, that we have found little leisure to record those domestic trials, to which, in common with the rest of his species, the great Marlborough was subject. One of these has indeed been noticed, the death of the young and promising marquess of Blandford; a blow which the duke felt severely when it overtook him, and which to the last he ceased not to deplore. Another bereavement he suffered on the 22d of March, 1714, by the premature decease of his daughter, lady Bridgewater, in the twenty-sixth year of her age. Lady Bridgewater was an amiable and an accomplished woman, imbued with a profound sense of religion, and beloved both by her parents and her husband. But she possessed not the same influence over the former, which her sister Anne, countess of Sunderland, exercised, on no occasion for evil, on every occasion for a good purpose. Of the society of this excellent woman, who had devoted herself since his return to dull the edge of political asperity, and to control the capricious temper of her mother, Marlborough was likewise deprived. After bearing with christian fortitude a painful and lingering illness, she was attacked, in the beginning of April, 1716, with a pleurisy, against which her enfeebled constitution proved unable to op-

pose itself, and on the 15th she died, at the early age of twenty-eight. Like Rachel weeping for her children, Marlborough refused to be comforted. He withdrew to the retirement of Holywell, that he might indulge his sorrow unseen; and there became first afflicted by that melancholy distemper, under which first his mind and eventually his body sunk.

To what proximate cause this attack is to be attributed, — whether to excess of sorrow, or, which is more probable, to an accumulation of predisposing occurrences, — we possess no means of ascertaining; but on the 28th of May he was smitten with paralysis, and became deprived on the instant both of sense and of speech. The best medical aid being at hand, he was speedily relieved from the fit, and under the skilful management of sir Samuel Garth, gradually regained his strength; but from the usual effects of such a stroke he never wholly recovered, neither his articulation nor his memory being restored to their original tone. He was able to proceed, it is true, so early as the 7th of July, to Bath, where he drank the waters with benefit, and he returned in a certain degree into society, resuming with apparent ease the ordinary course of his employment. That his faculties were not absolutely impaired, moreover, is demonstrated by the fact, that it was subsequently to this his first seizure that he played his part on the trial of lord Oxford; while his successful speculation in South Sea stock, by which, contrary to the custom of the adventure, he realised 100,000*l.*, proves that the talent of making money, at least, had not deserted him. But it seems an idle as well as an uncalled for perversion of truth to contend, that from the date of his first attack he ever was the man he had been previously. If "the tears of dotage" did not flow from his eyes, it is certain that much of the vigour of mind which once belonged to him was lost, and even his speech continued embarrassed in the pronunciation of certain words, as his features were slightly distorted. Nor did the events which accumulated upon him, both at home and abroad, by abstract-

ing him from painful subjects, tend to facilitate his recovery. The duchess, not less the slave of caprice now than formerly, managed to involve herself in a serious misunderstanding with the king, and withdrew, in consequence, her attendance on a court where her presence ceased to be agreeable. This was preceded by quarrels with almost all the oldest and steadiest friends of her husband, such as Cadogan, Stanhope, Sunderland, and secretary Scraggs, which were not composed till after the growing infirmities of the duke had taught them to think of what he once had been, and what he was likely soon to become. Nor was the death of Sunderland, which took place in April, 1722, without its effect in harassing the duke of Marlborough. That nobleman not only died in his father-in-law's debt, to the amount of 10,000*l.*; but the sealing up of his papers by government occasioned a tedious suit, Marlborough being naturally anxious to secure them to himself; a measure which the government, on public grounds, resisted.

Besides being involved in these vexatious disputes, Marlborough was again harassed by the workmen employed at Blenheim, who in 1718 renewed their actions against him for arrears of wages due since 1715. He resisted the demand; but a decree issued against him, from which he appealed, though without effect, to the house of lords. No doubt there was excessive meanness here on the part of government, of which Marlborough had just cause to complain. Yet was it beneath the dignity of the greatest man of his age to dispute with his ungrateful country about 9000*l.* Better would it have been had he paid the debt at once; for the sum was not such as to put him to the smallest inconvenience, and posterity would have more than recompensed the loss by the judgment which it would have passed on the entire transaction. In spite, however, of these multiplied sources of disturbance, it does not appear that the latter years of this great man's life were spent unhappily. Frequent returns of illness he doubtless had, each of

which left him more and more enfeebled in mind and body; but his intervals of ease seem to have been passed in the society of those who were well disposed to cheat him, as far as they could, into a forgetfulness of his fallen condition. He played much at chess, whist, piquet, and ombre; he took exercise for a while on horseback, latterly, on account of weakness, in his carriage; he even walked, when at Blenheim, unattended about his own grounds, and took great delight in the performance of private theatricals. We have the best authority for asserting, likewise, that he was never, till within a short time of his death, either indisposed or incapable of conversing freely with his friends. Whether in London, at Blenheim, Holywell, or Windsor Lodge (and he latterly moved from place to place with a sort of restless frequency), his door was always open to the visits of his numerous and sincere admirers; all of whom he received without ceremony, and treated with peculiar kindness.

In this manner Marlborough continued to drag on an existence, which, when contrasted with the tenour of years gone by, scarcely deserves to be accounted other than vegetation. In 1720, he added several codicils to his will, and "put his house in order;" and in November, 1721, he made his appearance in the house of lords, where, however, he took no prominent part in the business under discussion. He had spent the winter too in London, according to his usual habits, and was recently returned to Windsor Lodge, when his paralytic complaint again attacked him, with a degree of violence which resisted all efforts at removal. On this occasion, it does not appear that the faculties of his mind failed him. He lay, indeed, for the better part of a week, incapable of the slightest bodily exertion, being lifted from his couch to his bed, and from his bed to his couch, according as he indicated a wish to that effect; but he retained his senses so perfectly as to listen with manifest gratification to the prayers of his chaplain, and to join in them, as he himself stated, on the evening pre-

ceding his death. The latter event befell at four o'clock in the morning of the 16th of June, 1722, "when his strength," says Dr. Coxe, "suddenly failed him, and he rendered up his spirit to his Maker, in the 72d year of his age."

The most bitter political adversary to whom Marlborough ever stood opposed, and the individual at whose hands he suffered the deepest wrong, has not scrupled to leave on record this testimony to his character, that he was "the greatest general and the greatest minister whom our country or any other has produced." * Higher praise than this, the involuntary tribute of an enemy, no man need desire; yet it can scarcely be accounted as extravagant. When Bolingbroke wrote, England, at least, had produced no military commander, whose exploits would bear one moment's comparison with those of the duke of Marlborough; while, as a minister or a diplomatist, it may admit of a question whether even yet any superior to him has arisen It may not be out of place if we endeavour to ascertain the true causes of effects so remarkable; in other words, if we strive to point out, as far as our ability extends, those peculiar qualities of mind, a happy combination of which raised him, and will at all times raise others, above their competitors in the great games of politics and war.

It is admitted on all hands that to the care and diligence of tutors the duke of Marlborough owed nothing. He entered upon public life at an age when it was next to impossible that he could have acquired more than the first rudiments of education; and his studies were in consequence either totally neglected, or carried on without order, almost without an aim. But Marlborough had received from nature gifts infinitely superior, for the purposes of action, to any which mere learning can bestow. To an intuitive quickness, which enabled him to see into and understand the characters of others, he united an extraordinary share of circumspection in the developement of his own; a circumspection which was the

* Lord Bolingbroke, in his Letters on the Study of History.

more available, that it lay hidden under the guise of perfect openness and candour. Frank in his general deportment, and apparently without the wish or the power to hold back from others the absolute confidence which they bestowed upon him, he nevertheless contrived to communicate to each only so much of information as the peculiar disposition of the party consulted seemed to warrant. Discretion, therefore, may be said to have formed one very prominent feature in his mental portrait; that kind of discretion which, equally removed from timidity and rashness, directs a man as well when to exhibit reserve as when to display its opposite; as well how to meet an exigency as to avoid it; as well when to take the lead, as to be guided by the advice of others, the occurrence of circumstances, or the movements of an adverse party. We do not pretend to affirm that Marlborough was never deceived, that he never committed himself, with men who eventually betrayed him. This were to attribute to him such a degree of foresight as belongs to no finite mind: but the narrative of his life forms one continued exemplification of prudence, to which there is not a parallel in history. Had he been able to control the wayward temper of his wife, the close of his public career would have offered no contrast to its commencement. That, however, he found it impracticable to accomplish; and hence a fabric of power, built up by the exercise of more than man's discretion, a woman's violence, the offspring of wounded vanity, threw to the ground.

Another important quality conspicuous in the character of this illustrious man, was that power of calculation which enabled him to examine before-hand, with surprising accuracy, all the chances, if we may so speak, of any undertaking in which he proposed to embark. Shutting his eyes to none of the dangers that might, by possibility, attend it, he brought these into immediate contrast with their opposites, and he came to his conclusion according as the weight of probabilities appeared to incline to the one side or the

other. If it be said that this, at least, is no unusual faculty, for that all men, when placed in situations of responsibility, exercise it; we answer, that the very reverse is the fact. Not one man in a million is gifted with sufficient clearness of perception to embrace all, and no more than all, the chances for and against an enterprise still in the future: the sanguine naturally overlook the obstacles which may stand in the way of success; the desponding are equally fertile in magnifying the risks of failure. It is only such a mind as that of Marlborough which can take in all the bearings of the question fairly and honestly, and decide upon it according to its merits. What but a military genius of the highest order would have dictated the march upon Vienna in 1704? yet how could the empire have been saved had no such march been accomplished?

In addition to this rare faculty of calculation, Marlborough possessed a third quality, without which hours of the most patient enquiry will prove useless; a firmness of purpose, which, when a resolution was once taken, hindered him from being diverted from it either by the remonstrances or the apprehensions of others. Entering upon no enterprise till after it had been examined in all its bearings, he ceased, so soon as the movement began, to deliberate; and considering the difficulties by which it was beset only so far as might be necessary to overcome them, he pressed steadily forward towards the end which it was sought to attain. There are a thousand proofs in every one of his campaigns, both of the truth of this observation, and of the benefits attending the habit of mind described; but in none was the unbending resolution of the great commander more prominently exhibited than during the prolonged and harassing siege of Lille. The obstacles opposed to him there were not only gigantic in themselves, but rendered doubly perplexing by the opinion which the allies entertained of them; yet Marlborough met them one after another, and by patience and perseverance overcame them.

With three principal points of character, then, which

seem equally requisite for the great general and the great politician, which, and as they are bestowed by nature alone, all the instruction in the world will not create, Marlborough was pre-eminently gifted. He was discreet in communicating with others, sagacious in deliberation, and prompt and decisive in execution. As a military man, on the other hand, he possessed little science; that is to say, he could not boast of any intimate acquaintance with the theories of professed tacticians; nor was his knowledge of engineering, in any of its departments, more than superficial. But these defects, and such they doubtless were, only served to bring more prominently into view excellences far more rare as well as more important. Marlborough has never been surpassed in the perfect knowledge to which he attained as to what men can really perform: in the dexterity which he displayed in making the most of his instruments, we doubt whether he has ever been equalled. Long and painful marches he doubtless executed, when the exigencies of the moment seemed to require; but he who examines with a critical eye the operations of the whole war, will find that not a single instance occurs in which the allied troops were harassed beyond their strength, or deprived, even during the busiest times, of a just proportion of rest. It was this wise consideration for the health of his troops, which enabled him to bring them into the field, at all seasons, fit for their work; and we have said enough to show that his movements were, after all, both more rapid and better combined than those of his opponents. We dwell the more strongly upon this fact, because there are men who, in the excess of zeal, look upon an officer as wanting in activity, who is not prepared to move, both by night and day, as well in advance as in retreat. No really great general ever indulged wantonly in night marches. Rouse your soldiers as early in the morning as you please; but unless all be at stake, bring them to their ground, and let them sleep for three hours at least before midnight.

Again, though little read in strategy, Marlborough had obtained from nature an aptitude in the examination of ground for military purposes, such as she bestows only on the most gifted of mankind. Whether the matter under consideration were the choice of a position for his own army, or the detection of some weak point in that of the enemy, the eagle eye of Marlborough was equally keen; and of the advantages which either held out, he invariably took advantage with as much promptitude as effect. The battle of Blenheim affords one out of numerous instances of his extraordinary quickness in observing the errors committed by his opponents; the disposition of the corps which covered the sieges of Lille and Douay shows how correct were his own views of the military strength of a country.

Of bravery, if by the term be meant the animal courage which prompts men to face danger, the great Marlborough could boast only in common with the meanest of his followers; but he possessed also that kind of courage which is found to co-exist only with talent of the first order. Neither perils nor difficulties, however unlooked for, deprived him for one moment of the most perfect self-command. In the heat of battle, he was as cool and collected as when deliberating with his staff in his tent; nor was his attention ever so completely engrossed with affairs in one quarter, as to render him careless or inattentive to what might be doing elsewhere. At the battle of Blenheim, it is true that he led a charge of cavalry in person, and became for a brief space so mingled in the throng that it was impossible to look around; yet even here all his dispositions were made; and the smoke had no sooner cleared away than the effects of these dispositions became apparent. Reserves arrived exactly when they were needed; and Marlborough flew to some other point, where he saw that his presence appeared more likely to be useful. In like manner, neither the frustration of one part of his plan, nor the necessity thence arising to change it, in any degree discomposed the temper of his mind. At Mal-

plaquet the rashness of the young prince of Orange had well-nigh proved fatal, by deranging the whole order of attack, and costing a prodigious loss of life; yet Marlborough treated it as an accident not uncontemplated, and modified at once his own dispositions, to meet the exigency. His campaign of 1711, again, not only displays the same indomitable self-command, but places him in the foremost rank among the masters of manœuvre. The passage of the lines has not been cast into the shade by any subsequent operation in presence of an enemy.

It has been said of Marlborough, by one of his most elaborate biographers, that "his genius was of English mould, vast, comprehensive, and daring; attaining its purposes by great and decided efforts, simple in design, and majestic in execution." * We must be pardoned if we venture to say, that we do not exactly comprehend the object of this commendatory sentence. Between English genius and genius as it appears elsewhere, we know not how a diversity of character is to be detected; and as to the remainder of the eulogium, we must confess, that to us it is wholly unintelligible. As little are we able to comprehend what the learned author means, when he asserts that his hero, "averse by character as well as principle from defensive warfare, was always the assailant, and invariably pursued one grand object, regardless of minor consequences." The leader of an army, if he possess the talents which become his station, can permit neither principle nor natural bias to direct him in his mode of conducting a war. Wherever the state of affairs shall appear to recommend his acting on the offensive, he will, of course, and with all diligence, adopt that system; when a contrary mode of proceeding seems to hold out better hopes of ultimate success, he will with equal cheerfulness adopt it. The truth is, that the power of choosing between the fitting moment for aggressive and defensive manœuvre is exactly that which,

* Dr. Coxe.

more than any other, belongs to the great military genius. Events so ordered it, that an offensive warfare promised to Marlborough, in all his campaigns, more important results than its opposite; on this account he pursued it: but had he been differently situated, we cannot for one moment doubt that he would have adapted his tactics, without violating any principle, to the position in which he stood.

In addition to these rare qualities of mind, the duke of Marlborough was endowed by nature with a person and address more than usually captivating, as well among his inferiors as his equals. To the elegance of that person and that address, indeed, lord Chesterfield does not hesitate to attribute a large share of Marlborough's success throughout life; and though we cannot exactly go so far as the noble author has done in the passage to which we allude, we are far from denying that it contains a great deal both of philosophy and sound reasoning. One thing, at least, is certain, that his mode of addressing the troops, the appearance of interest which he exhibited in his visits to the hospitals, and his manner of speaking to the meanest sentinel whenever he happened to cross his path, rendered him an object of equal love and respect to his followers. Nor ought it to be forgotten that Marlborough kept up something more than the forms of religion in his camp. He never entered upon a general action of which the plan had been deliberately laid, without himself receiving the sacrament, and causing prayers to be read at the head of every regiment; and the consequence was, that, to use the words of one who served under him, "cursing and swearing were seldom heard among the officers; and the poor soldiers, many of them the refuse and the dregs of the nation, became, at the close of one or two campaigns, civil, sensible, and clean, and had an air and spirit above the vulgar."

The plan of this work necessarily precludes us from offering any general review of the character of the illustrious Marlborough, considered as a statesman and a

diplomatist. On some accounts we are disposed to lament, on others to rejoice, that such restrictions are imposed upon us; for though the exposure of even his moral delinquencies might convey a useful lesson to mankind, it were not an agreeable task to lay them bare. Enough is done, therefore, when we express our regret that the greatest hero of his age was not, as he might have been, also the most honest politician; and that, when looking back upon his conduct towards his first master and early benefactor, we are almost compelled to acknowledge that the wrongs which he endured in his latter days were but a just recompence of his early treachery.

The duke of Marlborough left behind him three daughters, all of them married into the best families of the kingdom. Henrietta, the eldest, the wife of Francis earl of Godolphin, became on her father's decease duchess of Marlborough; but died in 1733, without male issue. Anne married Charles, earl of Sunderland, from whom are descended the present duke of Marlborough and the earl of Spencer; and Mary gave her hand to the duke of Montagu. The property which he had accumulated in the course of his long and busy life proved to be very great. In addition to the estates purchased for him by the country, he disposed by will of lands and money, of which the interest fell not short of 100,000*l.* a year; indeed, the annual revenue bequeathed to his successors in Woodstock alone is given on the best authority at 70,000*l.* The mansion house at Blenheim was at the period of his death still in progress of erection, and he set apart a sum of money for the purpose of completing it, of which he committed the management exclusively to the duchess, who survived her husband many years. It seems alone necessary to add to this, that the estates of Woodstock are held on feudal tenure, the occupant presenting to the king once a year a standard similar to those which the founder of his house captured; and that these are regularly deposited in a private chapel at Windsor, where they may still be seen by the curious.

The funeral of this illustrious warrior and statesman was of course as magnificent as his reputation and the honour of the country seemed to require. His body, after undergoing the process of embalming, and lying in state at Marlborough House, was conveyed in a sort of triumphal car to Westminster Abbey, long lines of carriages following, and all the parade of troops, heralds, and mourners preceding and surrounding the senseless clay. A gorgeous canopy overshadowed it, adorned with plumes, military trophies, and heraldic achievements. Dukes and earls were the chief mourners; the pall being borne by persons of not less eminent rank; and the cavalcade was received by the light of blazing torches at the door of the abbey by all the dignitaries and ministers of the church in full canonicals. Yet was the solemn ceremony performed for no other purpose than to render due honours to the remains of England's most illustrious commander. The body was not permitted for any length of time to rest where, amid such splendour, it had been entombed; but, being removed to the chapel at Blenheim, it was finally deposited in a mausoleum, erected by Rysbrack, under the superintendence of the duchess.

CHARLES MORDAUNT, EARL OF PETERBOROUGH.

Charles Mordaunt, the son of John lord Mordaunt, of Reigate in Surrey, and viscount Avalon in the county of Somerset, by Elizabeth, daughter of Thomas Carey, second son of Robert earl of Monmouth, was born at his father's house in the country, in the year 1658. Of the events which marked the progress of his childhood and early youth no record has been preserved, at least we have utterly failed in our efforts to obtain any information on the authority of which it would be prudent to rely. We know, indeed, that he served, when a mere boy, on board the Mediterranean fleet, under admirals Torrington and Narborough; and that in 1675 he succeeded to the honours and estates of his ancestors. We are likewise assured that he was present at the siege of Tangier, in 1780; having, by this time, exchanged the naval for the military profession: but of the system adopted in forming his early tastes, as well as of the names of his instructors, we are left entirely ignorant. To one fact, however, the habits of his latter years seem to bear tolerably conclusive testimony. His education, using that term in its ordinary sense, could not have been neglected: at least, if the contrary be the case, he stands forth an almost solitary instance of literary aptitude acquired in the decline of life, for which no preparation had been made in boyhood.

The first historical mention made of the subject of this memoir, represents him as a bold and uncompromising opponent of the state policy pursued by the last two princes of the house of Stuart. Walpole even asserts that his hostility to the court went so far as to involve him in the plot of which lord Russell and Algernon Sydney were the victims*; and that he accom-

* Walpole's Royal and Noble Authors.

panied the latter to the scaffold. But as neither Burnet nor Tindal make mention of this circumstance, and as Walpole neglects to quote his authority, the truth of the statement may, at least, be doubted. Be this, however, as it may, we find him, immediately after the accession of James, taking an active part in the opposition set up to the proceedings of that ill-advised monarch. It is probable that his exertions in the cause of public liberty marked him out as an object of royal disfavour; or, it may be, that sheer disgust drove him, as it drove others, to abandon, for a time, his devoted country. At all events, he became, by degrees, so little satisfied with the state of affairs at home, that he solicited, and obtained, permission to serve abroad, and quitted England, avowedly for the purpose of commanding a portion of the Dutch fleet, which was then about to sail for the West Indies. Thus screened from animadversion, he passed over to Holland, where he immediately attached himself to the person and fortunes of the prince of Orange; strongly urging upon him the wisdom of attempting, without further loss of time, a revolution for which all classes in England were ripe. But the advice, though according well with the designs of the stadtholder, was rejected for the present as premature. "The lord Mordaunt," says Burnet, "was the first of all the English nobility that came over openly to see the prince of Orange. He asked the king's leave to do it. He was a man of much heat, many notions, and full of discourse. He was brave and generous, but had not true judgment. His thoughts were crude and indigested, and his secrets were soon known. He was with the prince in 1686; and then he pressed him to undertake the business of England; and he represented the matter as so easy, that this appeared too romantical to the prince to build upon it. He only promised, in general, that he should have an eye on the affairs of England; and should endeavour to put the affairs of Holland in so good a posture as to be ready to act when

it should be necessary: and he assured him, that if the king should go about either to change the established religion, or to wrong the princess in her right, or to raise forged plots to destroy his friends, he would try what he could possibly do."

From this date, up to the memorable era of 1688, lord Mordaunt resided entirely in the Low Countries. He was much courted by the prince; being, as Burnet expresses it, "one whom his highness chiefly trusted, and by whose advice he governed his motions." Nor, when the cause finally triumphed, and William became king of England, were his services permitted long to go without their reward. On the 9th of April, 1689, he was created earl of Monmouth, having, on the day previous, been nominated to the twofold office of lord of the bedchamber and first commissioner of the treasury.

Lord Monmouth, as he must now be called, discharged his civil duties only till November, 1690; when, in consequence of some misunderstanding, of the precise nature of which we are ignorant, he was suddenly dismissed from the king's councils. It is, perhaps, more to be wondered at, that two men, differing so widely as the king and his chamberlain, should have lived together during a year and a half in amity, than that they quarrelled at last: nevertheless, the rupture, if such it was, cannot be said to have been complete; inasmuch as his military dignities were not taken away from the discarded courtier. Monmouth still continued to command the royal regiment of horse-guards, a corps of which the king was colonel; and, accompanying it to the Continent, in 1692, served throughout the campaign with distinction; but his rank being necessarily subordinate, and his responsibility light, it were out of place to describe in detail operations over which he exerted no control.

There occurs little in the personal history of lord Monmouth, during several years from this date, of which it were necessary, in a sketch like the present, to give

any account. Like most of his contemporaries, we find him mixed up, from time to time, in party feuds and personal bickerings; but the results attending these differ so little from the issues of political cabals in general, that we need not now pause to record them. The case is widely different as we come down to 1696, when he was suddenly deprived of all his offices, and committed to the Tower. Over the part which he played in the transactions of that memorable year, it is deeply to be regretted that a veil of studied mystery is thrown; nevertheless, as we are not absolutely without a clue to guide us, it may be well if we give, in few words, the substance of a tale which is told more at length both by Tindal and Burnet.

We need scarcely remind our readers, that in 1696 a plot for the assassination of king William was detected; and that sir John Fenwick, a violent jacobite, was, along with other persons, arrested as one of the conspirators. Through the management of his wife, a near relative of the earl of Carlisle, one of the principal witnesses against the prisoner was induced to fly the country; so that, when the day of trial came, it was found necessary to suspend the proceedings, the testimony of one being insufficient to convict of high treason. A bill of attainder was in consequence introduced into parliament; during the preparation and progress of which, considerable delays occurred; and other and more powerful parties were, by means highly disgraceful to all concerned, dragged as it were before the bar of public opinion. A pamphlet appeared, having the name of Smith upon the titlepage, which charged lord Shrewsbury with being accessory to the plot; while Fenwick himself threw out more than one hint that the accusation was not absolutely groundless. As the proceedings went on, however, Fenwick refused to repeat his insinuations, or to fasten a positive charge on lord Shrewsbury; while Peterborough, who at first appeared reluctant to sanction the bill of attainder, spoke vehemently in favour of its passing. Strange occurrences followed upon this. The duchess of

Norfolk openly declared, that the whole device of lord Shrewsbury's accusation originated with lord Monmouth. She asserted that he, assisted by Dr. Davenant, drew up the pamphlet of which Smith stood forth as the ostensible author; and that lady Fenwick had repeatedly been worked upon, the duchess herself being the instrument, to encourage her husband in his designs against Shrewsbury. We are not called upon to decide whether this story, given in part by Tindal, in part by bishop Burnet, be or be not correct; all that we know on the subject is, that an enquiry took place before both houses of parliament; that Smith's book was pronounced by the commons to be libellous and false; that both Fenwick and his lady confirmed before the lords the statements of the duchess of Norfolk; and that Peterborough suffered immediately afterwards the disgrace of which we have already spoken. Yet, though the tale undeniably received credence at the time (and Marlborough among others believed it), the king would not push matters to an extremity. Monmouth was liberated, after a short confinement; and the loss (of places) says Burnet, "was secretly made up to him; for the court was resolved not to lose him quite."

In the month of June, 1697, Henry second earl of Peterborough died, and Monmouth, his nephew and heir-at-law, succeeded to the title. The circumstance appears to have produced no immediate change either in his private habits or public fortunes, over the latter of which a cloud continued to hang during some time longer: indeed, it was not till after the death of William, and the accession of Anne to the throne, that any advances were made towards rendering his talents available to the service of his country. Yet there is good reason to believe that Peterborough had not held aloof, throughout this extended interval, from all intercourse with the court and its attendants: he opened, on the contrary, a correspondence with Marlborough, of whose good opinion he expressed himself exceedingly covetous; and he succeeded at last in gaining a prominent place in the esteem

of that illustrious nobleman. The consequence was, that in 1702, the appointment of governor-general of Jamaica, and commander-in-chief of the forces about to be employed in the West Indies, was offered to him; though, for some reason unknown to us, it was declined: and during a space of nearly three years more, he led the kind of life which was in those days usually led by Englishmen of his rank.

Perhaps there never breathed the human being with the bent of whose genius a life of inactivity and repose could so ill accord. Ardent, ambitious, brave, and aspiring; possessed of talents, too, which he was not given to under-rate; lord Peterborough pined and fretted for employment on some stage where there might be difficulties to surmount, or glory to be acquired. He continued, therefore, to solicit, through every channel within his reach, service abroad; and at last, through the interference of Marlborough in his favour, he attained his end. In the spring of 1705, an expedition was planned, on the success of which the issue of the Spanish war was expected to turn; and to Peterborough, as an officer of tried courage and acknowledged ability, its guidance was entrusted. Whence the necessity of the movement originated, as well as the ends which it was designed to serve, will be best understood if we look to the state of affairs as they existed then, and had prevailed for some time previously, in Spain and Portugal.

It is not our intention to give any detailed account of the Spanish war of succession, from its commencement in 1702, down to the period of which we are now treating. Our purpose will be sufficiently served if we state, that it opened, on the side of England, with an unsuccessful attempt to reduce Cadiz; that the failure of this enterprise induced her majesty's government to turn their attention towards the establishment of an alliance with Portugal; and that, in accordance with the terms of that alliance, 12,000 men, of whom two thirds were English and one third Dutch, arrived early in 1704 at Lisbon, under the command of the duke of Schomberg. With

this force, which Charles of Austria accompanied in person, and which ought to have been joined, immediately, by 28,000 Portuguese, it had been resolved to make an inroad into Spain; and as the duke of Anjou was understood to be but ill prepared for defence, confident anticipations were entertained as to the result. But Charles soon became aware, that it is one thing to promise, and another to perform an obligation. The Portuguese army was shamefully deficient, both in numbers and equipment; there was neither unanimity of purpose, nor cordiality of feeling, among the generals; and Schomberg himself proved eminently deficient both in the temper and talent requisite to set in motion a machine so cumbersome. The consequence was, that the duke of Berwick, instead of defending Spain, carried an army of 50,000 men into Portugal, where he reduced several places of strength, and created alarm up to the very gates of Lisbon.

A commencement so disastrous, of operations in which he had somewhat reluctantly embarked, induced Schomberg almost immediately to resign; and he was succeeded in his command by lord Galway, a foreigner by extraction, but naturalised, and promoted to the peerage by king William. Galway reached Lisbon on the 30th of July, a fortnight after the taking of Gibraltar by the prince of Hesse and sir George Byng; and immediately hastened to join the army, which had proceeded towards the frontier as far as Coimbra. No event of importance marked the progress of the campaign. The duke of Berwick, securely posted in an entrenched camp behind the Agueda, bade defiance to the efforts of the Anglo-Portuguese leaders; who withdrew from before him, early in October, into winter quarters. Berwick instantly detached a strong corps to reinforce the marquis of Villadarias, already on his march to attempt the recovery of Gibraltar; and, with the remainder of his troops, placed himself in cantonments along the frontier. The siege of Gibraltar, however, ended, as every reader of history knows, in the repulse of the assailants with heavy loss.

Four English with two Dutch battalions being sent round from Lisbon, gave such a superiority to the garrison, that they not only checked the approaches of the enemy, but adventured on many and daring sorties, which wore out the patience of marshal Tesse, ruined his infantry, and compelled him to retreat with disgrace. It was chiefly owing to this circumstance, indeed, that the allies were enabled to take the field in the ensuing spring with marked superiority; and to recover the strongholds of Alcantara and Albuquerque, both of which had been wrested from them by Berwick.

The war was thus languishing along the Portuguese frontiers, when circumstances occurred, which induced the English government to hazard a fresh expedition into Spain itself. The two kingdoms of Castile and Aragon, though united since the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, retain to this day something of the hereditary animosity which they harboured one towards the other in times of old. This feeling, as may be imagined, was considerably stronger in the beginning of the eighteenth century than at any later period, and hence whatever line of policy the Castilians might be disposed to approve, seldom failed of receiving the condemnation of the people of Aragon. It so chanced that the Castilians had espoused the Bourbon cause with extraordinary zeal. The knowledge of this fact led queen Anne's ministers to anticipate that the task of exciting an Austrian party in Aragon would not be difficult; and the mission of Mr. Crow, which took place early in the summer of 1704, convinced them that the expectation had been well founded. Throughout the provinces both of Catalonia and Valencia, but particularly in the former, the archduke Charles had many friends; strenuous and successful efforts were therefore made to rouse among them a spirit of opposition; and the better to encourage them, it was resolved to support, with an English army, any designs which they might entertain of liberating themselves from the yoke of France. To the command of that expedition the earl

of Peterborough was nominated, full authority over the land forces being committed to him; while a joint control was assigned to him and sir Cloudesley Shovel over the movements and operations of the fleet.

From the tenour of the instructions conveyed on this occasion to lord Peterborough, it would appear that several objects were submitted to him for attainment. Prominent among these was the reduction of Barcelona, a strong place on the coast of Catalonia, the possession of which would, it was imagined, secure to the allies, under all circumstances, a hold upon the provinces most favourable to their cause. Should he fail in this attempt, the earl was advised to try his fortune against such others of the sea-ports as might, by their subjugation, offer, according to his judgment, the best prospect of permanent advantages. Cadiz, in particular, was named; yet it was stated that he ought not to lose sight either of Italy or of Toulon; because, by acting on one or other of these theatres, he would always have it in his power materially to relieve from pressure the duke of Savoy. Nevertheless, a great deal seems to have been left to his own discretion. He was assured, for example, that "the principal design of the expedition was to make a vigorous push in Spain;" and he was left free to conclude that, so long as that design should be accomplished, neither the seat of his operations, nor his peculiar mode of conducting them, would form subjects of minute investigation to the authorities at home. Few officers, entrusted with what is called a separate command, would desire instructions less apparently embarrassing than these; and to Peterborough, of all men living, so wide a range of choice and responsibility could not fail to prove peculiarly acceptable.

Towards the end of May, in the year 1705, the earl of Peterborough sailed from St. Helen's, at the head of a corps of infantry and artillery which amounted in all to something less than 5000 men. Of these, one third, or perhaps less than one third, were Dutch, the remainder English; and they equally put to sea,

as too often happened in those times, if not destitute, at all events wretchedly provided both with money and stores. On the 20th of June, the squadron arrived at Lisbon, whither lord Galway and the archduke Charles had returned; and Peterborough landing, directed his first attention to the amelioration of that defect, from which, above all others, disastrous consequences were to be apprehended. By means of a Jew named Curtisos, to whom he granted a contract for the supply of bread and meat to the troops, he raised, upon treasury bills, the sum of 100,000*l.*; with a portion of which, he laid in such supplies as his necessities rendered immediately indispensable.

Having so far bettered his condition, Peterborough's next object was to increase the efficiency of his land forces; as well by the additition of a select body of cavalry, of which he possessed not a squadron, as by an increase to his veteran infantry. In furtherance of this design, he prevailed upon lord Galway to hand over to him two weak regiments of dragoons, himself providing horses for their equipment; while he obtained permission to withdraw from Gibraltar two seasoned battalions, leaving two in their room which, being composed entirely of recruits, were better fitted for garrison duty than for active operations in the field. So far he was undeniably indebted to the good nature and zeal for the public service which actuated lord Galway; but another honour which befell him (for an advantage it can scarcely be termed) originated in a widely different source. The archduke Charles, disgusted with the proceedings of the allies in Portugal, proposed to cast in his lot with Peterborough; and Peterborough could not, either in delicacy or with propriety, decline the proffered compliment. The compliment, however, occasioned to him no trifling inconvenience, as well individually, as in its general political results. In the first place, the expense of the archduke's transport fell entirely upon Peterborough; — a burden of which his country never esteemed it necessary to relieve him; while, in the next place, the

presence of the claimant of the crown added little to the vigour of those counsels by which the army in Catalonia ought to have been from first to last directed.

Having taken the archduke with his suite on board, and embarked his cavalry and stores, Peterborough sailed for the Tagus; and, directing his course towards Tangier roads, formed a junction there with the squadron under sir Cloudesley Shovel. The combined fleet proceeded next to Gibraltar, where the exchange of infantry already referred to was effected, and where the prince of Hesse, as much in compliance with his own request as in deference to Charles, joined himself to the staff of the army. The prince of Hesse was a brave and meritorious soldier: he had held the office of viceroy in Catalonia, where his amiable manners and strict integrity endeared him to the people at large; and hence it was fairly enough presumed that circumstances might arise under which his presence with the expedition would prove of essential benefit. His arrival on board was therefore hailed as affording a happy omen of success; and the expedition pursued its course in the highest possible spirits.

An agreeable voyage of a few days' continuance brought them to Aldea Bay; where, at the mouth of the Guadalavier, and within sight of the towers of Valencia, the fleet cast anchor. No time was then lost in opening the business of the campaign. The castle of Denia, a place of little strength, which commanded one flank of the roadstead, was attacked the next day by a frigate and two bomb vessels. It surrendered, after a few shots had been fired; and was immediately occupied by 400 men under general Ramos; after which, a point of disembarkation being secured, the allies made haste to distribute their manifestos among such of the country people as approached the shore. As they came in great numbers, however, bringing with them fresh provisions, and exhibiting in their language and manner a rooted abhorrence of the French, it occurred to Peterborough that important uses might be made of the first conquest, trivial

as it might appear, which fortune had permitted them to attain. He looked again to his instructions, and saw that they were very vaguely expressed, more especially as related to the time in which certain services were to be performed: he proposed, therefore, to his colleagues that advantage should be taken of this happy ambiguity; and that the attempt upon Barcelona should be postponed, while another and a bolder, but, as he argued, a not less prudent enterprise, was carried into effect. Of the plan of that enterprise, as well as of the reasons which guided him in recommending it, Peterborough has left an ample account on record, of which we cannot do better than give, at this stage of our narrative, a brief but faithful abridgment.

Valencia, a populous and flourishing town, is situated in a country more than ordinarily fertile in corn, as well as abundantly supplied with horses, cattle, and other beasts of burden. It is distant from Madrid barely fifty leagues; and of its friendly disposition towards a prince of the house of Austria, the avidity with which the people received his proclamations, and the zeal which they manifested in furnishing provisions to the fleet, afforded the most satisfactory evidence. Destitute of regular troops, likewise, (of which, indeed, there were none nearer than the capital,) it appeared absolutely to invite the descent which Peterborough proposed; while its position on a navigable river rendered it extremely convenient as a base of operations to a force dependent for its chief supplies upon the shipping. But the views of Peterborough extended far beyond the mere occupation of one town, or even one province: he conceived it practicable to make from this point that "push upon Spain" which the orders of his government recommended; and he entertained sanguine expectations that the push, if made with spirit, would give a new turn to the entire course of events.

It was well known that the duke of Anjou occupied Madrid at this moment with a feeble corps of cavalry alone. The whole of his infantry, or rather, his entire

disposable force, lay detached at the two extremities of the kingdom: one portion being at Barcelona, and in the districts near; the other, under marshal Berwick, spreading along the Portuguese frontier. Both Portugal and Catalonia were, however, so far removed from Madrid, that, if common diligence were used, an army advancing from Valencia must reach the capital long before it could be supported from either flank. Now, as the people of Valencia were friendly; as the means of transport were ample; and, above all, as neither fortified towns nor other impediments stood in the way, to arrest the English in their progress; it appeared to lord Peterborough not only possible, but in all respects judicious, to make a dash upon Madrid itself. It was true that the movement could not be effected without alarming the duke of Berwick, whose instant countermarch upon the threatened point might fairly be expected. But then, as Peterborough justly argued, Berwick could not move alone; his retreat would be promptly followed by lord Galway, the king of Portugal, and their armies; so that Berwick, instead of acting to any purpose, must himself be exposed to a double danger. Let him march upon Madrid, and he would find it occupied by Charles and his allies, who could easily maintain themselves till relieved by lord Galway's troops. It was therefore a mere chance whether he would commit himself, as it were, between two fires, or provide for his own safety by abandoning the capital to its fate. As to Philip, again, his evacuation of the city was inevitable; and, provided the confederates played their cards well, his return to it might be rendered, if not impossible, at all events highly improbable. But this was not all: even supposing that lord Galway failed to follow up the duke of Berwick, a retreat to Gibraltar lay open; whilst Gibraltar could be used as a base even more convenient than Barcelona, inasmuch as its distance from England was not so great.

Deeply impressed with the importance of this plan, and full of confidence as to its practicability, Peterborough

took the earliest opportunity of submitting it to the consideration of the archduke. To his equal surprise and mortification, it was very coldly received, while the wisdom of adhering to the original scheme,—the reduction of Barcelona,—was strongly insisted upon. Peterborough urged his point with the ardour and impetuosity which formed prominent features in his character; but he found that his reasoning failed to produce the smallest effect. He then proposed to lay the project before a council of war, in order that the opinions of his colleagues might be ascertained; the proposal was agreed to, and again the decision was against him. Though Valencia might be well disposed (such were the arguments of the court), yet beyond the bounds of that narrow province all men were enemies; whereas, by commencing operations in Catalonia, you made war, as it were, in a friendly country, and blocked up one of the principal roads of communication between Philip and his supplies from France. It was to no purpose that Peterborough reminded the court both of the extent of the enemy's resources in these parts, and the strength of the place which they proposed to attack. The former, it was insisted, were in a great degree neutralised by the decided hostility of the people; while of the latter it was gravely urged, that no opinion could be formed from the inaccurate information of which they were as yet in possession. Thus thwarted by the sovereign whose cause he was sent to maintain, and over-ruled in his opinions by the prince of Hesse and others, nothing remained for lord Peterborough but to yield; and if he exhibited by his manner that he did so reluctantly, neither his zeal nor determination suffered the slightest abatement. After the delay of some days, the fleet again hoisted sail, and on the 15th of August came to anchor in the bay of Barcelona.

The city against which it was now proposed to operate chanced to be one of the largest as well as best fortified in Spain. Surrounded by works constructed after the most approved model, protected by a citadel, and covered on one side by the sea, it was rendered safe from

assault on the inland face by the proximity of Montjuick, a fortress of prodigious strength, which occupies a hill about a mile or a mile and a half from the town. The garrison which held it was known to fall very little short of the English army in point of numbers; and the enemy were too conscious of the importance of the city itself, not to have amply stored its magazines both with bread and ammunition. It was but a meagre source of satisfaction, under such circumstances, to be told that the inhabitants were, for the most part, friendly. Whatever the dispositions of unarmed civilians may be, they will scarcely venture to display them in the presence of a powerful garrison; more especially if, as was the case here, the strictest discipline be maintained, and the most vigilant watch kept over every lane and alley. Besides, what hope could be entertained of establishing even a blockade by 6000 or 7000 men; when, according to the most moderate computation, at least 30,000 were required to form the first line of circumvallation? These were the difficulties which occurred, not to Peterborough only, but to every other officer attached to the expedition, so soon as the condition of the town became known; and the effect was such as to induce even those who had been forward in counselling the movement, to recommend now an immediate abandonment of the project.

Aware that a conviction prevailed of the utter hopelessness of the undertaking, and disappointed in the expectations which he had been led to form as to the readiness of the Catalans to join his standard, Peterborough required a council of war to assemble on board the Britannia, for the purpose of determining how it behoved them to act. The council met on the 16th; when it came to the unanimous conclusion that the troops ought not to be landed; but that the expedition should either follow up its ulterior object by passing over to Italy, or direct its efforts against some other town on the sea coast. It does not appear that Peterborough dissented, on this occasion, from the

views taken by his colleagues. He saw, indeed, not less clearly than they, that he had adventured upon an enterprise in which success was not to be obtained by the ordinary means of exertion; and he could not, upon any grounds of reason, oppose himself to a decision which rested upon premises too correct to be gainsayed. Nevertheless, when the archduke expressed his anxiety that the project should not be precipitately laid aside, and the prince of Hesse remonstrated against it as discreditable to the British arms, Peterborough overcame his own scruples, and again called the generals together. This occurred more than once, with no better result than at first; till Charles, in the end, entreated as a personal favour, that they would gratify him by conducting the siege for the limited space of eighteen days. With great difficulty Peterborough prevailed upon his officers to yield; and, on the 27th, the troops were landed. But scarcely was the disembarkation completed, when the generals again met to record their decided opinion of the impropriety of the measure. Certain chiefs of the Catalans had, it appeared, come in, on whom they made large demands for workmen, which had not been acceded to; and they now utterly despaired of being able so much as to throw up their batteries, in the face of such a garrison as held the town.

Not less convinced than they, that the idea of laying formal siege to Barcelona was, with the means at his disposal, ridiculous, Peterborough found it difficult to evade compliance with a demand of which he acknowledged both the justice and the force. Not such were the dispositions of the archduke Charles or the prince of Hesse. The latter vehemently contended, that till the breaching guns were landed, the people would not believe that the allies were in concert; nor, as a necessary consequence, join them: while the former did not hesitate to declare that, whatever might be done with the troops under Peterborough's orders, he at least was resolved to live and die among his faithful Catalans.

It was to no purpose that they were both reminded of the real state of the case,—that the absence of every thing like a disposition to arm, on the part of the inhabitants, was pointed out to them; and that they were requested to draw up the rudest outline of a plan by which the extensive city before them might be attacked to advantage. The prince of Hesse met these remonstrances by a somewhat unworthy attempt to magnify the number of the miquelets, who, to the amount of perhaps 1500, hovered near the camp; while Charles assumed the language of one whose prospects were about to be blighted, at the very moment when their realisation seemed inevitable.

Stung by the murmurs of the court faction on one hand, and harassed by the angry remonstrances of his own officers on the other, Peterborough's temper, neither the most patient nor the most placable, gave way; and he contented himself with holding his position before the place, in apparent indifference as to what might eventually befall. The consequence was, that serious misunderstandings began to arise in the camp. The general of the Dutch contingent went so far as to declare that he would not obey lord Peterborough, in case he went forward with an enterprise so hopeless; while the courtiers insisted that, at all events, an effort should be made to breach the town, even if an assault should be esteemed, ultimately, too hazardous. The prince of Hesse, in particular, was loud in his demands to this effect; while the naval officers, in their turn, ceased not to reproach their comrades on shore, because they hesitated to embark in an undertaking which seamen esteemed feasible. Of all these occurrences Peterborough was made regularly aware; indeed, the prince himself scarcely disguised his opinion, that he accounted but lightly of the talents for command of one who could, in public, give his voice for active proceedings, yet permit that voice to be over-ruled by his inferiors. But neither the remonstrances of the one party nor the groundless recriminations of the other moved Peterbo-

rough to deviate from his own course. He reminded the former class, that of the difficulties which they now esteemed insuperable, he had sufficiently forewarned them ere they quitted Valencia; while, to the latter, he held one uniform tone of unanswerable argument:— "Draw out your plan in detail: convince me that, with 6000 men, I can furnish working parties and guards for the trenches; keeping up, at the same time, an efficient blockade, round the place; that, when a breach shall be effected, I can, with my little army, hazard an assault; and the siege shall be formally commenced to-morrow. But, in common fairness both to yourselves and me, abstain from general exhortations which partake largely of the character of reproach."

Upwards of three months were expended amid these embarrassing and profitless disputes. Occasionally, indeed, the general was urged to penetrate into the interior; the very persons who hesitated to follow from Valencia declaring their willingness to leave Barcelona in their rear: but, for the most part, the demand of his colleagues was to be led back to their ships, that they might proceed at once into Italy. Peterborough was sorely distressed by this appeal. Brave even to a fault, and entertaining a sense of military honour which would have been esteemed sufficiently acute even in the chivalrous age, he could not brook the idea of abandoning, without a trial, any enterprise in which he had fairly embarked; and, in the present instance, his chagrin was not diminished by the reflection that he must either yield to this dire necessity, or risk the very existence of his army. He gradually withdrew from the society even of those to whom he had formerly been most attached; while towards the prince of Hesse and the archduke Charles he evinced a marked coldness. But, though he thus held aloof from communicating with those around him, he was not regardless of the position in which the cause of his country stood: he bent, on the contrary, all the energies of his active mind to the discovery of some device by which the discredit attaching to a failure

in the outset of his career might be avoided; and he finally worked out a scheme, the very boldness of which tended, in no slight degree, to secure its accomplishment.

We have spoken of Fort Monjuick as in a great measure commanding the town, or, to express ourselves more accurately, as rendering it secure from all hostile approaches on the inland or western face. The fort in question is built upon an eminence, the loftiest of an irregular cluster of heights which branch out from the roots of the Montserrat chain, as these gradually decline towards the sea. Numerous ravines and hollows girdle it round; one of which, running transversely between it and the city, would, if not overawed by the guns of the fort, furnish a sort of natural parallel to a besieging army. Upon the fortifications of this stronghold all the care had been bestowed which the state of military science, then scarcely less perfect than it is now, would permit. The ditches were riveted and scarped; the outworks presented a very model of exactitude; and the batteries which defended the interior circle were all constructed on the most approved principles. In a word, if there was one point in the chain which, to the most practised eye, would have appeared less assailable than another, that point was Monjuick. Yet against it Peterborough now meditated a blow, not after the tedious process of a siege had been gone through, but by surprise.

The romantic idea was no sooner conceived than Peterborough, attended by a single aide-de-camp, went forth from the camp, in order to ascertain how far the degree of vigilance exhibited by the garrison would or would not authorise an attempt to realise it. The reconnoissance was effected without difficulty or hazard; for the miquelets, or armed peasants from the mountains, occupied all the gardens and inclosures near; and Monjuick possessing few conveniences for the lodgment of cavalry, no sudden attack was to be apprehended. It sufficed, moreover, to convince the English general that

the hope which his imagination rather than his sober judgment had entertained, was not altogether visionary. He saw that the ordinary precautions of placing advanced sentries without the ditch were scarcely taken; that no patrols were ever pushed beyond the limits of their own works; and that, in all respects, both the governor and the garrison appeared buried in the most extravagant confidence. Such was precisely the posture of affairs on the existence of which the success of his scheme depended; so that he returned to his tent more than ever resolute on making the attempt at all hazards.

Peterborough felt that his enemies had deceived themselves; his own good sense told him that he must deceive his friends also. Every thing, indeed, depended upon concealment; and hence he took care not to drop so much as a hint that the possibility of surprising Monjuick had occurred to him. He continued, on the contrary, to give his assent to the renewed assembling of councils of war; in deference to the repeated determinations of which the troops were warned for reimbarkation. Indeed, the artillery in front was withdrawn, and the heaviest pieces sent on board the fleet; not without a renewal of protestations on the part of the court, and a fresh outpouring of reproach from the naval officers. Yet Peterborough bore all with the utmost apparent indifference. He even affected to argue against the statements of those who condemned the proceeding, and appealed to his brigadiers to support him; insomuch that they all, whether friendly or otherwise to the measure of a retreat, regarded him as its serious supporter. But Peterborough had a different game to play. On the night preceding that morning when the army expected to quit its lines the troops were suddenly ordered under arms; and a column of 1800 men took its way, in profound silence, along the base of the hill, towards Monjuick.

From the day of the landing the troops had occupied a position on the south-western flank of the town,—having

their right extended towards the sea, and their left protected by the waters of the Llobregat. The better to secure themselves against sorties, they had thrown up several redoubts; while, by cutting sluices in the river's bank, they had it in their power, almost at any moment, to flood all the plain between the camp and Barcelona. They lay, however, at the distance of two leagues from the projected point of attack; and the only secure road by which to gain it led round the base of a rugged hill, at a circuit of not less than a league in addition. In spite, however, of the difficulties attending so protracted a march, in a dark night, Peterborough set forward; and, as his line of route led him past the door of the prince of Hesse's quarters, he alighted, and sent in a message that he desired to speak with his highness. "Being brought into the prince's apartment," says an eye-witness*, "the earl acquainted him that he had at last resolved on an attempt against the enemy; adding, that now, if he pleased, he might be a judge of their behaviour, and see whether his officers and soldiers had deserved that character which he had so liberally given them. The prince made answer that he had always been ready to take his share; but could hardly believe that troops marching that way could make any attempt against the enemy to satisfaction. However, without further discourse, he called for his horse."

Thus accompanied by the man whose intemperate reproaches had been heaped upon him ever since they began to act together, Peterborough continued his march. It was a toilsome and an arduous one; nevertheless the soldiers accomplished it well; and, about two hours before dawn, the little column found itself under the hill of Monjuick, something less than a quarter of a mile from the enemy's outworks. As might be expected, there was a profound silence throughout the ranks. A vague suspicion of the general's design began now to be entertained; and men naturally supposed that the attempt at surprise, if made at all, would be made ere morning broke. But

* Captain Carlton.

it was not so. Peterborough had well and closely examined the place. He had observed that there were neither palisades nor other barriers in any of the ditches; that the inner circle of works, though tolerably perfect in itself, scarcely commanded the outer entrenchments with effect; and that the whole were so arranged that, could the enemy be tempted into the outward ditch, beneath the bastions of the second enclosure, the best hopes might be entertained of effecting, at least, a lodgment. He determined, therefore, not to give the assault before day; partly because he felt that darkness always magnifies the obstacles to which assailants may find themselves opposed; partly because he conceived that a bold rush, in the sight of the sun, would occasion greater consternation among the enemy, than a stealthy approach under the curtain of night. Nevertheless, his arrangements were all made, and his orders issued, while yet the veil of darkness lay over them; and hence, when the moment of action did come, there was not an officer or man unacquainted with the duties which he was expected to perform.

Peterborough divided his little corps into three columns; of which one was appointed to attack a bastion that looked towards the town; another to assault a demi-bastion on the western face; and the third to act as a support to either when needed, or to cover their retreat in case of a reverse. Each of the assaulting bodies, again, was thus distributed: — First of all went a lieutenant, with thirty men, — a sort of forlorn hope, as it is called, or advanced guard; then followed a captain, with fifty men; and last of all came the little battalion, which mustered in all not more than 200 firelocks. The orders issued to both were the same. The men were directed to push forward, to receive the enemy's fire, and then leap into the ditch; out of which it was not doubted that they would speedily drive their opponents. They were then to follow the fugitives close, so as to secure a hold upon the outward circle of works; where, after pressing the garrison within what

was called the upper fort, they were to establish themselves.

Daylight had not long come in, when the troops proceeded to execute this plan with the utmost coolness and gallantry. The storming parties rushed forward, over a space of ground every where exposed to the fire of the garrison; yet such was the celerity of the movement, that they suffered comparatively little from the volley of grape and musketry which immediately opened upon them. The western attack, indeed, accomplished the service intrusted to it, with the loss of but one man killed and three wounded; for the governor, not anticipating molestation there, had withdrawn almost all his people for the defence of the eastern bastion. Immediately the soldiers sprang up the uneven face of the rampart, made themselves masters of the demi-bastion, as well as of three pieces of cannon which were planted there, and, hastily constructing a parapet with such materials as they could find, turned the guns upon the inner fort with prodigious effect. Meanwhile the column employed against the eastern bastion exhibited not less of gallantry or resolution in its operations. Having received the enemy's fire, the troops, without pausing to silence it, leaped into the ditch, and in five minutes the garrison was in full flight, leaving the sally-ports unbarred behind them in their confusion. Instantly one of these was seized. Peterborough and the prince of Hesse, followed by the main body, made good their entrance; and the bastion passed in an instant into their possession. Its gorge was promptly blocked up with a quantity of large loose stones, which happily lay in a heap, as if for the purpose; and hence, before the guns of the inner fort could open, a tolerable cover was secured.

So far every thing had fallen out even beyond the most sanguine expectations of those engaged. A secure lodgment was effected in the outworks, and the reserves coming up, placed the garrisons of these newly constructed redoubts beyond the hazard of discomfiture; but, as if to cloud the good fortune of the day, the prince of

Hesse permitted his naturally sanguine temper to lead him into a situation which cost his own life, and the loss of nearly 200 of his followers. The firing at Monjuick having alarmed the governor of Barcelona, a body of dragoons were sent from the latter place, 200 of whom, entering the beleaguered fort, were welcomed with loud cheers by the garrison. The prince, mistaking the cause of these vivas, and imagining that the place had surrendered, pushed forward, with 300 men, to secure it, and himself perished, together with the greater number of those who had improvidently adopted his opinion. But the confusion which might have followed so untoward an event the coolness and decision of Peterborough prevented. He drew off the remains of the prince's party, in excellent order, and, sending the body of that gallant officer to the rear, promptly replaced the men in the positions which they ought not to have quitted.

This was scarcely done when an alarm arose that a heavy column both of horse and foot was advancing from Barcelona upon Monjuick. It is to be observed, that there were lines of communication between these two places, which, leading over some very rugged ground, rendered it impossible to pass from the one point to the other free from observation. Peterborough saw that the report was not groundless; but being anxious to ascertain more accurately the precise amount of the approaching enemy, he mounted his horse, and rode beyond the glacis. He was scarcely gone when one of those groundless panics, for which it is extremely difficult to account, arose among the men. The dangers to which they were really exposed became magnified in their eyes so soon as their general passed from before them; and the example spreading even to the officer left in command, he ventured, on his own responsibility, to issue orders for the abandonment of their conquests. It is a curious fact that these orders were in part obeyed; that the troops had actually withdrawn from the bastion which they had won, and were already in the ditch when Peter-

borough, recalled by captain Carlton, arrived, and put a stop to a movement so disastrous. He shouted aloud that the men were marching in the wrong direction. He threw himself from his horse, grasped a standard, and waved it over his head; upon which his people, as if inspired by some influence more powerful than nature, suddenly wheeled round. As good fortune would have it, their momentary retrogression had not been observed by the enemy; and they recovered, in consequence, their vantage ground without difficulty, while the cloud that seemed to menace them from Barcelona dispersed of its own accord. It so happened that the prisoners taken during the prince of Hesse's ill-judged advance, fell in with the column of relief while yet on its march. They were questioned, as usual, by the officer in command, as to the amount of force engaged; and reporting that Peterborough conducted the operation in person, a belief naturally arose that the whole of the British army had moved upon Monjuick. The consequence was, that, apprehensive lest their own retreat might be cut off, they fell back with the utmost precipitation, securing their own safety in the town, and leaving the castle to its fate.

Among other dispositions which Peterborough had considered it advisable to make, he had moved up 1000 men, under general Stanhope, whom he posted half-way between the camp on the western side of Barcelona and the point of attack. These were now ordered to seize the ground between Monjuick and the town, so as to close up the garrison of the former, and to cut off all communication with the open country. They executed the charge intrusted to them with effect; and the heavy guns being immediately re-landed, batteries were raised, and a furious bombardment began. On the third day a shell struck the principal magazine, and blew it up. The governor's house was shaken to the ground, where himself with all his guests perished in the ruins; while a face of one of the smaller bastions was, by the same concussion, shivered into fragments. Instantly the miquelets rushed

up the open space; while Peterborough, not less attentive than they, sent his regular troops to support them. In ten minutes this strong fortress was in possession of the English; the utmost regard being paid both to the persons and property of its recent occupants.

The effect of this success upon the minds both of the land and sea forces was the more encouraging, that it had by no means been anticipated. Among the naval officers, in particular, the greatest enthusiasm prevailed; insomuch that they one and all volunteered, with every disposable man from their ships' crews, to serve in the trenches. Peterborough was not slow in taking advantage of the good spirit thus excited: three breaching batteries, armed one with nine, another with twelve, a third with thirty guns, were raised against the western flank; while six lighter pieces were planted on the summit of a rock, so as to enfilade the defences, and keep down the fire from the place. With respect, again, to the troops, they were divided into two camps, of which one held Monjuick, while the other occupied the line of the beach; and they relieved each other at intervals, their route lying along the base of the hills, by which the movement was effectually concealed from the enemy's observation. Thus were the men alternately exposed and sheltered, their labour being in like manner very equally distributed; while the guns, manned in part by seamen, in part by soldiers trained to the service, did their work with the very best effect. Within the space of a few days, indeed, a breach was effected; and the engineers having pronounced it practicable, preparations were made to storm.

The governor, don Velasco, disheartened by the loss of Monjuick, and made aware of the exasperation which prevailed among the miquelets, would not incur the hazard of an assault. He hung out a white flag, and proposed to capitulate; and, as he gave up without reluctance one gate as an earnest of his sincerity, no difficulty was experienced in bringing the negotiation to a satisfactory issue. But this act, intended on his part to

evince his perfect abhorrence of deceit, had well-nigh proved fatal both to himself and the people. The miquelets, whose hatred towards Velasco seems to have been, though not unfounded, very extravagant, no sooner found an opening, than, in defiance of all the laws of war and civilised life, they penetrated within the works. A scene of the most revolting violence must have followed, had not Peterborough made his way through a postern into the town, and, at the imminent hazard of his own life, saved that of the governor, and preserved the devoted city from rapine and plunder. Velasco was neither indifferent to the act of kindness thus performed nor slow in acknowledging it. Though the terms of capitulation authorised him to exclude the English during nine days longer, he issued orders on the instant for the general surrender of the place; and the garrison having marched out with all the honours of war, Charles made his solemn entrance, and was immediately proclaimed king.

The results attendant on this splendid and unlooked-for victory proved scarcely less important than the victory itself. Almost all the principal towns in Catalonia — Taragona, Tortosa, Lerida, San Mateo, and Gerona, — declared for the house of Austria. The enemy's troops deserted in whole battalions, — even the garrison of Barcelona passing, with the exception of 1000 men, into the service of Charles; while recruits presented themselves in such numbers, that six new regiments were speedily embodied. Valencia, in like manner, became restless under the Bourbon supremacy. Don Raphael Nevat, commanding a regiment of veteran infantry, marched to Denia, and joined general Ramos. A movement was next made upon Valencia itself, which submitted; while various places of lesser note promptly followed the example. There needed, in short, but an unanimity of sentiment in council, producing its natural consequences, promptitude of action in the field, to render the success of the cause certain; for the enemy were panic-struck, their reserves remote, and their plans thoroughly disconcerted. Unfortunately, however, the little court of Charles be-

came a prey to faction almost from the first hour of its establishment. Peterborough, on the one hand, impetuous and domineering, strove to carry, by sheer dictation, measures judicious perhaps in themselves, though little in accordance with the sluggish tempers of his colleagues; the Spanish authorities, on the other hand, jealous of the interference of a foreigner, affected to rely more upon their own negotiations and intrigues than upon the operations of the army; while the Dutch officers, not wholly unsupported by certain English brigadiers, contended for the necessity of giving rest to the troops after the labours of the siege. It was to no purpose that Peterborough remonstrated against the loss of time, on the right improvement of which he conceived that the issues of the war depended. His sarcastic and haughty manner inflicted wounds too deep for the wisdom of his advice to heal; and arrangements were made, in spite of protestations to the contrary, for passing the winter months in mischievous inactivity.

In accordance with the decisions of a council of war, the greater part of the fleet returned to Lisbon; and the army was distributed among the several towns which had recently submitted to king Charles. Lerida, in particular, was strongly occupied; while in Tortosa, a place peculiarly important, as in some degree connecting the kingdoms of Valencia and Catalonia together, 1000 foot and 200 horse were quartered. San Mateo, again, though valuable on account of its position on the main road, or rather pass, from one province to the other, was intrusted to 500 miquelets only, under colonel Jones; while about 4000 men were kept idle at Barcelona, for the purpose, as it appeared, of giving lustre to the court. Peterborough vainly argued against the folly of this disposition, even when he ceased to urge the propriety of a winter campaign; and it needed but the lapse of a few weeks to demonstrate that he had not been mistaken in any of his calculations.

The fall of Barcelona was no sooner communicated to Philip, than he took vigorous measures to arrest the

progress of the English arms, as well as to recover, if possible, the ground which he had lost both in Catalonia and Valencia. The conde de las Torres, an officer of considerable experience and character, put himself at the head of all the disposable force that could be collected, and marched upon San Mateo. The place was immediately invested; and the approaches being pushed with equal determination and address, colonel Jones, the officer in command, found great difficulty in maintaining himself. Urgent and pressing entreaties for relief were forwarded to Barcelona, where the bold measures of the enemy excited both surprise and dismay; more especially as the corps engaged in the siege of San Mateo was known to exceed in numbers the total amount which Charles had left disposable from his remote garrisons. Under these circumstances, recourse was had to a species of finesse, not very unusual in Spanish warfare, though calculated, in most instances, to bring ruin upon those whom it is designed for the moment to encourage. The king addressed a letter of instructions to Peterborough, requiring him to hasten, with the troops in Tortosa, to the relief of colonel Jones; while, the better to ensure his compliance, a story was invented for which there does not appear to have existed even a shadow of foundation. The earl was assured that Las Torres's army scarcely amounted to 2000 men; that he was shut up in the wood of Valvana, between Morella and San Mateo, by 16,000 armed peasants; and that it required only the presence of a small regular force to ensure his unconditional surrender. As Peterborough could not imagine that the master whom he served would intentionally thrust him into a position of the utmost hazard, he sent orders to the officer in command at Tortosa, that he should pass the Ebro without delay; and himself travelling express, he arrived in an incredibly short space of time at the base of his future operations.

The first measure which he judged necessary to adopt was to call the magistrates of Tortosa together for the

purpose of ascertaining from them the exact strength and position of the irregular bands alluded to by the king. His astonishment may be conceived, when he learned that no such bands were in existence; and that the enemy, to the amount not of 2000, but of 7000 men, of whom 3000 were cavalry, occupied a strong encampment under the walls of San Mateo. Almost any other general would have abandoned all hope, and accounted himself fortunate in escaping the snare into which he had well-nigh been lured; but Peterborough was not a man to act or calculate according to the ordinary rules of prudence. He examined his instructions again; saw that the relief of San Mateo was strongly urged; felt, moreover, that the service was highly important; and determined, at all hazards, to attempt it, even with the 1200 men whom alone he had at his command. It required a good deal of address, however, to persuade the inferior officers of the practicability of a scheme, on the first blush, so extravagant; for they, equally with himself, were aware of the prodigious numerical superiority of the enemy: nevertheless, his success at Barcelona having inspired all ranks with a perfect confidence in his talents, they finally yielded, with a good grace, to his wishes. Nor did the result disappoint their anticipations.

Brave as he was, even to rashness, Peterborough never entertained the idea of risking his handful of troops, however trustworthy, in action against an enemy so superior. He determined, on the contrary, to effect by stratagem, what he possessed not the means of attempting by open force; and, with this view, broke up his little corps into detachments, each of which he placed under the command of an officer in whom he believed that he could repose implicit confidence. These were severally instructed to march by the most unfrequented mountain paths; to permit no straggling nor marauding on any account whatever; and to reunite at Traguera, a walled town distant about six leagues from the enemies' camp. The detachments executed the

orders given them with equal promptitude and secrecy. They gained Traguera without exciting the smallest alarm; and, the gates being closed, Peterborough henceforward took care that an opportunity of betraying his designs to the enemy should not be afforded.

Having thus drawn his corps within a single march of Las Torres, Peterborough's next object was to create a persuasion in the mind of his adversary, that a very superior force was preparing to attack him. For this purpose he employed two Spaniards; one a trusty spy, and as such in his own confidence — the other an ordinary peasant, himself deceived, and, therefore, incapable of betraying the secrets of his employer. These persons were directed to convey to colonel Jones a letter, so expressed as that it should seem to have been written after all dread of failure had passed away. The letter in question informed Jones, that Peterborough had arrived at Traguera; and that, by means of water carriage, he had brought up a force equal, if not superior, to that of the besiegers. It entered into details so minute as to carry with them an air of perfect reality; and, above all, it stated that, though every precaution had been taken to ensure its safe delivery, its falling into the enemy's hands would "do little prejudice, since they shall see and feel the troops as soon almost as they can receive intelligence, should it be betrayed to them." With this letter the Spaniards set out over night; the spy being fully warned of the course which it behoved them to follow. Every thing fell out as Peterborough could have wished. The men separated in the darkness: the spy who was first taken reported to his captors, that another countryman, the bearer of a letter, lay concealed somewhere not far off; and the peasant being found, and his statements rigidly corresponding with the written account, Las Torres became convinced that his own situation was critical. Nor was much leisure afforded him to consider of the course which it would be judicious to pursue. Peterborough, who had marched from Traguera within an hour from the departure of the

messengers, showed himself, as the dawn broke, in several columns upon the high grounds above the camp; and as the hills were well feathered with coppices and underwood, an exaggerated opinion of his strength was, without difficulty, excited. Las Torres believed all that he had heard. He caused his tents to be struck, his stores abandoned or destroyed, and his heavy artillery spiked; after which he retreated, with the utmost precipitation, along the road to Valencia. Immediately the British troops marched into San Mateo, amid the loudest acclamations of its gallant but hard-pressed garrison.

It was confidently expected, as well by colonel Jones as by the officers employed under his own immediate command, that Peterborough, satisfied with the accomplishment of a service, on the successful termination of which no man had a right to calculate, would have halted and refreshed his troops,—at least till the dead of winter had passed away; but no such arrangement was ever contemplated by this daring and chivalrous leader. He scarcely paused, indeed, to receive the congratulations of the garrison, and to give necessary instructions for repairing the ruined defences, ere he again put his little column in motion along the route which the enemy had taken. Keenly alive to the sound policy of acting upon an impression while it is recent, he determined to pursue Las Torres; and he conducted the chace with not less skill and decision than he had displayed in the advance from Tortosa. His letter to Jones had been so expressed as to produce a belief, on the part of Las Torres, that the hills which hemmed in the road, both on the right and left, were all occupied by Charles's troops. Las Torres, in consequence, retreated along the plain, scarcely venturing to push a patrol, on either flank, to the distance of half a mile from his line of march; while the march itself was conducted with a degree of haste which gave full assurance of the alarm under which he laboured. Peterborough ably availed himself of these several blunders. Sending his infantry through the

passes of the mountains, he hung upon the rear of the enemy with his cavalry; cutting off their stragglers, occasionally threatening their covering parties, and spreading dismay throughout the whole of their ranks. But he had not proceeded further than Albocazer, a town about six leagues from San Mateo, when a courier from Barcelona overtook him, bringing letters of which the contents materially interfered with the arrangements which he had previously made.

The plans of Peterborough, when marching from Tortosa on San Mateo, extended greatly beyond the relief of the latter place. He had received orders from king Charles, so soon as his first object should be attained, to attempt the total expulsion of the enemy from Valencia; and he was now pressing forward with the avowed intention of fulfilling these instructions. It was communicated to him, at Albocazer, that three armies were forming elsewhere, to meet which every disposable man would be required. One corps, amounting to 8000 men, had entered Catalonia from Roussillon; Tilly was in Aragon, with 4000 or 5000 more, over-running the whole country up to the gates of Lerida; whilst Philip himself had collected, at Madrid, not less than 10,000 infantry, besides cavalry, with the view of executing some movement of which the object was not yet ascertained. In addition to all this, it was stated that Berwick, recalled from the Portuguese frontier, was hastening, by forced marches, to the capital; and hence, that whatever fortune might attend Valencia, neither Catalonia nor the king's person could be accounted safe, unless a general concentration took place for their defence. Finally, the earl was given to understand, that a reinforcement of 1000 foot and 300 horse, which had been promised him, and which had already penetrated as far as Tortosa, was countermanded; and that no supplies would be forwarded till the danger which seemed to threaten Catalonia should disperse. Peterborough was a good deal disconcerted by these despatches; more especially as they threw a prodigious load of responsi-

bility upon himself, without at the same time explicitly marking out the line of conduct required at his hand. Nevertheless he made up his mind as to the part which it behoved him to play, and followed his own plans with unflinching steadiness. He saw that, in spite of the cry of danger nearer home, the despatches were so expressed as to render him, in a great measure, answerable for the maintenance of authority abroad. He accordingly summoned a council of war; and, laying before it his instructions, requested a decision as to the course of conduct which it would be advisable to pursue. The decision at which the officers in council arrived, was exactly such as, under the circumstances, might have been anticipated. They declared that, with the means actually at their disposal, any attempt to carry on an offensive war would savour of madness; and hence, that nothing remained, except to look mainly to Catalonia, in pursuance of the expressed wishes of the king.

Peterborough could neither dispute the justice of this sentence, nor venture openly to oppose it, however distasteful to his own feelings an abandonment of the meditated enterprise might be. He therefore filed his infantry across the hills to Venaroz, a seaport town distant about six leagues from the Ebro; where, their communications with Catalonia being both direct and easy, they could, at the shortest notice, fall back upon Barcelona. For himself, however, he reserved a task, to all appearance still more arduous than either the capture of Monjuick, or the relief of San Mateo. Finding nothing in the despatch recently forwarded, which relieved him from the duty of recovering Valencia, he determined, with his cavalry alone, to make the essay; in other words, he avowed his intention of continuing the pursuit of Las Torres, at the head of something less than 200 weary horsemen. The project seemed to those about him as visionary as it was rash; yet such was the ascendancy which Peterborough had acquired over the minds of those with whom he now acted,

that his people entered upon it, if not confident, at all events cheered by some vague expectations of success.

A rapid march carried the daring band to Alcala de Chivant, where certain stragglers from the enemy's rear were overtaken. They were immediately charged and cut to pieces — their own fears operating not less powerfully than the swords of their assailants; after which the most judicious arrangements were made, at once to conceal the real weakness of the pursuers, and to keep alive, among the fugitives, the apprehensions under which they had heretofore laboured. For this purpose parties were sent out in all directions, which, penetrating through the mountain defiles and unfrequented by-paths, showed themselves, now upon the right, now upon the left, and now close in the rear of the retreating enemy. As often as the patrols halted, or lost their way, they were either sabred or taken. So long as they continued their march in good order, demonstrations only were made; rencounters being carefully avoided. Thus was an impression produced, in the minds of Las Torres and his officers, that their only chance of safety lay in a hasty but regular retreat; and that their steps were closely followed by the same numerous and efficient army which had compelled them to abandon their attempt upon San Mateo.

While Peterborough was thus boldly following up his first successes, the duke of Anjou, distrustful of the talent or fidelity of Las Torres, suddenly recalled him to Madrid, and sent the duke of Arcos, a very inadequate substitute, to succeed him in the command. That officer immediately ordered up a reserve of 4000 men, which he directed to commence, without delay, the investment of Valencia: and the operation proceeded so far as to excite serious alarm among the authorities by whom, in case of capture, no mercy could of course be expected. The consequence was, that they despatched messenger after messenger to Peterborough, praying that he would come quickly to their relief; and representing the straits to which the city was reduced, in colours the most

gloomy. Peterborough experienced no disinclination to comply with their wishes. As his own views, moreover, continued to point beyond local conquests, he readily availed himself of the existing state of affairs, to labour for their accomplishment; and finding that the dangers which recently threatened Catalonia were in part blown over, he made no scruple as to exercising the authority with which his sovereign had intrusted him. He sent to Barcelona, requiring that he might be immediately supported by the Spanish corps which, to the amount of 1000 foot and 300 horse, had been originally destined to act under his command. Along with this message he forwarded a peremptory notice, that, in the event of his demand being evaded, he should order up from Lerida a body of English which lay there under colonel Wills; while, at the same time, he instructed colonel Pierce, the chief of one of the regiments lately posted at Venaroz, to hold himself in readiness for a forward movement at a moment's notice. This done, he continued his chace of the flying enemy with the same energy as before; nor did any great while elapse ere fortune, or rather his own enterprising talent, enabled him to reap fresh laurels.

Among the various qualities required in forming the character of an active military commander, not the least important, perhaps, is the possession of a hardy and robust constitution: with this, Nature had, in a striking degree, gifted Peterborough; for, though slight of form, and delicately fair in his complexion, there was no extent of fatigue or privation which he seemed unable to endure. Night and day he was in the saddle; scarce a patrol, however weak, sallied forth from head-quarters, which he did not accompany either in part or throughout; and hence there was not a service performed, of the slightest importance, which he was not personally present to control. With such a leader at their head, we cannot be surprised to learn that every private trooper became a hero. There was not a man in his little corps, indeed, who did not feel that upon himself, in a great

degree, depended the success or failure of the enterprise; and hence there was not a man whose energies, both of mind and body, were not, from first to last, exerted to their utmost stretch. It is not surprising that men so acted upon by what may be termed the best spirit of chivalry, should have performed prodigies both of valour and discretion.

Nules, a walled town of some note, stands upon the main road, about three days' march from Valencia, and four leagues, or something more, from Villa Real. In the latter place, remarkable for its attachment to the house of Austria, the retreating army had committed great excesses; and they halted with the design of resting a day in the former, as being not less attached to the Bourbon cause than Villa Real was to its opposite. Peterborough followed them step by step, with his accustomed alacrity, though not without the requisite caution. He saw them through Villa Real; appeared suddenly before Nules; and induced them, by demonstrations of an immediate attack, to evacuate the place. They had scarcely done so, leaving 1000 armed citizens with strict orders to hold the town to the last extremity, ere he rode boldly up to the gate. A shower of musket balls saluted him and his escort, of which they took no notice; but peremptorily required that a priest, or the chief magistrate, should come forth without delay, and answer to a summons which the English general desired to convey. It would have been strange, had the panic, which drove 6000 regular troops before it, failed to affect the citizens of a town like Nules: a priest went forth as required; he listened with deep humility to the demands of Peterborough; and, in five minutes afterwards, the town gates were opened. Immediately 200 horses were seized, as if for the purpose of remounting an equal number of troopers, whom length of service and hard fare had denuded of their chargers; and the authorities being sworn to allegiance, and the burgher guard disarmed, Peterborough, with his handful of adventurers, turned off in another direction. They fell back as far

as Castillon de la Plana, where the troops from Venaroz, which he had previously ordered to advance, were directed to join him.

It seems next to impossible to account for the facility with which this extraordinary man contrived to spread, wherever he went, the most exaggerated notions of his force. At Castillon, whither almost the whole of his cavalry were drawn in, not less than at Nules, an opinion universally prevailed, that the troops which men beheld among them constituted the mere body-guard of the general; and that his army was following up the enemy in numbers so overwhelming, that no attempt could be made to offer battle. One inevitable result of a mistake so fortunate, was to confirm not the faithful only, but the wavering, in their loyalty; while the really disaffected were glad to conceal their sentiments under a show of more than common devotion to the cause of Charles. Peterborough caused a notice to be made public, that he stood in need of 800 horses for the king's service: in a single day they were brought to his quarters, and offered for sale at a very moderate price; and, as he really did require them for purposes of his own, he bought them up in the name of his sovereign queen Anne of England. Nor was the use to which he turned them, less characteristic of the man than the mode adopted in purveying for them. Colonel Pierce's regiment no sooner reached Oropesa, a place about four leagues from Castillon, than he hastened out to meet them; and in a moment converted a battalion of veteran infantry into a corps of well mounted and well equipped cavalry. The saddles and accoutrements he had previously ordered round by sea: they were all landed about a couple of days previous to the arrival of the men; and now, in the short space of an hour, under circumstances bordering upon the romantic, the transmutation was fully effected. He had drawn up the horses, saddled and accoutred, under the shelter of a hill, while he should pass the men under review on the opposite side. When the review closed, he merely asked the commander how

he should like to see his gallant followers mounted on excellent horses; and both officers and men declaring that they desired nothing more earnestly, he commanded them to march forward to a given point. There the chargers, caparisoned and loaded with the requisite appointments, burst upon their view; and the astonished corps all at once found itself in a new position, in which it continued ever after to perform good service.

Having thus provided himself with a body of cavalry — a force which, in rapid and desultory warfare, is invaluable — Peterborough immediately turned his attention to the formation of such an infantry corps as might enable him to attempt, with some prospect of success, the relief of Valencia. With this view, after distributing his dragoons among the walled villages near, where he knew that they would be safe from molestation so long as artillery failed to be brought against them, he set off in person, with his usual haste, for Tortosa; instructing his staff, at the same time, to keep up a frequent correspondence with the authorities at Valencia, for the purpose of deceiving both them and the enemy into a persuasion that he lingered still at Castillon. He had not, however, proceeded farther than Venaroz, when he obtained information both of the advance of the regular regiment from Tortosa, and of the assembling of the militia of the province in order to support it. He made no delay, after joining the latter force, in calling on the former to strengthen it; and he found that the total amount under arms fell little short of 2000 men. With these he traced back his steps to Castillon, the point of general rendezvous for the whole army; and allowing himself scarcely an hour to refresh, entered once more upon a career of daring and victory.

We have spoken in general terms of the appearance of Peterborough's little parties, sometimes on the flanks, sometimes in the rear of the enemy, as they retreated; as well as of the effect produced by the bold front which they presented, and the gallant and reckless manner in which they manœuvred. It was not, however, by sheer

audacity alone, that Peterborough contrived to impress his adversaries with an extravagant idea of his strength. The following anecdote, given by Dr. Friend, the chronicler of exploits with which he was perfectly conversant, will serve to illustrate, in some degree, the nature of Peterborough's tactics:—"He sent at once," says the doctor, "twenty spies forward into the country from San Mateo, knowing the route the enemy must take; appointing them the places from whence, and the time when, they should bring in to the general the pretended intelligence. It were too tedious to relate all the several pretences and directions, though my lord has them all in writing. The spies, upon the second day's march of the enemy, were very successful, and obliged the army to a march in the night. The Spaniards employed by my lord informed the conde de las Torres of a considerable force that was upon his left, and somewhat before him; which, as they told him, certainly designed to take some passes, which might prevent his entering upon the plains which lead to Valencia; and that there were English troops among them. This the Spanish general thinking impossible, the spy offered to give any two or three officers he pleased to appoint, the satisfaction of seeing what he affirmed. Upon this, two officers in the country habit went along with him to a place, where, pretending to alight and refresh themselves, they were seized by ten English dragoons that were posted there on purpose, and had marched in the mountains all night with the spies. The Spaniards thus surprised and seized, the spy pretended the guard was drunk; and the officers, seeing a couple of dragoons lying along in that condition, slipped into the stable, and took three of the dragoons' horses with their accoutrements. This was enough to confirm the intelligence, and to gain credit to the spy; officers of this country never failing to magnify their dangers and escapes."

In perfect agreement with this system of acting, were the operations of those flying parties which Peterborough kept out, in order to hinder the enemy from arriving at

a knowledge of the truth, and so turning round upon his cavalry at Castillon, ere he should have rejoined it from Venaroz. Day and night patrols scoured the country, penetrating as far as the Spanish pickets; while, occasionally, a dragoon or two would suffer themselves to be led in, as if taken in the act of marauding, by the peasants. On such occasions, however, both captors and captives were well instructed in the part which it behoved them to play: they equally reported that Peterborough's troops swarmed in all the towns along the road; and that he only waited the arrival of a train of heavy artillery, in order to bring things to the issue of a battle. Thus were 6000 or 7000 men kept completely at bay by a handful of unsupported cavalry; and the energies of their commander — not under any circumstances, perhaps, remarkably acute — overborne and paralysed by a system of false intelligence.

In the mean while, the infantry, of which notice has just been taken, hastened its march; and, on the 30th of January, arrived safely at Castillon. Peterborough instantly called in his detachments; and being again advertised of the distressed condition of Valencia, issued orders for a general movement to the front. It was not concealed, either from his followers or himself, that the card about to be played was a desperate one; yet the former looked to their chief, as they had hitherto done, with the most absolute confidence; and the latter seemed to account dangers and difficulties as nothing. They set forward, therefore, on the 1st of February, in the highest possible spirits; and were soon placed in a posture, equally trying to the skill of the general, and the patience and excellent discipline of the men.

The duke of Arcos had withdrawn, with the main body of his army, to a place called Torrente, whence he blocked up all the avenues to and from Valencia, and cut off its supplies of water. To secure his hold of this very advantageous position, he had posted a strong corps, chiefly of cavalry, at Murviedro, — a fortified town on the river of the same name which stands

along the base of a hill still crowned with the ruins of Saguntum. Of this corps, as well as of the armed inhabitants, whose numbers fell not short of 800, brigadier-general Mahoni, an Irish officer of great merit, had the command. A formidable artillery crowned the works, sweeping the whole of the defile by which alone troops could approach the ford; while beyond the river was a plain, stretching two leagues to the rear, and of course quite impassable in the face of superior cavalry. These circumstances no sooner became known to Peterborough's lieutenants, than they began to argue against any further advance; but Peterborough turned a deaf ear to their remonstrances. What force could not attempt, he determined to accomplish by stratagem; and the following is the device which he adopted,—whether strictly in agreement with the recognised laws of honourable warfare, we are not called upon to determine:—

The left bank of the Murviedro is overlooked, about cannon shot from the town, by a hill or eminence which slopes gradually towards the stream. Somewhat further off, a sort of amphitheatre of mountains girdles in the low ground out of which this eminence rises; forming a bold and striking back ground to the prospect of him who gazes in a northerly or north-westerly direction from the ramparts. Peterborough had gained the ridges of these mountains, and seemed ready to descend into the plain, when he suddenly halted, just where the heads of his columns might be seen by the enemy's videttes. Yet his exact strength remained a secret. His next measure was to send forward an officer, under shelter of a flag of truce, to invite Mahoni to a conference,—a request which seems to have been acceded to with at least as much of courtesy as caution; and the side of the eminence nearest to the town was selected as the place of meeting. This accorded well with Peterborough's designs. He caused some hundreds of his men to steal by ones and twos among the works, till they gained the opposite side of the height; and then, leaving directions with his second in command how

to dispose of the remainder, he, with a moderate retinue, proceeded to meet Mahoni.

The bearer of the flag having already given notice that lord Peterborough was desirous of preserving from the miseries of a war, a country which he hoped soon to conquer, no difficulty was experienced on either side in opening the conference. Mahoni expressed himself perfectly ready to enter into a convention for this purpose; upon which Peterborough proceeded to sound him on the subject of a change of masters, offering him high rank and large emoluments in the service of king Charles. But Mahoni, though he took the proposal in good part, as coming from a gentleman personally related to himself *, would not entertain the project for a moment. Nothing remained, therefore, but to try another mode of circumvention; and to that Peterborough immediately addressed himself. Assuming an air of extraordinary frankness, and thanking Mahoni for the confidence which he had reposed in him, he directed his attention to the hills above, which, by the judicious movements of the troops, seemed to swarm with men and cannon; and then, to use the words of his physician and advocate Friend, spoke as follows:—"The Spaniards," says he, "have used such severities at Villa Real, as will oblige me to retaliate. I am willing to spare a town that is under your protection: I know you cannot pretend to defend it with the horse you have; which will be so much more useful in another place, if joined with the duke of Arcos, to obstruct my passing the plains of Valencia. I am confident you will soon quit Murviedro, which I can as little prevent, as you can hinder me from taking the town. The inhabitants, then, must be exposed to the utmost miseries; and I can no otherwise prevent it, but by being tied by a capitulation, which I am willing to give you, if I had the pretence of the immediate surrender of the place this night. Some cases are so apparent that I need not dissemble: I know you will

* Mahoni was connected by the mother's side with the family of Thomond, from which the countess of Peterborough derived her descent.

immediately send to the duke of Arcos to march to the Carthusian convent, and meet him there with the body of horse under your command." Peterborough then offered to pass the whole of his artillery, which he represented as overwhelming, under the review of his open-hearted enemy; and spoke largely of the supplies which he could at any moment procure from the fleet which hovered along the coast.

Mahoni was much struck with the seeming candour and openness of his opponent, and answered in the same spirit which appeared to animate the earl. He smiled, while he frankly acknowledged that it was his main object to strengthen the duke of Arcos; and that he considered it useless to attempt concealment of such a movement, from one who admitted that he possessed no means to prevent it. Some further conversation passed, which tended more and more to confirm Mahoni in the persuasion that, against a force so superior as that by which he was threatened, effectual opposition was impracticable. He accordingly returned to the town, after promising to send a definitive answer in half an hour, for which Peterborough, with his attendants, consented to wait. Within the space of time appointed, a Spanish officer arrived, fully empowered to bring the negotiation to a close.

Mahoni consented to surrender the town, on condition that the lives and properties of the inhabitants should be respected. He insisted, however, on retaining possession of the place till one o'clock on the following morning; previous to which hour, it was understood on both sides, that not so much as a file of dragoons from Peterborough's army should cross the river. Peterborough was at once too sagacious to mistake the object of this stipulation, and too wily not to turn his knowledge to account. After vainly trying with the Spaniard the same arts of seduction which had failed when applied to Mahoni, he began craftily to excite in the mind of the subaltern, suspicions as to the fidelity of his chief; and he succeeded so well, partly by dark insinu-

ations, partly by dropping hints which seemed to come from one acquainted with more than he deemed it necessary to disclose, that the credulous officer returned into the town fully impressed with a firm conviction that Mahoni was a traitor. The immediate consequence was a species of mutiny among the troops in garrison; and their total disregard of all orders issued by their general.

Made aware how matters stood by Mahoni himself, whose misplaced confidence induced him to send another flag to the camp, Peterborough proceeded to improve the advantages he had already gained; and to use the same species of machinery in doing so. The enemy's patrols were no sooner withdrawn, and the evacuation of the town commenced, than he sent a squadron up the left bank of the river, with orders to commence an irregular discharge of carbines, so as to excite a belief among the distrustful Spaniards that an attack had actually begun. Every thing succeeded to his wish. The Spanish officers became more and more jealous of their chief: they insisted upon marching immediately, though it wanted yet a full hour of midnight; and they set out, some with their people straggling and confused, others singly, and leaving the men to their fate. Again Mahoni sent to Peterborough, conjuring him not to violate his engagement; and again was his candour made an instrument against himself by his subtle adversary. Peterborough suggested the propriety of pushing a regiment of English horse across the river, in order that means of support might be at hand, should the dissatisfaction of his own troops threaten Mahoni with personal danger. The suggestion was adopted; a pledge being solemnly given, that not a man should enter the town till one o'clock: and so far Mahoni had no cause to complain of treachery; but of the next step taken, it is extremely difficult to speak in other terms than those of absolute condemnation. Two active and intelligent Irish dragoons, having been well instructed, and encouraged to manage matters aright by promises of high reward, set off as deserters for the

head-quarters of the duke of Arcos. Being introduced into his presence, they stated, that while drinking wine together behind a rock, they became witnesses to a secret conversation between general Mahoni and lord Peterborough; that they saw the former accept a bag of pistoles, and heard him promise in return, that the duke of Arcos should be inveigled into a march across the plain; and that the latter spoke as if he possessed ample means to destroy the Spanish army, were it once brought into so exposed a situation. Arcos, who had recently assumed the command, and as yet knew little of the character of his officers, became alarmed. He questioned the spies in vague and hesitating terms; upon which they hastened to work still further upon his fears, by declaring that they were ready to undergo the severest punishment, provided no such request came from Mahoni. They had scarcely said so, when Mahoni's aide-de-camp arrived with the very proposition of which Arcos had been forewarned. No doubt now remained upon his mind as to Mahoni's treason; but if there had been such, the events of the next half hour would have removed it. Fugitives from the Murviedro corps began to pour in. They clamoured loudly against the brigadier; accused him of having betrayed the passage of the river; and implored the general-in-chief to provide for his own safety. Arcos adopted their recommendation, by placing Mahoni in arrest as soon as he arrived in camp; and, precipitately retreating into the interior, left a free passage for Peterborough as far as the gates of Valencia.

We return now to Peterborough himself, who, after waiting till the hour of one, took possession, without firing a shot, of Murviedro. His next measure was to follow up Mahoni's corps as rapidly as the darkness would permit; and as he entertained no doubt whatever of the perfect success of the stratagem which the spies had been appointed to conduct, his pace was not more measured than that of the force of which he was in pursuit. The dawn of day found him in the middle of

the great plain, throughout which Mahoni's broken and disorderly squadrons were alone visible; by noon the low grounds were traversed, and he and his little army safe. He halted that night at the Carthusian convent, where both men and horses refreshed; and on the following morning entered Valencia in triumph.

Brilliant as his successes were, and, if we look to the means at his disposal, altogether beyond the pale of ordinary calculation, Peterborough found that the difficulties of the enterprise on which he had embarked were by no means terminated by its apparent accomplishment. The duke of Arcos being recalled, the marquis de las Torres was sent from Madrid to resume the command of Philip's army; and Mahoni, restored to his rank, exhibited the utmost anxiety to wipe out the disgrace which the passage of the Murviedro had cast upon his scutcheon. Fresh troops, moreover, were marched in all haste from the capital, where the progress of the English arms in Valencia entirely engrossed public attention; while the designs on Catalonia, concerning which the authorities at Barcelona had said so much, were for the present suspended. Peterborough, whose scouts never failed him, received intelligence of all this; of the approach of 4000 men to reinforce Las Torres's army; as well as of the embarkation, at Alicant, of sixteen pieces of heavy cannon, such as would be required in conducting a siege. He, on the other hand, had under his command something less than 4000 men of all arms, miserably supplied with ammunition, and almost totally destitute of artillery; yet his confidence in himself, and in the resources which genius supplies, seems never for a moment to have forsaken him. He directed three of his cruisers to watch for the enemies' convoy at a point where, least of all, their appearance was likely to be apprehended; they obeyed his instructions, and brought in both ships and guns to the roads of Valencia. He then commanded a chosen body of 400 horse and 800 foot to hold themselves in readiness for a particular service; of the nature of which, as well as

of the manner in which it was executed, a few words will suffice to give a sufficiently accurate account.

We have alluded to a corps of 4000 men, with which Philip judged it expedient to reinforce the army of Las Torres in Valencia. The corps in question had advanced as far as Fuente de la Higuera, a village about fifteen leagues from the position which Las Torres occupied, when Peterborough resolved to strike a desperate blow for his own safety and its destruction. Sending out his little band of heroes, under able and gallant leaders, he caused them to pass the Xucar by night; then pushing, by forced marches, upon the encampment, where the reinforcement lay, to hazard their own existence in the attempt to surprise it. Never were orders more fully or more judiciously obeyed. The river was crossed, without the slightest alarm having been excited, within less than musket-shot of 3000 Spanish cavalry; the division at Fuente de la Higuera was attacked, at a moment when it dreamed of no enemy near; and 600 prisoners being taken, the remainder were either slain or dispersed, so effectually that they never again re-united during the remainder of the campaign. Nor did the good fortune which attended their advance, desert the brave assailants on their return. Again they contrived to cross the Xucar, without attracting any notice, and regained Valencia—with what feelings a soldier alone can understand.

From the date of this affair, up to the beginning of April, lord Peterborough was not personally engaged in any service of importance. Las Torres, alarmed by the destruction of a detachment, between which and the troops employed against it his whole army lay, abandoned all thoughts of besieging Valencia; and fell back, by hasty marches, upon the capital. He endeavoured, indeed, to make himself master of two small towns on the Xucar, the possession of which would have enabled him at any moment to resume hostilities with effect; but here, as elsewhere, the acuteness and foresight of Peterborough prevented him. The earl was thus left at

liberty to recruit his own exhausted strength, as well as to refresh his over-wrought followers, in a city remarkably attached to him; and as the opportunities of effecting both objects were of very rare occurrence, the present, it may well be imagined, was not neglected.

While thus resting from bodily toil, and enjoying (and no man enjoyed it more keenly) the pleasures of civilised life, lord Peterborough was not neglectful of the interests of that cause in which his heart and soul were embarked. Besides confirming the Valencians in their allegiance, and putting every strong-hold in the province in a state of defence, he wrote repeatedly to the king, urging upon his attention the necessity of more decided counsels, and the wisdom of more prompt and vigorous operations. Not for a moment was he ignorant of Philip's designs; that, so early as the end of February, he had assembled 25,000 men for the purpose of recovering Barcelona, and securing the possession of Catalonia and Aragon; yet he never ceased to treat the threatened movement as one which ought to excite no apprehensions in the minds of Charles or his adherents. While others advised the king to concentrate his forces in Barcelona, Peterborough implored him to follow a bolder line of policy, by quitting that city in person, passing round to Portugal, and putting himself at the head of lord Galway's army. There was good reason to believe that the army in question mustered not less than 25,000 men; whereas the force opposed to it, weakened by repeated drafts, amounted to little more than 5000. Were Charles to act thus, and to push rapidly upon Madrid, Peterborough pledged himself, with the troops already under arms, to maintain both Catalonia and Valencia; nay more, to ripen into full vigour the growing disaffection of Aragon, and to open out a road as far as Madrid itself. But Charles was not possessed of sufficient energy of character to perceive the advantages held out by such a line of operations. He was surrounded, too, by men who, envious of Peterborough's talents, and disgusted by the overbearing manner in

which he usually addressed them, were little disposed to adopt any scheme, provided only it came from him; and hence, a suggestion which, if judiciously followed up, might have decided the war in a single campaign, was permitted to pass unexamined, we had almost said unnoticed. The consequence was, that while Galway loitered on the frontier, Philip drew together, without molestation, one of the finest armies which had yet assembled in Spain; and, bursting into Catalonia, carried every thing before him up to the very gates of Barcelona.

It had been the original intention of marshal Thesse, by whom the Gallo-Spanish army was commanded, to reduce Lerida, Tortosa, and Taragona, previous to the commencement of his operations against Barcelona. This design, however, he was induced to lay aside, partly at the entreaty of Philip, who anticipated, from the capture of the latter place, more advantages, perhaps, than could have possibly accrued from it; partly by the consideration that, as yet, there was no English fleet on the coast capable of opposing the count de Toulouse's squadron. Leaving the strong-holds just named, therefore, behind him, he pushed at once upon Barcelona; before which he appeared on the 2d of April, 1706. The greatest consternation was, of course, experienced, as well by the court as by the inhabitants, and messenger after messenger was despatched to Peterborough, entreating that he would come to their relief. The earl stood in no need of any extraneous excitement to impel him in the course of his duty. Having sent off an express to Lisbon, for the purpose of hastening the arrival of admiral Leake and the squadron, he mustered all the troops that could be spared from the garrison of Valencia, and, at the head of 2000 infantry and 600 cavalry, took the road to Catalonia.

Arrived within an easy march of the enemy's camp, Peterborough halted amid the mountains, whence he made frequent movements so as to harass and disturb the operations of the siege, without in any degree com-

mitting himself to the hazard of an action. Meanwhile his sagacious mind ranged over all the chances that might occur; and concerted plans, such as would render even success in his present undertaking but little advantageous to the duke of Anjou. There are three roads, and three only, passable for artillery and baggage, which communicate between Barcelona and the Ebro; the great barrier, as it were, which separates Catalonia, Navarre, and a part of Biscay, from the rest of Spain. Of these, one, which passes through a barren and sterile district, leads along the sea shore, from Taragona towards Tortosa; another, which carries the traveller by Montonel and Crevesa to Lerida, leads directly through the defiles of the Montserrat range; while a third conducts through Valls towards Maros, along the very edge of a precipice, and along a path cut out in the side of the rock. Upon each of these, so soon as the French army had engaged in the labours of the siege, Peterborough set thousands of country people to work. From the first he caused every blade of grass, every grain of corn, and truss of forage, to be removed; along the second he threw up redoubts and field works, so as to command all the passes and defiles; while the third he rendered impracticable, by cutting huge orifices, at frequent intervals, in the giddy causeway. This done, he professed to care but little whether Barcelona held out or submitted; because, in the former case, he calculated on destroying the enemy in the trenches; in the latter, he made sure of hindering their return into the heart of Spain.

In the mean while, marshal Thesse pursued the siege of Monjuick, against which his first operations were directed. It surrendered, after sustaining a cannonade of three and twenty days' duration; and the guns being turned upon Barcelona itself, not fewer than fifty pieces battered in breach. The city wall soon began to moulder under this incessant fire; and, in the space of three days, an opening was presented, sufficiently wide to authorise an assault, had such a step been judged advisable. But there were various events occurring, which

induced the French general to hesitate about committing himself in so desperate an enterprise. Though the garrison was numerically weak, the presence of the king among them inspired all ranks with the utmost degree of resolution; while Peterborough ceased not, either by day or night, to hang like a thunder cloud above the lines of the besiegers. It was well for the Austrian cause,— or, to speak more accurately, for the personal honour of Charles, — that so much of irresolution prevailed in the councils of the enemy. By delaying to storm the place, while it lay absolutely at his mercy, Thesse afforded time for the coming up of those reinforcements to which the king and Peterborough had long and anxiously looked.

It will be readily imagined that the hopes of all parties were wound up to the most intense pitch of uneasiness; when, just as the breach began to fall in, a fresh opportunity was furnished to the earl, of which he failed not to take advantage, for the display of chivalrous hardihood, and prompt and daring address.

Some time previous to the fall of Monjuick, intimation had been given in camp of the sailing of the fleet from Lisbon under admiral Leake, as well as of the expected arrival of additional forces, both naval and military, from Ireland. Peterborough received intimation from general Stanhope, that, though he had arrived with his troops off the coast, no arguments could prevail on admiral Leake to approach Barcelona till he should have been joined by the promised squadron under Byng. How this message affected the general it is not very hard to conceive, harassed as he was by daily entreaties from the king to force an entrance, at all hazards, into the beleaguered city. Nevertheless, as Stanhope accompanied the announcement with assurances that he would not cease to urge a forward movement, and warned his chief of the kind of notice which should be given so soon as his arguments should prevail, hope was still kept alive, though not unmixed with the most lively apprehension. At last, however, after the breach had become prac-

ticable—after all men, except Peterborough himself, had begun to despair—a Spanish peasant presented a folded sheet of paper at one of the outposts, and desired that it might be immediately put into the hands of the general. It contained neither superscription without, nor writing within the fold. It was a mere envelope, enclosing another half sheet cut through the middle. Yet, within the short space of half an hour after its arrival, the little army was in order of march, and hastening towards the sea shore.

Having begun the movement soon after nightfall, the troops gained the beach, close to the fishing town of Segette, as day began to break. Parties were sent out in every direction, with orders to seize and bring in as many boats, feluccas, and chasse-marées as could be found; and, at the end of the second day, a quantity was gathered together, sufficient, with a good deal of squeezing, to contain the whole of the infantry. The utmost curiosity now arose as to the purposes which this flotilla was meant to serve; for as yet no one had received the slightest intimation on the subject: but it was not permitted long to prey upon men's minds. That very night Peterborough called his officers together, and laid before them a full detail of his plans and arrangements: he informed them that the fleet might be hourly expected, that it was of the first importance that he should himself get on board ere the enemy were made aware of its approach; and hence that he should put to sea, immediately, in an open boat, attended by a single aide-de-camp, in order to obviate all risk of its passing unobserved during the darkness. On their parts, again, so soon as the vessels hove in sight, they were to embark without delay in the small craft, and steer fearlessly for Barcelona, into which they were to throw themselves. There was nothing in these instructions to which his auditors offered the slightest objection, except, indeed, where he mentioned the necessity under which he considered himself to lie. They protested against his exposure to such hazards as must attend a nocturnal voyage in a common fishing-boat; and

they ceased to argue the point only when they found that neither reasoning nor entreaties would avail. They returned to their quarters anxious and uneasy, after they had seen him launch his crazy vessel from the beach.

There lay at this time off the coast of Barcelona, under the command of the count de Toulouse, a fleet amounting in all to twenty-seven sail, of which thirteen took rank as ships of the line. The British force, on the other hand, consisted of forty sail, besides transports, with which it formed part of Peterborough's scheme to surround the enemy's ships at their anchorage, and to destroy them where they lay. With this view it was that he put to sea as just described,—because, his commission giving him supreme authority afloat as well as on shore, he trusted that his presence with the fleet would enable him to direct it in any operation calculated to promote the general success of the war. This night, however, his uneasy watch proved fruitless; the squadron came not; and he returned, soon after daybreak, disappointed to the land: but the night following he was more fortunate; being received, greatly to the astonishment of her commander, on board of a fifty gun ship on the mainmast of which his flag was immediately hoisted. In the great object of his embarkation, however, the confusion attendant on the transmission of orders during the night caused him to fail. The progress of the fleet could not be arrested: it was seen at early dawn by the enemy's look-out frigates; and Toulouse, warned of the approach of an enemy, made no pause to ascertain his strength, but cut his cables and fled with the utmost precipitation.

While these things were in progress on board the navies of France and England, Peterborough's infantry, warned by the passing of so many ships of war, hastened, according to orders, on board their tiny squadron. The wind being light and variable, the craft soon came abreast of the fleet, which they passed amid the cheers both of seamen and soldiers; and then, turning their heads towards the mole, rushed

into the basin, where the troops made good their landing. Great indeed was the joy experienced and expressed by all classes of people at Barcelona; men shouted, women wept, children screamed with delight; while the enemy received intimation of succours poured in by a general discharge of cannon and small arms from the ramparts. As a matter of course, all idea of reducing the place was on the instant abandoned; the stores and ammunition were secretly destroyed; and, on the 1st of May, under cover of a dense eclipse of the sun, marshal Thesse suddenly raised the siege. Nor was this the only advantage which Peterborough's admirable dispositions secured to the Austrian cause on the present occasion: after abandoning upwards of fifty pieces of cannon, under the idea that they would only retard his movements, Philip found the roads into the interior so completely blocked up, that he could not venture to attempt them; while the devastated condition of the surrounding country, and the low ebb to which his own supplies were reduced, rendered even a brief sojourn where he was impossible. Under such circumstances, one course of proceeding, and one only, lay open to him: he wheeled to the right, took the route by Hostalrich and Gerona, and escaped across the mountains into France.

While the king and his attendants gave loose to the most extravagant demonstrations of joy, Peterborough, with characteristic activity, was arranging his plans for the future, and considering how present advantages might be best turned to a permanent account. Madrid lay at this time perfectly exposed; for scarce 500 men had been left to do the garrison duty; while marshal Berwick's force was known to be in full retreat before lord Galway, who had reduced Alcantara, and was advanced as far as Placentia. Once more Peterborough urged his favourite project,—an advance through Valencia upon the capital; and a council of war being summoned, the plan was pronounced to be judicious. Arrangements were therefore made for a proper distribution of the army, so as that Aragon and Castile

might be secured by strong garrisons; while a corps of 6000 men, with an adequate train of artillery, was allotted to Peterborough for active operations. Finally, it was settled that, while the horse marched overland to Valencia, Peterborough should proceed with the infantry by sea; that the king should repair to Tortosa, there to abide till the road through Valencia and Cuença should be opened out for him; and, that joining lord Galway, under the earl's escort, with every disposable man, they should make a grand push for the total expulsion of the Bourbons from Spain. These several decisions were passed at a council of war held on the 18th of May, 1706; and preparations were immediately set on foot for the purpose of carrying them into execution.

Allusion has elsewhere been made to the froward and supercilious temper which, in all matters of public business, threw its baneful influence over Peterborough's character. Conscious of his own talents, and not inclined to under-rate them, he was at once impatient of contradiction, and sensitively alive to neglect; always devising schemes, always eager to carry them into execution, and always striving, as it were, to hinder in others that absolute freedom of opinion which he claimed to exercise as matter of right in himself. Such a man is not likely, under any circumstances, to be popular among his colleagues; but when we look to the description of persons with whom, in his present service, he was compelled to associate, we shall scarcely wonder that Peterborough should have become to them an object of jealousy and personal antipathy. Cold, reserved, haughty, and obstinate, Charles could neither brook the petulant language in which his general too much indulged, nor admit the force of arguments which came before him in the garb rather of commands than of suggestions. The royal attendants, in like manner, looked with undisguised abhorrence upon a man who neither courted their interest, nor affected to value their opinions; while the generals themselves complained, and with some show of reason, that, in the arrangement of plans of campaigns,

very little care was taken either to conciliate their feelings, or convince their understandings. We would not, while expressing ourselves thus, be understood as desiring to convey an impression that solid and substantial ground necessarily existed for all the complaints which began now to be heard. Probably there was as much reason for disgust on the part of the general-in-chief, as for the murmuring and discontent which prevailed among his confederates; but, however this may be, a bitter estrangement took place, the effects of which upon the public service were truly lamentable. Men whose honour and interest were equally engaged in supporting one another with cordiality, permitted personal feeling to over-rule even a sense of professional duty; and the common cause was forgotten amid the desire experienced on all hands to humble and thwart the devices of a rival.

It is stated, in a work entitled "An Account of the Earl of Peterborough's Conduct in Spain," which, as it proceeded from the pen of the earl's physician, is of course not unfavourable to the subject of this memoir, that the council of war which had arranged the plan of campaign was scarcely dissolved, when some of the most important of the conclusions at which it had arrived were, by the king's command, evaded. Instead of 6000 men of all arms, only 4000 infantry, with a few squadrons of horse, accompanied lord Peterborough to Valencia; where, without money, and totally unaided by the local authorities, he was required to equip his little army for the field. Three whole weeks were accordingly expended in purchasing mules and laying up stores; while a corps of cavalry was formed, partly by the enrolment of raw levies, partly by mounting some of the most efficient of the companies of infantry. Peterborough was not of a temper to bear even these slights calmly; but when, at the end of a month, he found the king still lingering at Barcelona, his patience entirely forsook him. He wrote both to the persons about the Spanish court, and to the ministers at home, in the most querulous and irritating tone; he protested against being

responsible for the issues of events which he had opposed to the utmost of his power: and not satisfied with writing, began in some degree to act as if the game had entirely changed its character. Instead of pushing upon Madrid, as he had originally proposed to do, he employed his troops in the reduction of certain places along the coast; the possession of which, though not absolutely valueless, might have certainly been deferred without detriment to the interests of Charles. Yet let him not be hastily condemned for thus acting. Charles not only wasted a precious month at Barcelona—a space more than sufficient to have carried him, by way of Valencia, to Madrid—but, on the invitation of certain persons in Aragon, he suddenly adopted a totally new line of route towards his capital. He set off, under a slender escort, to Saragoza; from which no entreaties on the earl's part could, during many weeks, withdraw him.

It is exceedingly difficult, amid the conflicting evidence with which party spirit has overlaid the subject, to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion touching the motives which dictated this unfortunate journey into Aragon. The friends of Charles and of lord Galway contend, that the former was driven to undertake it, partly by the exhausted state of his treasury, and the failure of the English general to afford supplies, partly in order that he might personally escape from the intolerable insults to which lord Peterborough was now in the constant habit of subjecting him. Peterborough's adherents, on the other hand, assert that the arrangement was dictated by the pitiful jealousy of the court, which could not brook the idea of being conducted to Madrid in triumph by an officer whom they one and all abhorred. Let the truth rest where it may, no doubt can exist that to this fatal journey may be, in a great measure, attributed the disasters which eventually clouded over the prospects of the allies. It is beyond dispute, moreover, that a sense of the personal wrongs endured by himself operated, in a degree which cannot be justified,

in abating the zeal of Peterborough; while the delays incident upon such relaxation, coupled with the gross incapacity of those in command elsewhere, gave ample time to the enemy to recover from a situation which, at one moment, seemed to be all but desperate.

Finding that his arguments entirely failed of producing any effect upon the determinations of Charles, Peterborough, whose activity of enterprise amounted to positive restlessness, began to devise numerous schemes of conquest apart from his original design upon Madrid. Expeditions were fitted out against Alicant and Carthagena, both of which places were reduced; though not till much time had been expended in attacking them, which might have been better employed in operations elsewhere. Nor are these the only errors which seem to be justly attributable to Peterborough at this stage of the war. Influenced by feelings unworthy of a man of genius, and quite at variance with his professions of patriotism, he abstained from acting in support of lord Galway, on the ground that he had not been formally solicited so to do; while he appealed, in defence of his own remissness, to the terms of a council of war, which had long ceased to be an object of attention to any person affected by it. How this came about, and to what consequences it led, it will be necessary to give some account.

While these unfortunate misunderstandings gave a turn to affairs in one quarter, errors scarcely less glaring in kind, and equally fatal in their consequences, marked the progress of the war in another. The Portuguese army, after advancing as far as the bridge of Almaroz, and surprising in Alcantara the rear-guard of Berwick's columns, suddenly stopped short; Das Minas, the general, refusing to penetrate a league further into Spain, so long as Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo remained in possession of the enemy. This halt occurred during the second siege of Barcelona, on the results of which the fate of the war was supposed to turn; nor could all the entreaties of lord Galway induce his colleague to under-

take any enterprise of moment, till intelligence of the relief under Peterborough reached him. Even then, however, it availed not to press a march upon Madrid: Das Minas insisted upon reducing one, at least, of the two fortresses which command the principal approaches into Portugal; and as Rodrigo was supposed to offer the greatest facilities to a besieging army, Galway consented to re-open the campaign under its walls. Rodrigo was attacked, and in due time opened its gates; after which the order was issued to march upon Madrid: but the march itself was both languidly and discreditably conducted. Marshal Berwick, one of the ablest officers of his day, more especially in the conduct of a defensive war, kept the invaders constantly on the alert, beating back their patrols, and arresting their progress at every point where the slightest advantage of ground displayed itself. Meantime Las Torres, after throwing garrisons into Requena, Cuença, and other strong places, drew off entirely from Valencia, and took up a position amid the broken country which surrounds the sources of the Tagus. Nor was Philip neglectful of the breathing space which the indolence and want of cordiality among his enemies afforded him: bursting again into Spain at the head of a formidable cavalry, and pursuing the road by Pampeluna, he made his appearance in Madrid at a moment when such an apparition was least of all expected; and bearing off his consort, as well as the civil and ecclesiastical authorities, removed them all in perfect safety to Burgos. Then followed a series of masterly movements, which brought the corps of Berwick and Las Torres into communication; strong reinforcements were pushed from France along every route that was passable; while bands of armed peasants were hastily enrolled, both in Andalusia and the Castiles. In a word, the critical moment which might have decided the war in Charles's favour was gone: the enemy had recovered their confidence; the passes from Navarre were in their possession; the capital alone was lost; and even that, as the troops of Galway and Das Minas beheld it, presented

no cheering or encouraging aspect. On the 26th of June, the Anglo-Portuguese columns took up their quarters in Madrid; where, amid a death-like silence, because in streets absolutely deserted, Charles was proclaimed king.

The policy of the allies, circumstanced as they now were, appears so obvious and so simple, that we are at a loss to account for the strange infatuation under the influence of which it was neglected. Had Das Minas and Galway, with the troops under their immediate command, amounting at the lowest computation to 8000 infantry and 4000 cavalry, pushed upon marshal Berwick, as yet greatly inferior in point of numbers, not all his skill could have averted the necessity of a retreat into Old Castile: the allies might have then seized the mountain passes which separate Old Castile from New, and thrown open the roads both into Aragon and Valencia; along which it was fair to conclude that reinforcements would move promptly to their aid. Again, the arrival of the Anglo-Portuguese forces in the vicinity of Madrid ought to have drawn the attention both of Peterborough and the king exclusively to that point, whither every disposable man was bound to hasten, for the purpose of swelling their divisions to the greatest possible amount. Strange to say, however, neither of these events befell. The Portuguese entered Madrid, as has just been stated, on the 26th of June; on the 27th, king Charles was proclaimed; after which, as if the war were finished, both officers and men sat down to enjoy the pleasures of a large, a vicious, and then the reverse of a polished city. It is but fair to add, indeed, that detached corps were sent both to Toledo and Segovia, of which the allies made themselves masters without resistance; and that the generals despatched messengers in all haste to the king, to urge his immediate removal to the capital.

If there was one point more than another on which lord Peterborough piqued himself, it was on the excellence of the intelligence which he contrived to secure relative

to the movements both of friends and enemies. We cannot, therefore, give credence to Dr. Friend, when he asserts, that of the occupation of Madrid the earl remained ignorant during several weeks; more especially as we find him exacting a certificate from one of Galway's messengers, that he was not the bearer of any communication addressed directly to himself. It is much more probable that certain meaner passions to which he was miserably the slave,—a jealousy of control altogether irrepressible, and an ambition, if such it may be termed, which forbade him to act except in the most prominent capacity, — blinded him to a consideration of his own honour not less than of his country's welfare. He had heard from various sources, that the authority which he had hitherto exercised would cease so soon as his troops came into contact with those of lord Galway; he had received, moreover, numerous hints of the complaints lodged against him by the king of Spain; and hence he experienced no desire to place at the disposal of a rival, power which would certainly be used for his own destruction. He therefore delayed his movement till the period had long passed when any substantial benefit could be expected to arise from its accomplishment. Yet let justice be done: if Peterborough deserves censure on the score of time mis-spent, Charles lies open to charges still more serious; inasmuch as he not only abstained, himself, from following the course which became him, but proved in a great measure the cause of misconduct in others.

While the operations against Carthagena and Alicant were carried on, Peterborough ceased not to importune the king on the subject of an immediate removal of the court to Valencia, and a prompt advance upon Madrid. To many of his letters he received no reply; and when replies did come, they contained little besides excuses, grounded upon the want of adequate resources, and the impossibility of deserting the faithful inhabitants of Saragoza. The same tone of correspondence continued on both sides after Requena had fallen, and the road lay

open as far as the very heart of Castile. In a letter bearing date July 5. 1706, Peterborough writes—"Carthagena has submitted, and the garrison consists of 500 men: Requena has capitulated; the soldiers prisoners of war—the inhabitants without terms, to be disposed of at your pleasure. Your majesty will find the horse and foot near Alarcon, half way to Madrid. The Spaniards and Germans are on that side. The way is so free betwixt this and Madrid, that the deserters pass three or four in a company: your majesty may pass to your capital this way as in a most profound peace, and with what expedition you think fit." Neither this intelligence, however, nor a proposal subsequently made to repair himself to Saragoza, for the purpose of examining into the actual state of affairs, produced the smallest effect on Charles's determination: he continued fixed in his resolution of passing through Aragon to Madrid, and positively prohibited the earl's journey to Saragoza.

It will be seen that, in his communications with the king, Peterborough studiously avoided all allusion to the occupation of the capital by Das Minas. Of that event, indeed, he affected a profound ignorance, though lord Galway subsequently asserted, in the house of lords, that one of his first acts after the proclamation of Charles, was to communicate the fact of his arrival to lord Peterborough. Neither has it been denied by the most devoted of the earl's partisans, that so early as July 6th, an officer passing by way of Valencia from the head-quarters of Das Minas's army, reported, though not officially, the capture of Madrid. Yet Peterborough wrote and acted as if Madrid were either held by the enemy, or at most laid open to the occupation of whatever force might first arrive in its vicinity; for he persisted in holding back till the king should consent to adopt his views, and pass under his escort to the capital. It were a long and tedious tale, were we to enumerate, one by one, the mischiefs which arose out of so much perverseness on both sides: enough is done when we state that, after a

fruitless sojourn of five weeks at Saragoza, Charles became at length convinced of his inability to proceed through the heart of Aragon; that he then wrote to Peterborough, soliciting that protection which he had so often so coldly declined; that Peterborough hastened, with 700 horse and 1500 foot, to meet the king at Pastrana; and that, on the 6th of August, the royal cavalcade arrived at the head-quarters of the Portuguese army. That army, however, was no longer in possession either of Madrid or the fortresses near? a sad reverse had overtaken it; and now not even the presence of the sovereign sufficed to restore unanimity among the leaders, or confidence to the men.

We have spoken of the inactivity which, for some days after their arrival in Madrid, marked the proceedings, if such a term may be used, of lord Galway and Das Minas. It seemed, indeed, as if their plans had all been framed on the assumption of a belief that the king would precede them in the capital; and that these failing, they were utterly at a loss how to use the advantages which they had unexpectedly gained. No magazines were formed; nor was the slightest attempt made to raise, among the inhabitants of the city or country round, fresh battalions: nay, even the duke of Berwick, who, with a very inferior force, watched them so near as the vicinity of Alcala, suffered for a time neither interruption nor alarm. It is scarcely necessary to add, that of the indecision of the allies Philip and his generals made the best use; and that the days which the former wasted in indolence and folly, were devoted by the latter to the bringing up of succours or the organisation of corps of partisans.

On the 8th of July, information at length reached Madrid, that the king had removed to Saragoza for the purpose of passing from thence to the capital. It became necessary, in consequence, to drive the enemy from Alcala, as well as to clear the road through Guadalaxara and Torrija; and lord Galway advancing with a portion of the troops for this purpose, Berwick retreated before him. On the 11th, Das Minas, who had halted with

the remainder in Madrid, joined his colleague at Alcala; and the possibility of crushing Berwick, of whose resources they possessed very defective information, was considered. It is at least doubtful whether the attempt, even if hazarded at once, would have succeeded; for Berwick was already joined by Philip, and their combined armies occupied a strong position in a fork of the Henarez, near Jadraque; but as no movement took place till the 1st of August, a failure could alone be anticipated. Nor was the result different from what might have been expected: a brisk fire from the enemy's batteries satisfied lord Galway and Das Minas that the river could not be passed, nor the lines approached; and hence they fell back again to Guadalaxara, where, for some days, they rested on their arms. By and by came intelligence that the king's route was changed, and that he had gone to meet lord Peterborough at Pastrana. To that point, therefore, was attention immediately paid, and with such absolute devotion of zeal and common sense, that the thoughts of the two chiefs seemed to be wholly abstracted from the consideration of possible accidents elsewhere. Again did Berwick ably take advantage of the carelessness of his infatuated opponents: leading a strong detachment along the roots of the hills, he came suddenly upon Madrid, of which, as it was entirely drained of troops, he gained possession without resistance; and then pushing as far as Segovia and Toledo, he made himself master of both ere the garrisons seemed to be aware that danger impended.

Such was the melancholy state into which affairs had fallen, when Charles, with his scanty escort, arrived at Guadalaxara: he found his generals labouring under the combined influence of dissatisfaction with themselves and distrust the one of the other; while the men as little resembled the conquerors of a kingdom, as soldiers usually do when desponding and disheartened with reverses. The appearance of the king, and the coming up of further reinforcements which occurred on the day following, soon restored confidence to the soldiers; but among the generals,

feelings the most decidedly hostile to unity of purpose seemed to gain strength from hour to hour. Head-quarters presented, indeed, but one continued scene of altercation and mutual complaint. Peterborough accused Das Minas of shameful ignorance of his profession: Das Minas retorted, by laying to the charge of Peterborough's dilatory conduct the blame of all the disasters that had occurred. This was followed by bitter and acrimonious disputes as to the assumption of command and precedence of rank. Lord Galway, to do him justice, expressed himself willing to serve under Peterborough till his order of recall, which he had solicited, should arrive; but the Portuguese would not, in like manner, yield the palm; and Peterborough refused to act in a secondary capacity under any one. Nor was he more fortunate in a proposition which he ventured to make for the distribution of the forces into three or four separate corps. Neither to that, nor to his express desire of attempting, with 5000 men, the recovery of Madrid, was any attention paid: in a word, it became evident, even to himself, that a longer continuance with the Spanish army could not possibly redound either to his own honour or the public service. He accordingly remembered that his original instructions contained a clause authorising him to proceed, whenever it should appear desirable, to the assistance of the duke of Savoy; and, as Turin was now closely invested, he abruptly declared his determination of acting upon that order.

The extreme readiness with which the suggestion was sanctioned, could not fail to mortify a man of Peterborough's extravagant vanity. When he stated his intention in a council of war, not only was no voice raised against it, but the king, in order to confirm him in the design, laid upon him a commission to raise, at Genoa, a loan of 100,000*l.*, to be secured on the hereditary possessions of the house of Austria. He was then formally invested with the command of the fleet, and instructed, at the conclusion of his important services abroad, to employ himself in the reduction of the islands

of Majorca and Minorca; but not a hint was dropped, calculated to produce a belief that his return to head-quarters was either expected or desired. Yet Peterborough did not quit this somewhat ungrateful prince, without tendering him, as a last legacy, a few cautions as to his future proceedings. In direct opposition to the opinions of the other generals, he advised that no effort should be made to bring Berwick to a battle; but that ground should be taken up and maintained throughout the winter, defensively, in the heart of Castile. As Peterborough was not a witness to the consequences arising out of the neglect of this solemn warning, we need not pause to describe them in detail; but we may mention, that they led not only to a second failure in the enemy's presence, but to a disastrous retreat into Valencia.

With the avowal of his determination to quit the army of Spain, ends what, in strict propriety of speech, deserves to be termed the military biography of lord Peterborough. The remainder of his career is but that of an English nobleman; though marked with a degree of eccentricity rarely to be found in such histories, which it will not be necessary, in a work like the present, to trace with the same minute attention which we have bestowed on his services in the field: yet there are, even in his private life, if, indeed, his life can be said ever to have partaken of privacy, several passages which we are not authorised to omit; and of these we now proceed to give as succinct a relation as any regard to perspicuity will permit.

The council of war, which virtually deprived of his command by far the ablest officer in the service of Charles, concluded its deliberations on the afternoon of August the 9th. On the 11th, Peterborough set out, under a slight escort of eighty dragoons, for Valencia. But he had not travelled far, when intelligence reached him, little calculated under any circumstances to excite a feeling of satisfaction. He learned that the whole of his baggage had been attacked and plundered by the

enemy, the guard having suffered themselves to be surprised at Huette near Cuença, while following his rapid march to Guadalaxara. Peterborough's indignation became greatly roused, when an enquiry into the circumstances of the case led to a suspicion that the inhabitants of Huette had betrayed his soldiers. He instantly marched into the place, and would have burned it to the ground, had not the magistrates implored his clemency, and undertaken to make good his losses, which fell little short of 10,000*l.* Nevertheless, though he exacted the full value of the property stolen, he refused to apply any portion of it to his own use. Corn and other necessaries, of which the army began already to be in need, were accepted in lieu of money; and the whole was forwarded, in cars furnished for the purpose, to the royal commissaries at Chincon.

Having effected this important service, and devoted a few days to relaxation and amusement *, the little party again set forward. They journeyed as far as Compilio without meeting with any adventure, but in that place, the troopers were scarcely disencumbered of their harness, and the horses put up for the night, when the "trumpet's iron tongue" called them again to the ranks. Intelligence had, it appeared, come in, of an atrocious act of cruelty recently perpetrated in a village hard by, where a detachment of convalescents, when proceeding under an English officer to join their several regiments, had been treacherously attacked and overpowered. Not

* The following characteristic anecdote is taken from captain Carlton's Memoirs, one of the most amusing pieces of autobiography extant: — "While we stayed at Huette, there was a little incident in life which gave me great diversion. The earl, who had always maintained a good correspondence with the fair sex, hearing from one of the priests of the place, that on the alarm of burning the town, one of the finest ladies in all Spain had taken refuge in the nunnery, was desirous to speak with her. The nunnery stood upon a small rising hill within the town; and to obtain the view the earl had presently in his head this stratagem: He sends for me, as engineer, to have my advice how to raise a proper fortification upon that hill, out of the nunnery. I waited upon his lordship to the place, where, declaring the intent of our coming, and giving plausible reasons for it, the train took, and immediately the lady abbess and the fair lady came out to make intercession that his lordship would be pleased to lay aside that design. The divine oratory of one, and the beautiful charms of the other, prevailed; so his lordship left the fortification to be the work of some future generation."

satisfied with disarming the men, and handing them over to the French, the barbarians put them all to death, by casting them, one by one, headlong into a pit, where, with a single exception, they were dashed to pieces. It needed but the relation of this revolting story, to carry Peterborough's squadron forward with the utmost degree of alacrity. They burned to take revenge; and had they reached their place of destination but one hour sooner, the opportunity of effectually accomplishing that desire would have been ample. But a rumour of their design having by some means obtained circulation, almost all the murderers found an opportunity to escape. One man only was convicted of taking part in the atrocity, whom Peterborough hanged to the knocker of his own door, after which the village was consumed to ashes. The following anecdote, connected with this horrible affair, we give in the words of an eye-witness:— "After this piece of military justice," says Carlton, "we were led up to the fatal pit or hole, down which many had been cast headlong. There we found one poor soldier alive, who, upon his throwing in, had catched fast hold of some impending bushes, and saved himself upon a little jutty, within the concavity. On hearing us talk English, he cried out; and ropes being let down, in a little time he was drawn up, when he gave us an ample detail of the whole villany. Among other particulars, I remember, he told me a very narrow escape he had in that obscure recess. A poor woman, one of the wives of the soldiers, who was thrown down after him, struggled and roared so much that they could not, with all their force, throw her cleverly in the middle; by which means, falling near the side, in her fall she almost beat him from his place of security."

The remainder of the journey seems to have been performed without the occurrence of any incident deserving of notice. Peterborough reached Valencia in safety: spent a few days there, amid the gaieties of bull-fights, balls, and other entertainments; and then, under the influence of mortified feelings which he could

not disguise from those around him, took the road to Alicant, where he arrived just in time to receive the submission of the citadel, which Mahoni had hitherto defended with the greatest obstinacy. He found, also, that a new distribution had been made of the fleet*, in obedience to orders received from home; and hence, that the attempt upon Port Mahon, which had been recommended at the council of war, must, for the present at least, be suspended. After placing Alicant, therefore, in a state of defence, and appointing garrisons at convenient points for the preservation of the province, the earl put to sea;—not for the purpose of carrying aid to Turin, of which the siege was already raised; but to execute the single commission recently entrusted to him. The hero of Barcelona and the conqueror of Valencia laid aside the character of a soldier, that he might seem, at least, to exercise his rare talents in the management of a loan.

It is not worth while to follow, step by step, the proceedings of our eccentric hero in his present expedition. Let it suffice to state, that he succeeded in obtaining, from the merchants of Genoa, the pecuniary supplies, on terms which his worst enemies have alone ventured to stigmatise as unfavourable. But Peterborough's temperament was too sanguine, and his love of intrigue too strong, to permit his resting satisfied with the accomplishment of this important object. He proceeded to Turin, with the ostensible view of obtaining from the duke of Savoy a reinforcement of dismounted dragoons; but more truly that he might endeavour, through the agency of that prince, to bring himself again as a prominent actor on the stage of public events. He was not wholly unsuccessful in this attempt. The duke, delighted with his polished manners, and charmed with the energy as well as talent which gave life to his conversation, lent a greedy ear to suggestions, which were

* One half of it was ordered to the West Indies; and neither the remonstrances of Peterborough nor the entreaties of Charles availed to retard its departure.

the more readily considered, inasmuch as Peterborough took care to represent himself as acting not without the confidence of the English cabinet. Of the precise nature of some of these, it can scarcely be affirmed that any conclusive proof is on record; though the general impression then was, and still continues to be, that they had reference to the possible resignation, by Charles, of the Spanish crown in favour of Victor Amadeus.

How far this suggestion, wholly unwarranted on the part of Peterborough, may or may not have operated in weakening the mutual confidence of the allies, it is not our province to enquire. Probably its effects, though transient, proved not entirely harmless; since we find both Marlborough and Godolphin complaining bitterly of them in their correspondence: but however this may be, the uses to which he turned the confidence so singularly acquired, had well-nigh led to an open breach between the courts of Vienna and Turin. To the ministers of these two powers, Marlborough had, by this time, opened out his long-cherished project of a combined attack upon Toulon. The idea was well received by both; but when the means of realising it came to be considered, they discovered, as if by common consent, that there were other matters, more immediately affecting their own particular interests, which ought to be attended to in the first place. The emperor looked to the re-establishment of his supremacy in Italy; Savoy, not less jealous of the house of Austria than of the Bourbons, was anxious to secure to herself such an accession of strength as would enable her to hold the balance evenly between them: and hence they mutually gave themselves up to schemes of particular conquest, in no degree conducive to the advancement of the common cause. The court of Turin presented, under such circumstances, a glorious field of exertion to a man of Peterborough's disposition. He entered warmly into the designs of Savoy; urged the government at home, in pressing terms, to espouse them; and spoke of an inroad into Provence, not only as a scheme absolutely devised by

himself, but as a measure easy of accomplishment, so soon as Sicily and Naples should have been secured. It is scarcely necessary to add, that conduct so injudicious served but to increase the distaste into which he had already fallen; and that the government, equally dissatisfied with his services as a minister and a general, lost no time in withdrawing from him its countenance.

The letter to sir Charles Hedges, which contains Peterborough's views touching the projected attack on Sicily, bears date November 10. 1706; early in the January following, we find him again at Valencia, whither the head-quarters of the allied army were removed. It does not appear that on this occasion he either exercised, or claimed a right to exercise, the smallest authority over the movements of the troops. He assisted, indeed, in several councils which the exigencies of the times rendered necessary; and, notwithstanding the expected arrival of lord Rivers's corps, argued strenuously in favour of defensive operations. But his warnings being disregarded*, and his society little courted, he withdrew altogether from an interference in public matters; and returned, shortly afterwards, a prey to chagrin and mortification, into Italy. Nevertheless, the reception which met him there was not calculated to restore him to good humour either with himself or others. During his temporary absence, letters had arrived from England, which satisfied the duke of Savoy that Peterborough was no longer a minister of queen Anne; and the credentials afforded him by Charles — at best rather complimentary than official — sufficed not to replace him in the position which he had formerly occupied. Not only was his advice unsolicited, — an occurrence deeply distressing to his vanity, — but, when offered, it was politely declined. Turin became, in consequence, as dis-

* Whatever opinion may be entertained of the general soundness of Peterborough's views, the issues of the contest bore the strongest testimony to their wisdom in most instances. Lord Galway and Das Minas, preferring an offensive to a defensive war, marched, soon after the arrival of the reinforcements, upon Madrid. Of the defeat at Almanza, and the disastrous consequences arising out of it, every reader of history is aware.

tasteful as Valencia; and, after a few weeks of intrigue and cabal, he departed.

Allusion has more than once been made to the heavy reproaches and complaints with which the chief actors on the stage of Spanish warfare loaded one another. From the commencement of the operations before Barcelona, indeed, down to the final retirement of lord Peterborough, we discover, in the correspondence of all parties, little else than a series of reciprocal charges; throughout which the subject of this memoir appears, like the wild Arab of the Scriptures, "to have his hand raised against all men, as all men's hands are raised against him." The manner in which the British government chose to decide this controversy, seems neither to have altered his sentiments touching the incapacity of his colleagues, nor impressed him with a conviction that to pursue it further would, on his part, be attended with no advantageous consequences. From Genoa and Turin, during his first sojourn there, as well as from Valencia on his return into Spain, he continued to harass both friends and foes with a statement of personal wrongs and insults; and even when formally made aware that the cabinet had disowned him as an agent, he pursued the same course with unabated zeal. He continued to assert the perfect wisdom of all his own designs; he spoke of ministers and generals as equally combined to effect his disgrace; and he turned a deaf ear to the counsels of those who advised him to seek, at home, reparation foi the injuries of which he complained. But this is not all. With a strange perversity of taste, and a total absence of judgment, he persisted in forcing his services on a government which declined them; and seeing that confidence was not reposed in him, he began to negotiate and intrigue on his own responsibility, and according to his own conception of things.

Full of such notions, and confident in his own powers, to which he still looked as competent to replace him in the foremost rank of public men, Peterborough took the road to Vienna; where, as his military renown had pre-

ceded him, and he made no scruple of representing himself as an accredited agent of the English court, his reception was very flattering. A manner peculiarly fascinating (and no man's manners were more fascinating at will) enabled him to make the most of these advantages; nor did any great while elapse ere a happy opportunity presented for the exercise of that diplomatic talent, of which he coveted, in a remarkable degree, the reputation. He found Austria brooding over the injuries which she believed herself to have suffered at the hands of the king of Sweden; injuries for which it required all the influence of Marlborough to hinder her from seeking immediate redress. Peterborough hastened to turn his discourse into a channel which could not fail to be at least agreeable. Regardless of the consequences that might attend the fanning of a flame, he spoke undisguisedly in favour of measures of retaliation; and more than insinuated that England would not refuse her countenance to any attempt which might be made to curb the ambition of the Swedish monarch. It was well for the common cause that Marlborough, made aware of the earl's progress northward, had in some degree foreseen the game which he might be expected to play. Before any step was taken, of which the necessary result must have been an immediate march of the Swedish army into the heart of the empire, the Austrian cabinet received notice that Peterborough carried no commission from his own government; and hence that any reliance which might be placed upon his promises and assertions would be absolutely thrown away. There is good reason to believe that the fiery earl never forgave this prompt but necessary exercise of authority on Marlborough's part, which defeated in a moment a scheme not imprudently devised, but of which the sole end was the advancement of himself in public estimation.

A sudden change of address among the members of the council of state acquainted Peterborough with the downfall of his air-built castle. Vienna became, in consequence, as little agreeable to him as Turin had recently

been; and hence, so soon as a regard to decency would permit, he took a somewhat abrupt leave of the emperor. His restless steps were then turned towards Alt Ranstadt, where Charles XII. lay encamped; though whether from motives of curiosity merely, or under the expectation that there, at least, full scope for the display of his genius would be afforded, we take it not upon us to determine. Be this, however, as it may, his reception at the head-quarters of the Swedish army proved the reverse of gratifying: Charles would not so much as grant him a formal audience; and when on one occasion he forced himself into the king's presence, not all his efforts, though made with his usual address, prevailed upon the eccentric monarch to honour him with his confidence. The following account of the interview in question is given in an intercepted letter from M. Besenval, the French agent at Leipzig: —

"My lord Peterborough departed last week to return to England. Some days after his arrival, having come to Leipzig in a carriage to the quarters of the chancery, to pay his respects to the king of Sweden, they would not suffer him to enter the apartment where that prince had shut himself up with count Piper. He did not conceal his chagrin at this disappointment; and while he amused himself with conversing in a parlour, he was informed that the king of Sweden was going out. He ran to present himself to that prince, but found him gone; and, mounting the horse of a groom, he made so much diligence, that, joining him as he was going out of the village, he told him he was come to have the honour of paying his respects to him; and that his design had been to follow him for that purpose to his head-quarters at Alt Ranstadt. 'The weakness of my horse,' he added, 'obliges me to take the liberty of requesting your majesty not to go so fast; a liberty I would not have taken, if I were mounted on the smallest of the horses with which your majesty's stables are filled.' The king laughed, and listened to him afterwards all the way to Alt Ranstadt, as he understood enough of French to

comprehend what his lordship said." The same writer continues,—and we give the extract in his own words, because his sources of information were excellent,—"M. Hermelin told me that my lord Peterborough, not content with displaying his ideas in discourse, had written them down, and given them in the form of a memorial to the chancery. He added, that they were contrary to those of the English and Dutch ministers, because they tended to engage the king of Sweden to intermeddle in the affairs of Europe in quality of arbitrator, by the facility which he would find in it from all quarters; the English being so little in a condition to support the war, that they would be obliged, the ensuing year, to solicit peace, if France could preserve the advantages she had gained this campaign."

If it be difficult to devise a rational excuse for conduct so unwarrantably perverse, it is still a harder task to acquit of duplicity the man who, while thus striving to undermine the policy of Marlborough and his friends, could write, as Peterborough did, in the most abject style, to the very individual whom he abhorred and envied. A letter from the earl, bearing date Ranstadt, July 22d, is extant, which certainly does not place him in a very favourable light either as a diplomatist or a man of honour. Our limits will not permit us to give of that letter even an epitome; but we refer the reader to Dr. Coxe's "Life of the Duke of Marlborough," where he will find it printed at length.

The camp at Alt Ranstadt proving not more agreeable than other quarters, Peterborough turned his face towards Hanover; where, from a variety of causes, he seems to have obtained, beyond his most sanguine expectations, the good-will of the court, and the respect and even adulation of the courtiers. He arrived at a moment when the electress Sophia could neither talk nor think of any subject besides her intended removal to England. Peterborough warmly encouraged the project; and possessing a happy talent for conversation, with a great deal of boldness and political effrontery, he found little

difficulty in persuading the court to honour him with its confidence, and to look to him as an able and willing partisan. Yet his sojourn here was not protracted; for we find him, on the 15th of August, a guest in the duke of Marlborough's camp, at that time established in the proximity of the Nivelle, with the head-quarters at Soignies. The manner in which Marlborough writes of him, both to Godolphin and the duchess, impresses us with sentiments not very favourable either as to his discretion or dignity. He seems to have had but one subject of conversation throughout the ten days in which he was the duke's guest—namely, himself: yet he so far yielded to the remonstrances of his original patron, as to promise an immediate submission of his case to the judgment of parliament; and when he quitted the allied lines, it was with the professed design of returning to England. Nevertheless, the same haughty and irregular spirit which led him into constant disputes with his fellow subjects, rendered him long averse to submit his imagined grievances even to the arbitration of his sovereign: nor was it till the month of November, 1709, that he made his appearance in London.

For some time back no attention whatever had been paid to the querulous and petulant letters with which he continued to pester the queen's ministers. Indignant at such treatment, Peterborough not only refused to pay his court to the principal members of the cabinet, but kept aloof even from the queen herself; indeed, he abstained from all interference in public business, till charges affecting his honour as a soldier and a subject began to be bruited about from one parliamentary circle to another. Then, indeed, he came boldly forward to answer such accusations as his enemies might think fit to make; and as these resolved themselves into three principal points, he took the utmost pains to refute them. It was in answer to the complaints of lord Galway's friends and supporters, that Dr. Friend's "Defence of his Conduct in Spain" was composed; a work for which Peterborough not only supplied the

materials, but which he revised both in manuscript, and while passing through the press.

When the narrative in question first saw the light, the tide of public opinion had begun to turn as well in favour of the tory or high church party, as against the war and its supporters. The work accordingly met with many readers and admirers among all classes of persons out of doors; while, in parliament itself, both the tale and its hero were warmly eulogised and commended. Rochester, Nottingham, and the party that acted with them, stood forward boldly in Peterborough's defence; and a debate began, which, like all others springing out of incidental circumstances, gradually changed its character, by deviating from its avowed object. While he eulogised the chivalrous gallantry of Peterborough, Rochester failed not to strike a blow at the power of his rival, by proposing that 20,000 men should be withdrawn from Flanders, and transported into Spain. Peterborough skilfully and promptly availed himself of this proposition, to place his own conduct and designs in a new and favourable light. After running briefly through the history of the past, in a speech which told with prodigious effect against lord Galway, he summed up all by declaring, that their "lordships ought to grant the queen nineteen shillings in the pound, rather than make peace on other terms than the expulsion of the Bourbons; and I," continued he, with an extraordinary display of modesty, "will return, if necessary, to Spain, and serve even under lord Galway." It required all Marlborough's tact to divert the torrent of public opinion into a channel not directly hostile to himself; while the enquiry into Peterborough's conduct was, as if by mutual consent, permitted to fall to the ground.

From this period up to the spring of 1711, Peterborough resided entirely in England. He appears to have taken no very prominent part in politics, though he certainly threw the full weight of his influence and character into the scale of Harley and the tories; yet his correspondence with Swift and Pope seems to indi-

cate, that though Godolphin and the whigs were the objects of his most rooted abhorrence, he reposed little confidence in the honour or integrity of their rivals. Let it always be recorded, likewise, to his honour, that the strong antipathy which he harboured towards the duke of Marlborough as a man and a minister, never induced him to join in the popular cry for a speedy and inglorious peace. He voted, on the contrary, against his friends, as often as the question came before parliament, for a strenuous prosecution of the war till the object for which it was undertaken should be fully attained; nor does it appear, that on any occasion he gave his countenance to the miserable party spirit which led even Swift to speak of the conqueror of Blenheim as a merely successful general.

Time passed, and the increasing influence of the tories opened out to Peterborough prospects of honours more and more brilliant. The wrongs under which he believed that he had so long laboured, were gradually admitted as such in the highest quarter; and the session of 1710-11 brought with it a more than adequate compensation for all his sufferings. The same parliament which refused its thanks to Marlborough, instituted an elaborate enquiry into the conduct of the war in Spain; which it summed up by pronouncing, through its official organ the lord keeper, an extravagant eulogium on the gallantry and good conduct of the earl. Far be it from us to insinuate that the judgment at which parliament arrived was not a correct one. From the tone of this memoir it will have been already discovered, that we regard Peterborough as by far the ablest officer employed in the Spanish war; yet we must be permitted to observe, that commendation from a body which could even indirectly censure the military conduct of Marlborough, need not be rated at an extravagant value. The earl was, however, gratified by the compliment; and became, in consequence, more and more the supporter of the court party, and the enemy of Godolphin and his friends.

One effect of the changes which occurred about this time in the constitution of the queen's cabinet, was to bring Peterborough again prominently forward into public life. We find him, for example, in 1711, in the capacity of ambassador at Turin, and other courts of Italy, whence he proceeded to Vienna, with the view of softening down certain differences which had arisen between the duke of Savoy and the emperor. He was eminently successful here; so much so, indeed, that not even the death of Joseph, and the uncertainty as to a successor which ensued, operated to hold back Victor Amadeus from taking the field in force. He was rewarded for his services on this occasion by being appointed colonel of the royal regiment of horse guards,—a dignity which was speedily followed by others neither less gratifying nor less coveted. During the year 1712, he was successively promoted to the rank of general of marines, and lord lieutenant of the county of Northampton. This was followed by his nomination to the government of Minorca, a post of profit but not of labour; while, on the 4th of August, 1713, the order of the garter was bestowed upon him.

While thus reaping the fruits of royal and ministerial favour, Peterborough ceased not to maintain a constant and familiar correspondence with almost all the most distinguished wits and literary men of the age. With Swift, Pope, Prior, Atterbury, Gay, &c. he seems to have lived on terms of the most friendly intercourse; indeed his letters, which have been published among the works of these illustrious men, constitute by no means the least attractive portion of the several collections. Dr. Berkeley, likewise, afterwards bishop of Cloyne, the celebrated author of the most perfect dialogue in the English language *, ought not to be omitted from among the list of his associates. The doctor accompanied him in the capacity of chaplain, in 1714, to Italy, whither he proceeded as minister to the court of Sardinia; and

* The Minute Philosopher.

speaks in high terms of his assiduity and quickness, as well as of his affability and general kindness.

The death of queen Anne, which occurred soon after his return to England, again threw Peterborough out of the turmoil of public business. He had rendered himself too obnoxious to the whigs in general, and to the duke of Marlborough and his party in particular, to retain much influence at court under the Hanoverian dynasty; yet was he neither involved in the disgrace which overtook Oxford and Bolingbroke, nor treated with positive aversion by the new minister. He retained, on the contrary, his commission as general of marines; and appears, on various occasions, to have solicited and procured for others trivial favours at the hands of sir Robert Walpole; though his own opinions were not required, nor his own services put in requisition, in any department of the public service. That he felt the neglect acutely, and deeply resented it, various passages in his letters to Pope and Swift demonstrate. "The devil will drive me thither," says he, on one occasion, with reference to his attendance in the house of lords, "and I will call upon you to be sprinkled with holy water, before I enter the place of corruption." Again, when alluding to his own position, he observes, "I must give you some good news with relation to myself, because I know you wish me well. . . . I am cured of some diseases in my old age, which tormented me very much in my youth. I was possessed of violent and uneasy passions, such as a peevish concern for truth, and a saucy love for my country. When a Christian priest preached against the spirit of the Gospel, when an English judge determined against *Magna Charta*, when a minister acted against common sense, I used to fret. Now, sir, let what will happen, I keep myself in temper; as I have no flattering hopes so I banish all useless fears."

An active spirit, thus shut out from employment in the more important matters of state, sought refuge from time to time against lassitude in occupations not always worthy of its powers and capabilities. The illustrious

Peterborough became a frequenter of green-rooms, and a dangler after pretty singers and celebrated actresses. He was restless, likewise, and uneasy; moving often, with extraordinary rapidity, from place to place; while his vanity,—the great failing in his nature,—seemed to gain strength, as the vigour both of body and mind decayed. We find him, for example, so late as 1732, proposing a subject for prize verses to the boys at Winchester school, and selecting for that purpose his own exploits during the campaign of Valencia; while the fulsome flattery which pervades the letters of almost all his correspondents, redounds as little to the credit of him who read as of those who penned it.

While he thus persisted in playing, to the last, the part of a gay cavalier and man of the world, his constitution gradually gave way; and a frame, at all times spare, wasted as by the operations of an atrophy. He was tormented, likewise, by gravel and stone,—the effects, in some degree, of previous habits; and in the end, after enduring great and excruciating sufferings, he was compelled to undergo an operation. He never recovered; for, despising all the suggestions of prudence, he undertook, almost immediately afterwards, a journey from Bristol to Southampton, "like a man," says Pope, "determined neither to live nor die like any other mortal." The consequence was, that, finding it necessary to seek a milder climate, and embarking with that view for Lisbon, he became alarmingly ill; and died at sea, on the 25th of October, 1735, in the seventy-eighth year of his age.

The character which Walpole has given of this volatile but remarkable man appears in many respects so just, that we cannot refuse ourselves the gratification of transferring a portion of it to these pages. "He was," says our author, "one of those men of careless wit and negligent grace, who scatter a thousand *bon-mots* and idle verses, which we painful compilers gather and hoard, till the owners stare to find themselves authors. Such was this lord; of an advantageous figure and enterpris-

ing spirit, as gallant as Amadis and as brave, but a little more expeditious in his journeys, for he is said to have seen more kings and more postilions than any man in Europe. His enmity to the duke of Marlborough, and his friendship with Pope, will preserve his name, when his genius, too romantic to have laid a solid foundation for fame; and his politics, too disinterested for his age and country; shall be equally forgotten. He was a man, as his poet said, who would neither live nor die like any other mortal; yet even particularities were becoming in him, as he had a natural ease that immediately adopted and saved them from the air of affectation." "He lived," continues the same writer, "in intimacy and correspondence with Swift and Pope; showing by his letters that he was as much formed to adorn a polite age, as to raise the glory of a martial one. He lived a romance, and was capable of making it a history."

There are few sentiments expressed in this passage, to which a ready assent may not be given, even by such as feel disposed to carry their researches beyond the extreme point at which the noble writer has stopped short. Looking to Peterborough, indeed, as a military commander—and it is in that light that *we* are bound chiefly to regard him,—scant justice will be done either to his excellences or his defects, if he be considered only as a brave gentleman. Courage, even to rashness, he undoubtedly possessed; but he possessed a great deal more,—namely, enterprise, activity, wariness, and address; and if his genius cannot be commended on the score of comprehensiveness or sobriety, it was at least versatile and brilliant in no ordinary degree. It is true that a question may be raised, whether, in the whole history of his active life, any evidence is afforded, that he ever planned, or was capable of planning, a campaign on a large scale; while the same history distinctly proves that his was not a mind fit to control and regulate the conduct of a war spread over a widely extended surface. Nevertheless, we find enough to satisfy us that his military talents

were of a high order; and that they fully entitled him to the peculiar and chivalrous renown which even now attaches to his memory.

Though his exploits were neither very influential in their consequences, nor performed on an arena of the lordliest kind, they suffice to rank him among the ablest partisan leaders of whom any record has been preserved; as a man admirably qualified to make the most of slender means, — fertile in expedients by which to deceive an enemy, —prompt in his decisions, — daring in his movements, — and not over scrupulous touching the means to be employed, provided only the end were attained. Nor may the glory which attaches to the able leader in light warfare be esteemed either trifling in itself, or easy of attainment. Such leaders may, perhaps, be less rarely found than the small but gifted class by whose combination the destinies of empires are decided; but their paucity in the military annals of all nations, distinctly proves that the qualifications both of mind and body necessary to constitute the character, are not more infrequent than they are dazzling.

We have spoken of lord Peterborough as a brilliant partisan leader, not as a commander of the loftiest order: it is just that we assign some reasons for this opinion, less apparently trivial than are implied in the foregoing sentences.

He who examines with a philosophic eye the conduct of this singular man, will discover that almost all his actions, whether in war or diplomacy, sprang as much from impulse as from deliberation: his plans, when he formed any, were continually changed, at the dictation rather of feeling than of reason; he was more frequently the puppet of caprice or wounded vanity, than the servant of his own matured and sober devices. We are not, indeed, prepared, with his personal enemies, to assert either that the capture of Barcelona was the work of another, or the mere gift of fortune, — though fortune always has and always must have a considerable share in the success of such projects; neither

would we detract in the smallest degree from the merits of the Valencia campaign, which belong exclusively to him who conducted it. Both operations were deserving of all the glory which attended them; yet it were idle to assert that the advantages thus won were turned to the full account which those under whom Peterborough acted had a right to expect. If it be urged that the earl was not to blame for this, because the hostility of the king and the jealousy of his brother generals crossed him in all his undertakings, the question naturally arises, Whence did these unhappy sentiments spring? and, partial as we confess ourselves to be to the memory of our illustrious countryman, we fear that there is but one answer to be given to it. An unfortunate temper,—the child of boundless vanity,—rendered Peterborough no agreeable coadjutor in any undertaking; nor does it appear that he ever strove to stifle the one or to repress the ebullitions of the other.

But the period in Peterborough's military career in which he undeniably appears to the least advantage, is included between the date of his second arrival at Valencia and his march to Guadalaxara. We do not question the truth of his own or Dr. Friend's assertions, that no formal announcement of the occupation of Madrid was sent to him by Das Minas or lord Galway. As little would we seem to defend the course adopted by Charles, or justify his insane journey to Saragoza; yet, that Peterborough perfectly well knew how matters stood, and fully estimated the importance of a junction between his own forces and those of Das Minas, cannot, we presume, be disputed. Why, then, did he delay his movement to Madrid? Was it a matter of the slightest consequence, or affecting in any degree the issues of the war, whether Charles took possession of his capital under one escort or another? or is it probable that he, who set all orders at defiance as often as his fancy led him, really stood in need of a formal command from the king ere he could venture to quit his own province? No man will pretend to say that he was or could be

guided by any such considerations. It only remains, then, to believe that an unconquerable distaste towards his colleagues, or a disinclination to act under them, kept him from executing a movement, of the importance of which he was aware; and surely we need not add, that he who endangers the success of a cause which he has once undertaken to serve, on account of any personal feelings or feuds whatsoever, may not with justice be placed among the heroes of his age. The really great commander maintains at all times a perfect ascendancy as well over himself as over others; because it is only by acquiring the first that he can hope to attain the last, so as to wield those around him to his own purposes.

When we turn again from a consideration of the military character of lord Peterborough, and contemplate him in the light of a politician or statesman, we find a remarkable verification of the axiom elsewhere hazarded in this work, that a man's talents as a general are for the most part commensurate with his abilities as a diplomatist. Possessing considerable powers of mind, which he was by no means apt to under-rate, thirsting for renown, and impatient under obscurity, Peterborough not only embraced with eagerness every legitimate opportunity of distinguishing himself, but persisted in acting a prominent part at almost every court in Europe, long after authority so to do had been withdrawn from him by his own government. It has been seen, moreover, that in the course of these voluntary labours he was not always careful to pursue the line which the government for which he professed to act had adopted: nay, that on more than one occasion he had well nigh brought ruin on the league, by advocating a course of proceeding totally incompatible with its existence. Was this the work of a man smarting from a sense of personal wrongs, and willing to take revenge even at the expense of his country's honour? or did his conduct proceed from a deep-rooted abhorrence of Marlborough, whom since he could not rival, he was willing to undermine? We do not hesitate to answer both of these questions in

the negative. That Peterborough writhed under the slights to which he had been subjected, and of which he regarded Marlborough as the chief cause, ample proof remains; but there is proof equally conclusive, that his extravagances during the interval from 1707 to 1709 were in no way connected with these feelings. From first to last, Peterborough remained zealous for the war with France; he could not, therefore, desire the dissolution of treaties on which its continuance depended: is it not fair to conclude, that though some of his intrigues, more especially at Turin and Vienna, had well nigh ended in this, no one would have more deeply lamented the catastrophe than he? His ill-timed diplomacy may therefore be attributed to that which formed the actuating principle of his whole public life,—a craving appetite for fame, which impelled him to seek notoriety by almost any means, rather than not obtain it at all. The truth, indeed, appears to be, that the genius of this singular man was not competent to carry him forward as he wished in the race of glory, simply because, in the composition of his mind, one most essential power was wanting: had a sober judgment been present to direct him in the application of his talents, he might perhaps have performed fewer actions of which men spoke then, and speak still, as remarkable; but these would have at once told more powerfully on the state of his own times, and been better known and more highly esteemed by posterity.. Peterborough became a distinguished, but not a really great man,—because he desired with vain ardour to be accounted the greatest of his day.

Perhaps there never lived a human being whose manners in private society contrasted more forcibly with the tone of his conversation and conduct while acting a part on the great stage of public life. As a general, as a minister, nay, even as a member of the house of lords, Peterborough seems to have paid little heed to the feelings and prejudices of those around him; overbearing, or striving to overbear, all opposition to his own views, and carrying his point usually by

violence, seldom, if ever, by persuasion. Among the circle of his friends, on the other hand, he is represented as having been uniformly gay, gentle, sprightly, and well-bred. Eccentricities he doubtless had, which extended even to his mode of travelling; causing him to move from place to place with extraordinary frequency, and always as if in a hurry; but, as has been well observed in the passage already quoted from lord Orford's "Noble Authors," "even particularities were becoming in him, as he had a natural ease that immediately adopted and saved them from the air of affectation." We cannot, therefore, be surprised to find that he succeeded in attaching to himself all persons among whom he chose familiarly to converse: or that, uniting to these elegances of manner a pleasing countenance, and a light though rather diminutive figure, he should have been a great favourite with that sex to which he professed especial devotion.

Peterborough was generous even to profusion; and, as a necessary consequence, always in embarrassed circumstances. The common people, of course, esteemed him highly on this account; for there is no quality which more surely wins the hearts of the multitude; and they did not fail, especially towards the end of queen Anne's reign, to draw many and invidious comparisons between his conduct in money matters, and that of the illustrious Marlborough. That Peterborough felt the advantage which he so far possessed over his rival, and was not always careful to use it with moderation, the following anecdote will show:—It chanced, after Marlborough had fallen into disgrace, that a crowd, mistaking Peterborough's carriage for the duke's, surrounded it in a hostile manner, and began to utter yells of disapprobation. Peterborough looked from the window and exclaimed, "Gentlemen, I will prove to you that you are mistaken; and that I am not the duke of Marlborough. In the first place, I have but five guineas in my pocket; in the next, they are very much at your service." So saying, he threw the money among

them, and their yells were instantly changed to shouts of applause. But we have better proof of the liberality of lord Peterborough than is afforded here. His refusal to accept compensation for the loss of his baggage in Spain, the promptitude with which he was ever ready to expend his last shilling in the public service; these, with a variety of acts of private beneficence, bear full testimony to his open-heartedness. He was a strange compound of great and little qualities; of magnanimity and meanness; of patriotism and party prejudice: forming altogether at once the most selfish and the most disinterested public character of his own, or, perhaps, of any other age.

Peterborough was twice married: first, to Carey, daughter of sir Alexander Frazer, who died in the year 1709, after bringing him two sons and two daughters; and next, in 1735, only a few months previous to his decease, to Anastasia Robinson, a celebrated singer at the theatre. Of the latter union he was himself evidently ashamed; and it is more than once painfully alluded to by his correspondents who survived him.

MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES WOLFE.

Among the many illustrious names that fill up the page of British military history, there is not, perhaps, one to which a stronger, a more romantic, or more melancholy interest attaches than that of Wolfe. His prominent appearance on the stage of public life, at a moment when the arms of England were every where suffering reverses; the good fortune as well as gallantry with which he succeeded in retrieving the somewhat tarnished honour of his country; his death, in the very prime of manhood, on a well-fought field, just as the shout of victory began to be raised by his followers; —all these circumstances have combined to establish for him a species of renown which the bravest soldier of modern times may envy, the most favoured alone hope to emulate. Of the private history of that distinguished person, a full account will in due time be given, by one eminently qualified *, from various causes, to give it accurately. Be it our business, in the mean while, to lay before our readers such details of his public services as we have been enabled to collect from various sources placed liberally within our reach.

James Wolfe, the eldest son of general Edward Wolfe, a meritorious officer who had served under Marlborough, was born in the vicarage house † at Westerham, in Kent, November 6. 1726. His education, which, as far as it went, seems to have been liberal, was conducted at a private school in the vicinity of his father's residence, which at one period stood high in public estimation, and had not yet ceased to be frequented by the sons of the neighbouring gentry. How far his juvenile habits differed from those of schoolboys in general we have not been able to ascertain; tradition, indeed, is

* Robert Southey, Esq., who is in possession of the whole of Wolfe's correspondence.

† General Wolfe hired the vicarage as a temporary residence. Quebec house became the seat of the family at a later period.

wholly silent on that head, — a circumstance which goes far to assure us that his peculiarities, if he had any, were neither very numerous nor very broadly marked; nor, when we consider that he entered the army at the early age of fourteen, is it easy to imagine that he could have differed, in any remarkable degree at least, from his contemporaries. That he was a clever lad, full of ardour and ambition, seems to be universally admitted; but acuteness, ambition, and even ardour, are not so unusual among schoolboys as to confer a positive distinction on such as display them.

We have said that James Wolfe entered the service of his country at the early age of fourteen; to what regiment he was first attached, and under what circumstances he joined it, we have not been so fortunate as to discover. We know only that, in 1740, he embarked with his father for Flanders, and began immediately to study his profession in the best of all schools, — the field of active warfare. In like manner, we find no trace of him up to the month of April, 1742, when he wrote to his mother from Rome a letter which has been carefully preserved. But with the contents of that letter, though it may tend to illustrate the private workings of his mind, we have here very little concern, inasmuch as it throws no light whatever on the progress of his military history and fortunes. Nor, in truth, were the case otherwise, would it accord with the plan of this work to enter much at length into the exploits and adventures of a subaltern, however meritorious. Enough is done when we state, in few words, that from 1742 to the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, Wolfe took part in almost every continental operation in which the British army was engaged. He was present at the battle of Dettingen in 1742; and witnessed the ill-judged and dilatory movements that followed. He lingered with the allies behind the Scheldt in 1743; followed Wade in his abortive operations in 1744; in 1745 fought under the duke of Cumberland at Fontenoy; and in 1746 with Ligonier at Liers. On each of these occasions he omitted

no opportunity of seeking "the bubble reputation e'en in the cannon's mouth;" and the honourable mention which was made of him in the despatches of the several officers in command, furnishes ample proof that he did not seek it in vain. Finally, the battle of Laffeldt, on the 21st of June, 1747, enabled him to display his courage and conduct to advantage, under the immediate eye of the duke of Cumberland. He received at its conclusion, as he richly merited, the public thanks of his general, and he was immediately marked out by his comrades of every grade, as an officer of extraordinary merit and promise.

It would have redounded little to the credit of the existing government, had an officer thus honoured with the approbation of his fellow soldiers failed to obtain the more substantial recompence of a quick promotion. Wolfe had no cause to complain of neglect in this particular; indeed we find that, at the conclusion of hostilities, though barely two and twenty years of age, he had attained, through his own merit rather than the favour of the court, to the rank of lieutenant-colonel. In this station, and attached to Kingsley's regiment, of which lord George Sackville was the commandant, he proceeded, early in 1749, to Scotland; where, at Glasgow, on the 13th of August, after the departure of his chief, he succeeded to the command. Wolfe himself, contrary to the practice of young officers in general, seems to have felt the burden thus imposed upon him as an arduous one. "To-morrow," says he, in a letter written in contemplation of the event, "lord George Sackville goes away, and I take upon me the difficult and troublesome employment of a commander. You cannot conceive how hard a thing it is to keep the passions within bounds when authority and immaturity go together; to endeavour at a character that has every opposition from within, and that to which the very condition of the blood is a sufficient obstacle. Fancy you see one that must do justice to both good and bad, reward and punish with an equal unbiassed hand; one that is to reconcile the severity of discipline to the dictates of humanity; one

that must study the tempers and dispositions of many men, in order to make their situations easy and agreeable to them, and should endeavour to oblige all without partiality; a man set up for every body to observe and judge of; and, last of all, suppose me employed in discouraging vice, and recommending the reverse, at the turbulent age of twenty-three, when it is possible I may have as great a propensity that way as any of the men I converse with." Nevertheless, the individual who could write thus diffidently of his own capability for command, proved fully adequate to the task assigned him. He not only preserved discipline without infringing on the dictates of humanity, and reproved vice by setting an example of its opposite, but introduced into his battalion numerous and striking improvements; indeed, the high order to which it soon attained both at exercise and in quarters, gave the surest proof of ability and temper in its young but indefatigable commander.

It is not worth while to follow Wolfe from one cantonment to another, during the short and uneasy peace which preceded the war of 1755. Let it suffice to state that he accompanied his regiment whithersoever it went, — now to Glasgow, now to Inverness, now to Exeter; and by and by, to Winchester, Southampton, and Canterbury. At each of these stations, and, indeed, wherever his duties led him, his character was uniformly the same. His men adored, while they profoundly respected him; his officers esteemed his approbation, as much as they dreaded his displeasure; while a frank and open manner, with a large stock of general information, rendered him an acceptable guest in the families among whom he was thrown. Nor was Wolfe either unmindful of the prejudices of those with whom he associated, or indifferent to the more quiet pleasures of domestic life. His letters breathe, on the contrary, from time to time, a spirit of gentleness and affection over which ambition could not always triumph; indeed, it may be doubted whether the success of the latter ought not, in part at least, to be attributed to a dis-

appointment of which we are scarcely called upon to give any account. Be this, however, as it may, we see no reason to doubt that the man who, at five and twenty, could, from the head-quarters of his regiment, write repeatedly of abandoning the service, because "he had a turn of mind that favoured matrimony prodigiously, loved children, and thought them necessary to people in their latter days," possessed feelings not usually mixed up with the sterner qualities that compose the character of a hero.

While Wolfe was thus occupied by turns in dreams of domestic happiness, and in studying the theory of the profession to which he continued ardently attached, affairs were gradually working out for him the very opening to renown, of which, in many of his private letters, he expresses himself ambitious. The treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, by which a mutual restoration of conquests was awarded, though it proved easy of fulfilment in Europe, led to no satisfactory results throughout the vast continent of America. There, as the most perfect ignorance prevailed touching the true boundaries of the French and British settlements, each party stood prepared to claim whatever its rival might have omitted to seize; and disputes were, in consequence, handed down from generation to generation, such as all the plenipotentiaries in the world would have failed to determine. As a matter of course, the cessation of hostilities on one side of the Atlantic produced a momentary suspension on the other; but it produced nothing more. Old grounds of local quarrel were, on the contrary, revived, and new, and not less important, differences originated, almost as soon as the disputes between the two crowns ceased to operate; insomuch that the arms which the colonists had affected to lay aside in obedience to orders from home, they resumed, within the space of a few months, on their own responsibility. Whence this state of things arose, it is necessary that some account should be given; and a few words will happily suffice for the purpose.

When the war of the Spanish succession came to a

close, in 1713, the whole of North America, from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the Mississippi, was claimed or occupied by the subjects of the three European monarchs of France, England, and Spain. France held in absolute possession the Canadas, including a portion of what is now called New Brunswick, with the islands of St. John and Cape Breton at the mouth of the St. Lawrence. She advanced claims, likewise, upon the territory south of the river, as far as the isthmus which connects Nova Scotia or Acadia with the main land; and though her rival held possession of the district, bestowing upon it the appellation of New England, she persisted in asserting that it was hers by virtue of previous settlement. Meanwhile England, after subduing by force of arms the Swedish and Dutch emigrants, spread her colonists over the central portions of the continent; beginning, as we have just stated, at Nova Scotia, and ending with South Carolina. To a portion of Georgia, also, she asserted a right; granting land to her subjects, as far as the river San Mateo in Florida: but Spain disputed that right with considerable energy; nor was it determined till after various contests, in which Spain was not always unsuccessful.

While the English thus contended for the occupation of a tract of land, profitable only as a species of outwork by which to cover other and more fertile regions, the French, who, from the date of the treaty of Utrecht, had turned a large share of their attention to colonial affairs, were gradually maturing and bringing to perfection plans much more important. With the vast extent of territory which lies between the borders of Canada and the course of the Mississippi, as low as to the 33d degree of north latitude, the expedition, conducted in 1660, by Joliet and Marquette, had rendered them acquainted. The voyage of La Salle, though itself a failure, paved the way for the discovery of the mouths of the Mississippi; and in 1722, the rude beginnings were made of a colony at New Orleans. Nine years only elapsed, ere that colony rose to such importance

as to extend its ramifications over the fertile province of Louisiana. Detached settlements were next created along the Mississippi, and by the banks of many of its tributaries; till by and by a project began to be entertained of connecting the whole with Quebec itself. Posts were accordingly established here and there, along the St. Lawrence upwards. These soon gave to the Canadians a hold upon the great lakes, as a strong fort at Crown Point secured for them the command of lake Champlain; while the sites of others were marked out, all of them well calculated to circumscribe and grievously annoy the frontier settlements of the English. In a word, the French aimed at nothing less than the occupation of all the lands which stretch in a semicircle round the Alleghany mountains, one horn of their gigantic crescent being formed by the embouchure of the Mississippi, the other by the waters of the St. Lawrence where they join the Atlantic.

The war respecting the Austrian dominions, which began in 1744, scarcely interrupted for a moment the prosecution of this gigantic enterprise. If we except, indeed, the capture of Cape Breton, and the occupation of the disputed province of Acadia, the French suffered nothing from the hostility of their neighbours in America; while the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, by restoring to them the former of these conquests, placed them again in a position as favourable as they could desire. As soon, however, as the English began to migrate to the westward, the effects of schemes so long and patiently worked out were developed. Constant quarrels arose between the settlers from the two countries, as to their respective rights to land of which the poor Indians were the real proprietors. The English insisted that their occupation of the coasts of one sea entitled them to all the country between it and the other; the French, on the contrary, declared that every rood of land beyond the mountains was theirs, and theirs only. Thus were the seeds of fresh disputes sown, at the very moment when all ground of dispute appeared to be taken away;

nor did any great while elapse ere they brought forth an ample and bloody harvest.

In the early part of 1750, 600,000 acres of land, situated in the district to which the rival countries equally laid claim, were granted by the British parliament to the Ohio Company. No time was lost in sending colonists to clear it; but these had scarcely shown themselves, when they were attacked by a body of French and Indians, and forcibly driven back. A second attempt was made to take peaceable possession, which, like the preceding, failed; indeed, the French now acted with extreme harshness—killing some of the adventurers, and making prisoners of others. It was not accordant with the temper of the Anglo-Americans to sit down patiently under such insults: they endeavoured to retaliate upon their neighbours, and to obtain by violence what they had failed to acquire by negotiation; but for a while they proved not more fortunate in war than they had been in diplomacy. The French hastened to secure themselves by erecting a redoubt on the Ohio, to which they gave the name of Fort Du Quesne: this they connected with Lake Erie by means of two intermediate posts; and keeping its communications open by the Allegany River and Frenchman's Creek with Presquîle, they retained a perfect hold upon the rear of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia.

Things were in this state, when lieutenant-governor Dinwiddie, roused by the complaints of the people, determined, in 1753, to destroy at all hazards the French posts along the Ohio. Washington, at that time a major in the colonial army, was sent across the mountains at the head of 600 men; with whom, in the event of his remonstrances being disregarded, he was instructed to reduce Fort Du Quesne. But Washington was not happy in this his first essay as a commander: he was attacked at a place called Little Meadows, while marching upon the confluence of the Alleghany and Monongahela rivers, and, after a gallant resistance, compelled to surrender. As a necessary consequence, the French became daily

more and more insolent; the English less and less disposed to submit to their encroachments.

It is unnecessary to speak at large of the many trifling affairs which occurred, from time to time, during the eighteen months succeeding this expedition. Enough is done when we state, that without any notice given of a rupture between the mother countries, the colonists of France and England carried on a tolerably active war of skirmishes; and that they were secretly assisted by money and troops sent over in detached ships from Europe. The mask was, however, at length thrown aside. Early in the spring of 1755, the British government appointed general Braddock to the chief command of the king's forces in America; and, putting him at the head of 2000 regular troops, directed him to maintain, as he best might, the honour of the crown, and the rights of his majesty's subjects.

With the arrival of Braddock in Virginia, which took place in the beginning of April, war upon a great scale, and with all the formalities of proclamations and manifestos, may be said to have commenced. Four separate expeditions were immediately planned against Fort Du Quesne, Niagara, Crown Point, and the posts on the Bay of Fundy; more particularly against a redoubt called Beau Séjour, which the enemy had established on the neck of land that connects Nova Scotia with the continent. With the exception of the last, they all failed of success: Braddock, who commanded the corps on the Ohio, sustained a disastrous defeat, and perished with a large portion of his army; Johnson, a provincial general, though he overthrew the enemy in the field, proved too weak to reduce Crown Point; while general Shirley, who conducted the enterprise directed against Niagara, never penetrated beyond Oswego. Lieutenant-colonel Monkton alone proved equal to the charge imposed upon him, by compelling the enemy's garrisons in Beau Séjour, and the works dependent on it, to surrender. But the satisfaction arising out of this success was greatly overbalanced by the mortification which attended the failure

of the other and more important operations: indeed, the campaign of 1755 was felt, both at home and abroad, to have cast a serious slur upon the military reputation of England.

Exasperated by their reverses, the English prepared to take the field next year with a still greater number of troops, and more vigilant and active commanders. Lord Loudon arrived at New York in July, 1756, major-general Abercrombie having preceded him about a month; and the reinforcements which accompanied them swelled the total amount of disposable force now in America to not less than 16,000 men. These were distributed into two corps; one 6000, the other 10,000 strong; of which lord Loudon put himself at the head of the latter, general Abercrombie of the former; and they advanced, the first up the Mohawks from Albany towards Oswego, the last to Fort William Henry, whence an attempt upon the enemy's works at Crown Point was meditated. Again were the English baffled in their projects: the marquis de Montcalm, an able and enterprising officer, who had succeeded baron Dukan as governor of Canada, anticipated general Abercrombie in his designs. He passed lake Ontario early in August, reducing Oswego, with its garrison of 1400 men, and making himself master of an extensive depôt of stores which had been collected there with a view to the intended siege of Niagara. As the English flotilla fell at the same time into the enemy's hands, it was of course impossible to prosecute this enterprise further; and general Abercrombie was, in consequence, reduced to the dire necessity of suspending his march and returning to Albany. Nor was lord Loudon more fortunate in the issue of his enterprise: disheartened by the bad success of their comrades, and at variance among themselves respecting questions of local and general rank, his officers did little to encourage a chief naturally timid; while the rapid approach of winter imposed difficulties in his way, which he knew not how to surmount. The army never advanced beyond Fort William Henry, at the

head of Lake George; where, in the middle of November, it broke up and retired into quarters.

The return of the open season, in 1757, brought with it new devices and fresh hopes. It was now resolved to abstain from aggressive operations on the side of Canada; to maintain along the frontier only such a force as would secure forts Edward and William Henry from insult; and to employ the remainder of the army, under convoy of a powerful fleet, in the reduction of the enemy's works in Cape Breton. Of that island we have already spoken as lying at the mouth of the St. Lawrence. It was a post of the first importance, as well to the English as to the French, because it commands in a great measure the navigation of the river; whilst its proximity to the coasts of Nova Scotia rendered it an exceedingly convenient station, both as a rendezvous for troops, and a place of shelter to cruisers. Twelve regular battalions, with a body of 400 artillery, were accordingly assembled at Halifax; to meet which lord Loudon sailed from New York on the 20th of June; and on the 4th of August, the whole force, under convoy of sixteen sail of the line, prepared to put to sea. But just as the difficulties of embarkation and arrangement were overcome, and men's minds began to experience that stimulus which the anticipation of a severe but dashing service never fails to create, intelligence came in that a fleet of eighteen sail had lately arrived from France, and that the garrison was strengthened to the amount of full 3000 regular troops. Neither the general nor the admiral esteemed it prudent to persevere, under such circumstances, in the enterprise. The army was immediately broken up. A portion of it was distributed in garrison at Halifax, Annapolis, and Beau Séjour (now called Fort Cumberland); the remainder returned with lord Loudon to New York; while the fleet set out on a very useless, and, as the event proved, disastrous cruise against the enemy's squadron in Louisburg.

Had the misfortunes of the English ended here, they would have proved amply sufficient to excite the indig-

nation of the more sanguine members of the community, and the regret and mortification of all. It soon appeared, however, that a mere absence of success was not the only slur cast upon the reputation of our country's arms. Montcalm, the able and indefatigable opponent of lord Loudon, no sooner became aware of his adversary's intentions, than he made haste to take advantage of them, by advancing with all his disposable force upon Fort William Henry, and placing it in a state of siege. It was gallantly defended; but yielded at last to superior numbers. Montcalm took possession by capitulation on the 9th of August; held it till the return of lord Loudon to Albany on the 23d; and then, after rasing the fortifications to the ground, fell back unmolested to his own frontier strong-holds at Crown Point and Ticonderoga.

When intelligence of these events reached London, Mr. Pitt, who had recently been introduced into the cabinet, applied the undivided powers of his great mind to remedy the evils arising out of them. He wrote to the governors of the several provinces, assuring them of the most efficient support from home, and inviting them to call forth the strength of their respective districts in aid of the exertions about to be made by the mother-country. Lord Loudon was at the same time recalled, and the command of the troops already in America intrusted to general Abercrombie; while a new army was assembled at Portsmouth, for the purpose of achieving a service of which the full importance had been felt ever since hostilities began. That service was the reduction of Cape Breton; and upon it, in the capacity of brigadier under major-general Amherst, Wolfe had the good fortune to be employed.

On the 19th of February, 1757, the expedition, to which Wolfe was attached, sailed with a light breeze from St. Helen's. It reached Halifax early in May, where it was soon afterwards joined by such a portion of the troops already in the country as general Abercrombie had been directed to spare; and on the 28th, general Amherst again put to sea, with a force which amounted to something more than 11,000 soldiers of all arms. The fleet,

again, under the orders of admiral Boscawen, consisted of twenty-eight ships of the line, fifteen frigates, with transports and storeships innumerable; the whole of which came to an anchor in Gabarus Bay, just as the night had closed in, on the 2d of June. It was of course impossible to attempt a landing in the dark, ignorant as both soldiers and sailors were of the obstacles which might meet them. The men were therefore directed to lie down in their clothes, ammunition having been first of all served out to them; while the boats were made ready, against the first blush of dawn, to take each its gallant cargo on board. But the sky, which had for some time looked lowering and dark, suddenly overcast with clouds, and long ere midnight arrived a storm began: it was too violent by far to permit any idea of a landing to be entertained. No boat could, indeed, pretend to face it; nay, the ships, though in some degree land-locked, strained upon their anchors so heavily, that serious doubts were entertained as to their ability of riding; and, to the extreme mortification both of soldiers and seamen, the gale continued with unabated violence throughout the space of eight whole days. Nevertheless, though fully alive to the advantages thus afforded to the enemy, neither the naval nor military commanders were at all given to despond. They matured their plans as they best could, and provided against future contingencies by putting matters in such a train that no mistakes could arise; after which they patiently awaited the return of calm weather, of the first symptoms of which they stood ready to take advantage.

Gabarus Bay, where the British fleet now lay at anchor, is an open roadstead, lying somewhat to the westward of Louisburg, the chief town or capital of the island of Cape Breton. The town itself stands upon a tongue of land, and was, at the period of which we are now speaking, carefully fortified; being defended towards the sea with heavy batteries, and on the land side by three faces of regular works. Its harbour, again, one of the most magnificent in the New World, presents an entrance

of not more than 850 yards in width, which is flanked on one side by Goat Island, on the other by Lighthouse Point; these were both surmounted by redoubts, armed with cannon and mortars of the largest calibre; a garrison of 3000 regular troops, supported by 2500 seamen, manned the entrenchments; while five ships of the line at once closed up the entrance into the former, and enfiladed with their fire the redoubts on either flank. Such were the obstacles which the commanders of the British forces found themselves, on the return of moderate weather, called upon to surmount, under all the disadvantages of time gained by the enemy, and consequent preparations made to receive them wherever they should appear.

There is a creek or inlet in the bay, about four miles to the westward of the town, called Freshwater Cove, where, after mature deliberation, it was resolved to effect the descent: towards it, therefore, so soon as circumstances would admit, the frigates and lighter vessels moved; when the former took their stations within half cannon-shot of the shore, with their broadsides turned so as to cover the debarkation. This occurred on the evening of the 7th, the wind still blowing boisterously, and the surf running high; and at daybreak, on the following morning, the first division of troops entered their boats, under the command of brigadier-general Wolfe. They had not rowed ten yards from the ships, when a sudden glancing of arms among the sand-hills which they were approaching gave notice that they need not expect to gain the land without opposition. The enemy, it appeared, had anticipated this manœuvre, and striven by every means in their power to counterwork it; they had thrown up breastworks, run down field-pieces amid the hollows, and now mustered in considerable force to dispute the landing. Nevertheless, Wolfe pushed boldly forward, while the frigates, opening their fire, swept the beach, somewhat, it must be confessed, at random, with a shower of round shot. Not a gun was discharged on the side of the French till the

flotilla had arrived within range of musketry, when all at once a volley was thrown in, of which the effect was undoubtedly less fatal than might have been expected. Wolfe would not permit a shot to be returned. Trusting entirely to the broadsides from the frigates, which, dashing the sand into the air, continued still to keep at least the beach open, he urged the rowers to exert their strength; and finally, in spite of a heavy surf, amid which several boats with their crews perished, he made good his landing, though in extreme disorder. The men were promptly pushed on, company by company, as they arrived; and a loose and desultory skirmish, as all such encounters must be, began. It ended in the total discomfiture of the French; who, abandoning their works, retired with the utmost precipitation within the walls of Louisburg.

Though a footing on shore was thus gained, with comparatively little loss, the difficulties of the enterprise seemed only to increase; for the wind rose again with great violence, and the surf became, as a matter of course, more and more dangerous every day. Upwards of 100 boats, indeed, with a large portion of their crews, perished while striving to surmount it; while the communication with the fleet seemed throughout so insecure, as at one moment to threaten the worst consequences. Neither Amherst nor Wolfe were, however, persons to succumb under the weight of ordinary trials. They persevered in their efforts, encouraged by perceiving that every man and officer in the expedition partook in their enthusiasm; nor, in truth, where such feelings prevail, is it going greatly too far to affirm that there are no obstacles which a British army may not hope to overcome. In a space of time too moderate for ordinary calculation the troops were all ashore. Guns, stores, ammunition, working tools, and provisions, followed with amazing rapidity; and the business of the siege began ere the enemy had well learned to believe that the danger by which they had so long been threatened was become real.

Having invested the place on the land side, and opened his trenches before it, general Amherst detached Wolfe, at the head of the light infantry and a body of Highlanders, to attack the enemy's battery on Lighthouse Point. Wolfe executed this service with the greatest gallantry and skill. Dashing upon the outposts an hour before dawn, on the morning of the 13th, he drove them in with such rapidity that the enemy scarcely had time to get under arms, and were totally routed before they had completed their formation, with the loss of only a few men to the assailants. A like fortune attended him in the assault of one or two lesser works, which depended upon the Lighthouse redoubt for existence. They were carried in succession almost at a rush, and the troops which ought to have held them made prisoners; after which the guns were turned, with terrible accuracy, both upon the harbour and the town. The effect of this fire was to enfilade those faces against which Amherst had determined to erect his batteries; while the five men-of-war which had been moored for the defence of the basin with difficulty kept their stations.

From this date the siege was carried on with equal vigour and success. A furious sortie, which the enemy attempted on the 9th of July, scarcely retarded it for a moment; while, on the 16th, an advantage was gained, of which the good effects were immediately felt. Wolfe pushed forward a body of grenadiers and Highlanders, who took possession of a hill in front of the main battery of the place; and a lodgment was effected so near to the crest of the glacis, as to expose the embrasures and parapet to a deadly fire of musketry. On the 21st, one of the French ships took fire, and blew up, after igniting two of her consorts. This was followed by a boat attack on the two which remained, not less brilliant in design than fortunate in its execution; while the fire from the breaching batteries shook the ramparts to their foundation, and the shells spread ruin and death through the streets. It would have been madness, under such circumstances, to think of continuing the defence. The

enemy surrendered on the 26th; the garrison becoming prisoners of war, and the islands both of Cape Breton and Prince Edward passed into possession of the English.

Brilliant as his services had been in this campaign, and highly honourable to him as a soldier, they must necessarily be regarded as the exploits of a subaltern only; for they were executed — or to the world, at least, appeared to be executed — in obedience to the orders and instructions of general Amherst. The period was, however, approaching, when the talents which he was believed to possess must of necessity be put to a severe trial, and an ample opportunity be afforded for the gratification of that desire of distinction which almost all his letters on military subjects evince. General Abercrombie had not realised men's expectations on his peculiar field of American warfare. Repulsed with heavy loss in an imprudent attack upon Ticonderoga, he was at the earliest possible moment deprived of his command, which was conferred, greatly to the satisfaction of all classes in the country, upon major-general Amherst. Meanwhile Wolfe, having accomplished his point in the transatlantic drama, had returned to Europe, whither an engagement of the most tender kind led him; but he was not destined to obtain the accomplishment of his wishes. The country had still need of his services; and the peculiar call made upon him proved such as no man, possessed of even less than Wolfe's chivalrous sense of honour, could have evaded.

Wolfe had not long breathed the atmosphere of his native country, when a communication from head-quarters made him aware that his majesty had selected him as a fit person to conduct an enterprise of more than ordinary hazard and honour. The capture of Louisburg, by opening the great river St. Lawrence, and rendering facile, and, as it were, direct, the communication between England and the Canadas, had suggested to Mr. Pitt the idea of putting an end to the transatlantic war, by the reduction of the enemy's colonial capital;

and the project being submitted to the consideration of competent authorities, it was declared to be neither unwise in theory nor impracticable in operation. A plan of campaign was, in consequence, drawn out, more complicated perhaps than was absolutely necessary, yet not, upon the whole, injudicious. It was determined to open the campaign of 1759 on four separate points of attack: that general Amherst should advance from Albany, reduce Ticonderoga and Crown Point, penetrate through Lake Champlain, and gain the St. Lawrence from above; that general Prideaux should resume the attack on Fort Niagara, after re-establishing the post at Oswego, and securing the command of lake Ontario; that general Stanwix should act against the chain of posts between lake Erie and Fort Du Quesne; and, lastly, that an armament from England should penetrate up the St. Lawrence, so as to co-operate with Amherst's in the investment of Quebec. To the command of this armament Wolfe all at once found himself nominated. That he accepted the destination with cheerfulness, and experienced an honest pride in so doing, it is scarcely necessary to state; yet are there ample proofs in his correspondence, that, had he been left to the exercise of a choice perfectly unfettered, he would have preferred, just at this moment, a brief trial at least of domestic quiet. The fact is, that he was tenderly attached to Miss Lowther, afterwards duchess of Bolton, by whom his passion was returned; and the sudden order to head the army about to be employed against Quebec alone interfered to prevent their union.

So early as the middle of February, the armament destined for this important service quitted the shores of England. It consisted of twenty-two ships of the line and twenty-one frigates, under the immediate orders of admiral Saunders; in which, as well as in a fleet of transports and storeships, about 7000 men of all arms were embarked; and, on the 21st of April, the whole came to off Louisburg, the point of rendezvous in case of disaster, and the base, if we may so speak, of future

operations. But the harbour was still so much blocked up by ice, that the vessels could not enter; and the admiral bore up, in consequence, for Halifax. Here delays occurred, which hindered Wolfe from commencing his progress up the St. Lawrence till the first days of June were passed; and the end of the month was at hand ere the ships cast anchor off the Isle of Orleans. Of that entrepôt between the threatened city and Louisburg, immediate possession was taken; and, the land being fertile and in a high state of cultivation, both seamen and soldiers derived great benefit from the supplies which it afforded.

Quebec, the capital of the French settlements in America, is situated on the northern bank of the St. Lawrence, at the distance of something more than 120 leagues from the sea. It consists of what are called the upper and lower towns;—the former built upon the summit of a steep rock; the latter on a strand at the base of that rock, just where the waters of the St. Lawrence and St. Charles meet;—and it can boast of a harbour more commodious and more secure than any other in the known world. This is formed partly by the Isle of Orleans, which intersects the volume of waters in its upward flood; partly by the projecting headlands of Point Levi and Cape Diamond; while the stream itself, which, during a course of 320 miles from the Atlantic, measures no where less than five leagues across, narrows as it approaches the town, so as to present a surface of scarcely one mile in width. Behind the town, again,—that is, facing inland towards the great lakes,—lie a range of hills, rugged in their acclivities and diversified in their scenery: these are called the Heights of Abraham; and they place the traveller who has surmounted them on a level with the loftiest ridge, across which the works of the upper town are drawn.

At the period of which we are now speaking, the marquis de Montcalm, over whose energies old age threw no damp, occupied Quebec and the districts immediately contiguous, with an army of 10,000 or 12,000 men:

of these, 5000 were regular troops; the remainder, militia and Indians,—not perhaps equal, for some services, to their more seasoned comrades, but still far from despicable, more especially in desultory warfare. Anticipating the enterprise which now began to develope itself, he had formed his plan of campaign with singular judgment and skill. While he contented himself with observing general Amherst, and throwing as many impediments in the way of his advance as 3000 or 4000 men could create, he drew together the mass of his army in the capital, and distributed it so as to render any attempt at an investment, either from the one side or the other, in the highest degree perilous, not to say impracticable. Not satisfied with putting the city itself in the best state of defence, he threw up a series of entrenchments on the west; which, extending over a space of eight miles, formed a long yet defensible line between the outworks attached to the place and the Montmorency River. By this means he obviated all danger of a landing below the town, except at a point beset with difficulties the most gigantic, where the invaders would find themselves opposed, on the edges of the two deep and rapid streams, ere they could succeed in drawing a parallel against the city itself. Nor, though the anticipation of risk on the other side was by many degrees less vivid than here, did he show himself careless in providing against the attempts of an enterprising adversary: Montreal was occupied in force; while a corps of 2000 men, encamped about twenty miles above Quebec, between the Jaques Cartier River and Point aux Trembles, stood ready to take in reverse any force which might effect a debarkation in that direction. Such were the dispositions of Montcalm; liable to some objections, doubtless, inasmuch as they imposed upon him the necessity of acting on a stage too extensive for his means; yet exhibiting, on the whole, marks of great judgment, and presenting a very formidable front to the chief who was now called upon to derange them.

The arrival of the British fleet in the mouth of the

St. Lawrence was no sooner communicated to Montcalm, than, leaving a sufficient garrison in Quebec, he marched with all his disposable force, and took up a position at Beau Point, between the St. Charles and the Montmorency. The latter he was content, for a while, to observe with his outposts merely, covering them, however, with a redoubt and breastworks; but the debarkation of the English on Ile Orleans produced an anticipation of attack from below, and he moved onwards, so as to present a strong front even there. Meanwhile Wolfe, after distributing his little army into three brigades, under generals Murray, Townshend, and Monkton, bent his whole attention to the details of the arduous service in which he had embarked. He saw at once that obstacles of no common nature opposed him, and that his means of overcoming these were both limited and hard of application; nevertheless, he felt also, that to weigh the chances now with too scrupulous a hand would serve no good purpose, and he lost as little time as it was possible to lose in speculation. Having made up his mind, as most men in his circumstances would perhaps have done, to attempt a landing below the town, he commenced operations by seizing Point Levi, of which we have already spoken as contributing, with the headlands of Ile Orleans, to form the outer faces of the roadstead. General Monkton, who at the head of his brigade undertook this enterprise, accomplished it without the smallest difficulty. He drove a body of the enemy from the position; threw up a battery of cannon and mortars close to the river; repelled an attempt made a few nights afterwards to surprise him; and opened such a fire, both upon the upper and lower town, as produced considerable effect among the inhabitants. This done, and a portion of the Ile Orleans being fortified as an hospital for the sick and wounded, and a depôt where the stores might be lodged in safety, Wolfe crossed the channel in the night of the 9th of July, and gaining the left bank of the St. Lawrence

without molestation, took up his ground in presence of the enemy.

The river which now divided the French from the English armies runs with a swift and headlong current, sometimes through deep ravines, sometimes along the bottom of valleys, and occasionally, as it approaches the St. Lawrence, over two or three ledges of considerable altitude. Its banks are on both sides hilly, though to the eastward more so than on the west; at least there are points here and there in the former direction which considerably overtop the most lofty of the ridges that crown the western channel. Though uniformly deep, moreover, above the falls, except where a ford about three miles up the country occurs, it is passable below, both for men and horses, as often as the tide reaches but to half ebb; whilst its margin chances to be bare and level exactly where, in a military point of view, ravines and underwood would prove most peculiarly desirable. It was here, with his left resting upon the St. Lawrence, and his right secured by a bold hill, that Wolfe established his little army; while the boats continued day and night busily to convey to the shore such artillery and stores as the projected operations seemed to require.

The landing took place, as we have already stated, during the night of July the 9th. On the following morning working parties were sent out for the purpose of felling trees, with which the men might hut themselves. They were furiously attacked by a body of Indians, who drove them in with loss: nor was their retreat effectually covered by the piquets, who turned out to support them, till after a long and doubtful skirmish. A like event befell a few days afterwards, when a reconnoissance was pushed up the course of the stream; and attempts were made to establish a post upon the ford, of which we have spoken in the preceding paragraph. Twice the savages returned to attack the party thus employed; and, though dispersed, at last they succeeded in carrying off several prisoners, on whom they inflicted, according to custom, the most horrid barbarities. Nor was it at the

hands of the red men alone that the stragglers from the British lines suffered the most revolting treatment. The Canadians, scarcely more civilised than the Indians whom they had supplanted, made war not only with the musket and the sword, but with the scalping knife: indeed, it was only by laying a village or two in ashes, and inflicting summary justice on the most guilty of their inhabitants, that Wolfe succeeded in putting a stop to atrocities against which he had remonstrated in vain.

Though fortune had now so far favoured him, and his troops were all ashore, and though the possession of Ile Orleans and the headland at Point Levi laid open to him the navigation of the river, Wolfe soon discovered that the real difficulties of his enterprise were but beginning. The larger vessels, by reason of their draught, could not approach the enemy's works, so as to molest them in any serious degree; and against an advance by land were opposed two deep rivers, a succession of fortified positions, and a country in itself singularly defensible. Even the first movement to the front could not be made without incurring imminent hazard of destruction: and as to penetrating beyond the line of the Montmorency, all the reports of his spies united in assuring him that the thing was impracticable. Neither implicitly crediting nor absolutely disbelieving these rumours, Wolfe so far acted upon them, as to turn his thoughts seriously to the consideration of a new plan of campaign. He embarked on board of a sloop of war, and causing a petty squadron of transports, filled with troops, to follow, shot, on the 18th of July, beyond the town; only to discover that, above not less than below, the enemy were every where on the alert. He beheld a high and precipitous bank on his right hand, guarded at every accessible spot, furnished with cannon and mortars, and occupied by bodies of troops, in the face of whom any attempt at disembarkation must prove as desperate as would be the condition of the fleet, exposed at anchor to the fire of the

artillery. The idea of shifting his ground, which he had hoped to realise, was therefore for the present abandoned; and he returned, full of vexation and anxiety, to his people on the left margin of the Montmorency.

Had Wolfe's genius been cast in a more common mould, — had he been less chivalrous, or less enterprising than he was, he would have abandoned, under such circumstances, all thoughts of a perseverance in active hostilities. Fair and legitimate grounds, moreover, were not wanting on which to justify, both to himself and others, this line of conduct. He was told, before he quitted England, that his was only a subsidiary expedition; that to general Amherst's corps the government mainly looked for exploits affecting the issues of the war; and that, though he was expected to clear the way to the undertaking, by gaining a hold on the country round, the reduction of Quebec itself was looked for as the result of a junction between himself and the commander-in-chief. If, therefore, he had given up as impracticable the idea of an advance for the present, and contented himself with holding his ground till Amherst should arrive, no offence against either the letter or spirit of his instructions could have been laid to his charge. But Wolfe's genius was not cast in a common mould. He knew that the eyes of the world were upon him: he remembered the lofty expectations which his conduct as a subordinate had taught his comrades and superiors to form of his military talents; and he determined either to verify their expectations, by surmounting the difficulties by which he was beset, or to perish in the attempt. It was a resolution worthy of one of Plutarch's heroes; and it received in due time its merited accomplishment.

In order to distract the enemy's attention by alarming them in their rear, colonel Carleton, an active and intelligent officer, was commanded to proceed up the St. Lawrence, in a light squadron, which had a body of chosen infantry on board. With these he received instructions to attempt a landing somewhere in the vici-

nity of Point de Tremble, where the general had been given to understand that copious magazines were formed, and where, as a large number of the inhabitants had taken refuge from the dangers which threatened Quebec, it was probable that important papers might be found. Carleton executed his instructions with equal alacrity and good fortune. Though opposed by a body of Indians and militiamen, he gained the beach, scrambled up the steep face of the cliffs, and made himself master of the position; but finding neither magazines nor papers, retired again to his ships, carrying with him a few prisoners, and all his wounded. The same evening he rejoined Wolfe at the position on the Montmorency; and lent his aid in maturing a plan which the general had for some days past carefully considered.

On the extreme right of the enemy's position, that is to say, close to the junction of the rivers, stood a redoubt, considerably detached from the rest of their works, yet so placed as to afford an admirable point of reconnoissance. Wolfe determined, if possible, to make himself master of it; partly with the hope that the enemy, in their eagerness to save it, would bring on a general action; partly with the design, in case this anticipation should fail, of turning it to the best account which circumstances would allow. With this view, he prevailed upon the admiral to arm a transport of shallow burden; which, when the fitting moment came, might be run close in shore, and keep the batteries silent by her superior weight of fire. A small frigate was directed to take her station at the same time in mid-channel; so as to command a battery which Montcalm had thrown up for the defence of the ford already alluded to, under the falls of the Montmorency; while the grenadiers of the whole army, with the greater portion of general Monkton's brigade, were told off for a descent from the fleet's boats, in rear of the post threatened. These several dispositions were to be made just before the ebb tide should fall so low as to enable the brigades of Murray and Townshend to traverse the stream; and the

attack was to take place in the afternoon of the 31st, both the land and water columns moving on at the same moment.

We are not informed as to the knowledge obtained by Montcalm touching the danger with which he was threatened; neither does it appear that he took any extraordinary precautions to provide against it. The flotilla of boats, on the contrary, assembled without exciting the smallest seeming alarm, at an early hour in the day named for the attack; and the grenadiers, with Townshend's brigade, arranged themselves on board with perfect coolness and precision. Meanwhile the frigate and transport, in the latter of which Wolfe took his passage, weighed anchor; and drifting with the stream, the one opposite to the ford, the other abreast of the battery, immediately opened their fire. While this was going on, the general reconnoitred more accurately than he had hitherto been enabled to do, both the strength and the local position of the point of attack. He saw that the redoubt, though easy of conquest, could not be maintained without loss, inasmuch as the fire from the ships afforded to it no protection; and he became aware also, that its reduction, unless followed up by some more decisive conquest, could scarcely better his condition in any material degree. Nevertheless, observing, or fancying that he observed, some confusion among the enemy's columns, and aware that nothing was to be gained on his part by delay, he gave the signal to advance so soon as the enlarging mud-banks along the shore gave evidence that the waters had subsided to a convenient degree of shallowness. In a moment the flotilla, which had long wavered in anticipation, pushed forward; while the regiments under Murray and Townshend, forming in columns of grand divisions, stood with muskets shouldered, and in profound silence, waiting for the order to push on.

The enemy, who had slackened their fire during the last half hour, no sooner got the boats within range, than they opened upon them with increased fury, and

some effect: a few, though only a few, were sunk; while the remainder pressed forward, the sailors encouraging one another at the oar, and the soldiers shouting from time to time, as it were in defiance of the fate which threatened them. Already were they within 200 yards of the beach, when a ledge of rocks, which by some unaccountable oversight had not previously been noticed, presented itself all at once to impede their farther progress. Wolfe threw himself immediately into a man-of-war's cutter, and, followed by a flat-bottomed boat, rowed along this ledge, under a murderous shower of grape, till he descried a channel through which they might pass. They followed their daring leader in excellent order; and still in some degree covered by the broadsides of the frigate and transport, each, as it gained the strand, disembarked its gallant cargo.

Energetic as the proceedings of the general had been, and ably seconded as they were both by seamen and soldiers, a good deal of time was lost, and some confusion occasioned, by the interruption which the ledge of rocks presented. The men, moreover, became exasperated, by witnessing the loss of many of their comrades; while an over-anxiety to close with the assailants produced its customary effects,—a reckless, daring, but ill-regulated valour. The grenadiers, in particular, no sooner touched the soil, than, setting all the commands and entreaties of the officers at defiance, they rushed forward, but in total disorder, upon the redoubt; and they were, as might be expected, cut down by hundreds, without producing the smallest impression. Wolfe beheld the error, without possessing any power to rectify, though he made haste in some degree to alleviate it. He formed Monkton's brigade on the beach, as boat load after boat load arrived, and gave the preconcerted signal for Murray and Townshend to advance; which was obeyed with great promptitude, and more than the degree of steadiness which usually attends a rapid march over a narrow ford. Nevertheless the decisive moment was lost; the enemy evacuated the redoubt, it is true,

and fell back upon their lines, where they stood ready to receive the charge of the English so soon as it should be given; while, by an incessant and murderous shower of cannon and musket balls, they hindered the broken grenadiers from attaining to any form or consistency. Wolfe was eventually compelled to order the retreat of this corps, which at last attained to something like consistency in rear of Monkton's brigade.

Night was now fast closing in, with symptoms of a coming storm; and the tide, which had some time turned, threatened to cut off all communication between the army and the other side of the Montmorency. Had it been worth the general's while to persevere in his original plan, the latter circumstance would have in no degree affected him; because his force was well together, and there was little probability of their standing in need of any thing which they possessed not already, during the interval which must elapse between the flow and the ebb of the waters. Wolfe, however, had seen enough to convince him, that the scheme of forcing his adversary upon the St. Charles, even if accomplished, would tend in no degree to facilitate the conquest of Quebec; for Montcalm's present position was one of prodigious strength. He occupied an entrenched camp on the summit of a steep hill, intersected here and there by ravines and gullies of portentous depth; while his retreat was at once secure and easy whenever he should judge it expedient to evacuate one line for another still more formidable. Under these circumstances, Wolfe resolved to abandon his undertaking. Murray and Townshend were directed to recross the river, while the remainder of the grenadiers, and Monkton's corps, returned to the boats, and made the best of their way, with diminished numbers, to the fleet.

We cannot pretend to describe the feelings of Wolfe when, the excitement of action having subsided, he began to reflect on the issue of this his first essay as an independent commander, as well as on the aggravated difficulties which beset him. His own sound military judg-

ment told him, that in acting from the Montmorency at all he had committed a serious error; while the arrangements made for the operation itself, would not, he was well aware, reflect much credit on those who directed them. In the first place, how was it to be explained that an obstacle so serious as a ledge of rocks in the channel through which troops were to pass should have been overlooked? The rocks were bare when the boats approached them; they were equally so at every half tide; yet had a debarkation been attempted in open day, without so much as a pilot cutter to lead acquainted with the steerage. It was a heavy charge both upon the naval and military authorities, that the beach had not been carefully examined ere the lives of the troops were placed in jeopardy. In the next place, a moment's consideration would serve to convince all persons cognisant of such matters, that the leading attack ought to have been from the ford. The advance of the land column was even better covered by the fire from the armed vessels than that of the muskito fleet; and had the case been otherwise, no comparison can be drawn between the pliability of soldiers in a ford, however narrow, and the absolute helplessness of men cooped up in open boats. Nor was this all: it might be said, by such as knew not the full extent of his embarrassments, that Wolfe had abandoned his attempt with a precipitancy for which no excuse could be urged. It is true that his grenadiers had suffered, and that delays in bringing the rest of the army forward had occurred; yet were even the grenadiers far from disheartened, while neither Murray's nor Townshend's corps had fired a shot. Wolfe ruminated on these points with a degree of intensity and bitterness which proved too much for a frame not naturally robust: a violent fever seized him, and during some weeks hostile proceedings were in some measure suspended, while he lay in a state of great suffering, and very considerable danger.

Wolfe's health was as yet but imperfectly restored, when he summoned his principal officers to a council,

and entered with them into a minute consideration of the present state and future prospects of the expedition. It was found, on enquiry, that disease and the sword had so far thinned their ranks, that, after allotting a sufficient guard for the preservation of the depôts on Ile Orleans, scarce 5000 effective men could be mustered. With such a force it was justly concluded that no hope of success, except by the occurrence of some lucky accident, could be encouraged; and hence it was unanimously resolved to withdraw the army entirely from the left bank of the river. But whither could they transport it? — that was the great and trying question. If they remained idly at Lake Orleans, waiting for the arrival of Amherst, they would certainly consume their provisions, and injure the condition of the men, without, perhaps, in the end deriving any benefit from the sacrifice. Amherst might not come this season; for though they received intelligence of his successes both at Ticonderoga and Crown Point, no mention whatever was made of his progress beyond the latter of these stations. If, on the other hand, they gave up all for lost, and returned to winter at Cape Breton, Amherst might be sacrificed; inasmuch as they possessed no authority for concluding that even now he might not be in full march to attack Quebec on the opposite quarter. It would have been somewhat extraordinary if, under such circumstances, a good deal of hesitation had not occurred. Nevertheless, it was finally determined — and Wolfe cordially approved the decision, to make yet one attempt more, — to seek, on this occasion, for some point less guarded than the rest above the town; and there, either by surprise or open force, to make good a landing.

In accordance with the above resolution, the men and matériel which had hitherto kept their ground along the Montmorency, were withdrawn from that position. They were not, however, placed on board of ship, but transported to the southern bank of the St. Lawrence; up the course of which they could march in

perfect safety, while the fleet, which accompanied them, would alone be exposed to the enemy's fire. It was on the 11th of September that these changes of disposition took place; and on the following morning the general's plan began to develope itself. While a few of the heavier ships of the line remained at anchor off Beau Point, the remainder, with all the frigates, suddenly hoisted sail; and, favoured by a breeze on their quarter, and a strong tide, passed Quebec under a cannonade from all its batteries. Simultaneously with this manœuvre the land column began its progress; which was not arrested till they had accomplished a space of about three leagues up the river; where, far beyond the reach and even observation of the enemy, they found the fleet riding at single anchor. The particular point which Wolfe had selected, as affording some chance of success in his next desperate measure, lay within a mile and a half of the town. His present march was therefore accomplished with the single design of deceiving; and evening no sooner began to set in, bringing with it a change in the course of the tide, than he turned his feint to its true account. In an incredibly short space of time, there covered the surface of the St. Lawrence a multitude of boats, which the admiral had secretly prepared and conveyed to this place of muster. That done, he hung out the signal for sailing, and, leaving the soldiers to their own guidance and that of the trusty crews appointed to serve with them, he once more bore proudly down the channel. Long before midnight the thunder of his guns was heard, as he cannonaded, at long shot, the enemy's entrenchments below the St. Charles; thus at once assuring the troops that his voyage had been attended with no disaster, and exciting in the minds of Montcalm and his followers the expectation of a renewed attack.

The fleet was already far advanced on its downward passage, and the last glimmerings of twilight were departing, when the troops began, in profound silence and perfect order, to take their places in the boats. Two

hours sufficed to see them all arranged; when, on a given signal, the flotilla pushed off, and the whole glided, like a huge flock of water-fowl, down the current. Not a word was spoken from the van to the rear of this brave, but frail armada. The soldiers sat erect and motionless; the sailors scarcely dipped their oars in the water, so fearful were they lest the splashing might attract the notice of the enemy who lined the shore at narrow intervals; while the general watched with an attentive eye, each headland and promontory as he neared it, in order to avoid the obvious hazard of passing the cove where he designed to disembark. There is a trivial diversity in the accounts of those who detail this gallant exploit at length: some asserting that he did pass the point, and afterwards moved up to it; others that, with extraordinary precision, his boat, which led the column, came to land as if impelled by an act of volition: but however this may be, it is certain that the debarkation was effected, without discovery or interruption, a little before midnight on the 12th of September. It was a hazardous and brilliant enterprise; of which the full merits can only be made apparent, by giving a short description of the spot where it was achieved.

Wolfe's Cove, as the sort of bay or inlet immortalised by the landing of the British army has been called, is formed by the projection of two small promontories, which incline towards each other at their extreme points, so as to form almost a basin for the water which washes their base. A space of level beach lies at the bottom of this petty gulf, scarcely wide enough to allow the formation of a single brigade; while above, the bank rises perpendicularly, to the height of 250 feet. In the face of the precipice there is, however, a winding path, with rocks and woods overhanging, narrow, but not on the whole difficult of passage; inasmuch as it will permit four men accoutred to go abreast, and is constantly traversed by the clumsy cars of the country. It leads to the summit of the bank, after attaining which, the traveller finds himself on a plain, formed by one of

those extensive table lands which give their peculiar character to the Heights of Abraham. Such was the predicament into which Wolfe found himself thrown; when, a voyage of extraordinary peril accomplished, his troops first touched the soil, with stealthy tread, on the enemy's side of the St. Lawrence.

It had not escaped the observation of the general, when reconnoitring this particular pass, that it was defended by a redoubt, a battery of four guns, and a strong piquet of infantry. Had the persons composing that guard exercised common vigilance, it seems next to impossible that a landing could have been effected; or if it had, a very moderate display of resolution would have sufficed to hold the brow of the cliff against any numerical superiority. Happily for the English, however, vigilance was not among the military qualities to which their present opponents could lay claim. Not a cry was heard, nor a shot fired, while the advance mustered upon the beach, and under the guidance of colonel Howe, began to ascend, as they best could, the face of the bank. The leading files, indeed, were already close upon his station, ere the French sentinel challenged; but it was then too late. With a hearty cheer the men rushed forward; they received, but paused not to return a single irregular volley; and then springing upon the high ground, closed with their bayonets upon the devoted guards. The latter fled in extreme dismay, abandoning both the redoubt and the artillery; of which colonel Howe immediately, and with great judgment, took possession.

Having thus secured his hold upon a new theatre of operations, Wolfe lost not a moment in turning it to account. As rapidly as the boats could discharge their cargoes, the men hurried forward; insomuch that, long before dawn, the wholy army was assembled on the great plain which immediately overlooks the cove. Even here, however, their indefatigable commander allowed them no leisure to rest. Leaving two companies as a rear guard, to maintain the redoubt, and cover the land-

ing of stores against the attempts of stragglers, he advanced, without delay, in the direction of Quebec; and halted only when he had attained a convenient position within three quarters of a mile from the place. There the men lay with arms in their hands, in readiness to act on the first alarm; while a chain of videttes covered both their front and left, their right leaning upon the abrupt face of the precipice.

While Wolfe was thus maturing and carrying into effect one of the hardiest enterprises in military history, Montcalm, his able and vigilant adversary, was, by the skilful dispositions of the fleet, kept anxious and uneasy at Beau Point. The splash of oars was heard in various directions, but particularly about the mouth of the Montmorency and above it; the lighter vessels shifted their stations so as to approach the shore; and an incessant cannonade ploughed up the beach, apparently with the view of clearing a space for the debarkation of troops. This went on throughout the whole of the night, the general every moment expecting that some desperate effort would be made to storm his lines; when, just as the sky began to redden, his delusion was at once and painfully dispelled. A horseman from the town came in at full speed, with intelligence that the English were landed. He was followed soon afterwards by certain fugitives from the spot where the debarkation actually took place; and the French camp became, ere long, a scene of indescribable commotion, not unmixed with dread. In the latter feeling, Montcalm himself never for an instant partook. He gave his orders coolly and deliberately; and within the space of half an hour the whole army was in full march across the St. Charles River, towards the Heights of Abraham.

It is not our province to speak either in praise or otherwise of the many and brilliant services performed by the marquis of Montcalm. Every reader of history must be aware, that, among all the able persons appointed by the French government to preside over the destinies of their transatlantic possessions, Montcalm stands pre-

eminent for his talent and zeal; that he supported the honour of the mother-country during a period of unexampled difficulties; while, at the same time, he advanced the interests of the colonies, and conciliated their affections, without in any degree lowering the dignity of the office which he held: even the arduous and dispiriting campaign in which he was now engaged had hitherto been admirably conducted; for, if we except the solitary error into which he fell by detaching a corps too far to his rear, and, perhaps, the mistake, for it deserves no harsher term, of seeking to defend the Montmorency, all his dispositions would seem to have been made with equal skill and foresight. He was now about to commit a grievous and fatal error: forgetful of the policy which had hitherto guided him, that of defensive warfare, he put his columns in motion for the avowed purpose of bringing the English to battle; thus playing the game which his adversary wished him to play, and had long and ardently striven to bring about.

It might be about eleven o'clock in the forenoon of September 13th, when a cloud of Indian and Canadian sharp-shooters began to emerge from beneath a woody ridge that overhangs the valley of the St. Charles. They spread themselves dexterously through the thickets and copses, and opened a sharp skirmishing fire upon the piquets; thus warning Wolfe and his companions that the opportunity for which they had hitherto panted in vain was at length about to be afforded. No time was lost in making the proper arrangements to meet the attack with which they were threatened. The infantry, which consisted of ten battalions, including one of Highlanders, one of rangers, and a body of Louisbourg grenadiers, was drawn up in two lines, immediately in front of the spot where they had previously bivouacked. In the first line were placed all except a single battalion, the provincials holding the right, the regular troops the left; the light companies, in skirmishing order, covered the front; and the 47th regiment, broken up into grand divisions, acted here and there as a reserve. With

respect to artillery, again, as only one piece had as yet been landed, it were superfluous to allude to it at all; while of mounted men, there were not, including the generals and staff-officers, ten present with the whole army. Such was the order in which Wolfe stood to receive the attack, which was not slow in developing itself, and which, in point of arrangement and vigour, proved not unworthy of the reputation which the marquis de Montcalm had previously earned.

We have alluded to the arrival of messengers at the head-quarters of the French general, and to the resolution which the intelligence conveyed induced him to form: it is only necessary to add, that, passing the St. Charles on a bridge of boats, and traversing the valley beyond, he left the city of Quebec on the right, and reached the Heights of Abraham before any of his subordinates became aware of the nature of the service on which they were about to be employed. His dispositions for a battle, in which he ought never to have engaged, were as judicious and able as could be: throwing a mass of tirailleurs before him, he engaged the light troops of the English, whom he drove back with precipitation upon the line; and then, pushing forward a heavy column towards his own right, compelled Wolfe to wheel back three battalions, as it is called, *en potence*. This done, he silently withdrew his people by the rear, under cover of the skirmishers, whom he largely reinforced: and, forming line to the left, came down with great impetuosity upon the irregulars of Wolfe's army which occupied his right. But Montcalm, if he calculated on the inefficacy of this force, mistook the people with whom he had to deal: they nobly did their duty; nor could all the efforts of the enemy, though made with a courage truly chivalrous, produce the slightest effect upon their order or firmness.

It has been stated that the French masked all their formations, and concealed their grand advance under the galling fire of a numerous body of skirmishers. Before these the light infantry of the British army soon gave

way, and came in upon their supporters with such haste, as to create something like a feeling of dismay among the troops stationed in the rear. Wolfe saw this, and hastened to obviate the evil consequences likely to accrue from it: he rode along the line; encouraged them to stand firm; assured them that the light infantry only obeyed their instructions; and exhorted them not to return a shot till the enemy should have arrived within forty yards of the muzzles of their pieces. The effect of this proceeding was electrical: raising a shout, the men held their ground with muskets shouldered, as if on parade, while the French continued to press onwards, throwing in an incessant but irregular fire, which occasioned a severe loss to the troops opposed to it. But they had no sooner come within forty yards of the British line, than the state of affairs underwent a striking and instantaneous change: a volley passed from right to left, of which the effects were for a moment unnoticed, by reason of the dense smoke which followed the discharge, but which, so soon as the breeze had dispersed this covering, was seen to have taken effect in a degree hardly paralleled in modern warfare. Huge gaps appeared in the enemy's line: the ground in the rear was crowded with persons withdrawing from the combat; and even such as had neither themselves received a wound, nor were employed in conveying their wounded comrades to a place of safety, wavered and stood still, like men irresolute. Wolfe saw how matters were going, and hastened to improve the effect produced: he was in the act of cheering his men to a charge, when a musket ball struck him in the wrist, and hurt him severely; he tied his handkerchief about the wound, and again pressed forward, when a second ball took effect in his belly. Even now he exhibited no symptoms of pain, but continued with the utmost coolness to issue his orders; when a third shot pierced his breast, and he fell to the ground. He was immediately conveyed to the rear, where all the medical assistance that could be procured

hastened to exert its skill in a vain effort to arrest the course of nature.

If the reader has never beheld West's splendid picture of the Death of Wolfe, we advise him not to omit the first opportunity of examining it. He will there see how the hero lay amid a group of officers and attendants, conscious indeed that life was ebbing, yet attentive only to the wavering sound of the battle, as it came back in fits and starts upon the breeze. We have reason to believe, likewise, that though the face of the general, as given by the painter, bears no resemblance whatever to that of Wolfe, the scene, in its general outlines, is very faithfully delineated. Wolfe lay, as he is there represented, occasionally raising his head that he might gaze over the field of strife, till finding his eyesight begin to fail he leaned backwards upon the grenadier who had supported him out of the line of fire. He had rested thus some moments without exhibiting other signs of life besides a heavy breathing, accompanied by an occasional groan, when an officer who stood by exclaimed all at once, "See how they run!" "Who run?" cried Wolfe, raising himself on his elbow, and looking up as if a new lease of animation had been granted him. "The enemy," replied the officer; "they give way in all directions." The general still spoke with firmness:—"Run one of you to colonel Burton," said he, "and tell him to march Webb's regiment down to Charles River with all speed, so as to secure the bridge, and cut off the retreat of the fugitives. Now, God be praised," cried he, after a brief pause, "I shall die happy!" These were the last words which this gallant and high-minded soldier uttered. His strength forsook him, he again fell back, and turning, as if convulsively, on his side, expired.

Thus died, in the 34th year of his age, major-general James Wolfe, an officer whose memory will be revered and cherished so long as high courage, unblemished honour, brilliant talents, and a disinterested love of country, obtain the respect which they deserve from the British army and the British people. The reputation which

he left behind partakes, as we have already said, as much of the romantic as of the real; indeed the peculiar circumstances under which he perished could scarcely fail of exciting in his favour a degree of interest rarely attached even to the most successful generals. But he was not unworthy of the feeling, whether we regard him as a citizen or as a military commander just starting in the race of fame. In private life he is uniformly represented to have been upright, high-minded, generous, humane, and religious; as an officer he was brave, enterprising, indefatigable, vigilant, and above all not wanting in that most rare of all qualities, a moral courage capable of sustaining the weight of personal responsibility. What he might have become had Providence prolonged his days, it is of course impossible to conjecture; it is enough that he had acquired, at a period when men in general scarcely begin to be known, a celebrity which has not often rewarded half a century of toils, and even of eminent services.

We are not going to indulge in any close or captious examination into the military character of an officer who never held a separate command but once, and then held it successfully. It may be that the eye of the unsparing critic might detect a few mistakes in the campaign of the St. Lawrence, — more particularly when reviewing the series of operations which preceded the last decisive movement,—but he who hopes to find, either among military commanders or civilians, so much as one individual with whose professional conduct no fault is to be found, must entertain very erroneous opinions of human nature, with all its excellencies and defects. Be it our part rather to say a few words touching the private bias of the soldier's mind; in which we discover a great deal calculated to excite the esteem of posterity to the full as much as its respect.

We have been favoured, through the kindness of a gentleman * well versed in the local history of Kent, with the perusal of many letters addressed at various

* The Rev. Thomas Streatfield, of Chart's Edge, near Westerham.

times and from divers places by Wolfe to the members of his own family. It is impossible to speak too highly of the noble and affectionate spirit which pervades them; of the proofs which they exhibit, that an ardent and romantic desire of renown was, in the case of the writer, mixed up with the best feelings of a son, a man, and a Christian. We cannot pretend, in a sketch like this, to make numerous extracts from this collection; but the following sentences, taken at random, will perhaps tend, more than any remarks of our own, to throw light upon the private character of the conqueror of Quebec.

On the 13th of August, 1749, Wolfe writes to his mother from Glasgow, partly in general terms, and partly in reply to a letter of advice respecting his attendance on the outward forms of religion: — "I have observed your instructions so religiously, that, rather than want the word, I got the reputation of a very good Presbyterian, by frequenting the kirk of Scotland till our chaplain appeared."—"To-morrow, lord George Sackville goes away, and I take upon me the difficult and troublesome office of a commander. You cannot conceive how hard a thing it is to keep the passions within bounds when authority and immaturity go together, to endeavour at a character that has every opposition from within, and that the very condition of the blood is a sufficient obstacle to. Fancy you see me, that must do justice to both good and bad, reward and punish with an equal unbiassed hand, one that is to reconcile the severity of discipline to the dictates of humanity; one that must study the tempers and dispositions of many men, in order to make their situation easy and agreeable to them, and should endeavour to oblige all without partiality; a man set up for every body to observe and judge of; and, last of all, suppose me employed in discouraging vice and recommending the reverse at the turbulent age of 23, when it is possible I may have as great a propensity that way as any of the men I converse with." Again, in a letter addressed to the same person, which bears date Inverness, November 6. 1751, he says, "This day I am

five-and-twenty years of age."—"There are times when men fret at trifles, and quarrel with their tooth-picks. In one of these ill habits I exclaim against the present condition, and think it the worst of all; but coolly and temperately it is plainly the best. Where there is most employment and least vice, there one should wish to be." It is in this letter that he declares his propensity for the married state; after which he goes on to say, "Lord Bury (the colonel of the regiment) professes fairly and means nothing: in this he resembles his father. He desires never to see the regiment, and wishes that no officer would ever leave it. This is selfish and unjust."

To his father he writes from Exeter, February 18. 1755:—"By my mother's letter I find that your bounty and liberality keep pace, as they usually do, with my necessities. I shall not abuse your kindness, nor receive it unthankfully; and what use I make of it shall be for your honour and the king's service; an employment worthy the hand that gives it."

We have given these extracts as tending to illustrate the affectionate and kindly feeling which Wolfe cherished towards his parents, as well as the sober and just conceptions which he had formed, even in the heyday of youth, as to the duties imposed upon himself by his station. We subjoin the following, for the purpose of proving that the writer's principles were not lightly taken up, and that each successive year served only to strengthen and mature them. He writes from Southampton, 28th of September, 1755, to his mother, "My nature requires some extraordinary events to produce itself. I want that attention and those assiduous cares that commonly go along with good nature and humanity. In the common occurrences of life, I own I am not seen to advantage." Again, from Canterbury, 8th of November, 1755, he says, "I write by the duke's (of Cumberland) order to enquire after an officer's widow in Ireland, who, he was told, had a son fit to serve; and his royal highness, who is for ever doing noble and generous actions, wanted to provide for

that child. The father was killed at Fontenoy."—"If I don't keep a good watch over myself I must be a little vain, for the duke has of late given me such particular marks of his esteem and confidence, that I am ashamed not to deserve it better." This expression is in strict agreement with a remark which he makes elsewhere in his correspondence:—"Such has been the marked and unmerited notice taken of me by the leading military characters of the day, that I feel myself called upon to justify such notice, which, when occasion occurs, will probably be by such exertions and exposures of myself as will lead to my fall."

Such are but a few out of the numerous specimens which lie before us of the style which characterised the correspondence of this distinguished man; and though we may lament that the plan of our work will not permit the insertion of more, we feel that even they suffice to convey a correct picture of a mind, not more aspiring than gentle, nor more brilliant than modest.

Wolfe owed little to nature, as far as the form of his features was concerned, though the general expression of his countenance was good. His hair was red, and he persisted, contrary to the fashion of the times, in wearing it undisguised even by powder; but his blue eye was full of meaning, and his smile peculiarly attractive. His constitution, which from his cradle was delicate, began in latter years wholly to fail him. To the stone he had become a complete martyr, and there were the seeds of other diseases sown, some of which must have doubtless cut short the thread of life, had the bullet of the enemy spared it. Under these circumstances, who can regret that he should have fallen as he did on the battle-field, more especially as there is evidence on record that he began to entertain something like disgust to the service? Of his attachment to Miss Lowther we have already spoken; and to it, perhaps, may be attributed the plan which he seems to have formed of retiring from active employment, so soon as the American expedition should be terminated. But however this may be, it is

impossible not to rejoice that Providence saw fit otherwise to dispose of him. As a domestic man, his fame, no matter how justly earned, would have year by year lost its lustre; by closing his earthly career in the moment of a great and shining victory, he cast a halo round his name such as time will never be able to diminish.

The body of Wolfe, preserved in spirits, was conveyed in a ship of war to Portsmouth, where it was carried on shore amid all the honours which usually attend the debarkation of highly valued clay. Minute guns sent their echoes over the water; the flags floated half-mast high; and a military escort, with arms reversed, received it on the beach, and followed the hearse, which stood ready to carry it elsewhere, beyond the precincts of the fortification. But the respect shown to Wolfe, or rather to services which Wolfe had performed, ended not here. All classes of persons, high and low, rich and poor, mourned for him; while parliament voted that a monument should be raised to his memory in Westminster Abbey. Yet his ashes rest not under the shade of that gorgeous pile. His mother, by this time the sole surviving member of the family, claimed the melancholy satisfaction of committing them to the dust; and they were laid beside those of his father in a vault in the parish church of Greenwich.

We cannot close this memoir without briefly stating, that the prize for which Wolfe had so long struggled, and for which he died, was won. The enemy, totally routed, and deprived of their able leader, Montcalm, who, with his second in command, fell in the action, opened a negotiation with general Townshend on the 18th of September, and surrendered Quebec on terms of honourable capitulation.

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